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THE LIFE OF 
WILLIAM H. SEWARD 



By 
FREDERIC BANCROFT 

II 
WITH PORTRAITS 

IN TWO VOLUMES 
Vol. II. 




NEW YORK AND LONDON 

HARPER & BROTHERS PUBLISHERS 

1900 



0. 



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Copyright, 1899, byH^ PER & Brotbers 

All rights rcstrvcd. 



CONTENTS 



CHAPTER PAGE 

XXV. The Winter op 1860-61 : Seward Preserves 

the National Status 1 

XXVI. Seward's Opinions on the Tariff, Public 
Lands, Internal Improvements, Subsidies, 

Commerce, Etc 46 

XXVII. The Man and the Senator, 1849-61 70 

XXVIII. Signs of the Inadequacy of Seward's Policy of 

Peace and Reconciliation 91 

XXIX. Seward's Struggle for Supremacy 123 

XXX. The Department of State. — Shaping Foreign 

Relations, 1861 150 

XXXI. Two Diplomatic Incidents : Seward and the 
Declaration of Paris ; British and French 
"Negotiations" with the Confederacy . . 187 
XXXII. "King Cotton," The Blockade, and the Eu- 
ropean Inclination to Interfere, 1861 . . . 204 

XXXIII. The Trent Affair 223 

XXXIV. Seward and the Political Prisoners, to Feb- 

ruary, 1882 254 

XXXV. The Question of European Intervention, 

1862-63 281 

XXXVI. Slavery and Foreign Relations 317 

XXXVII. Some Miscellaneous Activities and Trials . . 349 

iii 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAGB 

XXXVIII. The Brink of a Foreign War : Blockade-Run- 
ning and Building Confederate War-ships . 374 

XXXIX. The End of the War 400 

XL. Seward's Attitude Toward French Interven- 
tion in Mexico 419 

XLI. Seward's Part in Reconstruction, 1863-69 . . 443 
XLII. Aspirations for Territorial Expansion : The 
Purchase of Alaska ; Attempts to Annex 
St. Thomas, St. John, Santo Domingo, and 

Hawaii 470 

XLIII. I. Negotiations about the Alabama Claims. — 

II. Some Traits as Secretary of State . . 492 
XLIV. Travels and Sunset, 1869-72. — Some Conclu- 
sions 514 

APPENDIX 531 



THE LIFE OF 

WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD 



THE LIFE OF 
WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD 



CHAPTER XXV 



THE WINTER OF 1860-61: SEWARD PRESERVES THE NATIONAL 

STATUS 

The election of Lincoln caused almost as great an 
outburst of joy in Charleston and New Orleans as it 
did in Boston and New York. The Republicans had 
gained the power to prevent the extension of slavery, 
but they were not more confident of realizing their long- 
cherished aim than the leaders of the cotton states were 
of founding a new confederacy in the near future. 

Party interests had made it necessary for the Repub- 
licans to belittle the threats of secession, and they had 
succeeded so well that they fully deceived even them- 
selves. Seward's past and present opinions illustrated 
this fact. When the jubilant citizens of Auburn crowd- 
ed about him to hear his comments on the election he 
bade them dismiss all thoughts of the future until some 
new election should call them to renew their efforts in 
payment of the price of enduring libert}?". The duty of 
the hour was to show magnanimity and moderation in 
triumph. Then came the idea, borrowed from Jefferson : 
" The parties engaged in an election are not, never can 
be, never must be, enemies, or even adversaries. We are 

II.— A l 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM II. SEWARD 

all fellow-citizens, Americans, brethren." An appeal 
would lie from the people this year by making new ar- 
guments to the people next year. This had been the 
custom of the Republicans in the past. If, contrary to 
that custom, others should attempt to take a more hur- 
ried appeal by marshalling armies and pulling down the 
pillars of the republic, "let us not doubt," he said, " that 
if we commend our way by our patience, our gentle- 
ness, our affection toward them, they, too, will, before 
they shall have gone too far, find out that our way, the 
old way, their old way as well as our old way, is not 
only the shortest but the best." ' 

But the rumors of the secession movements called 
him to Washington before the end of November. There 
he found that the ultra - southern men were bent on 
disunion, not on account of grievances, as he wrote, 
" but from cherished disloyalty and ambition," and that 
the Republicans were " ignorant of the real design or 
danger." For himself, he said : " I begin to see my way 
through, without sacrifice of principle. But I talk very 
little, and nothing in detail." 3 When he found that 
there was no harmony of opinion among the Republi- 
cans, he urged them to adopt a friendly and fraternal 
silence — not the sullen one of the previous year. 3 

As yet the public had only the vaguest suspicions as 
to how Seward intended to deal with the serious prob- 
lem, and these suspicions were derived from rumors and 
from some of Weed's articles in the Evening Journal. 
Shortly after the election Weed declared that he would 
favor the extension of the Missouri - compromise line 
to California, and also an alteration of the fugitive-slave 
law so as to make the counties in which slaves should 
be rescued liable for their value. He felt confident 



1 4 Seward's Works, 115, 116. * 2 Seward, 478. 

3 2 Seward, 479. 

2 



THE WINTER OF 1860-01 

that there was imminent danger of disunion ; that this 
could be averted only by drawing out, strengthening, 
and combining the Union sentiment of the whole coun- 
try, and that the Republicans could afford to be tolerant 
of southern misunderstandings of Republican principles 
and aims. Hence he favored a constitutional convention 
for hearing and correcting the grievances of each section. 1 

In his annual message of 1860 Buchanan maintained 
both that a state had no constitutional right to secede 
and that the Federal government had no constitutional 
power to prevent secession. He overlooked the fact that 
there was not only a constitutional right but a duty to 
forestall an attack upon the property of the nation and 
to forearm against resistance to the collection of the 
revenue. Had he been mindful of this, and acted ac- 
cordingly, it seems likely that he could have prevented 
secession from attaining any substantial existence. Sew- 
ard wittily characterized Buchanan's reasoning by say- 
ing: "It shows conclusively that it is the duty of the 
President to execute the laws — unless somebody op- 
poses him ; and that no state has a right to go out of 
the Union — unless it wants to." 2 

Immediately after the message had been read an an- 
gry discussion about secession and slavery broke forth 
in both chambers. The leaders of the cotton states, 
with " knit brows and portentous scowls," pointed angry 
speeches at their victorious opponents ; they enumer- 
ated violations of the Constitution by the Republicans, 
and gave notice that withdrawal from the Union would 
be their means of redress. Hale replied that he could 
show aggressions on the part of the South that would 
infinitely outweigh and outnumber all that could be 
counted against the North ; that if the alternative were 



1 For the article of November 30, 1860, see 1 Greeley's American 
Conflict, 360. » 2 Seward, 480. 

3 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

the acceptance of secession or the waging of war against 
a revolt to escape the results of a constitutional election, 
his choice would be for the latter. 1 Then Iverson, of 
Georgia, exclaimed : " We will meet ... all the myrmi- 
dons of abolitionism and black Republicanism every- 
where, upon our soil ; and ... we will ' welcome you 
with bloody hands to hospitable graves.'" 2 Unfortu- 
nately the advocates of resistance against secession were 
destined to be in a helpless minority for three months, 
while the secessionists had the advantage of that time 
in which to develop and execute their plans. So the 
southern extremists devoted themselves to arousing 
sentiment in favor of a slave-holding confederacy. On 
the other hand, most of the radical Republicans insisted 
that, as their party had not violated the Constitution, 
they must yield neither to the demands for compromise 
nor to secession, but that all the states must remain in 
the Union and await the effect of the changing opinion 
of the North. 

Although each house soon appointed a special com- 
mittee to consider the best means to allay the excite- 
ment, the breach widened and the strength of disunion 
increased. Many of the Garrisonian abolitionists re- 
joiced in the prospect of realizing their dogma, "No 
union with slave-holders." 3 

With vastly more injurious effect, the New York Tri- 
bune, the most influential of the Republican newspapers, 
had proclaimed, in November, that if several states should 
decide to secede, they should be allowed to depart in 
peace, in deference to the sacred right of revolution. 4 
Nearly all of the Bell-Everett party, and most of the 

1 Globe, 1860-61, 9, 10. - Ibid,, 12. 

3 " Sacrifice anything to keep the slave-holding states in the Union? 
God forbid! We will rather build a bridge of gold and pay their toll 
over it," exclaimed Wendell Phillips in January, 1861.— 1 Speeches, 334. 

4 1 Greeley's American Conflict, 359. 

4 



THE WINTER OF 1860-61 

Democrats, were opposed to enforcing the laws at any 
point where the secessionists threatened resistance. 
And the inhabitants of the southern border states were 
almost unanimous in demanding at least the adoption of 
measures — best expressed in the Crittenden compromise 
— that would make slavery secure where it then existed 
and in every part of the present and future territory of 
the United States south of the Missouri -compromise 
line, and that would remove the obstructions to the re- 
turn of fugitive slaves. With one voice the thousand 
commercial interests of northern cities also called upon 
Congress to avoid war by making some such concession 
to the South. 

The rarest opportunity for immortal fame ever offered 
to a President was at this time thrust upon Buchanan. 
Had he spoken and acted promptly and boldly in de- 
fence of Federal property, the whole North and a 
large proportion of the people in North Carolina, Tenn- 
essee, and the southern border states would have sup- 
ported him. Then Lincoln's administration would have 
fallen heir to the policy of national self-defence. But 
Buchanan's arm was nerveless and his reason weak. 
Habitual servility to the southern leaders made him un- 
willing to oppose his old political friends even when 
he knew that they were plotting treason. Although he 
was sincerely in favor of preserving the Union, it would 
have been difficult for the secessionists to find a more 
serviceable President. As John Sherman sarcastically 
wrote at the time: "The Constitution provided against 
every probable vacancy in the office of President ; but 
did not provide for utter imbecility." ' 

Appearances soon indicated that the President's inde- 
cision and the anger of the coercionists would render 
haste on the part of the secessionists both urgent and 

1 The Sherman Letters, 95. 
5 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

easy. If the Union was to be maintained, it must be 
done under Republican leadership. Yet the members 
of the other parties felt so confident that there was an 
ulterior purpose to make unconstitutional inroads upon 
slavery that they were unwilling to support the Re- 
publicans. Even the victors themselves saw that they 
might precipitate hostilities without having the strength 
necessary for successful resistance. The possibility that 
vigorous measures might result in a civil war caused 
many even of their own partisans to look with favor 
upon some of the propositions for compromise. Hence 
there was danger that Lincoln might come into pow- 
er with the strength of his party much reduced since 
November, confronted with an organized confederacy 
of several states, and with an opposition at home that 
would make any attempt to conquer secession futile, if 
not foolhardy. 

Before Congress had time to consider any compro- 
mises, the leading secessionists issued an appeal urging 
every slave-holding state to " seek speedy and absolute 
separation from the unnatural and hostile Union." 1 
This fanned the cotton -state fires into a blaze. On 
December 20, 1860, South Carolina passed an ordinance 
of secession. Then she sent commissioners to Wash- 
ington to seek recognition of her independence, and 
despatched agents to urge other states hurriedly to 
withdraw from the Union and to choose delegates to a 
southern congress. The business interests of the North 
were greatly affected. No one could anticipate events 
for more than a few hours. Yet secession was still in a 
theoretical stage ; no violence had been used against the 
Federal government, although it had been threatened. 
Buchanan had not positively announced what his posi- 
tion would be in that event. Naturally, Lincoln had not 



1 McPherson's Political History of lite Rebellion, 87. 
6 



THE WINTER OF 1860-61 

yet shaped a definite policy, and did not wish to be held 
responsible for one before his time. 

Seward's past no less than his present position in his 
party gave him special responsibilities and opportunities 
in such a crisis. Every one regarded him as the fore- 
most Republican. At times he had talked like a radical, 
but he had always acted upon the maxim that the high- 
est statesmanship consists in getting the best results from 
actual conditions. No one on his side of the Senate, 
and perhaps no one in either house, had such pleasant 
personal relations Avith the other members of Congress. 
It was assumed as a matter of course that he would be 
the controlling influence in the coming administration. 
His pre-eminence, together with his immovable calmness 
when others were excited, caused the country to suppose 
that he had a solution for the difficulties, and that his 
actions would be indicative of Lincoln's present opinions 
and future policy. But for weeks he carefully refrained 
from expressing his opinions publicly; privately he wrote 
such sentences as these : 

December 7 : "The madcaps of the South want to be 
inflamed, so as to make their secession irretrievable. Good 
men there want moderation on the part of the government, 
so that they may in time produce a counter-movement." 
December 8: "I am, thus far, silent, not because I am 
thinking of proposing compromises, but because I wish to 
avoid, myself, and restrain other Republicans, from inter- 
meddling, just now — when concession, or solicitation, or 
solicitude would encourage, and demonstrations of firm- 
ness of purpose would exasperate." 

In the middle of December he went North intending 
to spend the holidays at home. He had declined an 
invitation to attend the annual dinner of the New Eng- 
land Society in New York, December 22d. But sena- 
torial duties made it urgent for him to be in Washington 
Monday, December 24th. Leaving Auburn Saturday 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

morning, the 22d, lie arrived late that evening at the 
Astor House, where the members of the New England 
Society were still at table. As soon as his presence in 
the hotel became known, a special committee was sent 
to fetch him. He went reluctantly, and was received 
with such enthusiasm that he was compelled to speak. 
With humor in perfect harmony with the circumstances 
of his impressment and the mood of the banqueters 
over their liqueurs and cigars, he began by saying that 
he had heard they were all Yankees, and he inferred 
that they would, therefore, want to know all about the 
status. In colloquial phrases, with a pun or two, and 
with amusing repartee at their interjected questions, he 
made several diverting references to some of those pres- 
ent, and to a few matters in state and national politics. 1 
He believed that the old centripetal force of common 
interest, which had drawn the states into a confedera- 
tion and which the fathers had concisely expressed in 
E jplurihus unum, still existed. Therefore, secession 
must be a passion, a delusion, a "humbug" even, which 
could not withstand a calm debate. 

"We all know that [that New York would go to the 
defence of Charleston in case of her being attacked by a 
foreign nation]; everybody knows that: therefore they do 
not humbug me with their secession. I do not believe 
they will humbug you, and I do not believe that if they do 
not humbug you or me that they will succeed very long 
in humbugging themselves." 

Here was his first hint of a dangerous illusion, as will 
be seen later. He concluded with an expression of his 
opinion that the agitation for secession had steadily de- 
clined in strength since the day of the election, and 

1 1 Moore's Rebellion Record, Documents, pp. 4-7, nnd N. Y. Times of 
December 24th, give verbatim reports of the speech, indicating the 
applause and interruptions. The speech printed in 4 Works, 644-50, 
omits much and is a careful revision. 



THE WINTER OF 1860-61 

that " sixty days' more suns will give you a much bright- 
er and more cheerful atmosphere." ' 

At the time many were shocked by Seward's levity, 
and he has been severely criticised since because he was 
jovial, evasive, and over-optimistic, rather than serious, 
frank, and precise. While the censure is not altogether 
unjust, it at least overlooks two most important facts : 
that it was still too soon for the Republican leaders to 
have shaped a definite policy; and that, in any case, 
this occasion would have been a most unfit one on 
which to explain it. It was necessary for Seward to 
speak in order to prevent damaging inferences ; he had 
spoken without creating excitement or committing him- 
self or his party to any plans for the future. His opin- 
ions were soothing and tentative, and the extraordinary 
applause with which they were received was good evi- 
dence that they were opportune. Two days later he 
partially explained his optimism by saying : " Stocks 
were up and commercial skies were brightening. The 
apprehension of disunion had, for that reason, visibly 
abated." * 

On December 24th he met his colleagues of the " Union 
Saving Committee of Thirteen." With the unanimous 
consent of the members from his section, he offered three 
propositions : First, that the Constitution should never 
be altered so as to authorize Congress to abolish or in- 
terfere with slavery in the states ; second, that the 
fugitive-slave law should be amended so as to grant a 
jury-trial to the fugitive ; third, that Congress should re- 
quest all the states to revise their legislation concerning 
persons recently resident in other states, and to repeal 
all laws that contravened the Constitution of the United 
States or any law of Congress made in pursuance there- 

1 1 Moore's Rebellion Record, Documents, p. 7. This prophecy was 
left out of his Works. 2 2 Seward, 483. 

9 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

of. Later he offered a fourth proposition : that Congress 
should pass a law to punish invasions of one state from 
another, and conspiracies to effect such invasions. 1 Of 
the other propositions Seward wrote to Lincoln : " With 
the unanimous consent of our section [of the committee 
— Seward, Collamer, Doolittle, Grimes, and Wade], I 
offered three propositions which seemed to me to cover 
the ground of the suggestion made by you, through Mr. 
Weed, as I understand it.'' 3 Hence there was nothing 
peculiar about Seward's position as indicated at this time. 

1 2 Seward, 484 ; Senate Reports, 2d Sess. 36th Con., No. 288, pp. 
10, 11, 13. 

3 2 Seward, 484. Heretofore it has been supposed that Lincoln's 
memorandum, " prepared for the consideration of the Republican 
members" of the Senate committee of thirteen had been lost, and his 
biographers seem never to have known its precise wording. A sepa- 
rate sheet in the Seward MSS. contains these sentences (and nothing 
else) in Lincoln's handwriting: 
" Resolved: 

" That the fugitive slave clause of the Constitution ought to be en- 
forced by a law of Congress, with efficient provisions for that object, 
not obliging private persons to assist in its execution, but punishing all 
who resist it, and with the usual safeguards to libert} r , securing free 
men against being surrendered as slaves — 

" That all state laws, if there he such, really, or apparently, in con- 
flict with such law of Congress, ought to be repealed ; and no oppo- 
sition to the execution of such law of Congress ought to be made — 

" That the Federal Union must be preserved." 

That this is the original "suggestion " is indicated by the following 
sentences from Seward's letter already referred to: "This evening, 
the Republican members of the committee, with Judge Trumbull 
and Mr. Fessenden, met at my house, to consider your written sug- 
gestion, and determine whether it shall be offered. While we think 
the ground has been already covered, we find that, in the form you 
give it, it would divide our friends, not only in the committee, but in 
Congress, a portion being unwilling to give up their old opinion, that 
the duty of executing the constitutional provisions, concerning fugi- 
tives from service, belongs to the states, and not at all to Congress." — 
2 Seward, 484. The first of Seward's formal propositions, made about 
a fortnight later, as a means of preserving peace gave the gist of Lin- 
coln's first point. See post, p. 14. 

10 



THE WINTER OF 1860-61 

During the holidays the excitement in "Washington 
greatly increased. The President's communications with 
the commissioners from South Carolina precipitated an 
angry outbreak between the two factions in the Cab- 
inet. It was rumored, and widely believed, that the city 
was to be seized by the secessionists. Seward's intimate 
relations with loyal Democrats in the Cabinet, in the 
Senate, and in the South, enabled him to keep himself 
informed of all that was occurring, and he made long 
reports to Lincoln. So rapidly did the secession frenzy 
seem to have spread that on the last day of December 
he thought the country to be in an " emergency of 
probable civil war and dissolution of the Union." * By 
January 3, 1S61, the secessionists had gained such 
strength at the White House and in some of the depart- 
ments that Seward considered it necessary, as he wrote, 
to "assume a sort of dictatorship for defence," and to 
work night and day against the contemplated revolution. 
And he added : " My hope, rather my confidence, is un- 
abated." 2 

The question of separation was hotly discussed in all 
the slave states, and it was everywhere alleged that the 
Republicans intended to put their antislavery ideas into 
practice after the inauguration. However, in North Caro- 
lina, Arkansas, Tennessee, and the border states, the ma- 
jority deprecated the dissolution of the Union. Fortu- 
nately, Virginia believed that both slavery and state rights 
could be preserved within the Union. The very fact that 
the leaders of the cotton states were riding with whip and 
spur aroused a considerable feeling of opposition. 3 But 

1 2 Seward, 489. 5 2 Seward, 491. 

s Early in January, 1861, Governor Letcher sent a message to the 
extra session of the Virginia legislature, in which he indignantly pro- 
tested against the efforts that South Carolina and Mississippi were 
making to compel the border slave states to join the secession move- 
ment by threatening to cut off the market for their slaves. He would, 

11 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

unless this opposition should be encouraged, it was sure 
to disappear ; for there was a wide-spread and genuine 
fear, which in most instances amounted to a convic- 
tion, that Republican rule would inevitably undermine 
slavery, and, therefore, that its safety demanded a slave- 
holding confederacy. • 

For the Republicans there was but one of two courses 
to pursue. Charles Sumner saw the difficulty as plainly 
as Seward, and stated the problem a few days later by 
writing : " People are anxious to save our forts . . . ; 
but I am more anxious far to save our principles. . . ." 1 
Talking of force and of saving principles served a good 
purpose in keeping up the flagging spirit of many per- 
sons at the North, but it also helped to fuse, rather than 
to separate, the different elements at the South. 

During the debates in Congress it was the Southern- 
ers that had kindled enthusiasm and applause. The 
angry logic of the Northerners was no match for the 
picturesque and defiant declamation of their opponents. 
By January 11th, Mississippi, Florida, and Alabama had 
followed South Carolina's example. Time and the dis- 
cussion of constitutional grievances had deepened south- 
ern convictions and exhibited the helplessness of the 
Republicans. It was announced that Seward would 
speak on January 12th. This aroused intense curiosity, 
because there were such conflicting rumors about his 
plans. Accordingly, on the day of his speech the au- 
dience was larger than had ever before assembled in 
the Senate-chamber. 2 

Seward declared his purpose to be to seek a truce from 

he said, resist southern coercion as readily as northern. — Richmond 
Serai-Weekly Enquirer, January 8, 1861. 

1 4 Pierce, 17. Before the end of January, he thought it not unlikely 
that all the slave states, except possibly Maryland (and Delaware, 
doubtless) would be out of the Union very soon. — Ibid., 16. 

2 N. Y. Tribune, January 14, 1861; 2 Seward, 493, 494.: 

12 



PRESERVING THE NATIONAL STATUS 

dogmatic battles, and to appeal to the country — to the 
seceding South no less than to the acceding North — on 
the question of union. Lest his mildness might be in- 
terpreted to mean acquiescence in secession, he said : " I 
. . . avow my adherence to the Union in its integrity 
and with all its parts, with my friends, with my party, 
Avith my state, with my country, or without either, as 
they may determine ; in every event, whether of peace 
or of war ; with every consequence of honor or dishonor, 
of life or death." 1 The only way to dissolve the Union, 
he maintained, was by constitutional amendment ; but 
Congress should, if it could, redress any real grievances, 
and then supply the President with all the means neces- 
sary to defend the Union. 

For thirty }^ears Seward had believed and frequent- 
ly declared that the Union was natural and necessary, 
as well as politically and economically expedient. Our 
people were homogeneous and our government benef- 
icent. Disunion would bring us humiliation abroad and 
war and ruin at home. It would endanger rather than 
preserve slavery ; for it would forfeit all but a small 
fraction of the territory of the United States, and re- 
move every constitutional barrier against a direct attack 
upon slavery. Dissolution would not only arrest but it 
would extinguish the greatness of our country ; it would 
drop the curtain before all our national heroes; public 
prosperity would give place to retrogression, for stand- 
ing armies would consume our substance ; and our liberty, 
now as wide as our grand territorial dimensions, would 
be succeeded by the hateful and intolerable espionage of 
military despotism. The issue, then, was really between 
those who cherished the Union and those who desired 
its dissolution by force." 

1 4 Works, 651. 

2 This is the merest outline of several grand passages. — 4 Works, 
654-65. 

13 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

It was as much Seward's duty to avoid saying any- 
thing; that could be turned to the advantage of secession 
as to urge considerations that would directly strengthen 
national sentiment. Jefferson Davis had said, two days 
before, that if the doctrine of coercion were accepted as 
the theory of the government, its only effect would be to 
precipitate men of his opinion into an assertion of their 
ideas. 1 Seward now averred that there was no political 
good that he would seek by revolutionary action. Then, 
in sentences that were designed to soothe the South, he 
announced : 

"If others shall invoke that form of action to oppose and 
overthrow government, they shall not, so far as it depends 
on me, have the excuse that I obstinately left myself to be 
misunderstood. In such a easel can afford to meet preju- 
dice with conciliation, exaction with concession which sur- 
renders no principle, and violence with the right hand of 
peace. " 

As evidence of what he was willing to do for the sake 
of peace and harmony, he formulated his views under 
five heads : 

First, he acknowledged the full force of the fugitive- 
slave clause of the Constitution, but thought that the 
special provisions for its execution should be so modified 
as not to endanger the liberty of free blacks, or to com- 
pel private citizens to assist in the capture of slaves. 
He also favored the repeal both of the personal-liberty 
laws of the free states and of the laws of the slave 
states that contravened the Constitution by restricting 
the liberties of citizens from the other states. 

Second, slavery in the states was free from congres- 
sional control, and he was willing to make it so perma- 
nently by constitutional amendment. 

Third, after the admission of Kansas as a free state, 



Globe, 1860-61, 310. 
14 



PRESERVING THE NATIONAL STATUS 

he would consent to the consolidation of all the territo- 
ries into two states, and admit them without restriction 
as to slavery, if the right to make subdivisions into sev- 
eral convenient states could be reserved. But he thought 
that the Constitution did not permit such reservation. 
If it were feasible, he would prefer to have the present 
difficulties settled in a regular constitutional convention, 
a when the eccentric movements of secession and dis- 
union shall have ended, in whatever form that end may 
come, and the angry excitement of the hour shall have 
subsided, . . . then, and not till then — one, two, three 
years hence." 

Fourth, he would favor laws to prevent invasion of 
any state by citizens of any other state. 

Fifth, since he regarded physical bonds — such as high- 
ways, railroads, rivers, and canals — as vastly more power- 
ful than any covenants, he would support measures for 
a northern and for a southern railroad to the Pacific. 

In general explanation he added : 

" If, in the expression of these views, I have not proposed 
what is expected or desired by others, they Avill do me the 
justice to believe that I am so far from having suggested 
what, in many respects, would have been in harmony with 
cherished convictions of my own. I learned from Jefferson 
that, in political affairs, we cannot always do what seems to 
us absolutely best. . . . We must be content to lead when 
we can, and to follow when we cannot lead ; and if we can- 
not, at any time, do for our country all the good that we 
would wish, we must be satisfied with doing for her all the 
good that we can." 

The concluding sentences of this speech -were a fitting 
climax to his appeal for forbearance and union : 

"Soon enough, I trust, for safety, it will be seen that 
sedition and violence are only local and temporary, and 
that loyalty and affection to the Union are the natural 
sentiments of the whole country. Whatever dangers there 
shall be, there will be the determination to meet them ; 

15 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

whatever sacrifices, private or public, shall be needful for 
the Union, they will be made. I feel sure that the hour 
has not come for this great nation to fall. . . . This Union 
has not yet accomplished what good for mankind was 
manifestly designed by Him who appoints the seasons and 
prescribes the duties of states and empires. N ; if it were 
cast down by faction to-day, it Avould rise again and re- 
appear in all its majestic proportions to-morrow. It is the 
only government that can stand here. Woe ! woe ! to the 
man that madly lifts his hand against it. It shall continue 
and endure; and men, in after times, shall declare that this 
generation, which saved the Union from such sudden and 
unlooked-for dangers, surpassed in magnanimity even that 
one which laid its foundations in the eternal principles of 
liberty, justice, and humanity." 

Seward's patriotic eloquence was so impressive that 
more than one Senator was seen to express his sympathy 
in tears. 1 If the plan was inadequate it was because 
human ingenuity was inadequate to the task. Consid- 
ering the actual conditions and what was most urgent 
at that time, there is reason to believe that this was as 
wise, as patriotic, and as important a speech as has ever 
been delivered within the walls of the Capitol. If Sew- 
ard had spoken as most of the Republicans had done, or 
if he had gone no farther than Lincoln had even con- 
fidentially expressed a willingness to go, by March 4th 
there would have been no Union that any one could 
have summoned sufficient force to save or to re-es- 
tablish. To Seward, almost alone, belongs the credit of 
devising a modus vivendi. But the country was too 
excited to estimate justly the value of such a speech.* 



1 2 Seward, 494 ; 4 Works, 118. 

* Seward wrote home on January 13th : " Distraction rules the 
hour. I hope what I have done will bring some good fruits, and, in 
any case, clear my own conscience of responsibility, if, indeed, I am to 
engage in conducting a war against a portion of the American people." 
—2 Seward, 496. And again the next day: "The city is bewildered 
by the speech. But things look better." — Ibid. 

16 



PRESERVING THE NATIONAL STATUS 

Nearly every one demanded a comprehensive declara- 
tion either for compromise and peace or for coercion 
and war. The zeal of the abolitionists and of the se- 
cessionists had bred a fanaticism that made the impor- 
tance of preserving the Union seem small indeed. While 
Garrison attacked Seward, he called upon the North to 
" recognize the fact that the Union is dissolved." ' Sum- 
ner and Chase had protested in advance against Seward's 
sentiments, and they deplored them afterwards. 2 So 
general was the disapprobation of the Republican Rep- 
resentatives that it was feared they would call a caucus 
to pass resolutions in disapproval of Seward's ideas. 3 
Even Mrs. Seward objected to what she called his " con- 
cessions." 4 Many persons understood the conciliatory 
tone to be equivalent to a promise to make a concession 
of principle." On the other hand, Lincoln wrote: " Your 
recent speech is well received here, and, I think, is do- 
ing good all over the country." ° Ray Palmer praised it 
in the highest terms, and pronounced it worthy of " the 
distinguished men of the best days of the republic." 7 
George William Curtis Avrote to a friend: " I hope you 
like Seward's speech as I do. I see by the New York 
papers that people are beginning to see how great a 
speech it is. Webster had his 7th of March, and went 
wrong; Seward his, and went right." 8 

On January 31st Seward presented a petition signed 
by many thousand citizens of New York, praying for a 
peaceable adjustment of the national difficulties. He 
told the Senate that he had asked the committee that had 

1 " And if nothing but the possession of the capital will appease 
you, take even that, without a struggle!" — 4 Garrison, 15. 
5 4 Pierce's Sumner, 9, 17, 22; Schuckers's Chase, 202. 

3 Grimes to Seward, January 12, 1861. Seward MSS. 

4 2 Seward, 496. 

5 John M. Williams to Seward, January 16, 1861. Seward MSS. 

6 January 19, 1861. Seward MSS. 

' January 15, 1861. Seward MSS. 8 Cary's Curtis, 141. 

II.— b 17 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

brought the memorial to him to manifest, on their re- 
turn home, their devotion to the Union, above all other 
interests and sentiments, by speaking for it, by voting 
for it, by lending it money, if it needed it, and, in the 
last resort, by fighting for it.' Again he expressed his 
hope and confidence that the Union would still be pre- 
served. One reason for this was his belief that the 
great question of the past — slavery in the territories — 
had been practically settled, and that, too, in the in- 
terest of freedom. In opposition to what freedom had 
gained by the admission of the free states of California, 
Minnesota, Oregon, and Kansas, slavery could count but 
twentv-four slaves in all the remaining territories, which 
were about twenty-four times the size of New York. 
There was no further danger from slavery, and the 
question of union or dissolution might well be given 
precedence. At the conclusion of this speech, Mason 
sprang to his feet and made a persistent effort to mis- 
represent what had been said by Seward, whom he 
called "the exponent of the new administration." "Let 
the facts be what they may, he presents but one remedy — 
the argument of the tyrant — force, compulsion, power"; 
and the Virginian hoped by reiterating the idea to ex- 
cite the people of his section into immediate action. 3 
In his most placid manner, Seward expressed surprise 
that his peaceful, fraternal, and cordial remarks could be 
construed into a declaration of war. He had consider- 
ed eveiy proposition, he said ; offered up his own prej- 
udices ; made concessions and recommended New York 
to take part in the peace conference, in the hope of 
effecting an arrangement ; and if all should fail, he ex- 
pected that the controversy would be taken up and set- 
tled in a constitutional convention. In comparison with 
the question of union, the controversy about twenty -four 
slaves was " frivolous and contemptible." 

1 4 Works, 671. 2 Globe, 1860-61, 659. 

18 



PRESEEVING THE NATIONAL STATUS 

What good came of Seward's declarations in favor of 
conciliation, enigmatical and self-contradictory as some 
of them were ? " Before I spoke," he wrote to Weed, 
January 21st, " not one utterance made for the Union 
elicited a response in either house, while every assault 
brought down full galleries. Since I spoke there have 
not been four hundred persons in the galleries any day, 
and every word for the Union brings forth a cheering 
response." ' This was an exaggeration, 1 but the Globe 
shows that applause of unionist sentiment was much 
more frequent after his speech than before it. Hun- 
dreds of thousands of northern Democrats soon began 
to realize that they and the conservative Republicans 
had a common cause. Seward renewed intimate rela- 
tions with many of his old southern Whig associates 
and obtained important information. Within a week 
from the first speech, Virginia — although both of her 
Senators were determined secessionists — invited all the 
states to join her in a peace conference in Washington, 
February 4th. North Carolina, Tennessee, and every 
border state welcomed the proposal. This of itself was 
a practical guaranty against revolutionary movements 
in these states and at the national capital pending the 
conference. On February 2d, Kentucky requested the 
southern states to stop the revolution, protested against 
Federal coercion, proposed a national convention to 
amend the Constitution, and declined to call a state 
convention to consider secession. 3 On February 4th 
Virginia chose delegates to a state convention. Only 
a small number of immediate secessionists were success- 
ful. 4 On the 8th, Tennessee decided against a state 

1 2 Seward, 497. 

2 Wade caused " applause in galleries," December 17, 1860 {Globe, 
104), by a strong Union speech. The Globe records no applause in 
connection with Seward's speech of January 12th. 

8 McPherson, 8. 

4 Colonel Ritchie, who was sent by Governor Andrew on an impor- 

19 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

convention hy a popular majority of over thirteen thou- 
sand. 1 Later in the month, North Carolina rejected a 
proposition for a convention. 2 The southern border 
states became calmer, and hoped for the Union. Sew- 
ard's attitude greatly helped to bring about these results. 
Seward's public declarations and senatorial duties 
represent but a small part of his activity. Since De- 
cember he had been in confidential relations with At- 
torney-General Stanton and General Scott, 3 who united 
to counteract the influences of Floyd, Davis, Cobb, 
Thompson, Slidell, and several South Carolinians, who 
were alternately wheedling and frightening Buchanan. 
From Stanton he received secret advice daily as to what 
was going on in the Cabinet.* Late in January rumors 
of an attempt to seize the capital were again rife. 
Seward drafted a resolution, which Galusha A. Grow 
introduced in the House, directing a committee to in- 
vestigate whether there was any secret organization in 
the District hostile to the Government, and to report if 
any officials or employees of the executive or judicial 
departments were members of it. & By the middle of 
January the financial credit of the United States had 
sunk very low. The new Secretary of the Treasury, 

tant mission, reported, February 6, 1861: "He (Sumner) is convinced 
that the conspirators counted upon a different result in Virginia ; that, 
by the 18th, the Virginia convention would have pronounced for 
secession ; and that they were, therefore, safe in calling the Maryland 
convention for that day, being sure that in that event Maryland would 
follow suit. If the result of the Virginia election had been in favor 
of the secessionists, the attack on the capital might have been carried 
out without waiting for the formal action of the Virginia conven- 
tion." — 1 Schouler's Massaclmsclts in tlie Civil War, 36. 

1 McPherson, 5. " Ibid. 3 2 Seward, 493, 507. 

4 2 Seward, 492 ; 26 Atlantic Monthly, 464, 465 ; ex- Senator Dawes' 
recollections, in 72 Atlantic Monthly, 163. 

5 For the resolution, see Globe, 1860-61, 572. Mr. Grow told the 
writer in 1S94 that the object of offering the resolution w r as to convince 
plotters that their movements were well known. 

20 



PRESERVING THE NATIONAL STATUS 

John A. Dix, brought forward a proposition that the 
different states should guarantee the bonds of the na- 
tional government to the extent of the surplus revenue 
that was deposited with them in 1837. Seward became 
so zealous to obtain the support of the New York legis- 
lature for this project that he sent a special messenger 
to Alban} r .' Lincoln and many others had felt much 
concern lest on February 13th, the day for counting the 
electoral votes, a revolt might be started, beginning with 
Congress. But before that date the investigation of the 
committee of the House, the collection of troops in "Wash- 
ington by General Scott, and the daily meetings of the 
peace conference all stood in the way of the success of 
such a plan, if, indeed, it had ever been formally adopt- 
ed. Seward knew that as long as the peace conference 
could be kept in session all the states represented in it 
could be held in the Union. When one of the Republi- 
can delegates made a vigorous and warning speech in 
reply to the southern demands for constitutional guaran- 
ties, it looked as if the convention might speedily dis- 
solve in anger and excitement. 2 Seward sent for the 
Republican delegate and read to him a long editorial from 
an ardent secession newspaper in Richmond, warning its 
friends that Seward was merely temporizing with the 
South so as to get the new administration firmly set- 
tled in power. Seward's tones and the general char- 
acter of his non-committal remarks convinced the caller 
that the article explained his aim, and that, therefore, 
it was important for the Republicans to avoid arousing 
the Southerners.' 



1 2 Weed, 319. He also asked Governor Andrew to urge the Mas- 
sachusetts legislature to guarantee the bonds. — 1 Schouler's Massa- 
chusetts in the Civil War, 37. 

2 Chittenden's Conference Contention, 105. 

3 Experience and recollections of George S. Boutwell, recounted to 
the writer in 1894. 

21 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

Seward's efforts were untiring, and reached out in 
other directions. At a dinner given to the French Min- 
ister by Senator Douglas, Seward proposed this toast, 
asking the company to fill their glasses to the brim and 
to drain them to the bottom: "Away with all parties, 
all platforms of previous committals, and whatever else 
will stand in the way of the restoration of the Ameri- 
can Union!" 1 Seward and Stanton started a patriotic 
movement that caused the national flag to be displayed 
throughout the North on Washington's birthday, 1861. 2 
On February 13th the Virginia convention assembled. 
The unionism of a large majority of its members mere- 
ly meant that they would oppose secession as long as 
there was reason to expect that the Republicans would 
not use force against any southern state and t-hat a com- 
promise would be made giving security to slave prop- 
erty. Seward's supremacy was the hope of all these 
men, for he had convinced them that he had a plan that 
would prevent the immediate secessionists from control- 
ling. Letters from prominent Virginia politicians and 
from his special agents kept him informed of the trend 
of opinion in the state convention at Richmond. 3 It is 
striking evidence of the caution of Seward's manage- 
ment that he seems neither to have written to the cor- 
respondents nor to have told them his precise purposes. 
Yet he retained their confidence after the peace confer- 
ence proved to be a failure and the two leading Virginia 
delegates, ex-President Tyler and James A. Seddon, re- 
turned home and tried to hurry their state into secession. 



1 MS. recollections of J. A. Campbell, then one of the Justices of 
the Supreme Court. 

8 Seward to William Schouler, June 13, 1867, 1 Scbouler's Massa- 
chusetts in the Civil War, 41; 2 Seward, 491 

3 These statements are based on many letters in the Seward 
MSS. For some of the most important of these letters, see Ap- 
pendix. 

22 

\ 



PRESERVING THE NATIONAL STATUS 

Lincoln had not yet expressed his opinions as to the 
best way to deal with the seven states already practically 
in the Confederacy. But about two points he had left 
no room for doubt : that he would neither consent to a 
compromise guaranteeing new territory to slavery, nor 
agree to peaceable secession. He was not disposed to 
3'ield to southern demands; yet on several occasions he 
indicated that he would assent to any plan that would 
preserve peace and the Union without strengthening 
slavery. 1 Shortly after arriving in "Washington, Febru- 
ary 23d, Lincoln submitted to Seward for criticism a 
copy of his prospective inaugural address. In it he had 
planted himself firmly upon the Republican platform. 2 
In several places sentences were lacking in tact, and oc- 
casional phrases had a flavor of dogmatism or severity, 
considering the times. It concluded with the suggestive 
sentence, "With you, and not with me, is the solemn 
question of ' Shall it be peace or a sword V " It was all 
intended in a kindly spirit, and some passages were 
generous and touching, but other parts would have more 
than counteracted them. 

Seward went through the entire address, making a 
sentence here and there less positive, rounding many of 
the phrases, and softening some of the adjectives. He 
counseled the omission of a few careless and useless 
sentences ; and where Lincoln had written, " A disrup- 
tion of the Federal Union is menaced, and, so far as can 
be on paper, is already effected," Seward changed the 
last part into "heretofore only menaced, is now formid- 
ably attempted." He suggested that, in lieu of the con- 
clusion quoted, the address should end with " some words 

1 2 Weed, 311 ; 1 Lincoln's Works, 657, 658, 661,662, 669; Schuckers's 
Chase, 202 ; 2 Seward, 484, 485. 

2 3 Nicolay and Hay's Lincoln, 327-44, gives Seward's suggestions, 
the wording of the original draft, and the inaugural address as de- 
livered. 

23 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

of affection, some of calm and cheerful confidence," and 
wrote the striking paragraph about " our bonds of affec- 
tion" and "the n^stic chords," which, only slightly 
changed, became one of Lincoln's most impressive pas- 
sages. 

The letter that Seward sent when he returned the 
draft is too important to be abbreviated. 



"Sunday Evening, February 24th. 

" My dear Sir, — I have suggested many changes, of lit- 
tle importance, severally, but, in their general effect, tend- 
ing to soothe the public mind. 

" Of course the concessions are, as they ought to be, if 
they are to be of avail, at the cost of the winning, the tri- 
umphant party. I do not fear their displeasure. They 
Avill be loyal, whatever is said. Not so the defeated, irri- 
tated, angei-ed, frenzied party. I, my dear sir, have devoted 
myself singly to the study of the case here — with advantages 
of access and free communication with all parties of all sec- 
tions. I have a common responsibility and interest with 
you, and I shall adhere to you faithfully in every case. 
You must, therefore, allow me to speak frankly and candid- 
l} r . In this spirit I declare to you that my convictions 
that the second and third paragraphs, even if modified as I 
propose in my amendments, will give such advantage to 
the disunionists that Virginia and Maryland will secede ; 
and we shall within ninety, perhaps within sixty days, 
be obliged to fight the South for this capital, with a di- 
vided North for our reliance ; and we shall not have one 
loyal magistrate or ministerial officer south of the Poto- 
mac. 

" In that case the dismemberment of the Republic would 
date from the inauguration of a Republican administra- 
tion. I, therefore, most respectfully counsel the omission 
of those paragraphs. I know the tenacity of party friends, 
and I honor and respect it. But I know also that they 
know nothing of the real peril of the crisis. It has not 
been their duty to study it, as it has been mine. Only the 
soothing words which I have spoken have saved us and 
carried us along thus far. Every loyal man, and, indeed, 
every disloyal man in the South, will tell you this. 

" Your case is quite like that of Jefferson. He brought 

24 



PRESERVING THE NATIONAL STATUS 

the first Republican party into power against and over a 
party ready to resist and dismember the government. 
Partisan as he was, he sank the partisan in the patriot, in 
his inaugural address ; and propitiated his adversaries by 
declaring, 'We are all Federalists; all Republicans.' I 
could wish that you would think it wise to follow this ex- 
ample, in this crisis. Be sure that while all your adminis- 
trative conduct will be in harmony with Republican princi- 
ples and policy, you cannot lose the Republican party by 
practising, in your advent to office, the magnanimity of a 
victor. 

"Very faithfully your friend, 

"William H. Sevvakd. 

"GENERAL REMARKS 

" The argument is strong and conclusive, and ought not 
to be in any way abridged or modified. 

" But something besides, or in addition to, argument is 
needful to meet and remove prejudice and passion in the 
South and despondency and fear in the East : some words 
of affection; some of calm and cheerful confidence/' 1 

Nor was this the limit of Seward's soothing influence. 
He was especially anxious that Jefferson Davis, the 
President of the Confederacy — the formation of which 
practically began at Montgomery, February 4th — should 
believe that Lincoln would favor reconciliation and 
peace. Seward knew that if Davis considered war to be 
inevitable, he would prepare the Confederacy for it, 
and thereby make the problem more difficult. Senator 
Gwin, of California, had been bred in the school of Cal- 
houn, and continued to be the trusted friend and adviser 
of Davis. Seward and Gwin had been intimately asso- 
ciated as advocates of a railroad to the Pacific. Seward 
now persuaded Gwin to write to Davis saying that if 
Seward should go into Lincoln's Cabinet, he would be a 
firm advocate of the amicable settlement of every ques- 

1 2 Seward, 512, 513. 
25 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

tion between the sections.' Shortly before the inaugu- 
ration it became known that Chase was to go into Lin- 
coln's Cabinet. In order to relieve himself from further 
responsibility, Gwin prepared a despatch to Jefferson 
Davis saying that this was understood to indicate a 
change to a war policy. When Ward showed the pros- 
pective despatch to Seward, he altered it so that Davis 
was advised that, in spite of Chase's appointment, the 
administration would be for peace.* 

After watching a public man's words and acts con- 
cerning a question for several w r eeks or months, there 
would ordinarily be no doubt as to his opinions regarding 
it. But Seward believed that circumstances made it 
best to remain uncommitted as to the precise method 
that he thought would be effective." Nevertheless, he 
had certain definite aims. It will be less difficult to in- 
dicate what they were after we know whether he and 
Weed were substantially of one mind. 

In the long article of November 30th, Weed twice 
declared that he spoke only for himself. 4 Several times 
Seward implied or asserted that he was not responsi- 
ble for Weed's course, but so far as is known he never 
directly affirmed that he was opposed to Weed's opin- 
ions. 5 Weed and Seward saw shortly after the election 

1 Gwin's posthumous article in the Overland Monthly, 2d series, 467. 
Gwin and Seward often used Samuel Ward, popularly known as 
"King of the Lobby," and they met at his house to avoid attracting 
attention. A memorandum from Ward, written shortly after Lin- 
coln's inaugural address, reports to Seward the receipt of this letter by 
Davis. — Seward MSS. 2 18 Overland Monthly, 2d series, 469. 

3 " I talked very little, and nothing in detail," continued to be his 
rule. When writing confidentially to Lincoln he stated facts with 
precision, but he seemed studiously to keep back his own ideas as to 
remedies. Even then he enjoined secrecy, and added : " My power to 
do anything would be seriously impaired, if what I write were made 
known."— 2 Seward, 484, 485. * 1 Greeley, 861. 

6 December 2d, Seward wrote home: "You will see that Mr. "Weed 

26 



PRESERVING THE NATIONAL STATUS 

that the Southerners were in earnest and that civil war 
and disunion were threatened. What could be done 
to avert either or both depended upon the public opin- 
ion of the North. It was urgent that some one should 
make tentative propositions to test northern sentiment. 
Seward could not do this without wasting his popular- 
ity in mere experiments. So the initiative was left to 

lets me out of responsibility for his well-intentioned but rather im- 
pulsive movements. He promised me to do so." The same letter 
said: " I am engaged busily in studying and gathering my thoughts 
for the Union." Evidently he had not fully made up his mind as to 
a course. (2' Seward, 479.) Again, December 4th: "Mr. Weed's 
articles have brought perplexities about me which he, with all his 
astuteness, did not foresee. But yon need not expect, or rather fear, 
that I will act unwisely or wrong." (2 Seward, 4S0.) Notwithstand- 
ing these sentences, Mrs. Seward became so much concerned lest the 
Senator might favor a compromise that she wrote to him expressing 
her fears. Again he shunned giving her a clear and comprehensive 
answer: " I am, thus far, silent, not because I am thinking of propos- 
ing compromises, but because I wish to avoid, myself, and restrain 
other Republicans, from intermeddling." ... (2 Seward, 480.) A 
Republican senatorial caucus was called on the first day of the session 
for the purpose of finding out if Seward agreed with Weed's sug- 
gestions about compromise. Seward snubbed his indiscreet col- 
leagues, and declined to give them any satisfaction. (2 Weed, 308.) 

A few days later, when the Albany Evening Standard asserted posi- 
tively that he had aided in the preparation of an important article on 
compromise in the Evening Journal, the Auburn Advertiser printed 
the following: "Mr. Seward, in conversation, fully repudiates the 
telegraph and newspaper assumptions of his authority for or concur- 
rence in the Albany Journal's article of yesterday. He says he won- 
ders how long it will take newspapers to learn that when he desires 
to be heard he is in the habit of speaking in his proper place for him- 
self." — Cited 3 Rhodes, 159. This is not considered final. Nor would it 
be if it were plainly authoritative, for Seward was determined to con- 
.ceal his opinions. In public he called secession impossible and a " hum- 
bug," while in private he was conducting a " dictatorship for defence," 
and studying how to avert civil war and disunion. Had he openly 
approved Weed's course, the radical Republicans would have made a 
bold attack upon him, which would have deprived him of most of his 
influence in the party, and it would have cost him his prospective place 
in Lincoln's Cabinet. Even as it was, his difficulties were very great. 

27 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

the Evening Journal, of which his son Frederick, the 
future Assistant Secretary of State, was associate edi- 
tor. The New York Times and the Courier and En- 
quirer followed. Weed and Seward were never in 
closer communication than during these months. Weed's 
two most elaborate articles, those of November 30th and 
December 17th, appeared just after he and Seward had 
held long conferences. Had there been any consider- 
able difference in their opinions, Seward would hardly 
have asked Weed to go to Springfield to express to 
Lincoln his (Seward's) views on public affairs. 1 It has 
been positively stated that Weed favored the Critten- 
den compromise. 2 However, he objected to the propo- 
sition that in all the present and future territory south 
of 3G° 30' slavery should be recognized, but he thought 
that that could be rendered satisfactory if provision 
should be made so that territory should be acquired 
only by treaty or by a two-thirds vote of Congress. 3 
Seward explained his non-committalism as to any speci- 
fic plan, by telling the Senate, on January 31st, that no 
propositions had been offered that promised to bring 
about reconciliation. 4 There was a close resemblance 5 
between the expressions employed by Seward and Weed 
respectively when speaking of the need of amending the 

1 2 Seward, 482. 2 2 Weed, 312. 

3 Evening Journal, December 19, 1860 , January 22, 1861. 

4 4 Works, 671 

5 " Is it strange, then, that this " After more than seventy years 
complex system of our govern- of 'wear and tear,' of collision 
ment should be found to work, and abrasion, it should be no cause 
after the lapse of seventy yenrs, a of wonder that the machinery of 
little roughly, and that it requires government is found weakened, 
that the engineer should look into or out of repair, or even defec- 
the various parts of the engine, tive." — Weed, quoted 1 Greeley, 
and see where the gudgeon is 361. 

worn out, and watch that the 
main wheel be kept in motion'?" 
—Seward, 4 Works, 647. 

28 



PRESERVING THE NATIONAL STATUS 

Constitution and of the question of slavery in the terri- 
tories. 1 Weed spoke with equal boldness for a compro- 
mise and in condemnation of Buchanan's failure to en- 
force the laws and to defend the forts. 2 Circumstances 
forbade that Seward should be explicit about either. 
However, no conflict of opinion on any essential point 
has been found, while numerous unmentioned signs in- 
dicate that they had a common aim. Each adopted the 
course best suited to his surroundings, but, nevertheless, 
they were in close alliance. 3 

1 " There has been a real, a vital " The continued blindness of 
question in this country for twelve the Democracy and the continued 
years at least — a question of sla- madness of slavery enabled us to 
very in the territories of the United elect Lincoln. That success ends 
States. ... It has been an earnest our mission, so far as Kansas and 
and, I regret to say, an angry con- the encroachments of slavery into 
troversy ; but the admission of free territory are concerned. We 
Kansas into the Union yesterday have no territory that invites sla- 
settled at least all that was vital very for any other than political 
or important in the question, leav- objects, and, with the power of ter- 
ing behind nothing but the pas- ritorial organization in the hands 
sions which the contest had en- of Lincoln, there is no political 
gendered." — 4 Works, 673. temptation in all the territory be- 

longing to us. The right is over. 
Practically the issues of the late 
campaign are obsolete " — Weed to 
Preston King, 2 Weed, 309. 

~ s Evening Journal, December 21, 22, 1860, January 4, 11, 12, 16, 17, 
22, and 25, 1861 

s The following letters from Weed show that he and Seward were 
working together like the two hands of one man. 

"Albany, January 9, [1861]. 

"Dear Seward, — I am now less anxious about time than I was. 
Monday will answer and is better than you should be hurried. 

" I wish I could see what you intend in its completeness. Now that 
you print speak for all. Words should be weighed. 

"The war spirit is rising and raging The sooner the war is, the 
safer the ground you propose to occupy. I enclose Mr. Lincoln's prop- 
ositions, in the hope that you substantially accept his views on the 
two kindred questions. 

29 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

Seward was studiously equivocal or general in his 
expressions. When he went beyond this, he was par- 
ticular to enjoin secrecy. This was not only justifiable, 
but it was also necessary as a means of using his peculiar 
position to the best advantage. Many of his expres- 
sions make it plain that he was much less concerned 
about what he should concede than about what could 
be conceded effectively and without danger to politi- 
cal interests. On December 2Gth he wrote to Lincoln: 
"Nothing could certainly restrain them [the border 
slave states from joining the cotton states], but the 
adoption of Mr. Crittenden's compromise, and I do not 
see the slightest indications of its adoption, on the 
Republican side of Congress." 1 Again on January 27, 
1861, he sent these plaintive sentences: 

" The appeals of the Union men in the border states for 
something of concession or compromise are very painful, 
since they say that without it their states must all go with 
the tide, and your administration must begin with the free 
states meeting all southern states in a hostile confederacy. 
Chance might render the separation perpetual. Disunion 
has been contemplated and discussed so long there that 
they have become frightfully familiar with it, and even 
such men as Mr. Scott and William C. Eives are so far dis- 
unionists as to think that they would have the right and 

"I could not sec Mr. Gilmer [probably about going iuto Lincoln's 
Cabinet], but hope that you have done so. 

" Blatchford was off before I could see him. 

" I return the letter. " Truly yours, 

"T. Weed. 

"You see that the murder is out !" [This means that Seward's se- 
lection as Secretary of State is publicly reported.] 

An undated note written a day or two earlier said: 

" Mr. Gilmer was in committee. I go without seeing him. 

"Pray work out your salvation and that of the country as speedily 
as you can. Offer all that is right and demand all that is due. 

" I do so want it to be right that I shall think of nothing else. 

"Swett should see Mr. Gilmer if you have not time." — Seward 
MSS. > 2 Seward, 485. 

30 



PRESERVING THE NATIONAL STATUS 

be wise in going if we will not execute new guaranties 
which would be abhorrent in the North. It is almost in 
vain that I tell them to wait, let us have a truce on sla- 
very, put our issue on disunion, and seek remedies for 
ultimate griefs in a constitutional question [convention?]." 

After a few sentences he made it still stronger : 

"In any case you are to meet a hostile armed confederacy 
when you commence — you must reduce it by force or con- 
ciliation. The resort to force would very soon be de- 
nounced by the North, although so many are anxious for a 
fray. The North will not consent to a long civil war. A 
large portion, much the largest portion of the Republican 
party, are reckless now of the crisis before us; and com- 
promise or concession, though as a means of averting dis- 
solution, is intolerable to them. They believe that either 
it will 'not come at all, or be less disastrous than I think it 
will be." 

As if to prevent the plain inference, he states his opin- 
ion — but not on this precise point : 

" For my own part, I think tbat we must collect the 
revenues, regain the forts in the Gulf, and, if need be, main- 
tain ourselves here; but that every thought that we think 
ought to be conciliatory, forbearing, and fraternal, and so 
open the way for the rising of a Union party in the seced- 
ing states which will bring them back into the Union." 1 

In the same letter Seward said that he had had an 
interview with James Barbour, "the master-spirit of 
the Union party " in Virginia, who, he suggested, might 
be available as the southern member of the Cabinet 
for whom they were seeking. On February 8, 1861, this 
"master-spirit" wrote to Seward that he and other 
unionists had taken the ground that " secession ought to 
follow the extinction of the hope of constitutional 
amendments. I for one assumed that ground not only 
as expedient for the canvass, but as right in itself, as did 
many others." 2 As early as January 21st the general 

1 3 Nicolay and Hay, 365, 360. 2 See Appendix, E. 

31 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

assembly of Virginia voted unanimously that honor and 
interest demanded that the state should unite her des- 
tiny with the slave-holding states of the South in case 
the efforts to reconcile the unhappy differences should 
fail; 1 and other Virginia correspondents, besides Bar- 
bour, expressed similar opinions to Seward. 2 

Early in the session Seward became convinced that 
Congress would not approve a satisfactory compromise 
amendment. 3 Therefore he concluded that the only 
practicable course would be to seek a remedy in a con- 
stitutional convention. After two-thirds of Congress 
had favored it, the balance of the work could be done by 
the states. So when the amendments proposed by the 
peace conference came before the Senate, and it was 

1 2 Tyler's Tylers, 605. 

2 Although the recollection of a conversation that took place many 
years before may be unreliable, the following sentences, from a letter 
dated August 24, 1893, from James Barbour to the author, are worth 
quoting in connection with the foregoing speculation : 

"I told him [Seward, at the interview referred to above] frankly 
that nothing materially less than the Critteuden compromise would 
allay it [the excitement] in Virginia. ... He said, you have asked 
me if I would favor the Critteuden compromise. I am of your opin- 
ion that nothing short of that will allay the excitement, and therefore 
I will favor it substantially. . . . 

" When about to leave Mr. Seward, I told him that I would state 
the purport of his conversation for publication. He requested me 
not to do so, as a premature publication of his views would destroy 
his influence to accomplish his purpose. . . . 

" I took Washington in [on] my return trip, and again saw Gover- 
nor Seward. He then remarked that the contest in Virginia had not 
been so close as I had expected, and in his opinion we could trust the 
Union sentiment in Virginia to an indefinite extent. This annoyed 
me, and I brusquely told him that if he acted on that view our state 
would secede in thirty days. He said I misunderstood his remark, 
and he still designed to do just as lie had formerly told me." 

3 On December 2d, he wrote to Weed : " No amendment that can 
be proposed, and would be satisfactory, can get two-thirds of both 
Houses, although just such amendments might pass three-fourths 
of the states in convention."— 2 Seward, 479. See also 488. 

32 



PRESERVING THE NATIONAL STATUS 

known that there was no prospect of their adoption by 
constitutional majorities, Seward offered a joint resolu- 
tion requesting the legislatures of the states to consider 
the advisability of asking Congress to call a constitu- 
tional convention. 1 The definite propositions he offered 
were mere feelers, and it was generally understood that 
the}?- did not represent all he would concede under favor- 
able circumstances. If this was a mistaken inference, 
he had forced it. When he presented the long petition 
from New Yorkers, praying for a settlement of the sec- 
tional question on the basis of the border-state propo- 
sitions — which were very similar to Crittenden's compro- 
mise, except that the protection of slavery in territory 
acquired in the future was not promised a — he said : " I 
have thought it my duty to hold myself open and ready 
for the best adjustment that could be practically made. 
. . ." 3 On March 2d the Crittenden compromise and 
some resolutions offered by Senator Clark, of New 
Hampshire, declaring that the Constitution needed to 
be obeyed rather than amended, were put to a final test. 
Seward had been present earlier in the day, but he now 
voted neither for enforcing the Constitution and the 
laws nor for the compromise. 4 He was, therefore, 
practically uncommitted as to any special action, except 
against recognizing secession. 6 

From such evidence it seems fair to conclude that if 
a constitutional convention had met, Seward would 
have been morally bound by the logic of his arguments, 

1 Globe, 1860-61, 1270. 2 McPherson, 73. 

8 4 Works, 671. * Globe, 1860-61, 1375, 1404, 1405. 

6 On January 16th, when Clark's resolutions were first brought to a 
vote, as an amendment to Crittenden's compromise, Seward voted for 
them. Crittenden's plan was to put his propositions to a popular 
vote, as a means of indicating to Congress what ought to be done. 
— Globe, 1S60-61, 237. Seward said subsequently that he had opposed 
it because he regarded the method as " unconstitutional and ineffect- 
ual."— 4 Works, 678. 

ii.— c 33 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

by his pleas for the Union, and by his pledges for con- 
cession, to favor either the Crittenden compromise or 
one substantially the same except in respect to slavery 
in territory that might be afterward acquired. 

In opposition to the correctness of this conclusion, 
several pledges to Mrs. Seward might be cited: De- 
cember 24th, "We have come to no compromise; and 
we shall not." ' December 31st, " There is no fear of 
any compromise of principle or advantage of freedom. 
If there is such an one, which I do not expect, I shall 
be no party to it." a January 13, 1S61, "I could not 
compromise a principle, if I would, for there is nobody 
to go with me."* It is at least suggestive that his wife 
continued to suspect that he had turned compromiser. 4 
If he meant to promise that he would favor no propo- 
sition that she then, or he himself a few months be- 
fore, regarded as a compromise, he did not keep his 
word. When it was reported that Charles Francis 
Adams was ready to vote for the admission of New 
Mexico as a slave state, Mrs. Seward wrote to Sumner: 
" Three hundred thousand square miles of God's earth is 
a high price for the questionable advantage of a union 
with the slave states."' In the speech of January 12th, 
as has been noticed, Seward indicated his willingness 
to favor a division of all the territory, aside from Kan- 
sas, into two states, and admit them without restriction 
as to slavery, if provision could be made for their sub- 
division, whenever necessary, into several states. 8 His 
belief that this reservation could not be made consti- 
tutionally did not affect the principle. The general 

1 2 Seward , 483. 2 Ibid. , 489. 3 Ibid. , 496. 

4 When Mrs. Seward objected to his " concessions " in the speech 
of January 12th, he replied : " You will soon enough come to see that 
they are not compromises, but explanations to disarm enemies of 
Truth, Freedom, and Union of their most effective weapons." 
—2 Seward, 49S-97. s 4 Pierce, 10. 6 4 Works, 667. 

34 



PRESERVING THE NATIONAL STATUS 

expectation was that by such a plan New Mexico 
would become a slave state, and the northern territory 
would be free. Seward's whole argument about slavery 
in the territories was similar to that of the northern 
Whig compromisers of 1850, and was entirely inconsist- 
ent with what he had been saying for the past twelve 
years. 

But it must always be remembered that Seward's two 
immediate objects during these months were to foster 
sympathy between the loyalists of both sections and to 
prevent a conflict with the Confederates before Lincoln's 
inauguration, and that these objects were of supreme 
importance. 

Wo one knew better than he how many unionists in 
both sections honestly believed that the Republicans 
designed to initiate a revolutionary policy. There never 
was a day before the surrender at Appomattox when 
the Republicans alone could have saved the Union. Be- 
cause Seward and "Weed saw how helpless their party 
must remain, they aimed to win for it as much confi- 
dence and support as possible. " The North is divided," 
wrote Seward, on January 13th. " Two-thirds of the Re- 
publican Senators are as reckless in action as the South. 
They imagine that the government can go on and con- 
quer the South, while they, themselves, sit still and see 
the work done." ' " The Union cannot be saved by 
proving that secession is illegal or unconstitutional." 3 
The only way in which the North as a whole could be 
brought to the point of fighting for the preservation of 
the Union Avas by making it plain that the Republicans 
had not provoked the South into secession and that there 
was stiil enough loyalty in the border slave states to 
warrant the expectation of an easy victory over the Con- 
federacy. 1 

1 2 Seward, 496. J Speech, January 12th, 4 Works, 652. 

3 See M. H. Grinnell to Seward, Appendix B. 
35 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

But the urgent task was to preclude a violent outbreak 
during Buchanan's term. The constant aim of the se- 
cessionist leaders ever since the election had been to de- 
stroy all hope of reconciliation, and when they found 
the unionists in the border slave states exerting unex- 
pected power, they charged them with being the dupes 
of the Republicans. 1 And Governor Pickens, of South 
Carolina, suggested to Toombs, on February 12th, that it 
would be a good plan to bring on a conflict so as to 
open a gulf between the southern border states and the 
North. 8 

On January 23d Seward wrote home : " Once for all, 
I must gain time for the new administration to organize 
and for the frenzy of passion to subside." 3 Until the 
Republicans could command the physical and material 
strength of the government, any positive offer to com- 
promise would weaken them more than their enemies." 

1 Editorial articles in Send -Weekly Richmond Enquirer, February 
19 and 22, 18G1, are good illustrations. 

2 Crawford's Genesis of tlie Civil War, 270. a 2 Seward, 497. 

4 Six years afterward Seward described bis purpose at this time as 
follows: 

"In regard to February, 1861, I need only say, that, at the time 
the secession leaders were all in the Senate and House, with power 
enough, and only wanting an excuse, to get up a resistance in the 
capital to the declaration of Mr. Lincoln's election and to his inaugu- 
ration — in other words, to have an excuse and opportunity to open 
the civil war here before the new administration and new Congress 
could be in authority to subdue it— I desired to avoid giving them 
that advantage. I conferred throughout with General Scott and Mr. 
Stanton, then in Mr. Buchanan's Cabinet. I presume that I couversed 
with others in a way that seemed to me best calculated to leave the 
inauguration of a war to the secessionists, and to delay it, in any case, 
until the new administration should be in possession of the gov- 
ernment. It was less military demonstration that was wanted at that 
particular moment than political discretion. 

" Discretion taught two duties — namely, to awaken patriotism at 
the North, and to get the secessionists, with Buchanan's administra- 
tion, out of Washington. Mr. Adams well and thoroughly under- 

36 



PRESERVING THE NATIONAL STATUS 

There is no reason to doubt that Seward's policy warded 
off the most imminent dangers and bridged over the 
chasm between November and March. No one but 
Buchanan had the power — and he wholly lacked the 
capacity and the courage — to develop a better and 
more far-reaching method of dealing with secession. 
What Seward did was less a deliberate policy than tac- 
tics for an emergency, but it was timely and effective 
for the immediate purpose, and amazingly so when all 
the difficulties are given due consideration. This was 
the hour of Seward's supreme greatness. 

Seward's self-conscious bearing at this time has been 
much criticised; and it has been alleged that he imag- 
ined himself another Atlas on whose shoulders rested 
the whole weight of the Union. He assumed, as has 
been noticed, "a sort of dictatorship for defence"; and 
he wrote home, January 18, 1861 : " It seems to me that 
if I am absent only three days, this administration, 
the Congress, and the District, would fall into con- 
sternation and despair. I am the only hopeful, calm, 
conciliatory person here." ' At that time the Senators 
from Florida, Alabama, and Mississippi were about to 
withdraw from the Senate, and Georgia was hourly 
expected to pass her ordinance of secession. One needs 

stood me. On the 22d of February, in concert with Mr. Stanton, I 
caused the United States flag to be displayed throughout the north- 
ern and western portions of the United States."— Seward to William 
Schouler, June 13, 1867. 1 Schouler's Massachusetts in the Civil War, 
41, 42. 

The Evening Journal of February 14, 1861, said that if the peace 
conference did nothing else, it had shown " that northern states do 
not regard southern ones as enemies, and by securing what is of the 
first importance in all this business — time for the excitement to cool, 
and for the madness of secession to be realized. . . . The only ob- 
jection that can be raised to either of these [methods of changing the 
Constitution] is, that it requires time and prevents ' precipitation into 
revolution.' This is precisely why we commend it." 

1 2 Seward, 497. 

37 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

but to read the records of the proceedings in the Sen- 
ate three or four days later, after these Senators had 
departed, to see how easily consternation and despair 
might have prevailed if Seward had not been there to 
insist with serene assurance on proceeding with the 
regular business and to oppose entering into an exciting 
and futile debate, which some of the secessionists tried 
to stir up. On January 23d he again wrote to Mrs. 
Seward: "Mad men North, and mad men South, are 
working together to produce a dissolution of the Union 
by civil war. The present administration and the incom- 
ing one unite in devolving on me the responsibility of 
averting those disasters. My own party trusts me, but 
not without reservation. All the other parties, North 
and South, cast themselves upon me." 1 Great as his 
egotism appears, it was not out of proportion to his su- 
periority and responsibility at the time. And his inti- 
macy with Lincoln during these months fully warranted 
the statement about the incoming administration. 2 

On December 8, 1860, Lincoln began the definite se- 
lection of his Cabinet by inviting Seward to be Secre- 
tary of State. The newspapers had circulated a rumor 
to the effect that the offer was to be tendered merely as 
a compliment, with the expectation that it would be de- 
clined. Lincoln informed Seward that the rumor was 
groundless, and with characteristic frankness made this 
handsome acknowledgment: "I now offer you the place 
in the hope that you will accept it, and with the be- 
lief that your position in the public eye, your integ- 
rity, ability, learning, and great experience, all combine 

1 2 Seward, 497. 

* To no one else did Lincoln write so many important letters dur- 
ing this period (see 1 Lincoln's Works, 653 ff.), and Seward seems to 
have had no extensive correspondence with any one besides Lincoln, 
excepting Mrs. Seward and Thurlow Weed. 



THE WINTER OF 1860-61 

to render it an appointment pre-eminently fit to be 
made." 1 No proposition could have been less a sur- 
prise to Seward, but he knew the wisdom of asking for 
time to reflect. 2 As it was impracticable for Seward 
and Lincoln to meet at this time, Weed soon went to 
Springfield. When he returned he brought Lincoln's 
memorandum suggesting what concessions the Republi- 
cans might make, and a request that Seward should 
write to him about the status in Washington. 3 On the 
26th of December Seward sent Lincoln an elaborate 
statement about political affairs, and two days later he 
formally accepted the proffered secretaryship. 4 When 
the acceptance became public, earl}' in January, Lincoln 
paid Seward this high compliment: "Your selection for 
the State Department having become public, I am happy 
to find scarcely any objection to it. I shall have trouble 
with every other northern Cabinet appointment, so much 
so that I shall have to defer them as long as possible, to 
avoid being teased to insanity to make changes." 6 

Seward was anxious to have in the Cabinet one or 
more southern unionists that had not been identified 
with the Republican party, and he suggested the names 
of John A. Gilmer and Kenneth Ray nor, of North Car- 
olina, Robert E. Scott and James Barbour, of Virginia, 
Randall Hunt, of Louisiana, and Meredith P. Gentry, of 

1 1 Lincoln's Works, 657. 

2 On December 13th he replied to Lincoln : " You will readily be- 
lieve that, coming to the consideration of so grave a subject all at once, I 
need a little time to consider whether I possess the qualifications and 
temper of a minister, and whether it is in such a capacity that my 
friends would wish that I should act if I am to continue at all in the 
public service. These questions are, moreover, to be considered in 
view of a very anomalous condition of public affairs. I wish, indeed, 
that a conference with you upon them were possible." — 3 Nicolay and 
Hay, 350. The same day he wrote to "Weed: "I have now the oc- 
casion for consulting you that you have expected." — 2 Seward, 481. 

a Seward, 484. 4 2 Seward, 484, 485, 487. 

5 1 Lincoln's Works, 665. 

39 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

Tennessee. 1 When Weed insisted that some of the 
southern unionists could be trusted, although their 
states might secede, Lincoln said, "Well, let us have the 
names of your white crows, such ones as you think fit 
for the Cabinet." 3 Seward was expected to consult 
some of the Southerners named ; but no practical ar- 
rangement could be made with any of them. Doubtless 
each was found to be "too exacting for his section," as 
Seward said was the case with Eobert E. Scott. 3 Lin- 
coln never had any confidence that the plan was feasible. 
Seward's fears lest violence might break out in Wash- 
ington before the inauguration caused him to recom- 
mend that Lincoln appear somewhat earlier than the 
public would expect." But Lincoln thought it better to 
wait until after the result of the electoral count should 
be announced. 6 General Scott and Seward had become 
convinced, after causing three New York detectives to 
investigate the rumors, that there was a plot to attack 
Lincoln during his passage through Baltimore. There- 
fore, Lincoln consented to take an earlier train so as to 
get through that city before the public heard of his 
change of plan. Seward met Lincoln at the station in 
Washington, and during the next few da}^s they were 
together much of the time. He introduced Lincoln to 
the President, the members of the Cabinet, and General 
Scott, and escorted him into each house of Congress." 
Lincoln drove and dined with Seward the first day he 
was in Washington, and on the following day they ap- 
peared together at church. 7 "He is very cordial and 
kind toward me — simple, natural, and agreeable," Sew- 
ard wrote home before Lincoln had been in the capital 
twentjr-four hours. 

1 3 Nicolay and Hay, 363-65. 2 1 Weed, 606. 

3 3 Nicolay and Hay, 365. * 2 Seward, 486, 487. 

6 3 Nicolay and Hay, 363. 

6 National Intelligencer, February 26, 1861. ' 2 Seward, 511. 

40 



THE WINTER OF 1860-01 

"What Lincoln bad said about deferring Cabinet ap- 
pointments as long as possible to avoid being teased 
into insanity to make changes was one of the early illus- 
trations of his foresight. When he arrived in Washing- 
ton but one other department-chief besides Seward had 
been positively chosen. This was Edward Bates, the 
future Attorney- General. Lincoln had almost decided 
to nominate Chase as Secretary of the Treasury, Caleb 
B. Smith, of Indiana, as Secretary of the Interior, Gideon 
Welles, of Connecticut, as Secretary of the Navy, Simon 
Cameron as Secretary of War, and Montgomery Blair, of 
Maryland, as Postmaster-General. There was then most 
doubt about appointing Cameron and Blair. In a gen- 
eral way, the friends of the aspirants finally became asso- 
ciated with either the Seward or the Chase faction. The 
Seward men expected the new administration to be 
conducted along the lines of the policy advocated by 
their idol. Chase's friends counted among their number 
most of Seward's enemies of 1860 and the radical Repub- 
licans, some of whom believed in recognizing secession 
as a fact, while others favored coercion. There was con- 
siderable personal antipathy between the two branches 
of the party, but the antagonism w T as essentially legiti- 
mate because it grew out of two distinct theories as to 
future action. 

Shortly after the election William Cullen Bryant 
urged Lincoln to make Chase Secretary of State; and 
when Seward's selection became known he again praised 
Chase's qualities, and spoke of " the need of his presence 
there [in the Cabinet] as a counterpoise to the one who 
joins to commanding talents a flexible and indulgent 
temper of mind and unsafe associations." ' The old hos- 
tility to Seward was made sharper, especially in New 
York, because Seward and Weed had lately prevented 



1 2 Godwin's Bryant, 150. 
41 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

the election of Greeley as United States Senator. Dur- 
ing the month of February the Tribune and the Evening 
Post assailed Seward with unwonted virulence. The 
criticism became so exasperating that Weed declared 
that the assailants " were ready to dissolve the Union, 
destroy the government, and bankrupt and ruin the peo- 
ple to keep Seward out of the Cabinet and secure for 
themselves and their adherents the 'spoils of office.'" 1 
After Lincoln's arrival, Greeley and other Chase men 
came to Washington to press their opinions with more 
force. The leaders of the Seward faction were at first 
less public and direct in their opposition to Chase and 
the candidates likely to act with him. Seward's prestige 
and his intimacy with Lincoln were expected to give his 
friends an advantage, but during the last days of Febru- 
ary they became alarmed on finding that Seward's influ- 
ence over Lincoln was less and Chase's greater than they 
had supposed. Rumors to the effect that Lincoln had 
been unable to harmonize the two factions led some of 
Seward's too zealous supporters into a desperate move- 
ment, not merely as a means of excluding Chase, but of 
making sure that Seward himself should be retained. 2 



! Evening Journal, February 25, 1861. 

2 "It [the Republican party] seems to care a great deal more about 
getting Seward out of the Cabinet than anything else just now. 
Lincoln is a 'Simple Susan,' and the men who fought a week at Chi- 
cago to nominate him have probably got their labor for their pains. 
But no matter — Seward is a necessity ; Chase or Banks ought to be, 
and really are, if the machine is to run its four years ; but let the 
New-Yorker with his Illinois attachment have a fair trial." — Bowles 
to H. L. Dawes, February 26, 1861. 1 Merriam's Bowles, 318. 

"Later on in the evening came over and sat by me to urge 

me to go with him to-morrow to see Mr. Lincoln in regard to the 
Cabinet appointments. He was much agitated and concerned about 
them, having gotten [it] into his head, for reasons which he gave me, 
that Mr. Lincoln, in his despair of harmonizing the Seward men with 
the Chase men, has concocted or had concocted for him a plan of 
putting Corwin into the State Department, sending Seward to Eug- 

42 



THE WINTER OF 1860-61 

Lincoln seemed determined to have Montgomery Blair, 
a resolute coercionist, nominated in place of Henry 
Winter Davis, a protege of Weed and Seward. This 
made it all the more urgent that Seward should either 
surrender his expectations of controlling the policy of 
the administration, or else force Lincoln to give up 
Chase. A party of Seward's friends ventured, on March 
2d, to inform the President - elect that Seward could 
not serve in the Cabinet with Chase. 1 On the same 



land, and giving the Treasury to New York. ... He showed me a 
letter he had received a fortnight ago from Mr. Draper, in New 
York, expressing great anxiety as to Mr. Seward's position in tlie 
Cabinet in case of the nomination of Mr. Cbase, and intimating an 
intention of visiting Washington with several other gentlemen for 
the purpose of making Mr. Lincoln understand that he must absolutely 
drop the idea of putting Mr. Chase into the Treasury. I told him 
that Mr. Weed had to-day expressed the same ideas to me, and I 
asked him if he did not know that a counter-pressure was putting on 
Mr. Lincoln to exclude Mr. Seward. 'Suppose,' I said, ' they should 
both be excluded ?'" — "Diary of a Public Man," entry of February 
26, 1861 ; 129 North American Review, 262, 263. 

The fact that the authorship of this "Diary" has been kept a pro- 
found secret might seem to exclude it from the field of trustworthy 
evidence ; but its tone, accuracy, and scope indicate that it was written 
by a man influential in public affairs and an intimate friend of Seward. 

1 Lamon's Recollections, 49-51. "Mr. Lincoln makes his owu Cab- 
inet. There can be no doubt about it any longer. This man from 
Illinois is not in the hands of Mr. Seward. Heaven grant that he may 
not be in other hands — not to be thought of with patience ! These 
New York men have done just what they have been saying they 
would do, and with just the result which I have from the first ex- 
pected ; though I own there are points in the upshot which puzzle 
me. I cannot feel even sure now that Mr. Seward will be nominated 
at all on Tuesday ; and certainly he neither is nor after this can be the 
real head of the administration, even if his name is on the list of the 
Cabinet. Such folly on the part of those who assume to be the 
especial friends of the one man in whose ability and moderation the 
conservative people of the North have most confidence ; and such folly 
at this moment might almost make one despair of the republic !" The 
diarist then gives a long and interesting account of the report of one 
of Seward's friends who was in the party of politicians that had just 

43 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM II. SEWARD 

day Seward asked permission of Lincoln to withdraw 
his acceptance of the secretaryship. Seward's belief 
was that he alone could safely direct the next ad- 
ministration, and therefore there must be at least a 
majority of the Cabinet in sympathy with his ideas. 
Lincoln had given Seward first place as a counsellor, 
but he had no intention of allowing the great New- 
Yorker to dictate to him. It was about this time 
that he indicated his impatience of the attitude of 
the Seward - champions, by remarking that if the 
" slate" should break again, it would "break at the 
top"; that is, Seward would be left off it. 1 But his 
sober second thought told him that the hostility be- 
tween Seward's followers and those of Chase would 
be less harmful if their chiefs were in the Cabinet; 
and, furthermore, the only way to control Seward — to 
prevent him from taking the first trick, as Lincoln ex- 
pressed it 3 — was to insist on his becoming Secretary of 
State. So on the morning before the inauguration 
Lincoln wrote to him : " It is the subject of the most 
painful solicitude with me; and I feel constrained to 
beg that you will countermand the withdrawal. The 
public interest, I think, demands that you should ; and 
my personal feelings are deeply enlisted in the same 
direction." 3 That afternoon Seward had a long confer- 
ence with the new President, and on the following day 
the letter of March 2d was formally withdrawn. The 

called on Lincoln "to bring matters to a head, and prevent the Domi- 
nation of Chase at all hazards." They practically told Lincoln that 
Seward would not sit in the same Cabinet with Chase. Lincoln 
seemed much distressed by the prospect. Finally, he filled his callers 
with consternation by asking them how it would do to give the Treas- 
ury to Mr. Chase, the State Department to "William L. Dayton, and 
let Seward go as Minister to England! — "Diary," etc., entry of 
March 2, 1861, 129 North American, Bedew, 271-73. See also Welles's 
Lincoln and Seward, 36. » 3 Nicolay and Hay, 370. 

3 3 Nicolay and Hay. 371. 3 3 Nicolay and Hay, 371. 

44 



THE WINTER OF 1800-01 

incident was closed. But Seward seemed not to realize 
the significance of what had taken place, for a letter 
written a few days later contained these sentences : 

''The President is determined that he will have a com- 
pound Cabinet, and that it shall be peaceful, and even 
permanent. I was at one time on the point of refusing — 
nay, I did refuse, for a time, to hazard myself in the experi- 
ment. But a distracted country appeared before me, and 
I withdrew from that position. I believe I can endure as 
much as any one ; and may be I can endure enough to 
make the experiment successful. At all events, I did not 
dare to go home, or to England, and leave the country to 
chance." 1 

1 2 Seward, 518. 



CHAPTER XXVI 

SEWARD'S OPINIONS ON THE TARIFF, PUBLIC LANDS, IN- 
TERNAL IMPROVEMENTS, SUBSIDIES, COMMERCE, ETC. 

Seward's prominence in antislavery politics and in 
diplomacy has caused his opinions on other questions to 
be overlooked. In mental qualities, education, and ex- 
perience he ranked high among the Senators best fitted 
for the serious business of legislation. 

His career in JSTew York had indicated that he was a 
stanch federalist and protectionist. He believed that 
one of the chief functions of government was directly 
to stimulate national development by legislation. The 
principal support of such a system must be a high tar- 
iff, for in no other way can the necessary revenues 
be obtained. He maintained that where there were 
many resources, but where industry was applied to only 
a few staples, three great interests were neglected : natu- 
ral resources were unimproved; labor was unemployed; 
and internal exchanges, which a diversity of industry 
would render necessary, were undeveloped. He held 
that foreign commerce, based on a narrow system of pro- 
duction, compelled a nation to sell its staples at prices 
reduced by competition in foreign markets, and to buy 
fabrics at prices established by monopoly in the same 
markets. The application of industry to a large number 
of objects rested upon these " impregnable grounds, viz. : 
first, that the use of indigenous materials does not di- 
minish, but on the contrary increases, the public wealth ; 
second, that society is constituted so that individuals 

46 



OPINIONS ON THE TARIFF, ETC. 

voluntarily classify themselves in all, and not in a few, 
departments of industry, by reason of a distributive con- 
geniality of tastes and adaptation of powers ; and that 
while labor so distributed is more profitable, the general 
contentment and independence of the people are secured 
and preserved, and their enterprise is stimulated and sus- 
tained." 1 He held that it ought not to be less profita- 
ble to supply ourselves from our own resources with 
copper, iron, glass, and paper than with flour, sugar, and 
gold. If mining and manufacturing were profitable in 
England, they could be made so here. To the objection 
that labor was cheaper in that country, he replied: "Yes, 
because you leave it there. If you offer inducements, it 
will come here just as freely as agricultural labor now 
comes. The ocean is reduced to a ferry." In his opin- 
ion the theory that the encouragement given to the in- 
dustry of one class of citizens is partial, and is injurious 
to that of other classes, could not in any just sense be true, 
" since the prosperity and vigor of each class depend in 
a great degree on the prosperity and vigor of all the in- 
dustrial classes. But all experience shows that if gov- 
ernment do not favor domestic enterprise, its negative 
policy will benefit some foreign monopoly, which, of all 
classes of legislation, is most injurious and least ex- 
cusable." s 

In 1853, when one of the appropriation bills was 
under consideration, Mason, of Virginia, offered an 
amendment to repeal the duty on iron imported for 
rails to be laid upon railroads in the United States. 
Douglas desired to have the duty abolished for three 
years. 3 Hale estimated, without being contradicted, 
that only about one-tenth of the railroad iron used in 
the United States was manufactured in this countrv ; 



1 4 Works, 154, 155. 2 4 Works, 156, 157. 

3 Globe, 1852-53, 906. 

47 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

that a duty of three million seven hundred thousand 
dollars would be paid in order to benefit our few fur- 
naces one -tenth of that amount; and, therefore, that 
railroad building was taxed nearly four million dollars, 
merely in their interest. 1 

Seward defined his position with startling frankness : 
" Sir, I have voted land by the square league across the 
continent, and twenty millions of dollars out of the pub- 
lic treasury for railroads. I will not vote one dollar 
out of the iron mines of my country, at the cost of the 
owner, and of the miner who is engaged in drawing its 
wealth to the surface." 2 This seemed somewhat incon- 
sistent, but it was not so for a sincere protectionist. 
Seward fully understood the practical importance of 
all protectionists standing together: 

" We know that it [protection] requires the co-operation, 
the concerted action of all the industrial classes, and of 
capitalists of every description, to adjust and render equal, 
to procure the establishment of a system of imposts, with 
any view whatever, direct or indirect, to the protection and 
encouragement of American industry." . . . 

"'Mr. President, the whole manufacturing interest of the 
country is in danger ; and it is in danger because we, who 
are its friends, arc demoralized and divided." ... "In the 
very next session of Congress they will come with argu- 
ments equally insidious, and equally forcible, and then the 
manufacturers of Lowell may look to the safety of their 
spindles, and the sugar and the cotton-growers of the South 
may look to the safety of their sugar and their cotton- 
fields ; and the wheat-grower of Maryland, and the corn- 
grower of Ohio and Illinois, may look to the safety of their 
special interests." s 

Of free-trade he said : 

"I can understand the proposition of free-trade. It is 
an intelligible theory, and at some future'period down the 
vista of years, it is probable that the world will come to 
understand that universal free-trade is the wisest and most 

1 Globe, 1852-53, 910. 2 3 Works, 667. 3 3 Works, 633. 



OPINIONS ON THE TARIFF, ETC. 

beneficent system of fiscal administration for any govern- 
ment and for all governments ; and so far as that forms 
the principle on which this measure proceeds, I hail the in- 
troduction of it here. But free-trade involves not one 
only but two principles, not only absence of imports, but 
direct taxation to support the government. I call, then, 
upon those who support this measure of free-trade to de- 
fend it upon that principle — to carry it out on that prin- 
ciple, by bringing in a bill for direct taxation to an extent 
which will replace revenues surrendered/' 1 

However, Seward in 1854 voted for the reciprocity treaty 
with Canada, which was a liberal measure. 1 ' 

The exigencies that compelled the revision of the 
tariff in 1857 were not such as to bring into bold con- 
trast the principles of protection and free-trade. The 
tariff of 18-16 had so encouraged importations that there 
was a surplus of about twenty millions of dollars in 
gold in the treasury. This growing surplus both invited 
extravagant appropriations and seriously lessened the 
volume of currency in circulation. The first aim, there- 
fore, was to reduce the revenue. Two means were pro- 
posed. The House bill was designed to decrease the 
income of the government chiefly by transferring to the 
free list articles not produced here or that were neces- 
sary to our manufactures. This left the tariff on arti- 
cles coming into competition with American products ; 
and to that extent it recognized the principle of protec- 
tion. The Senate amendment proposed what is popu- 
larly called a horizontal reduction on most articles and 
a free entry for those demanded only by manufacturers. 
This, it was held, would preserve and extend the free- 
trade principle/ Seward naturally preferred the House 
bill, for he was opposed to reducing the duty on raw 
materials produced here, such as iron and wool. 

1 3 Works, 659. 2 4 Works, 30. 

3 Globe, 1856-57, Apdx., 328 ff. 
ii.— d 49 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

"I think/' he said, "the redaction of the revenue is in 
itself subordinate in importance to the stability of the in- 
dustry of the country. The inconvenience of having too 
full ;i treasury is only a consequence of the greater public 
inconvenience of importing from other countries many 
things which ought to be produced at home. I, therefore, 
want a measure which, while it effects a reduction of the 
revenue, will be sure also to reduce imports." ' 

Principally as a result of the financial crisis of 1857, 
the tariff law enacted that year had not yielded a suffi- 
cient revenue. The Morrill tariff of 1801 was designed to 
supply the deficit. Under the tariffs of 1846 and 1857 
there was a liberal warehouse system, so that import- 
ed goods might lie in bond a considerable time before 
the payment of duty. The House bill proposed to re- 
duce this period to so short a time as practically to do 
away with the credit feature. The Senate committee 
desired to increase the time from thirty to ninety days. 
Seward wished to make it three years. 2 The inland 
protectionists, like Simon Cameron, naturally looked 
upon such a plan as protection for importers and foreign 
manufacturers and as the withholding from the United 
States treasury of many millions. 3 Seward's constituency 
in New York city and his experience on the commit- 
tee on commerce had kept him free from the common 
prejudices against international exchanges where they 
did not directly conflict with important domestic inter- 
ests. This was the only point in the debate that he 
defended with persistency and special skill. He and 
his colleague, Preston King, and Sumner voted against 
their Republican associates, and the Senate approved 
Seward's amendment. He also made an effort — but 
an unsuccessful one — to reduce the tariff on books and 
printed literature from fifteen to ten per cent., urging 

J Globe, 1856-57, Apdx., 345. « Globe, 1860-61, 948. 

3 Globe, 18G0-G1, 930. 

50 



OPINIONS ON PUBLIC LANDS, ETC. 

that that would be "quite enough to levy on knowledge 
and literature." ' 

Nearly three-fourths of the four million square miles 
of national area had been in the possession of the Federal 
government, subject to the control and disposal of Con- 
gress. The public lands were so vast that for more than 
half a century our legislators seemed to believe that the 
supply could never be exhausted. They were sold at 
nominal prices, distributed as bounties for military ser- 
vice, and donated to the new states by the hundred 
thousand acres for purposes of internal improvement, 
education, and charity. 2 The westward flow of the 
population was greatly accelerated by the discovery of 
gold in California and by the acquisitions from Mexico. 
The schemes for obtaining public land soon became 
countless. West of the Ohio river many persons be- 
lieved that every one that wanted land should be given 
it for the asking, and the new states set up a clamor 
against the Federal government retaining control over 
lands within their borders. The revenue from the sale 
of the public lands was not needed by the United States 
treasury, but a majority in Congress could not be ob- 
tained for its distribution among the states. However, 
many of the Democrats agreed with the "Whigs that the 
Constitution gave Congress absolute control over the 
public domain. The popular demand for a spendthrift 
policy of distribution, and the political advantages to be 
gained by the advocates of such a policy, soon became too 
great to be resisted. As late as 1850 Seward estimated 
that there still remained seventeen hundred million acres 
of the public domain.' No wonder that the most sober 
legislators and the most clever politicians were over- 
flowing with opinions on the great land question. 4 

1 Globe, 1860-61, 987. s Globe, 1850-51, 742. 3 1 Works, 293. 

4 In 1851, Dawson, of Georgia, told the Senate, that the public lands 

51 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM II. SEWARD 

Seward's theories about the functions of the Federal 
government indicated that he would be hampered by 
no constitutional objections. Months before the Hun- 
garian revolution had failed, thousands of the spirited 
Magyars had come to the United States to seek a 
home. On January 9, 1850, Seward presented to the 
Senate a resolution denouncing the "injustice, bar- 
barity, and oppression" which Austria and Russia had 
practised toward Hungary, and requesting the commit- 
tee on public lands " to inquire and report on the pro- 
priety of setting apart a portion of the public domain, 
to be granted, free from all charges, to the exiles of 
Hungary already arrived, and hereafter to arrive, in the 
United States, as well as to the exiles fleeing from op- 
pression in other European countries." 1 Subsequently 
Foote, of Mississippi, characterized the different prop- 
ositions before the Senate for the disposition of public 
land as " bids " for popularity ; and the way in which 
Senators laughed and joked about the remark indicated 
that others held similar opinions. 2 Douglas charged 
Seward with giving the foreign-born resident an advan- 
tage over the native American ; and Dawson, of Georgia, 
called Seward's plan " constituting our public domain 
into a great national charity fund." 3 Seward practically 
admitted Dawson's charge, and replied to Douglas by 
saying that he would gladly vote for any other proposi- 
tion placing the immigrant and the native on an equal 
footing. He suggested that if the foreigner was given a 
preference it was because his " liberties had been cloven 

were "made a mere battledoor for political purposes; and any man 
who has any aspirations to the highest office in the gift of the people 
of this country makes it his business to form his platforms upon the 
public lands, and the rights and interests of the states are made sub- 
servient to the personal aspirations of individuals." . . . "This is true, 
and should be known; and I am prepared to tell it boldly. "— Globe, 
1850-51, 743. i Qiobe, 1849-50, 128. 

2 Globe, 1849-50, 262, 263. 3 Globe, 1849-50, 264. 

52 



OPINIONS ON PUBLIC LANDS, ETC. 

down," because he bad been deprived of his home, and 
had sought this land of liberty as an asylum. 1 More- 
over, he was so friendly toward immigrants that he was 
in favor of receiving all classes, and would support "an 
amelioration of the laws of naturalization, so as to give 
a vote to any man of any country on his becoming per- 
manently domiciled among us." 3 

In September, 1S50, he favored a bill for surveying 
Oregon and making donations of the public lands to 
settlers. He desired that immigrants that had declared 
their intentions to become citizens should have the same 
privileges as native Americans. 3 A few daj T s later, 
when the Senate was considering a measure to grant 
citizens certain mining privileges on the public lands in 
California, he moved to amend it so as to include immi- 
grants, as in the bill relating to Oregon. 4 Dawson pro- 
tested that this would throw open the gold mines to the 
whole world ; 5 and both of the California Senators, Fre- 
mont and Gwin, feared that the passage of such an 
amendment would cause their state to be overrun by the 
half-civilized Mexicans, while Gwin believed that many 
Mexicans would bring their peons with them. 6 Seward 
considered that " distinctions between races and castes 
are vices in any constitution of government," and he 
ventured the prophecy " that if we now refuse to dis- 
criminate in California in favor of those who are already 
citizens and those who are in the process of becoming 
so, we shall happily crush in the bud that principle of 
Native-Americanism which, if allowed to ripen, would 

1 Globe, 1849-50, 264. 

2 Ibid., 267. This phrase was changed so that in his Works it reads: 
" The melioration of the laws of naturalization, which put a period 
of five years and an oath in the way of any man of any country in be- 
coming a citizen, which raises a barrier between ourselves and those 
who cast their lot amongst us." — 1 Works, 295. 

3 1 Works, 322, 323. 4 1 WorJcs, 323-27. 
5 Globe, 1849-50, Apdx., 1365. a Ibid., 1366, 1367. 

53 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM II. SEWARD 

there, as elsewhere, produce only bitter fruits." 1 He 
could see no difference between the giving of farming 
privileges and the granting of mining concessions to 
immigrants. " The policy is the same in both cases ; it 
is to cover the earth with population as fast as possi- 
ble, and to distribute the wealth acquired as broadly as 
possible." He advocated the measure because he " re- 
garded the interests of the whole American family as 
demanding the practice of not only the largest civil 
liberty, but also the opening of the door to the privileges 
of citizenship widely and freely to all who may desire 
to enter." Foote, in another of his personal outbursts, 
charged that Seward could have advocated such doc- 
trines only " for the purpose of bolstering up the tot- 
tering pretensions to presidential advancement." 2 

The objection to Spanish-Americans was so strong that 
Senator Dodge, of Iowa, offered a further amendment 
conferring the proposed privileges on immigrants from 
Europe only. 1 This, it should be noticed, excluded those 
from Canada and all other parts of this continent, from 
Australia and other sections of the globe inhabited by 
European races. But few save Europeans had become 
citizens — and voters. Seward supported Dodge's amend- 
ment, without making any explanations. 4 

In February, 1851, a bill proposing to release to 
Louisiana all the public lands within her borders, to en- 
able her to improve the navigation of the Mississippi, 
was under consideration. Seward favored it, and in a 
carefully prepared speech explained his theories as to 
the best way to deal with the public domain in general.' 
The strongest objections to the gratuitous distribution of 
the lands or their relinquishment to the states in which 
they lay, were that they had cost the nation millions of 



1 1 Works, 324. * Globe, 1849-50, Apdx., 1366. 

3 Ibid., 1367.. « Ibid. ■ 1 Works, 156-71. 

54 



OPINIONS ON PUBLIC LANDS, ETC. 

dollars, and that they were a proper and important 
source of revenue. In order to overcome these objec- 
tions, Seward urged such considerations as these : that 
"the property given would remain with the giver after 
the gift, and would be enhanced in usefulness by the 
gift"; that, if against all the cost of the public lands we 
put " all the national benefits — financial, commercial, and 
political — which have been secured, the domain would 
be discharged from all indebtedness whatever to the 
treasury " ; that the value of the public land " is what it 
is worth now, not what it cost." Because the govern- 
ment had disposed of so many million acres in recent 
years, which were still unoccupied and in the market, it 
was estimated that it would be from eight to sixteen years 
before the public lands would again be a source of any 
considerable profit. " The domain no longer yields, nor 
will ever again yield, a revenue." 1 He further main- 
tained that we had only a temporary jurisdiction and a 
temporary estate in the public lands ; that the reversion 
belonged to the states ; and that until that reversion 
had taken place, the domain would not begin to contrib- 
ute to the wealth and strength of the whole republic. 2 

He overlooked the facts that the lands could only 
be made valuable by actual settlement; that whether 
owned by the states or the nation the demand for 
them by settlers would not be greatly affected, for 
the tendencies and numbers of the population would 
not be specially influenced ; that if the states made 
gratuitous grants, then there would be no revenues 
from them with which to "construct channels of trade 
and to found systems of education," of which Seward 
was dreaming; 3 that if the states should realize 
small or great returns from them at any time — and 
Seward expected the latter — then it must be because 



1 1 Works, 164-66. * 1 Works, 168. 3 Ibid, 169. 

55 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM IT. SEWARD 

the lands, which the government was urged to surren- 
der as worthless, had value. Furthermore, Seward was 
mistaken as to his estimate of future revenue. As a 
fact, for the next eight years the public lands yielded 
over forty-one million dollars. 1 

From his experiences in connection with the land 
company in New York, he had gained valuable knowl- 
edge about the importance of small possessions of 
land by individuals, and the keeping of the homestead 
free from seizure by creditors. His influence in these 
respects was thoroughly good. But in regard to the 
disposal of the national estate his reasoning was often 
unsound. He seemed to be infatuated with the no- 
tion that the public lands should be got rid of in the 
shortest possible time. His manner and restless activity 
remind one of a bustling land-agent rather than of a 
sober and far-seeing statesman, who remembers that 
there are to be future generations and increased mill- 
ions to be cared for in other centuries. At first he fa- 
vored the appropriation of the revenues from the sale 
of the public lands to the use of the states. Then he 
unsuccessfully attempted to have the lands within the 
states given to them outright. So the nearest he could 
come to realizing his wishes was to favor every meas- 
ure asking for public lands for any purpose that claimed 
to be connected with internal improvements, education, 
or charity. It should not be inferred that these ideas 
were peculiar to Seward. Many others were influenced 
by the current of popular opinion ; but his i'ederalistic 
principles, his ambition, and his prominence in his party 
compelled him to be first and most extreme in this field 
as in others, or to forego the popularity to be won. 

There was one important advantage to be gained by 
the speedy settlement of as much as possible of the pub- 



3 Lalor's Cyclopedia, 478. 
56 



OPINIONS ON INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS, ETC. 

lie domain — most of which had a climate unfavorable to 
slavery — and that was the development of the power of 
the North, which would make disunion more and more 
difficult. Seward and the southern leaders foresaw this, 
and it had considerable influence upon their respective 
actions. He would have been glad, as has been noticed, 
to use the public lands to pay for "the gradual but 
certain removal of slavery, by a scheme of compensat- 
ing emancipation." 1 But there was no public senti- 
ment favorable to such a suggestion. 

Seward's opinions regarding internal improvements 
resembled those on the tariff and the public lands. The 
plan of making moderate grants of lands to the states 
for the purposes of highways and canals was departed 
from in 1850. In that year Douglas, although theoreti- 
cally a strict constructionist, pushed through Congress a 
bill ceding to the states of Illinois, Mississippi, and Ala- 
bama about two and a half million acres of land for 
the purpose of building the Illinois Central and the 
Mobile and Ohio railroads. 2 The measure received Sew- 
ard's enthusiastic support. 3 He saw no constitutional 
objections to the construction of roads of any kind that 
would serve for great national objects. As a country 
had need of great highways and canals before private 
capital could build them, and as the new states, unlike 
the old, did not possess the resource of public lands, 

"the government owes it to itself, and to the states, to 
make liberal, and at the same time judicious, appropria- 
tions, to extend its net-work of railroads and canals over 
these new regions, where the people and the government 
are unable to construct the work themselves. And, if 
there were any apparent fallacy in this argument, I think I 
should nevertheless be convinced of its soundness by the 

1 1 Works, 167. 

s Globe, 1849-50, 844-45 ; Cutts's Douglas, 187-99 ; 2 Lalor's Cyclo- 
paedia, 572. 3 1 Works, 302-307. 

57 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

fact that all the new states which have undertaken to con- 
struct these necessary thoroughfares — necessary not only 
for themselves but for the whole country; necessary for 
the welfare and prosperity and even for the existence of 
the Union— have all found themselves embarrassed and 
crippled, and many of them rendered bankrupt, by the at- 
tempt to accomplish objects which they were unable to ac- 
complish, and which the Federal government had ample 
power to carry into effect." 1 

From this time forward bills of similar character, but 
not calling for such enormous amounts, became very nu- 
merous. In 1854, when many of them were before the 
Senate, Seward said : " I have always voted for every 
one of these bills, though I have no personal interest in 
them." 2 

In his political career there was no public project 
that he cherished so persistently as that of building, 
with the assistance of the Federal government, a rail- 
road to the Pacific ocean. During the first year of his 
senatorship he promised to aid it, 3 and nearly twelve 
years later he said that it had been " the first, chiefest, 
and best of all the measures" he could support while 
remaining in the public service. 4 From the beginning 
of 1854 he was a member of the special committee on 
a Pacific railroad, and he was the ablest and most 
strenuous advocate of whatever measure seemed likely 
to win a majority in Congress. Many members in each 
house had "constitutional" objections to giving govern- 
mental support to a project unless they could be assured 
that the road would be so located as to be a special 
benefit to their respective states. A majority could not 
be obtained for one road, but it seemed likely that a 
bill providing for three, in different localities, might be 
passed. A large number of Congressmen were willing 

1 1 Works, 305. * Globe, 1853-54, 409. 

3 3 Works, 424, 435. * Globe, 1860-61, 250. 

58 



OPINIONS ON A PACIFIC RAILROAD, ETC. 

to vote for the necessary appropriations, but they were 
opposed to making the railroad a governmental enter- 
prise. 

It was decidedly to Seward's credit that he looked 
with disfavor upon the lavish and probably impossible 
" log-rolling " scheme of constructing three railroads to 
the Pacific. At the same time he admitted: "It is the 
very extraordinary extension of that [the railroad] sys- 
tem, indeed, which has, to a great extent, produced the 
present depression in the country." 1 While he thought 
the building of a Pacific railroad so urgent as to make 
the adoption of any special plan secondary in impor- 
tance, he had very clear ideas about the advantages of a 
northern route "in continuation of the northwestern 
track of the emigration which has been pursued from 
the time when the navigation of the great lakes was 
opened." ... "I would directly employ the capital and 
credit of the United States, increasing the revenues of 
the United States from commerce for the purpose of 
defraying the cost, and establishing, at the same time, 
a sinking fund which should, within a reasonable 
period, absorb the public debt thus created. And I 
would surrender the public lands in the vicinity of 
the road to actual settlers for cultivation, so as to 
secure the speediest possible production of revenue from 
it." 8 

Believing a Pacific railroad to be essential to the 
safety of the Union, the matter of appropriating fifty 
or a hundred million dollars, or of pledging ten millions 
a year for maintaining the system, seemed to him to 
be comparatively insignificant. "It is necessary; and, 
since it is necessary, there is an end of the argument." 
In his opinion it had the same claims upon the United 
States treasury as the postal system and the main- 

1 Globe, 1854-55, 750. i Globe, 1858-59, 157. 

59 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

tenance of the army and the navy ; and if it could not 
otherwise be built, there should be retrenchment in 
these departments. 1 

Year after year he begged Senators to stop quibbling 
and to come to a vote. He repeatedly urged that it 
was folly to think of a foreign war or to negotiate 
treaties for routes across Central America until we had 
done what was possible to make one people of the in- 
habitants of the East and of the West. In the winter 
of 1858-59, when there were many indications that the 
Democrats were in search of a foreign war as the best 
way to retrieve the fortunes of their party, Seward 
pleaded for his enterprise as " a peaceful direction of 
the activity of the nation. Peaceful activity is safer; 
it is cheaper; it is surer; it saves all the elements of 
national strength and national power, and increases 
them." 3 Again, in January, 1S61, when the Union was 
about to be rent in twain, he begged the Senate to 
appropriate ninety- six million dollars for the building 
of a northern and a southern railway to the Pacific, 
insisting that the measure was one " of conciliation, of 
pacification, of compromise, and of union." 3 A few 
days later, after several southern Senators had made 
their valedictories, he tried to lay aside the disputed 
question as to their resignations, so that he might bring 
the Pacific railroad bill to a vote. 4 Although Congress 
did not settle upon a plan until a year after Seward 
had become Secretary of State, he lived to see the com- 
pletion of the leading features of the great enterprise. 

Long before 1850 the custom of making appropria- 

1 Globe, 1858-59, 158. In his zeal he called it "the realization of 
what all Europe has been striving for for the last four hundred years," 
for it made practical the expectations of a discovery of a western 
passage from Europe to the shores of Cathay. — Globe, 1857-58, 1585. 

5 Globe, 1858-59, 159. 3 Globe, 1860-61, 250. 

4 Globe, 1860-61, 505. 

60 



OPINIONS ON INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS, ETC. 

tions for the improvement of the navigation of rivers 
and harbors had become well established. Many of 
the strict constructionists still believed that the Consti- 
tution had not given Congress the right to make such 
improvements within the states; but as in the case of 
land appropriations for railroads, Democratic Congress- 
men of any state to be especially benefited were gen- 
erally ready to vote with the Whigs or the Republicans. 
Seward was so confident that Congress had this power 
that he seems never to have considered it worth while 
to undertake its defence. A careful search of the Globe 
during the years when he was Senator has not revealed 
any evidence that he ever objected to any item in any 
river and harbor bill, even where there was a large 
appropriation for deepening some little river, creek, or 
cove, as was often the case. He frequently had the 
management of these bills when before the Senate, and 
he pursued, almost the same policy as in his efforts to 
promote the distribution of the public lands. He fa- 
vored granting the utmost that anybody would pro- 
pose, but he would accept what could be obtained: "I 
prefer internal improvements somehow to internal im- 
provements nohow; I prefer internal improvements any 
way to a defeat and subversion of the system." 1 

The self-confidence resulting from the rapid growth 
of population and riches had inspired the United States 
with a desire to rival the greatest of maritime nations. 
England began to subsidize the Cunard steamers as early 
as 1839. Two years later, Thomas Butler King, of Geor- 
gia, urged that the United States should adopt a like 
system. In 1847 a line of steamers, aided by our na- 
tional treasury, began to ply between New York and 
Bremen. Shortly afterward provision was made for 

1 Globe, 1854-55, 661. 
61 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM II. SEWARD 

other lines. Edward K. Collins agreed to build five fast 
ships, suitable for use by the government in time of war, 
which should make twenty round trips per annum be- 
tween New York and Liverpool, and carry the United 
States mail for three hundred and eighty-five thousand 
dollars a year for ten years. In 1852 the United States 
wanted the number of trips increased to twenty-six, but 
the Collins company claimed to have suffered great loss- 
es, and it demanded that the subsidy should be increased 
to eight hundred and fifty-eight thousand dollars. 

R. M. T. Hunter, of Virginia, who was chairman of 
the Senate committee on finance, led the opposition, urg- 
ing that we were trying to rival England by subsidiz- 
ing these steamers from the United States treasury ; that 
the plan rested upon the same basis as the protection of 
iron factories ; that it was injurious to all other lines car- 
rying freight and passengers, and that the ships would 
not be suitable for use in time of war. 1 

Seward became deeply interested in the enterprise. 
On April 27, 1852, he defended it in one of his careful- 
ly prepared speeches. 2 He maintained that it was nec- 
essary to break the English monopoly of carrying the 
mails; that it was essential to our national greatness, 
and would be invaluable in case of war; that the in- 
crease in postage accruing promised to defray the ex- 
pense in the near future ; that a few more years were 
necessary to decide whether steam navigation would be 
self-sustaining ; that to surrender it at this time would 
be nothing less than to yield "the proud commercial 
and political position we have gained by two wars with 
Great Britain" and to take "the position of Mexico, of 
the Canadas, and of the South American states." He 
had a vision of the world embraced in a single " great 
commercial system, ramified by a thousand nerves pro- 

1 Globe, 1851-52, 1148-49. ■ 1 Works, 222-35. 

62 



OPINIONS ON SHIP-SUBSIDIES, ETC. 

jecting from the one head at London. Yet, stupendous 
as the scheme is, our own merchants, conscious of equal 
capacity and equal resources, and relying on experience 
for success, stand here beseeching us to allow them to 
counteract its fulfilment, and ask of us facilities and 
aid equal to those yielded by the British government to 
its citizens." 1 He concluded with an eloquent tribute 
to America's mechanical genius, and expressed the belief 
that, considering our superior resources in soil and in the 
influence of freedom, our "enterprise will be adequate to 
the glorious conflict, if it shall be sustained by constancy 
and perseverance on the part of their government." 

The subject fired Seward's imagination, so that he 
made one of the most eloquent speeches of his life. No 
other argument in the debate was so finished and inspir- 
ing. The Tribune printed it in full and praised it editori- 
ally. 5 Writing to Seward about it, Greeley said : "Dana, 
who has been correcting the manuscript for the press, 
says it is the speech of the session." 1 

While the proposition for increasing the subsidy was 
under consideration, the Baltic,, one of the best of the 
Collins steamers, came to Washington. Seward moved 
that the Senate should adjourn over one day so as to 
accept the invitation of the company to inspect the 
vessel. Several members thought they scented cor- 
ruption, and strenuously objected to the proposition, 
but Seward carried his point. 4 The various influences 
at work were so strong that Congress voted the desired 
subsidy of eight hundred and fifty-eight thousand dol- 
lars per annum, reserving the right to cut off the in- 
crease after giving six months' notice any time after the 
end of 1854. 

1 1 Works, 233, 234. 2 Tribune, April 28, 1852. 

3 Letter of April 27, 1852. Seward MSS. This showed that Sew- 
ard had furnished the Tribune a copy of the speech iii advance. 

4 Globe, 1851-52, 657-59. 

63 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

For several years there "was the keenest rivalry in 
speed between the Collins (American) and Cunard 
(British) lines. It was an international race which the 
people on each side watched with patriotic interest. In 
the autumn of 1854, the Arctic, of the Collins line, col- 
lided with a vessel in a fog, and over three hundred of 
those on board went down. The disaster was felt like 
a national calamity. Nevertheless, in 1855, Congress 
again voted the appropriation and tried to deprive it- 
self of the power to discontinue the increased subsidy. 
President Pierce vetoed the bill. The Tribune praised 
him ardently for his bold stand " against the overwhelm- 
ing surges of venality that broke over a debauched 
Congress." 1 Congress endeavored to pass the bill over 
the veto, but it was able only to continue the existing 
arrangement.* 

In the debate of 1855 Seward showed that his en- 
thusiasm had grown rather than lessened. Instead of 
seeing the evils of such special legislation, he complained 
because the contract had not been made absolute and 
unchangeable for a number of years. 3 To the com- 
plaint that it was " an extravagant and luxurious line," 

1 The article was entitled "Thou Shalt Not Steal," and seems to 
have been entirely non-partisan. See Pike's First Blows, etc., 279-82. 

2 3 Rhodes, 11, 12. 

3 "Sir, it is our misfortune that we have made an unnecessary 
stipulation, and reserve in our hands a power, in consequence of which 
every opponent of this scheme about the purlieus of the Capitol, in 
the city of New York, through the whole Union, all competitors, all 
enemies, all haters of Collins and his prosperity, will come here and 
combine together to urge Congress to discontinue the contract that 
their own private ends may be attained. Such as this is the spectacle 
which we see before us. Here are your Vanderbilts and others, rivals 
or enemies of the Collins line, who are pressing upon Congress to ex- 
ercise this power of annulling the contract, in order that they may 
have the benefit of it; and when the proprietors of the line come for- 
ward in great alarm and peril to defend their rights, they are told that 
their solicitations impair the dignity and taint the atmosphere of Con- 
gress."— Globe, 1854-55, Apdx., 301. 

64 



OPINIONS ON SHIP-SUBSIDIES, ETC. 

he replied by saying that in his judgment it was " the 
proper diplomatic representative of the United States to 
the Old World." He pledged it his support, " now, and 
always, with every contribution which is necessary." 
His ambition for such enterprises was boundless, and he 
added : " I shall endeavor to extend similar lines of com- 
munication across the Pacific, until we shall have en- 
circled the world with the couriers of intelligence and 
the instructions of civil and religious liberty." 1 Many 
objected that this plan created a monopoly and dis- 
couraged the development of a steam marine. Seward's 
answer showed w r hat an infatuation had taken posses- 
sion of him : 

" Sir, it is the way, and the only way, in which you can 
bring a steam marine into existence. It is thirty years 
since Dr. Lardner predicted that steam would never be a 
self -sustaining agent upon the ocean. When the first 
steamer crossed from Bristol to New York, the world de- 
rided the short-sightedness of the great philosopher. But, 
sir, what is the fact ? Thirty years have elapsed, and, al- 
though steam is so necessary and useful an agent, it is not 
yet self-sustaining as a navigating power across the Atlan- 
tic, nor across any other ocean ; and you have your choice 
either by the government to aid and sustain steam lines, 
or do without them altogether. It is true, the time will 
come when it will not be necessary to render this aid; but 
until that time shall come it is most wise, and just, and 
prudent to sustain it in this way." 2 

Many believed that the subsidy was extravagant, es- 
pecially as Vanderbilt offered to perform the same ser- 
vice for about half the amount. 3 Early in 1856 a second 
Collins steamer, the Pacific was wrecked, and all on 
board were lost. A few months later Congress ordered 
the discontinuance of the extra compensation. About 
the same time Seward wrote home : " Collins's steamers 



1 Globe, 1854-55, Apdx. , 301 . 8 Ibid. 

3 Globe, 1854-55, Apdx., 289. 
ii— e 65 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM II. SEWARD 

have been ruined by Vanderbilt's rivalry ; and Vander- 
bilt himself is even worse off." ' Collins soon went into 
bankruptcy, and this grand scheme came to a sad end. 

Cyrus W. Field became convinced that a telegraphic 
cable could be made and operated so as to connect New- 
foundland and Ireland ; and before the end of 1856 he 
obtained the assistance of Great Britain, for the hazard 
and expense of the experiment were too great for private 
capital. Then he visited Washington to enlist the sup- 
port of Congress. Early in 1857 Seward introduced a 
bill providing for governmental aid in the form of a 
small subsidy. 2 The object was just the one to call 
forth his best efforts. He defended the proposition and 
watched its interests in each house. Before the session 
ended, the desired support of the government was se- 
cured. Within about a year the great enterprise was 
brought to a successful completion. Nearly everywhere 
Americans expressed their joy and pride in such demon- 
strations as would not be expected to follow any occur- 
rence less important than a national victory. The citi- 
zens of Auburn, always alert and appreciative of the 
significance of passing events, flocked about Seward, 
and demanded that he should give utterance to their 
enthusiasm. He had a right to feel and express deep 
satisfaction on account of the part he had taken in 
helping forward the great undertaking. 3 

In a speech of July 29, 1852, on the " Survey of the 
Arctic and Pacific Oceans," Seward set forth his opin- 
ions as to the duty of the nation to maritime interests 
and as to the functions of commerce in bringing the 
Orient and the Occident into closer relations. 4 He had 

1 2 Seward, 2S7. 2 Globe, 1856-57, 258, 395. 

3 2 Seward, 348, 349. 4 1 Works, 236-53. 

66 



OPINIONS ON COMMERCE IN THE PACIFIC, ETC. 

reported from the committee on commerce a bill the 
purpose of which was to cause an exploration and the 
making of charts of those parts of the Pacific and Arctic 
oceans traversed by our vessels engaged in whaling or 
in commerce with China and Japan. The work was to 
be done by the Navy Department, and one hundred and 
twenty-five thousand dollars was to be appropriated for 
this service. 1 

One would have to search long before finding as in- 
teresting a summary of the whaling industry as Sew- 
ard gave in a few paragraphs. He was proud of the 
supremacy of American whale-fishermen, for between 
1750 and 1S24 England paid her whalers fifteen million 
dollars in subsidies. He showed that the most profit- 
able, but at the same time most dangerous, fishing- 
grounds were in the neighborhood of Behring Straits, 
where a large part of the exploration was to be made. 
With the practical sense of a business man, he asked : 
" Sir, have you looked recently at the China trade ? It 
reaches already seven millions in value annually. Have 
you watched the California trade ? Its export of bullion 
alone exceeds fifty millions of dollars annually, and as 
yet the mineral development of that state has only be- 
gun. The settlement of the Pacific coast is in a state 
of sheer infancy." But back of the great past and the 
wonderful present, and above the promises of the future, 
he thought he saw a higher purpose, a special mission 
for our people : 

" Even the discovery of this continent and its islands, and 
the organization of society and government upon them, 
grand and important as these events have been, were but 
conditional, preliminary, and ancillary to the more sublime 
result now in the act of consummation — the reunion of 
the two civilizations, which, having parted on the plains of 
Asia four thousand years ago, and having travelled ever 

1 Globe, 1851-52, 1935, 2041. 
67 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

afterward in opposite directions around the world, now 
meet again on the coasts and islands of the Pacific Ocean. 
... It will be followed by the equalization of the condi- 
tion of society and the restoration of the unity of the 
human family. . . . Liberty has developed under improved 
forms of government, and science has subjected nature in 
Western Europe and in America. Navigation, improved 
by steam, enables men to outstrip the winds, and intelli- 
gence conveyed by electricity excels in velocity the light. 
With these favoring circumstances there has come also a 
sudden abundance of gold that largely relieves labor from 
its long subjection to realized capital. Sir, this movement 
is no delusion." 

A little farther on he asked: 

"Who does not see that this movement [of commerce] 
must effect our own complete emancipation from what 
remains of European influence and prejudice, and in turn 
develop the American opinion and influence which shall 
remould constitutions, laws, and customs in the land that 
is first greeted by the rising sun ? Sir, although I am no 
socialist, no dreamer of a suddenly coming millennium, I 
nevertheless cannot reject the hope that peace is now to 
have her sway, and that as war has hitherto defaced and 
saddened the Atlantic world, the better passions of man- 
kind will soon have their development in the new theatre 
of human activity." 

He fancied that this change was to be wrought not by 
means of wars and conquests, but by commerce. " What- 
ever nation shall put that commerce into full employ- 
ment, and shall conduct it steadily with adequate ex- 
pansion, will become necessarily the greatest of existing 
states; greater than any that has ever existed." Al- 
though England's flag was to be met almost everywhere 
— " rooted into the very earth," claiming supremacy in 
continents, and whatever is most valuable in all the 
oceans — and although her commerce was advanced by 
the never -tiring steam-engine and by her thoughts, 
language, and religion, Seward correctly believed that our 
resources were abundant for competition with her. 

68 



OPINIONS ON COMMERCE IN THE PACIFIC, ETC. 

Here we see Seward in his best, his true role. The 
proposition was right, constitutional, and statesmanlike. 
There was no section to be flattered, no class of voters 
to be wheedled, no selfish or ulterior purpose to serve. 
Therefore he gave rein to his intelligence and his highest 
impulses. His graceful paragraphs show fine literary 
skill and oratorical power; his arguments are shielded 
by no sophistical antitheses ; his eloquence is the pro- 
duct of real feelings ; his dreams and prophecies ex- 
press the hopes of a zealous philanthropist, an ambitious 
patriot, and an over-confident federalist. 



CHAPTER XXVII 
THE MAN AND THE SENATOR, 1849-61 

Seward's intellectual and social qualities were most 
attractive. Yet probably no other antislavery man, on 
entering Congress, encountered such strong prejudices. 
" The newspapers have given me so bad a character 
that I am regarded with alarm and apprehension," he 
wrote from Washington in February, 1849. His man- 
ner was dignified, but not courtly, and his easy and un- 
pretentious address was very pleasing. Although Mrs. 
Seward's health compelled her to remain in Auburn 
most of the time, the Senator, unlike the great majority 
of his colleagues, always kept a well-equipped house in 
Washington. 

A social dinner was his favorite form of hospitality. 
Of course northern Whigs or Republicans were most 
frequently invited, but he early sought friendly relations 
with political adversaries. Of a dinner-party in April, 
1852, Mrs. Seward reported : "We had, as usual, a singu- 
lar combination of ultra-southern men, Free-Soilers, and 
Democratic members of Congress." In December, 1853, 
he gave a reception to the Whig delegation from New 
York, and to " such other Whigs as choose to come — 
say forty or fifty." On May 28, 1858, he wrote : " I in- 
vited all the Anti-Lecompton members of Congress to 
supper last night, together with most of the foreign 
Ministers. Nearly all came from North, South, East, 
and West, Republicans, ' Americans,' and Democrats, and 
we had a very joyful time." Seward's house was much 

70 



THE MAN AND THE SENATOR, 1849-61 

like a club where political questions were discussed with 
frankness, even with opponents. There was rarely any 
ostentation in his entertainments during this period, but 
he did not overlook the average public man's apprecia- 
tion of good dishes and choice wines and cigars. 

His personal habits were well suited to his political 
position and his many duties. He dressed plainly, usu- 
ally in black. He rose early, contrary to Washing- 
ton custom : at five or six in summer, and an hour or 
so later in winter. 1 He often enjoyed an early walk to 
the market, and rarely omitted his daily letter to Mrs. 
Seward when they were separated. 2 He wrote to her 
in 1850 : " I [have] had my walk, a visit to the public 
greenhouse, my coffee and eggs, and the Intelligencer, 
and now indulge myself with a word to you, before 
beginning the studies of the day." He was an in- 
veterate smoker. He drank little except at dinner, 
and then in moderation ; but he was always fond of the 
good-fellowship and sprightly conversation that wine 
and brandy are likely to inspire. He was much amused 
by a remark made in his house by Greeley to the servant 

1 111 a letter of May 16, 1850, to his wife, he said: " I retire at ten, 
and thus have enabled myself to resume my habit of rising at five." 

1 A few sentences from these notes will amply show their character: 

" I have set my window wide open to draw in the morning sun, and 
I begin the labor of the day as usual by rehearsing to you the details 
and incidents of the day that has just past." 

" Your letters woo me home strongly by so many touching notices 
of my children, of the trees and flowers, and of friends." 

On his fifty-fourth birthday he said : " I write to you a note to ex- 
press to you my joy at your returning health, and my assurances of 
continued and enduring affection. I would that I were nearer to you." 

"This is Christmas Eve. House solitary. How poor I am ! I 
shall wake up to-morrow and there will be no beaming faces around 
me, no children, no friends. Well, I am tired of this, and I have but 
one more Christmas after it to spend in Washington." 

71 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

filling a champagne-glass: " That's right. All that you 
put in there is warranted not to kill !" As to work, 
he had the happy faculty of accomplishing a great 
deal without seeming to be weighed down by it. He 
thought so far ahead and was so rapid a planner that 
he was hardly ever caught unprepared. Sumner told 
his colleagues that the New York Senator's life had 
been one of " unsurpassed industry." ' After Seward 
moved to Washington his opportunities for miscel- 
laneous reading became fewer and fewer. " What 
luxury there is in reading nowadays, when all that 
is done that way is not merely by stealth, but by 'flat 
burglary'!" 2 

1 Globe, 1855-56, Apdx., 540. 

2 2 Seward, 135. Writing of his father's summer life in Auburn, 
Mr. F. W. Seward says : " He rose usually at six, and liked either a 
walk in the garden or a canter on horseback of a mile or two before 
breakfast. Then meeting the family at table, he would tell them what 
new flower was in bloom, what fruit had ripened, what birds had 
come, and how they were occupied, what change or improvement he 
found in the village streets or on the country roads. After a cigar 
and the morning paper, he would go to the old writing-chair in the 
bay-window of the tower, and here write his letters and study law- 
cases or public addresses. . . . Sometimes the visitors would be so 
frequent, and the visits so long, that he would find it necessary to 
supplement the day's work by continuing his studies till late at night. 
The papers in his cases would be sent to the law - office to be 
copied." . . . 

" He liked to push his work vigorously . . . and then take a day 
for recreation. With his family, or some friend or neighbor, he would 
drive to the Owasco or Cayuga lake and spend the day in boating or 
fishing. Or he would take a longer drive to Skaneateles, Aurora, El- 
bridge, or some other village in the vicinity, call upon acquaintances 
there, and return at nightfall. In the evening, when not at work, he 
liked a rubber of whist, conversation, or reading." 

..." Though having little leisure, he contrived to find time, in the 
course of a season, for a good deal of reading. Old and standard au- 
thors he preferred to any literary novelties. He would devote his 
spare moments, for a week or two, to some poet, philosopher, or his- 
torian, and then take up another. Chaucer and Spenser, Ben Jonson 
and Ariosto, were among his favorites at this period. Of English 

72 



THE MAN AND THE SENATOR, 1849-61 

Of all the public men of his time, probably Seward 
travelled most extensively for pleasure. It was not 
strange that social and political questions in all states 
and countries interested him, but it is very unusual to 
find a busy and ambitious politician that has eyes and 
ears and tastes for almost everything. The careful and 
interesting accounts that Seward wrote of his experi- 
ences from day to day are crowded with evidences of his 
enthusiastic temperament, quick perception, and great 
mental and physical activity. 

In July, 1857, the Senator and Mr. and Mrs. Fred- 
erick "W. Seward started on a trip to Labrador. They 
made several short stops between Niagara and Quebec. 
Just for enjoyment and novelty they spent a whole 
night in a rowboat on the St. Lawrence. At Quebec a 
fishing schooner was chartered. They engaged a cap- 
tain, a pilot, and a seaman, and laid in provisions and 
equipments for a month's cruise. Labrador was the 
goal, and sailing and fishing according to wind and 
other circumstances were the chief pleasures. They 
caught cod, mackerel, trout, salmon, and lobsters, at 
different times. Seward kept a " Log of the Schooner 
Emerence" from July 31 to August 27, 1857. It was 
written in a flowing, jocose style, and was designed 
merely for the family circle at Auburn. But it was 
found to be so pleasing that the senatorial sailor con- 
sented to its publication in the New York Tribune and 
the Albany Evening Journal. 1 A few selections from 
this log will give the flavor of Seward's quality as a 
traveller and descriptive writer : 

essayists he liked Sidney Smith, Macaulay, Mackintosh, Jeffrey, and 
Carlyle. Prescott's histories he read as fast as they came out. 
Brougham's Political Philosophy, Lieber's Political Ethics, Burke's 
Speeches, and Tooke's Diversions of Parley, he read over more than 
once."— 2 Seward, 203, 204. 
1 2 Seward, 302 ff . 

73 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

"There was a dispute kept up for some time, yesterday, 
between the cook and the pilot, whether the waters around 
us were fresh still, or salt. We compromised by boiling 
our soup with fresh water from the cask, and our pork with 
that brought up from the depth beneath us. Toward night, 
myriads of ducks dotted the waves, and so late as ten 
o'clock birds were heard singing in notes not unlike those 
of the robin and the mocking-bird. Here and there a huge 
porpoise disturbed the glassy surface as he came up to in- 
hale, and once or twice a seal thrust his black and hairy 
doglike head like a buoy above the water. We studied 
the geography of the moon through our spy-glass, after the 
headlands of our planet became indistinct in the dark- 
ness." 

"At two p.m. yesterday we passed a high rocky point, 
and the river Saguenay was disclosed to our view. It is a 
mile wide at its mouth, but this magnificent flood seems 
narrow in contrast with the twenty miles breadth of the St. 
Lawrence. The Saguenay inspired admiration when first 
seen, three hundred years ago, by white men, and it is mar- 
vellous yet. It flows from Lake St. John (eighty miles 
northward from here) in a defile between mountains fifteen 
hundred to two thousand and two thousand five hundred 
feet high, and its depth lower than that of the St. Lawrence. 
Far up as we could see, and those acquainted say so far 
as it is navigable, its banks are rugged, and scarce a habi- 
tation is found upon it. The shore of the St. Lawrence is 
almost equally rugged. Here and there is a hamlet hung 
on the mountain-side, surrounded by sterility itself. . . . 
We landed on the rocks, where a dead porpoise and a dead 
seal had been washed by the tide. On the beach we were 
kindly received by a young Scotchman, who lives in a long, 
low, and old building, which proves, inside, to be a very 
respectable mansion, and which overlooks the bay. . . . 
He gave us brandy-and-water, and tendered us hospitali- 
ties under his roof for a day or a week. He showed us 
peltries and snow-shoes and the Indian -made apparel 
which he uses in his excursions in the winter." 

"The events recorded in this Log are not great nor brill- 
iant. They determine neither the fate of states nor the 
character of heroes. But they are nevertheless dramatic 
in one respect. They are various and sudden in their 
transition. Yesterday at noon we were humbly suing a 

74 



THE MAN AND THE SENATOR, 1849-61 

Yankee fisherman, with our silver in hand, for a few 
mackerel. At tea we were called off by the pilot to attend 
to our lines. I drew up, from the depth of one hundred 
feet, a huge cod. Hardly had we disengaged him from the 
hook when F. drew up two at once, and then even A. 
brought up one, large enough for an alderman's feast, from 
his watery home. We continued enjoying this sport for 
two. hours, when we relinquished it, simply because it was 
inhuman and a waste of time to add to our stores at pres- 
ent," 

"At five this morning the forest was whitened with 
puffins leaving their roosts, and cawing and clamorous so 
as to be heard for miles. Ducks are sailing round us with 
the utmost nonchalance ; porpoises are taking air-baths ; 
and last evening, after we had wearied ourselves with draw- 
ing cod-fish up from their recesses, and the sun had just 
set, a young whale calf, almost as large as an elephant, ap- 
peared just off the after quarter-deck, and moved around 
to the bows, near enough to be taken with a noose" 

A journey" of a different character was the one that 
began with such unusual demonstrations in New York 
harbor in May, 1859. ' He visited the great capitals 
and had interviews with many of the rulers and famous 
statesmen of Europe. When it is remembered that 
Seward had never held office in any administration, and 
that his name was, at best, but little known on the 
continent of Europe, this trip was a very surprising ex- 
pression of his ambition to know, and be known among, 
the great public men of the world. 

During the two months spent in England he received 
such attentions as are rarely shown to any one less than 
a Secretary of State or a Minister. Queen Victoria in- 
vited him to be presented without the usual delay. The 
names of the prominent persons he met would make a 
long list. Among them were Palmerston, Lord John 
Russell, Gladstone, Macaulay, Harriet Martineau, and 

1 See Vol. I., p. 494. 2 Seward, 363-436, gives the traveller's rec- 
ords of the trip. 

75 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

many others famous in politics or literature. Break- 
fasts, luncheons, dinners, receptions, and balls he at- 
tended as if he were a visiting diplomatist of great 
fame and high rank. He did not exaggerate when he 
wrote : " I leap from grave to gay — from history to 
poetry and romance. I fall flat into the midst of spindles 
and power-looms. Just now I am fresh from Holyrood, 
and old Stirling, and from patrimonial seats of the 
nobility — fallen into the black, thick smoke of York- 
shire." Manchester, Glasgow, and Leeds, with their 
countless industries and many thousands of factory- 
hands, did not interest him less than vast country estates 
and the aristocratic society of London. 

In France he met Lamartine and several Ministers of 
State, and spent a day very familiarly with Napoleon 
III. at Compiegne. In Rome everything seemed to in- 
terest him, and of course he — a candidate for the presiden- 
tial nomination in 1860 — did not overlook the influence 
of the Catholic Church. The Pope granted him a long 
audience, and gave him his blessing. Pius IX. knew all 
about the New York Senator's past, and playfully ex- 
pressed " some good wishes for my [Seward's] higher 
advancement." It also appeared that the Holy Father 
had received many publications of the United States 
government on geology and natural history. Who but 
Seward would have dreamed that such documents would 
call forth the Pope's hearty thanks as they did? Else- 
where in Italy he had interviews with Victor Emanuel 
and Cavour. He visited the ruin of Cicero's Tusculum, 
and spent eight hours alone in Pompeii, letting his im- 
agination conjure up the strange scenes and incidents of 
life there eighteen centuries before. 

He went from Italy to Egypt. Desiring to see the 
Holy Land also, but finding no steamboat, he chartered 
a fruit-boat hailing from Jaffa. Its captain and seven 
seamen spoke only Arabic. A few sentences from the 

76 



THE MAN AND THE SENATOR, 1849-61 

record be kept of the weird voyage of several days will 
suffice to show how Seward stopped at no obstacles and 
laughed at all privations : 

"The ship is a schooner of about twenty tons; her name, 
The Blest, is her only good trait. . . . 

" There are no berths, no beds, no tables, no provisions, 
no dishes. "We hastily extemporized our arrangements. A 
dozen chickens, a bologna sausage, six dozen eggs, with 
rice and bread and tea, constitute our stores. Four pieces 
of matting, two laid under us, one over us, and one wrapt 
around the courier, serve for our beds. The cabin is filled 
with dry sand for ballast ; and ants, cockroaches, and all 
kinds of vermin inhabit it. "We therefore sleep, as well as 
sit, on the deck. 

"The courier is our cook ; an inverted half-barrel is our 
table ; but we do not approach it too near, lest it may ex- 
pose us to vermin. For lack of chairs, we sit down on the 
deck, and screen ourselves from the sun as well as we can 
by the shade of the sails/' 

In Vienna he called on Kechberg, the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, and was granted an audience by the 
Emperor. A few days later he visited the battle-fields 
of Magenta and Solferino, lately drenched in blood. 
From Brussels he went to see the famous field of 
Waterloo. King Leopold I. of Belgium invited him 
to a state dinner and in other ways showed him special 
attention. 

Seward's oratory and genius for expression reached 
their highest development while he was Senator ; for 
he was then in his prime physically, and had more 
time for reflection than later. 1 Some have thought 
Seward's speeches more showy than brilliant. He was 
not an orator by nature, and his style lacked the flow 
and rhythm common in the best productions of such 

1 For some mention of liis characteristics as writer and orator in an 
earlier period, see ante, Vol. I., 189 ff. 

77 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

masters as Webster, Clay, and Beecher. But the 
speeches of no political orator of the period were so 
popular and effective, or attained so high an average 
of excellence. As Morley has said of Burke, Seward's 
speeches had " the style of his subjects, the amplitude, 
the weightiness, the laboriousness, the sense, the high 
flight," suited to the discussion of questions that were 
of vital moment to the nation. They were ardent, and 
many of them were designed to increase popular ex- 
citement. Yet they contained a surprising amount of 
political wisdom and sound judgment. His philosophiz- 
ing about liberty and political morality, his grasp of 
the leading facts in the territorial, industrial, and social 
development of our country, and his skill in arousing 
prejudice, indignation, anger, sympathy, fear, or courage 
— these and many other qualities gave strength, color, 
and charm to what he said. He was a close student 
of Burke, and, like that great Irishman, he studied and 
practised politics with his imagination ; it showed in all 
his speaking and writing. The last paragraph of the 
" higher-law " speech is a good illustration : 

" For the vindication of that vote, I look not to the ver- 
dict of the passing hour, disturbed as the public mind now 
is by conflicting interests and passions, but to that period, 
happily not far distant, when the vast region;? over which 
we are now legislating shall have received their destined 
inhabitants. 

" While looking forward to that day, its countless gen- 
erations seem to me to be rising up and passing in dim and 
shadowy review before us ; and a voice comes forth from 
their serried ranks, saying : ' Waste your treasures and 
your armies, if you will ; raze your fortifications to the 
ground ; sink your navies into the sea ; transmit to us 
even a dishonored name, if you must ; but the soil you 
hold in trust for us — give it to us free. You found it free, 
and conquered it to extend a better and surer freedom 
over it. Whatever choice you have made for yourselves, 
let us have no partial freedom ; let us all be free ; let the 

78 



THE MAN AND THE SENATOR, 1849-61 

reversion of your broad domain descend to us unincum- 
bered and free from the calamities and from the sorrows 
of human bondage."" 

It was not uncommon for Seward to speak on special 
occasions. Four formal addresses were delivered in the 
years 1853-55: "The Destiny of America," at the dedi- 
cation of the Capital University, Columbus, Ohio ; " The 
True Basis of American Independence," before the 
American Institute, New York city ; " The Physical, 
Moral, and Intellectual Development of the American 
People," before the Phi Beta Kappa Society of Yale 
College; and "The Pilgrims and Liberty," at Plymouth. 2 
They gave him an opportunit}'- to project his specu- 
lations and generalizations into broader fields than were 
usually open to him. In eloquence these efforts can- 
not be classed as of the first order, nor were the oc- 
casions especially inspiring ; but in thought, expression, 
and interest they deserve a high rank as political essays 
rather than orations. The formal speech at Plymouth 
was a profound study of the political significance of 
the ideas and acts of the Pilgrims, and it would have 
been strange, even with Seward's poor elocution, if it 
had not received great praise. But these and other 
public addresses not of a partisan character are now 
important chiefly as expositions of Seward's theories of 
our national development, and as indications of what he 
would have preferred to do in politics if he had had a 
free hand. They will also convince any candid man 
that Seward had a statesmanlike philosophy and an ex- 
traordinary intellect. 

As Seward avoided as much as possible Weed's prov- 
ince of keeping up confidential relations with political 
followers, he won new supporters by his non-partisan 

1 For other passages in the imaginative style, see 1 Works, 179 ff., 
225 ff. ■ 4 Works, 121-203. 

79 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM II. SEWARD 

addresses and cultivated their friendship by the distri- 
bution of his political speeches with probably a more 
lavish hand than any Senator of the time. He often 
said that he spent his whole salary in the printing and 
circulation of his speeches. 1 His private correspondence 
shows that bundles of his speeches were forwarded to de- 
voted supporters in different parts of the United States 
for distribution. As early as the beginning of 1852 he 
asked one of his political friends in California for a list 
of the prominent Whigs of that State. 2 The speeches 
were sent in all directions and often without solicita- 
tion. The recipients always felt pleased — for in those 
days almost any sort of reading-matter was welcome — 
and they must often have wondered how the famous 
New-Yorker had obtained their names and addresses. 
" I am hurried by sending off speeches by the thousand," 
he wrote, August 5, 1852. In subsequent years it was 
oftener a matter of tens of thousands, and sometimes of 
hundreds of thousands. 

Seward's bearing as a Senator and as a party antago- 
nist was excellent. His prominence, and the keenness 
and importance of what he said, made him the object of 
frequent and severe attacks. The charges were often 
very offensive, and were designed to injure his reputation. 
Shortly after the delivery of the "higher-law" speech 
he said : " I am not to be drawn into personal alterca- 
tions by interrogatories addressed to me. I acknowl- 
edge the patriotism, the wisdom, the purity of every 
member of this bod}'." 3 And again he announced : 

" I shall never assail the motives of any members of this 
body. I shall never defend myself against any imputation 

1 2 Seward, 162 ; 3 Seward, 481. 

2 This is shown by a letter in the Seward MSS. from W. IT. Shepard, 
S;;n Francisco, February 28, 1852. s Globe, 1849-50, 518. 

80 



THE MAN AND THE SENATOR, 1849-61 

of motives made against me. If such imputations are made, 
in whatever shape they may come, as they have done [come?] 
in various shapes here, I shall pass them by in silence. 
They will not in the least disturb my equanimity. I will 
venture further to assure those who may make them, that 
they will not in the least degree change my social and pri- 
vate feelings in regard to them." ' 

This was a very extraordinary policy, but what is 
stranger, he adhered to it without a single important ex- 
ception. Foote was the most persistent and insulting of 
Seward's political enemies. It was notorious at the 
time that, after one of the Mississippian's most inexcus- 
able attacks, Seward invited him to dinner. 1 After a 
Senator had made an important speech it was customary 
for him to pass around a paper to ascertain just how 
many copies his colleagues desired to send out. Such a 
paper in regard to a recent speech by Foote, in which 
Seward had been criticised with special venom, was acci- 
dentally handed to the New York Senator, who promptly 
subscribed for more than any one else. Foote's surprise 
and curiosity were hardly satisfied by Seward's explana- 
tion that he wanted the copies for distribution in New 
York! 3 

Seward's language was not always perfectly respect- 
ful and free from sarcasm and reproach. Toward Presi- 
dents Pierce and Buchanan he exercised on a few oc- 
casions very little self-restraint. But in relation to his 
colleagues he was equally careful of his own expressions 
and unmoved by theirs. Mrs. Seward, who was in the 
gallery one day when some of his remarks drew upon 
him a " tornado " of reproaches from Democrats, wrote 
that he " looked the personification of indifference, with 
his face turned directly toward the speaker." 4 Natural- 

1 Globe, 1849-50, 686. 

2 New York Tribune, March 19, 1850; Albany Evening Atlas, March 
18, 1850. 3 Statement of Mr. F. "W. Seward to the author. 

4 2 Seward, 120. 
II.— F 81 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

ly he was sometimes mistaken, and a few times in the 
course of exciting debates his remarks were cutting ; 
but whenever any exception was taken to them by a 
fellow -Senator he was ready to repair any injustice. 
It was true, as he remarked in the first debate on the 
Clayton - Bulwer treaty : " I have received injuries, 
many of them, here. The memory of them died in the 
hour in which they were committed." ' He neither in- 
terrupted an opponent by annoying questions nor as- 
sumed a contentious personal attitude. Angry alterca- 
tions between Senators were frequent, but Seward was 
never concerned with them except in the capacity of a 
peacemaker. 2 In 1856 he said : " I therefore hold (as a 
general truth) that all men are sincere and honest ; and 
I hold him to be merely a fool who esteems me to be 
otherwise." 3 He early adopted for his guidance Cow- 
per's lines — 

"A moral, sensible, and well-bred man 
Will not affront me, — and no other can." 4 

Notwithstanding these traits, Seward was, until the 
winter of 1860-61, the politician most hated and feared 
by the pro- slavery zealots. Benjamin expressed the 
general opinion of the South when he called him "the 
distinguished author of almost every heresy that ap- 
pears" regarding slavery. 5 The secessionists usually 
had Seward in mind when they threatened that the 

1 1 Works, 385. 

2 In June, 1858, he negotiated peace between Senators Davis, of Mis- 
sissippi, and Chandler, of Michigan, and between Gwin, of California, 
and Wilson, of Massachusetts. In the latter instance a challenge had 
been sent.— 2 Seward, 346. s 4 Works, 563. 

4 3 Seward, 481. In answer to Hale's severe criticism on account 
of supporting the army bill, he calmly remarked : "I never yet have 
seen the time when I could not bear a difference with friends, as I 
never yet have seen the time when I cared in the least for uukind or 
hostile reproaches from my enemies." — Globe, 1857-58, 520. 

* Globe, 1855-56, 1094. 

82 



THE MAN AND THE SENATOR, 1849-61 

Union should come to an end in case of the election of 
a " black Republican" President. Nevertheless, Seward 
took special pains to cultivate pleasant personal re- 
lations with prominent Southerners, iITnlike Sumner 
and others, he had no prejudices against slave-holders. 
"Differences of opinion, even on the subject of slavery, 
with us are political, not social or personal, differences. 
There is not one disunionist or disloyalist among us 
all," he said in February, 1860. He was at one time 
very friendly with Jefferson Davis. 1 Senator Gwin, 
hardly less a Southerner than Davis, was a useful link 
between Seward and the leaders from the other sec- 
tion. 2 At the beginning of 1858 Seward wrote to his 
son Frederick : " The southern and Democratic op- 
position in social circles has given way, and society of 
all classes is profuse in its courtesies." Even in the 
midst of the Civil War he spoke of " our old brethren 
of the South . . . with whom we used to have such 
pleasant social times." 3 

J 1 Davis's Jtflerson Davis, 579 ff. 

2 Derby's Fifty Years, etc., 70. The following story is at least ap- 
proximately true, and well illustrates some of Seward's characteristics : 
"Mr. Seward was anxious to enter the ' charmed circle' of southern 
social life, from which, as a ' black Republican,' he was rigidly ex- 
cluded. Doctor Gwin, with considerable trepidation, he afterwards 
confessed, invited him to a large dinner-party at his house, where 
nearly all the guests were southern Senators — among them, Toombs, 
Hunter, Mason, and Breckinridge — and their wives. Mrs. Gwin, afraid 
to assign him to any of the lady guests, herself took Mr. Seward in 
to dinner. Mr. Seward, by his brilliant and interesting conversation, 
soon dissipated the chilliness his presence had caused, and turned 
into a great success what Doctor Gwin had feared would prove a 
dismal failure. 

" The next day Mr. Hunter said to Mr. Toombs : ' When I met 
Seward to-day he had the impertinence to say, " Good- morning, 
Brother Hunter." ' ' Did you knock him down ?' exclaimed Toombs. 
'Why, no,' replied Hunter; 'how could I knock a man down for 
calling me his brother ?'"— 18 Overland Monthly, 2d series, p. 470. 

8 5 Works, 512. 

83 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

As long as the Whig party lasted Seward's success as 
a leader depended on his keeping up agreeable relations 
with the southern Whigs: There were so many stories 
to the effect that in private he disavowed what he had 
said in public that there must have been some ground 
for them, although the inferences drawn were probably 
erroneous. Here is a fair illustration : Jefferson Davis, 
when ill and in a nervous condition, once asked : 

" ' Mr. Seward, how can you make, with a grave face, 
those piteous appeals for the negro that you did in the 
Senate ; you were too long a school-master in Georgia to 
believe the things yon say ?' 

" He looked at me [Mrs. Davis] quizzically, and smiling- 
ly answered, ' I do not, but these appeals, as you call them, 
are potent to affect the rank and file of the North/ Mr. 
Davis said, very much shocked at Mr. Seward's answer, 
'But, Mr. Seward, do you never speak from conviction 
alone?' ' Nev — er,' answered he. Mr. Davis raised up 
his blindfolded head, and with much heat, whispered, 
'As God is my judge, I never spoke from any other mo- 
tive.' Mr. Seward put his arm about him and gently laid 
down his head, saying, with great tenderness, ' I know you 
do not — I am always sure of it.' 

" After this inscrutable human moral, or immoral, para- 
dox left us, we sat long discussing him with sincere re- 
gret and the hope that he had been making a feigned con- 
fidence to amuse us." 1 

This response was undoubtedly his jesting and evasive 
way of attempting to convey some such thought as this : 
" We are speaking of an unpleasant subject for conversa- 
tion between us. Think as you like about me ; it would 
be useless to try to explain to you what concerns my- 
self and my constituents." Another story, also recorded 
many years after the alleged incident occurred, reports 
Seward as acknowledging, while travelling in Virginia, 
that he had not been in earnest in declaring that the 
annexation of Texas would be unconstitutional, but had 

1 1 Davis's Jefferson Davis, 581. 
84 



THE MAN" AND THE SENATOR, 1849-61 

made such a declaration because Texas was not to be 
free territory. 1 As to the incident in Virginia, a letter 
of the time makes it plain that Seward's aim was to 
avoid discussing sectional questions on social occasions." 

During the twelve years of his senatorship Seward 
was a stanch partisan. More than once he refused to 
stand with the majority, but it was always because he 
believed that his ideas were wiser politically. In his 
first speech in the Senate he tried to persuade his "Whig- 
colleagues of the South that he had " the right to enter- 
tain and debate extreme opinions, without proscription 
and with fidelity to the Union." 3 This was the shrewd- 
est sort of partisanship. Just after the " higher-law " 
speech, Dawson asked him if he still claimed to be a 
Whig. Seward answered thus : 

" My duty is to promote the welfare, interest, and hap- 
piness of the people of the United States ; and I hold that 
I can do so in no effectual way by going alone and inde- 
pendent. That is always the error of schismatics. There- 
fore, in the discharge of my duty, I ally myself to such a 
party as I find most approximate to the principles and sen- 
timents that I entertain. I will do the Whig party the 
justice, or injustice, to say that I have been a member of it 
all my active life ; and I will do it the great disservice to 
say that, no matter what may happen, and who may put 
me under the ban, I shall be the last to leave it, however 
individuals may disown me or the principles I maintain. I 
shall adhere to it, because I think of the two great parties 
it is the most devoted to the cause of freedom and eman- 
cipation." 4 

Early in 1858 there was an angry debate in the Senate 
on the proposition to increase the army for the avowed 
purpose of putting down the insurrection of the Mor- 

1 7 SoutJiern Historical Society Papers, 354. Don Piatt's Memories, 
etc., 136 ff., and 129 North American Review, 135, give other illustra- 
tions. ' 2 1 Seward, 777, 778. 

3 2 Seward, 106. 4 Globe, 1849-50, 518. 

85 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

mons, who had expelled all evidence of Federal authority 
from their would-be independent " State of Deseret." 
Hale, Fessenden, and other Kepublicans feared lest 
Buchanan might employ the additional forces against 
the free-state men in Kansas. With Seward it was an 
axiom that it was unsafe for any public man to withhold 
means desired for defence of the government. In differ- 
ent ways he tried to prevent the use of the proposed 
regiment for any except the specified purpose, but he 
would not oppose the administration's request. Hale 
unjustly likened Seward's attitude to that of Webster on 
March 7, 1850 ; and he cut Seward to the quick by re- 
ferring to him as the man " upon whom the eyes and the 
hearts of the friends of liberty have centred and clus- 
tered," and by adding that he himself had expected that 
Seward " might lead great hosts to the consummation of 
their hopes and their wishes." ' " I think I may claim," 
Seward replied, indirectly, " that, when ten years shall 
have passed over the debates of to-day, when ten years 
of rest shall have been allowed to me after my service 
here shall have been completed, there will be no man 
living who, with the records all before him, will be able 
to tell whether I belonged to one party or another. ~No, 
sir ; I know nothing, I care nothing — I never did, I never 
shall, for party." a However, he wrote a few days later: 
" Mormonism belongs to the brood of ' Popular Sover- 
eignty.' Connection with it does not seemingly harm 
the Democratic party. But haw long could the Repub- 
lican party survive the clear or imputed responsibility for 
any disaster on the Plains f I have studied the matter 
deeply, and conversed with, officers and other s^ 3 

Seward continued to hear the two voices — in fact, he 
continued to act two distinct roles. It was John Quincy 



1 Globe, 1857-58, 520. « Globe, 1857-58, 521. 

3 2 Seward, 335. Not italicized in the original. 



THE MAN AND THE SENATOR, 1849-61 

Adams Seward that uttered the telling phrases and made 
the severe arraignments and was the hope of the radi- 
cals like Gerrit Smith, Theodore Parker, and, at times, 
of the Garrisonians. 1 He usually favored what was 
boldest and most extreme if it stopped short of violence. 
On the other hand, Thurlow Weed Seward kept in close 
relations with the party organization ; he watched the 
plans of the politicians, changed the programme to suit 
conditions, and tried to win all classes of men. Adams 
Seward was ardently antislavery and expected to live 
in history as a great philanthropist. Weed Seward was 
determined to control the patronage and to live in the 
White House. The one regarded himself as a martyr to 
a sacred cause, and wrote : " I am alone, in the Senate 
and in Congress, and about in the United States, alone. 
While adhering faithfully to the Whigs, I dare to hold 
on the disallowed right of disenfranchised men and 
classes. I must stand in that solitude and maintain it, 
or fall altogether." 2 The other was alone in deciding: 
which principles and theories should be given promi- 
nence and which should be ignored or explained away. 
The result was that Seward continued to be the political 
favorite of a large proportion of the champions of free- 
dom and of ardent youthful voters of the best impulses, 
as well as of the practical men and hard-headed poli- 
ticians, calculating on tendencies and eager for office. 

1 To Gerrit Smith he wrote, March 31, 18o8: " Accept my thanks 
for your approval [probably of the speech of March 3, 1858]. - I hope 
you may live to number many more years and to witness the decline 
of that monstrous evil which we have resisted together so long. 

" I begin to have faith in the uprising of the masses. I have never 
before seen such indications of anxiety and desire to hear in the slave 
states. When we shall have trained the whole generation of the free 
states to principles of freedom will they not carry those principles 
into their new homes, and where under the flag will they not make 
those homes ?" — MS. His correspondence with Parker was equally 
friendly. ' 2 2 Seward, 116. 

87 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

When, in 1850, Seward thought that courage and 
dash and the " higher law " would win, he rushed ahead 
fearlessly. In 1851-52 he submitted to the conditions 
of compromise and would take no risks with the anti- 
slavery agitators. But he was ready to go with the 
jingoes " as far as he who goes farthest " in reckless in- 
termeddling with foreign affairs when it would serve as 
a profitable digression, or as a means of benefiting his 
party or of injuring the Democrats. At times, during 
the Kansas excitement, he was one of the most success- 
ful, and almost revolutionary, agitators. After the John 
Brown invasion, when passions needed cooling and calm- 
ing influences, he undertook to demonstrate that the im- 
pending dangers were not due to a real conflict of in- 
terests and principles, as he had repeatedly said, but 
were largely imaginary. In the campaign of 1860 he 
once more gallantly led the charge. But in December, 
when the storm-cloud appeared, he again became very 
conservative and cautious. Watching the changing cir- 
cumstances, his first aim, as leader of the opposition, 
Avas not so much to advance principles as to use them 
as a means to party victories. His great successes were 
the result of keen perceptions, quick sympathies, and 
close association with men of different types and ten- 
dencies. He rarely failed where success was possible, 
because he was almost sure to see every opportunity, and 
to make the most of it. A statesman in character and 
purpose, he was yet a consummate opportunist. 

Seward would have preferred to be a theorizer and 
non-partisan reformer — for his natural tastes and tem- 
perament were of that character — if thereby he could 
have obtained the fame and the power he sought. He 
acted on the theory that whatever his ideas might be, 
they were of little consequence unless there was some 
opportunity for him to carry them out. So the question 
how to gain personal ascendency was always present. 



THE MAN AND THE SENATOR, 1849-61 

He believed that the Whig and then the Republican 
party would be much better for the country in any case 
than the Democratic party. To support a third party 
would entail a loss of time, and at least a temporary 
sacrifice of power. As his influence and success in- 
creased, he came to look upon himself as the one per- 
son that could defeat the schemes and undermine the 
strength of the Democrats and the secessionists. Once 
in authority, he would advance the public interests as 
fast as the people approved. To advocate right prin- 
ciples at a time when to do so would strengthen the op- 
position, or to maintain a strict consistency and frank 
honesty in public utterances at the expense of letting an 
enemy gain an advantage, he regarded as a mistaken 
use of one's resources — a surrender of a practical good 
to a theoretical one. Of course Seward's sincerity 
was often brought into question, much to his own sor- 
row. However, nothing, of which absolute knowledge 
is impossible, is more certain than that he was never 
consciously inconsistent. He considered the object, and 
by it tested the means. In his mind there was no in- 
consistency between being opposed to compromise in 
1850 and in favor of it in 1861 ; between denouncing 
popular sovereignty in 1854 and accepting it in 1858 ; 
because each position was, at the particular time, be- 
lieved to be most favorable to freedom. Likewise, to 
take one attitude regarding the Clayton-Bulwer treaty 
in 1853, and just the opposite one in 1856, did not prove 
real inconsistency, for his aim on both occasions was to 
prevent the Democrats from gaining an advantage. 
Such was his philosophy of action. 

To call him a great politician is neither precise nor 
adequate. He is entitled to the rank that results from 
a fair judgment of his qualities as a Senator in compari- 
son with those of his contemporaries in active politics. 
In sincerity and in the moral quality of his purposes he 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM II. SEWARD 

was as much below Sumner as Sumner was below him 
in political skill and practical statesmanship. Hale was 
hardly more than a merry, sincere, and effective agi- 
tator. Chase was mentally less brilliant than Seward, 
but his character was more ingenuous. His services 
were so generally recognized that if he had had a man- 
ager like Weed, and if Seward had been dependent on 
his own resources, Chase might have outranked his New 
York rival. Cass and Douglas and Marcy were inferior 
to Seward in methods, purposes, and associations. Of 
the southern men, Jefferson Davis most resembled him 
in his talent for directing the thoughts and influencing 
the action of a whole section. But neither Davis nor any 
other contemporary, except Clay, could rival Seward in 
his genius for politics and the wide range of his abilities. 
Although Seward's estimate of himself was in many re- 
spects inaccurate, it is safe to say that Seward the Sen- 
ator — like Seward the chief of the New York Whigs, in 
the previous years — stands first, among all the success- 
ful public men with whom he was associated, in the 
quality and extent of his service. His senatorial career 
is probably the best illustration in American history of 
how far the politician may go toward reform, and how 
much the reformer must bend to practical politics in or- 
der to attain position and power and accomplish results 
that contemporaries and history regard as great. He 
was not the father of the Republican party ; but he, 
more than any other man, was its master. He was not 
the first of antislavery champions ; but of the great 
antislavery North, having a reasonable and worthy 
political purpose, he was, as Jefferson Davis said, " the 
directing intellect." 



CHAPTER XXVIII 

SIGNS OF THE INADEQUACY OF SEWARD'S POLICY OF PEACE 
AND RECONCILIATION 

Seward became Secretary of State March 5, 1861. 
No chief of that department has had difficulties and 
opportunities as great as those that confronted Seward. 
Before them the stoutest heart might well have grown 
faint and the most resourceful mind have been filled, 
with doubts. Seward was hopeful, confident, even. 

Prior to March 4th, the Republicans had necessarily 
been theorists merely, for they had lacked the power to 
legislate or to administer the laws. Now they were in 
full possession of the executive branch of the govern- 
ment, and had practical control of Congress; and, there- 
fore, they were bound to pursue a definite course. The 
all- important question was: How shall the secession 
movement, actual and prospective, be met and over- 
come ? 

Most of the inhabitants of the city of "Washington 
s} 7 mpathized more with the disunionists than with the 
Republicans, and hardly any of them believed in vigorous 
measures. The well -organized and determined Con- 
federacy of seven states was not immediately in front of 
the national capital, but it rested safely behind a double 
row of states, which promised to serve the purpose of a 
vast series of defensive fortifications. It was a foregone 
conclusion that if anything resembling coercion should 
be directed against a slave state, the wide territor}*- be- 
tween the District of Columbia and the Confederacy 

91 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWAPtD 

would quickly swarm with armed secessionists. Theo- 
retically it was the plain duty of the President to en- 
force the laws and protect the property of the nation, but 
practically there were numerous grave objections. Many 
men at the North denied that the central government 
had the constitutional right to do more than to act de- 
fensively. Others insisted that there was no warrant 
whatever for an attempt to conquer the resistance of a 
whole state, much less that of a group of states. 

If the Confederacy had gained possession of all the 
forts within its territory, as it did of the post-offices and 
custom-houses, probably there would have been no war 
for the Union. But Fort Sumter, in Charleston harbor, 
and in sight of the fountain of secession, was still held by 
United States troops. They also retained possession of 
Fort Pickens, off Pensacola, Florida, which was the chief 
stronghold of the Gulf. The stars and stripes continued 
to wave over a few forts of minor importance, which 
the Confederates expected would soon be a part of their 
domain. Neither Fort Sumter nor Fort Pickens could 
be voluntarily surrendered or evacuated by the United 
States without national humiliation and a confession of 
inability or fear to resist disunion. Nor could the Con- 
federacy consent to the retention of these forts by the 
Federal government without inviting the reproach that 
it dared not assert the sovereignty it claimed. Hence, 
the thoughtful men on each side calculated that if there 
was to be a war it would begin at one of these points. 
So far, a conflict had been avoided by means of mutual 
agreements: the Confederates in each locality promised 
not to attack the neighboring fort on condition that 
Buchanan would not endeavor to reinforce it. The 
effect of this was highly beneficial to the secessionists. 
Every day the resources of Major Anderson, who was in 
command of Fort Sumter, became less, while South Caro- 
lina was surrounding the harbor with forts and obstruct- 

92 



THE INADEQUACY OF SEWARD'S POLICY 

ing the channel. Although the Brooklyn and other 
warships, with hundreds of troops aboard, hovered about 
and might have reinforced Fort Pickens and removed all 
danger of its seizure, this ill-balanced truce, so stupid and 
cowardly on Buchanan's part, tied the hands of the United 
States officers, while the Confederates planted batteries 
and prepared for offensive warfare. 

It was expected that Lincoln's inaugural address would 
either contain an unequivocal declaration that would lead 
to a vigorous policy and the execution of the laws or ex- 
hibit a willingness to compromise and thereby strength- 
en those favoring conciliation. It did neither. Conces- 
sionists and coercionists each argued that it committed 
the new administration to their side. The pledge that 
the power confided in the President would u be used 
to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places be- 
longing to the government, and to collect the duties and 
imposts," was much weakened by the further announce- 
ment that " be} r ond what may be necessary for these 
objects, there will be no invasion, no using of force 
against or among the people an}^where." This showed 
that some laws and executive duties were to be over- 
looked. The address might mean either war or peace, 
according to the stress put upon different passages, but 
even in its most touching appeals for reconciliation and 
fraternity there was no suggestion of cowardice. It is 
now plain that no definite course of action had been 
determined. 

On March 5th, Lincoln was surprised to learn from 
Judge Holt, still Secretary of "War, that Major Ander- 
son had reported that it would be impossible to retain 
Fort Sumter more than a few weeks, unless it should 
be reinforced and resupplied, and that it would require 
twenty thousand men to relieve and hold the fort against 
the Confederates. The papers were referred to General 
Scott for his opinion, and on the same day he replied, 

93 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

" Evacuation seems almost inevitable." ' Because several 
of the ablest military men agreed with Scott that it was 
doubtful if the difficulties of reinforcement could be over- 
come, it was " openly and half -officially printed in the 
newspapers nearly a whole week" 2 that the troops were 
to be withdrawn. 3 There is no positive evidence that 
Lincoln ever said directly that Sumter would be evac- 
uated, but there are many signs that he thought such 
an outcome likely. 4 However, he continued to make 
inquiries and to study the perplexing situation. 

Delay and indecision were prolonged by the greed and 
persistency of the office-seekers. It seemed as if the 
surging, enthusiastic crowds at the Chicago convention 
had marched upon Washington to claim their rewards. 
Until long after 1861 the Jacksonian "clean sweep" 
was one of the first principles of party contests ; and if 
ever excusable, it surely was when the offices were filled 
with men appointed by the present leaders of secession. 
Applicants so swarmed in and about the White House 
and the department buildings that it was difficult to go 
or come. The President, as Seward said, took up first 
the business that was most pressed upon him, and this 
was the distribution of the spoils. 5 The main question 
was discussed, but decision was postponed from day to 



1 3 Nicolay and Hay, 378. 2 3 Nicolay and Hay, 400, 407. 

3 Stanton reported to Buchanan, March 12th, that it was then "the 
universal impression in this city that Sumter and Pickens •will both 
be surrendered." — 2 Curtis's Buchanan, 531. 

4 Crawford, 364. Scott considered the abandonment of Sumter so 
probable that he drafted an order to that effect for the President's 
signature. — 3 Nicolay and Hay, 408. 

5 Ou March 16, 1861, Seward wrote: " Solicitants for office besiege 
him, and he, of course, finds his hands full for the present. My du- 
ties call me to the White House one, two, or three times a day. The 
grounds, halls, stairways, closets are filled with applicants, who ren- 
der ingress and egress difficult."— 2 Seward, 503. See also Julian's 
Recollections. 193, 194 ; 2 Curtis's BucJuinan, 534. 

94 



THE INADEQUACY OF SEWARD'S POLICY 

day, in the hope that some new occurrence might open 
a way for its solution. 

It was well known that Lincoln's powers as a politi- 
cal debater were of the first order, and of course the 
election had made him the head of the administration ; 
but he had shown no qualities that had convinced even 
good judges of men that he would be President in the 
fullest sense of the word. He was awkward and rustic 
in his manners and appearance, and was thoroughly un- 
conventional in his talk. It was assumed that either 
Seward or Chase would have a directing hand in af- 
fairs. Coming into strange surroundings, Lincoln wisely 
leaned on the man he had chosen for the first place in 
his Cabinet. This must have reminded Seward of how, 
twelve years before, Taylor accepted his advice and as- 
sistance in regard to the most important questions of 
that time. No one in public life throughout the period 
since 1849 had been so prominent as Seward. He now 
really believed that his assurances, that sixty days' more 
suns would give a much brighter and more cheer- 
ful atmosphere, had been made good ; that he had 
"brought the ship off the sands,'" and that it was his 
soothing words that had " saved us and carried us along 
thus far." And all this was entirely true in the sense 
he meant. What more natural than to infer that if he 
should either go home or become Minister to England, 
it would "leave the country to chance"; whereas, if he 
should go into Lincoln's " compound Cabinet," he could 
"endure enough to make the experiment successful." 3 
When Southerners and their friends questioned his 
ability to make his policy that of the Republican ad- 
ministration, he had pointed to his influence over Gen- 
eral Scott, the head of the army and, until recently, 
the chief of the coercion ists. 3 To the doubting he was 

1 2 Seward, 505. a 2 Seward, 518. 

3 Gwin's recollections, 18 Overland Monthly, 2d series, 466. 
95 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

able to show or quote a letter that the General ad- 
dressed to him on March 3d, as if the Secretary of State 
instead of the President were to decide how to deal with 
secession. 1 In fact, had not Lincoln asked and accepted 
Seward's criticism upon the first written statement of 
his prospective policy ? And although Seward had 
not been able to bar certain men from the Cabinet, had 
he not been refused permission to withdraw because 
Lincoln's feelings and the public interest forbade it? 
Sitting at the President's right at the Cabinet-table 
with men who, as he had stated in writing, had not 
studied the question as he had, was it not a matter 
of course that his plans must prevail? The tendencies 
had not changed with the coming of Lincoln and the 
departure of Buchanan. Seward's numerous channels 
of influence and information, extending throughout the 
border slave states and to the very heart of the Con- 
federacy, were still open. What he had accomplished 
was, in his opinion, merely in preparation for the time 
when the new administration could meet, with charity 
and patience, what was declared to be groundless fear; 
when rewards and punishments could be substituted for 
warnings and promises, if nothing else sufficed. So 
Seward continued to think that the future depended 
upon his management. 

1 It seems likely that this letter was chiefty inspired by Seward. One 
senteuce in it reads : " I beg leave to repeat in writing what I have be- 
fore said to you orally." Although Scott mentioned four ways of deal- 
ing with the difficulties, he made it plain that he preferred the one that 
was popularly supposed to be Seward's, and he was almost hysterical- 
ly opposed to what Seward most deprecated. — Scott's Autobiography 
(1864), 625-28. There was a strong suspicion that Thurlow Weed had 
a hand in the matter. As has been noticed, both Seward and Greeley 
drafted letters of acceptance for Scott in 1852. Near the end of 1861 
the old General published in London and Paris a very able and impor- 
tant letter about the seizure of the Trent, every word of which was 
written by John Bigelow. For a discussion of the question of the in- 
timacy between Seward and Scott, see post, p. 124. 

96 



THE INADEQUACY OF SEWARD'S POLICY 

While the other members of the Cabinet were chiefly 
occupied with a few special questions, or were giving 
their time to applicants for place, Seward's activit} r 
seemed to extend in every direction and to touch all de- 
partments. The day he took charge of his new office, he 
requested Stanton to draw up a nomination of Critten- 
den for the United States Supreme Court. 1 By means 
of a prominent resident of Washington he kept up close 
communications with some of the unionist leaders in 
the Virginia state convention, 2 and despatched Lander 
to the South to "kindle a 'backfire' against secession" 
in Texas. 3 He telegraphed to Gilmer asking for recom- 
mendations about appointing a marshal and a United 
States attorney in North Carolina. 4 And by scores of 
acts he showed that he had time and energy for any 
task, great or small, that came to his hand. 

Before the middle of March, Gustavus V. Fox, former- 
ly an officer in the United States ISTav}'", had somewhat 
counteracted the impression Scott, Anderson, and others 
had made upon the President. On March 15th Lincoln 
requested each member of the Cabinet to give a written 
opinion on this question: "Assuming it to be possible 
now to provision Fort Sumter, under all the circum- 
stances is it wise to attempt it ?" 6 

Seward's answer was given on the same day. It was 
comprehensive and direct, and as it contains the fullest 
explanation he ever made of his policy, the leading pas- 
sages may well be quoted here : 

" If it were possible to peacefully provision Fort Sumter, 

1 2 Curtis's Buchanan, 528. 

2 Statement of Mr. F. W. Seward to the author. 

3 3 Nicolay and Hay, 444 ; 2 Seward, 521. 

4 Gilmer to Seward, March 27th, Seward MSS. 

s The striking contrast between this question and the promise in 
the inaugural address "to hold, occupy, and possess the property and 
places belonging to the government," seems to have been overlooked, 
ir— g 97 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

of course I should answer that it would be both unwise and 
inhuman not to attempt it. But the facts of the case are 
known to be that the attempt must be made with the em- 
ployment of a military and marine force which would 
provoke combat and probably initiate a civil war, which 
the government of the United States would be committed 
to maintain through all changes to some definite con- 
clusion." 

As a citizen, he considered the Union necessary ; as a 
public official, he believed that it must be maintained at 
all hazards. Yet next to disunion he regarded " civil war 
as the most disastrous and deplorable of national calam- 
ities." Therefore, he had studied how to save the Union 
without war. He felt confident that secession was 
based upon false reasoning and had been carried forward 
in the seven states by means of artificial excitement so 
as to overcome for the time the devotion to the Union, 
which he believed to be a " profound and permanent 
national sentiment," "even in South Carolina." Yet he 
was sure that this sentiment 

" could, if encouraged, be ultimately relied upon to rally 
the people of the seceding states to reverse, upon due de- 
liberation, all the popular acts of legislatures and conven- 
tions by which they were hastily and violently committed 
to disunion. 

" The policy of the time, therefore, has seemed to me 
to consist in conciliation, which should deny to disunion- 
ists any new provocation or apparent offence, while it 
would enable the Unionists in the slave states to main- 
tain with truth and with effect that the alarms and ap- 
prehensions put forth by the disunionists are groundless 
and false. 

" I have not been ignorant of the objections that the 
administration was elected through the activity of the 
Republican party ; that it must continue to deserve and 
retain the confidence of that party ; while conciliation 
toward the slave states tends to demoralize the Republican 
party itself, on which party the main responsibility of main- 
taining the Union must rest. 

"But it has seemed to me a sufficient answer — first, that 

98 



THE INADEQUACY OF SEWARD'S POLICY 

the administration conld not demoralize the Republican 
party without making some sacrifice of its essential princi- 
ples, while no such sacrifice is necessary, or is anywhere 
authoritatively proposed ; and secondly, if it be indeed true 
that pacification is necessary to prevent dismemberment 
of the Union and civil war, or either of them, no patriot 
and lover of humanity could hesitate to surrender party 
for the higher interests of country and humanity. 

" Partly by design, partly by chance, this policy has been 
hitherto pursued by the late administration of the Federal 
government, and by the Republican party in its corporate 
action. It is by this policy, thus pursued, I think, that the 
progress of dismemberment has been arrested after the seven 
Gulf states had seceded, and the border states yet remain, 
although they do so uneasily, in the Union. 

"It is to a perseverance in this policy for a short time 
longer that I look as the only peaceful means of assuring 
the continuance of Virginia, Maryland, North Carolina, 
Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri, and Arkansas, or most of 
those states in the Union. It is through their good and 
patriotic offices that I look to see the Union sentiment re- 
vived and brought once more into activity in the seceding 
states, and through this agency those states themselves 
returning into the Union." 

" The fact, then, is that while the people of the border 
states desire to be loyal, they are at the same time sadly, 
though temporarily, demoralized by a sympathy for the 
slave states, which makes them forget their loyalty when- 
ever there are any grounds for apprehending that the 
Federal government will resort to military coercion against 
the seceding states, even though such coercion should be nec- 
essary to maintain the authority, or even the integrity, of 
the Union. 1 This sympathy is unreasonable, unwise, and. 
dangerous, and therefore cannot, if left undisturbed, be 
permanent. It can be banished, however, only in one way, 
and that is by giving time for it to wear out, and for reason 
to resume its sway. Time will do this, if it be not hindered 
by new alarms and provocations." 

" The question submitted to us, then, practically is : Sup- 
posing it to be possible to reinforce and supply Fort Sumter. 

1 Not italicized in the original. 
99 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

is it wise now to attempt it, instead of withdrawing the 
garrison ? 

"The most that could be done by any means now in onr 
hands would be to throw two hundred and fifty to four 
hundred men into the garrison, with provisions for supply- 
ing it five or six months. In this active and enlightened 
country, in this season of excitement, with a daily press, 
daily mails, and an incessantly operating telegraph, the 
design to reinforce and supply the garrison must become 
known to the opposite party at Charleston as soon at least 
as preparation for it should begin. The garrison would 
then almost certainly fall by assault before the expedition 
could reach the harbor of Charleston. But supposing the 
secret kept, the expedition must engage in conflict on enter- 
ing the harbor of Charleston ; suppose it to be overpowered 
and destroyed, is that new outrage to be avenged, or are we 
then to return to our attitude of immobility ? Should we 
be allowed to do so ? Moreover, in that event, what becomes 
of the garrison ? 

"I suppose the expedition successful. We have then a 
garrison in Fort Sumter that can defy assault for six 
months. What is it to do then ? Is it to make war by 
opening its batteries and attempting to demolish the de- 
fences of the Carolinians ? Can it demolish them if it 
tries ? If it cannot, what is the advantage we shall have 
gained ? If it can, how will it serve to check or prevent 
disunion ? 

"In either case, it seems to me that we will have in- 
augurated a civil war by our own act, without an adequate 
object, after which reunion will be hopeless, at least under 
this administration, or in any other way than by a popular 
disavowal both of the war and of the administration which 
unnecessarily commenced it. Fraternity is the element of 
union ; war is the very element of disunion. Fraternity, if 
practised by this administration, will rescue the Union from 
all its dangers. If this administration, on the other hand, 
take up the sword, then an opposite party will offer the 
olive branch, and will, as it ought, profit by the restoration 
of peace and union." 

. . . "I would not provoke war in any way now. I would 
resort to force to protect the collection of revenue, because 
that is a necessary as well as legitimate public object. Even 
then it should only be a naval force that I would employ 
for that necessary purpose, while / would defer military 
action on land until a case should arise tvhere ibe would hold 

100 






THE INADEQUACY OF SEWARD'S POLICY 

the defensive. 1 In that case we should have the spirit of 
the country and the approval of mankind on our side. 
In the other, we should peril peace and union, because 
we had not the courage to practise prudence and moder- 
ation at the cost of temporary misapprehension. If this 
counsel seem to be impassive and even unpatriotic, I con- 
sole myself by the reflection that it is such as Chatham 
gave to his country under circumstances not widely dif- 
ferent." 2 

He still left unexplained the method and influences 
by which the slave states hesitating whether to sympa- 
thize with the Confederacy or with the Federal govern- 
ment were to be kept within their normal spheres. He 
was even more vague as to the manner in which the 
resolute and ambitious new government was to be dealt 
with and finally dissolved. Yet, the logic of his answer 
to Lincoln's question, his opinions expressed at different 
times, the declared aims of those who were known to 
be his allies and confidants, and the plans of southern 
Unionists with whom he was in close communication 
furnish a clear outline of the policy by which he ex- 
pected to avert civil war and disunion. 

As has been noticed, the first step was an attempt to 
abolish party lines and to unite those who believed the 
preservation of the Union the most important considera- 
tion. This put in the background the aims of the radical 
Republicans, and tended to soothe the fears of a majority 
of the voters of the South outside the cotton states, so 
that they refused to rush precipitately into secession. 
North Carolina, Tennessee, Arkansas, and all the border 
slave states had shown at least a temporary preference 
for the old government. It was believed in many quar- 
ters that the Confederacy could not long continue unless 
she should w T in over several more states. In the contest 
to gain these middle states the Confederacy had a great 



Not italicized in the original. 2 5 Works, 600 IT. 

101 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

advantage, but it was not so evident then as it is now. 
"Force," "coercion," "subjugation," were words of such 
frightful omen to most Southerners that little distinction 
was made in their meanings. Many Northerners, like 
Seward, tried to eliminate these words from all discus- 
sions, knowing how they would be used by secessionists. 
After the inauguration, the first aim was to strengthen 
the southern Unionists and make allies of them. Be- 
cause the reprovisioning or the reinforcement of forts 
would be regarded as positive evidence of an intention 
to coerce the states, it must be avoided as much as coer- 
cion itself. The New York Times of March 21st said 
that the true policy of the administration was " un- 
questionably that of masterly inactivity"; that the ob- 
ject was " the conversion of the southern people from 
their secessionism." " Force, as a means of restor- 
ing the Union, or of permanently preserving it, is out of 
the question." Seward thought that the best evidence 
of the peaceful intentions of the administration would 
be the withdrawal of the troops from Fort Sumter. As 
a result it was expected that several of the loyal slave 
states would soon take a positive stand against seces- 
sion. Then their influence would be felt by neighbor- 
ing states, and, ultimately, by the Confederacy. 1 As 
late as April 10th, he expressed great confidence that a 
constitutional convention would remove the difficulties 
if all else should fail. 3 

Virginia, still the most important point, was to be 
used as the thin edge of the wedge. It was rumored that 

1 This idea is vaguely expressed in the opiuion of March 15th. 
"He [Seward] could give me no good reason for supposing it, but 
be seemed to be quite convinced that, as soon as the states of Vir- 
ginia, Kentucky, and Missouri rejected the appeals of the secession- 
ists, as he has positive information they will reject them, the dis- 
integration of the new-born Confederacy will begin." — " Diary of a 
Public Man," March 7th, 129 North American Review, 489. 

2 Diplomatic Correspondence, 1861, 74, 75. 

102 



THE INADEQUACY OF SEWARD'S POLICY 

Seward thought of going to Eichmond to help forward 
the cause, for the state convention was still in session 
there. 1 But he sent a special agent, and then recom- 
mended to Lincoln that George W. Summers, the ablest 
of the Unionists there, should be made a Judge of the 
Supreme Court. 2 About the same time he told an editor 
of the Washington National Intelligencer that the troops 
would be withdrawn from Sumter, and he requested him 
to state the fact to Summers. 3 

A few days later Summers wrote : " The [report of 
the] removal from Sumter acted like a charm — it gave us 
great strength. A reaction is now going on in the state. 
The outside pressure has greatly subsided." It was then 
supposed that a convention of the loyal slave states 
would be called at Frankfort or Nashville," and that the 
conditions of remaining in the Union would there be 
formulated and subsequently brought to the considera- 
tion of the other states. 5 Seward expected that a na- 
tional convention would soon follow, where an agree- 
ment would be reached by all the loyal states. 6 The 

1 New York Times, March 8th. 2 3 Nicolay and Hay, 423. 

3 29 New York Nation, 383, 384. The intermediary was the late 
J. C. Welling, subsequently president of Columbian Universit}'. 

4 Ibid. 

6 Summers's speech of March 11th, in the Virginia convention. 
Semi-Weekly Richmond Enquirer, March 25th. 

6 The " Diary," etc., of March 12th, records another interview with 
Seward. "He has news from Richmond, and I understood him from 
Mr. Summers, that the prospect of defeating the secessionists in the 
convention brightens all the time, and that Virginia, after disposing 
finally of the importunities of the southern states, will take the initia- 
tive for a great national convention. Of this he feels as confident as 
of the complete overthrow of the schemes of the fire-eaters by the quiet 
evacuation of Fort Sumter, which cannot now be long delayed." . . . 

"He is hopeful of the success of the convention plan if we can but 
get the better of our own mischief-makers here, who are much more 
dangerous to us, he thinks — and I agree with him — than the people at 
Montgomery." — 129 Worth American Review, 495. 

The Evening Journal of March 22d said : "In proposing a national 

103 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

New York Times, which was the frankest exponent 
of this policy, urged editorially, March 21st, that the 
efforts of the Union men ought to be recognized, that 
documents explaining the true position of the adminis- 
tration should be scattered throughout the South, and 
that the patronage, influence, and power of the govern- 
ment should be used to build up a Union party in every 
southern state. These were exactly the lines on which 
Seward was working. 1 

To what extent was the sovereignty of the United 
States to be suspended in the Confederacy during the 
practice of this " Fabian policy, which concedes nothing, 
yet which employs no force in support of resisted Fed- 
eral authority?" 2 It was here that optimistic theories 
and negotiations had to give way to facts and practi- 
cal administration. Excepting some phases of the pure- 
ly military question, all the considerations that Seward 
had urged for the evacuation of Fort Sumter applied 
with nearly equal force to Fort Pickens. Even from 
a military point of view, the difference, which was 
chiefly one of time and degree, would disappear with 
the carrying out of Seward's plan. His method of deal- 
ing with secession was surprisingly like Buchanan's. 3 

convention of the states, Governor Seward, as on many former occa- 
sions, saw farther and more clearly into the future than his congres- 
sional associates, most of whom repudiated the suggestion. . . . That 
sentiment is now toning up to the idea. Some states have met it with 
their approval. Our own will do so. We may look forward, there- 
fore, to a period when, passion subsiding, irritation soothed, and the 
popular mind tranquillized, wholesome results may flow from the 
deliberation of a national council." 

1 A letter from Samuel Hooper, dated Boston, February 18, 1861, 
showed that on Seward's suggestion he had collected one thousand 
dollars for the distribution of documents in the border slave states. — 
Seward MSS. 

2 Tribune, March 27, 1861. 

3 See the paragraph beginning "Partly by design," in the opinion of 
March loth ; also 129 North American Review, 12?, 128, 133, 489. 

104 



THE INADEQUACY OF SEWARD'S POLICY 

The attitude of each meant a waiving of sovereign 
rights, a voluntary paralysis in administration, and the 
acceptance of whatever might be necessary to avoid 
war. The prejudices and fears of the Southerners must 
be allowed to wear off in quiet, although at the expense 
of not using the force " necessary to maintain the au- 
thority, or even the integrity of the Union," as he in- 
dicated on March 15th. Of course he expected that a 
reaction would be brought about in some manner before 
"the integrity of the Union" was destroyed. 

Of the six other members of the Cabinet, Postmaster- 
General Blair alone positively favored provisioning Sum- 
ter, on the ground that evacuation would demoralize 
northern Unionists and encourage southern secessionists, 
while even defeat would unite and inspire the North. 1 
Chase, the Secretary of the Treasury, answered Lin- 
coln's question affirmatively, but said that he would ad- 
vise against trying to provision Sumter, "if the attempt 
will so inflame civil war as to involve an immediate ne- 
cessity for the enlistment of armies and the expenditure 
of millions." The Secretary of War, Simon Cameron, 
considered the question in its military aspects, and, lean- 
ing upon the adverse opinions of the army officers, he 
opposed the attempt to relieve the fort. Gideon Welles, 
Secretary of the Navy, answered in the negative, after 
a review of both the military and the political consid- 
erations. Caleb B. Smith, the Secretary of the Interior, 
supported Seward in his view of the difficulty of the 
undertaking and of the slight advantage of it, even if 
successful. He thought that it would cause the adminis- 
tration to appear to take the aggressive and to begin a 
civil war. To Attorney-General Bates the question was 
one of expediency merely, and his opinion as to the mili- 
tary inutility and the political danger of making the at- 

1 2 Lincoln's Works, 14-22, gives the various opinions. 
105 



TUE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

tempt still more closely resembled Seward's. Much like 
Seward, also, he said : " A reaction has already begun 
[in the seceding- states], and if encouraged b}^ wise, mod- 
erate, and firm measures on the part of the government, 
I persuade myself that the nation will be restored to its 
integrity without the effusion of blood." But, unlike all 
others on his side, he urged that, as a counter-balance 
to the loss of Sumter, " the more southern forts, Pick- 
ens, Key West, etc., should, without delay, be put in 
condition of easy defence against all assailants; and 
that the whole coast, from South Carolina to Texas, 
should be as well guarded as the power of the navy 
will enable us." 

The replies showed that Seward's policy — so called 
because he was its exponent, if not its author — had 
won support. Blair still persistently advocated energetic 
measures, as was expected by all who knew him. Chase 
seemed to be less firm, although it was well known that 
a large majority of the Eepublicans in the Senate, then 
in executive session, sympathized with him in opposition 
to the Secretary of State. Backed by the highest mili- 
tary opinion, by the Attorney - General, by the Secre- 
taries of War, the Navy, and the Interior, Seward's 
confidence was strengthened. 

Lincoln took the manuscript opinions and — continued 
to be non-committal. On the same day, Seward wrote 
home : " This President proposes to do all his own work." 
Not until the 18th did Lincoln call upon Bates, Chase, 
and Welles for opinions and facts that indicated that he 
was considering the question of using a naval force to 
collect custom duties or to blockade ports in the Con- 
federacy. 1 About the same time Captain Fox was sent 
to Charleston so that he could better judge as to the 
practicability of his plan of relieving Sumter. A few 



1 2 Lincoln's Works, 24, 25. 
106 



THE INADEQUACY OF SEWARD'S POLICY 

days later Lincoln requested one of his old Illinois 
friends, S. A. Hurlbut, to visit the same city and report 
if there was a suppressed Union sentiment there, as 
Seward had maintained. Ward H. Lamon, once a law- 
partner and for many years an intimate friend of the 
President, accompanied Hurlbut. Major Anderson's 
opinion was stronger than ever against attempting to 
provision Sumter, while Fox became more convinced of 
the feasibility of providing relief. Hurlbut reported 
that J. L. Petigru, a distinguished lawyer, was the only 
man in Charleston that continued to express adherence 
to the Union , that there was " positively nothing to ap- 
peal to." Lamon wrote to Seward that he was " satis- 
fied of the policy and propriety of immediately evacu- 
ating Fort Sumter/' ' 

Meantime a collateral question had arisen. On Febru- 
ary 27th, Martin J. Crawford, John Forsyth, and A. B. 
Roman had been appointed commissioners of the Con- 
federacy to the United States. Their chief task was to 
obtain a recognition of the independence of their gov- 
ernment. In case the President of the United States 
should refuse to receive them or open negotiations, but 
should be willing to refer the subject to the Senate, they 
were instructed to accede. Or if he should propose to 
withhold a reply to their communication until Congress 
should assemble and pronounce a decision in the prem- 
ises, they were to oppose no obstacle, " provided, in either 
case, you receive from the President of the United 

1 "I talked with Major Anderson privately for an hour and a half. 
He and his men are in fine spirits, but as to their spirits, I am satisfied 
from their very appearance that they would be buoyant if they knew 
there would be a necessity for blowing up the fort in the next half- 
hour — which they would do before they would surrender it. 

"From the best lights that I can judge from, after casting around, 
I am satisfied of the policy and propriety of immediately evacuating Fort 
Sumter.'" — Charleston, March 25th. Seward MSS. 

107 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

States assurances, which to you will seem sufficient, 
that the existing peaceful status as between the two 
countries shall be rigidly maintained, and that no at- 
tempt shall be made, under any pretext whatever, by the 
Government of the United States, to exercise any juris- 
diction, whether civil or military, within the limits of 
the Confederacy." l It was of the greatest importance 
that they should secure the maintenance of the existing 
status pending negotiations. 2 Crawford reached Wash- 
ington before Buchanan had left the White House, but 
too late to begin any negotiations with him. 

Within a few hours after Lincoln's inauguration 
Samuel Ward informed Seward that Crawford would 
immediately apply for a reception ; that if he should go 
back unacknowledged as commissioner, President Davis 
could not hold the people from attacking the forts ; that 
" Gwin and Hunter think the question had best be re- 
ferred to the Senate. They say it is a risk you must take." 
Then he speculated on how the Senate would vote, and 
added that Dr. Gwin desired to see Seward at Ward's 
house the following day. 3 Seward met Gwin at least 
once during the next few days, and assured him of the de- 
termination of the administration to settle the questions 
between the two governments in an amicable manner. 4 

On March 6th Crawford sent Toombs a long despatch 
describing what he understood to be Seward's ideas and 
plans. 6 It had been arranged that Seward should let 

1 These conditions will be referred to later. 

2 Instructions of the Confederate Secretary of State, Robert 
Toombs, to the commissioners, February 27, 1861. The original 
records of this commission are in the Treasury Department. 

3 See Appendix K. 4 18 Overland Monthly, 2d series, 469. 

6 "The President himself is really not aware of the condition of the 
country, and his Secretaries of State and War are to open the diffi- 
culties and dangers to him in Cabinet meeting to day." . . . 

"The construction which he [Seward] attempts to put upon the 
inaugural is, that it only follows the language of every President from 

108 



THE INADEQUACY OF SEWARD'S POLICY 

him know that afternoon when and in what manner the 
subject-matter of the mission should be brought forward 
and submitted for the consideration of the President 
and Cabinet. On the 8th the commissioners reported 
that they had availed themselves of the services of "a 
late distinguished Senator of the United States"— un- 
doubtedly Gwin — to establish an understanding with the 
Secretary. They were confident that Seward was eager 
for delay. 1 They could " travel the same path " with 

Washington down, wherein Mr. Lincoln pledges himself to ' the exe, 
cution of the laws,' and states that it was necessary to prevent utter 
ruin to tbe party and the administration itself. Touching the collec- 
tion of the revenues, he had an eye more to the ports outside than 
inside the Confederate States, and expresses apprehension if he had 
not declared his purpose in that regard that New York and San Fran- 
cisco might at any time for any reason refuse to pay over the customs. 

" As to the words ' hold, occupy, and possess the property and 
places belonging to the government,' he says that, with all else in 
the document, is to be considered in connection with the qualification 
wherein the President says, ' Doing this I deem it to be only a simple 
duty on my part ; and I shall perform it so far as practicable, unless 
my rightful masters the American people shall withhold the requisite 
means, or in some authoritative manner direct the contrary,' which in 
effect, as well as purpose, was to submit the question to the judgment 
of the country in some satisfactory form." . . . 

..." To cover the whole ground of his policy, it is to keep persons 
from without from engaging in this contest, and as rapidly as possible 
disaffect our own population to the point of war upon our govern- 
ment, and then, with small forces of Federal troops and meagre 
moneyed appropriations from the U. S. Treasury, ' conquer a peace.' " 
In advancing this policy the party in power was to drop the name Re- 
publican, ignore the word slavery, and merge everything into the 
Union cause and a Union party. 

1 They represented Seward as. follows : "The tenor of his language 
is to this effect : I have built up the Republican party ; I have 
brought it to triumph ; but its advent to power is accompanied by 
great difficulties and perils. I must save the party and save the 
government in its hands. To do this, war must be averted ; the ne- 
gro question must be dropped; the 'irrepressible conflict' ignored; 
and a Union party to embrace the border slave states inaugurated. 
I have already whipped Mason and Hunter in their own state. I 
must crush out Davis and Toombs and their colleagues in sedition in 

109 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

him up to " the point of fixing peace as the policy of the 
Lincoln government." Until pacific negotiations should 
be reached, it was " unimportant what may be his sub- 
sequent hopes and plans." 

Their " agent " was instructed to represent it as his 
opinion that the commissioners were " ready to accept 
war," and could not admit of delay while the flag of the 
United States was flying over Forts Sumter and Pickens 
and while ships and troops seemed to be preparing for 
hostilities, unless the most reliable guaranty should 
be received. It was reported that Seward replied 
that the administration could not then act upon so 
important a question ; for it was " besieged by appli- 
cants," " surrounded by all the difficulties and confusion 
incident to the first days of a new government," and 
the pressure of hordes of the most radical Republicans 
gave an advantage to his opponents in the party. There- 
fore, if compelled to take a stand then, he could not 
answer for the result. It required no great cleverness 
on the part of the commissioners to see that their best 
chance lay in pla3 7 ing boldly when Seward was ham- 
pered and fearful. So, by their direction, as they 
complacently reported, the agent told Seward, much 
as Ward had done a few days before, that " without 
proper assurances we [the commission] should be bound 
to precipitate the issue at once upon the administration 
and force it to define its policy. Would he give such 
assurances ? It was finally agreed that the agent should 
bring to Mr. Seward a memorandum stating the terms 
upon which we would consent to, and stipulate for, a 
brief respite." ' 

Accordingly, the agent called at the Department of 

their respective states. Saving the border states to the Union by 
moderation and justice, the people of the cotton states, unwillingly 
led into secession, will rebel against their leaders, and reconstruction 
will follow." ' Commissioners to Toombs, March 8th. 

110 



THE INADEQUACY OF SEWARD'S POLICY 

State at nine o'clock on the morning of the 8th with the 
memorandum. It stated that the commissioners would 
agree to postpone the consideration of the subject of 
their mission for a period not exceeding twenty days, 
provided that the existing military status should be 
preserved in every respect. 1 The commissioners im- 
agined that Seward would soon be in their trap ; for, 
as they wrote to Toombs, " the siguing of the mutual 
agreement and stipulations contained in the memoran- 
dum would be a virtual recognition of us as the repre- 
sentatives of a power entitled to be treated with by this 
government." 2 Unfortunately for them, the Secretary 
was not at the Department, but at home, and too ill to 
transact any business. Here this intermediary dropped 
out. 

Seward soon recovered, and Senator Hunter became 
the go-between." The commissioners represented to their 

1 This referred to Fort Pickens as much as to Fort Sumter. 

8 Ibid.; Crawford, 323. 

3 Gwin was the only "late distinguished Senator of the United 
States " with whom Seward is known to have had dealings of this char- 
acter, and Gwin's recollections (18 Overland Monthly, 469) show that lie 
quit the negotiations at exactly the point the "agent " did — i. e., when 
Seward's illness interfered, which was on the 8th. Crawford {Genesis, 
etc., 322) and Rhodes (vol. iii., p. 328) erroneously speak of Hunter 
as if he were the intermediary in the effort to have Seward agree to 
the memorandum. These sentences from the commissioners' despatch 
of March 12th should have precluded such an inference: " At the date 
of our last communication we were awaiting the convalescence of Mr. 
Seward. He was at the State Department on Monday (yesterday), 
when we proposed to place in his hands the memorandum of terms of 
delay, a copy of which has been transmitted to you. The gentleman 
who was to carry it had, however, left the city ; and feeling unwilling 
to lose time in waiting for him, we availed ourselves of the kind con- 
sent of Senator Hunter, of Virginia, to see Mr. Seward and learn if he 
would consent to an informal interview with us." 

It is not strange that Gwin was inaccurate as to the date and some 
other minor features. Many years after the incident occurred he saw 
a reference in Jefferson Davis's Confederate Government to a call that 
"a distinguished Senator" made March 11th on Seward in behalf of 

111 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

government that Seward was " perceptibly embarrassed 
and uneasy " when Hunter appeared at the Department 
of State, March 11th ; for the Secretary " seemed to ap- 
prehend the formal presentation of the issue we have in 
charge." Because it was believed that the evacuation 
of Sumter was certain, the commissioners concluded to 
drop the demand for the preservation of the military 
status and to insist on an informal interview. In reply, 
Seward said that before he could consent, he would have 
to consult the President, and that he would give Hunter 
an answer the next day. 1 As agreed, he wrote, March 
12th : " It will not be in my power to receive the gentle- 
men of whom we spoke yesterday. You will please ex- 
plain to them that this decision proceeds solely on public 
grounds, and not from any want of personal respect." 2 
Again Confederate hopes were blasted. 

The commissioners seem to have concluded that 
Seward was not to be caught with a pin-hook, and that 

the commissioners, and supposed the reference was to himself, for he 
had never heard of Hunter's services. See 18 Overland Monthly, 465. 

1 Commissioners to Toombs, March 12th. 

2 This entry of March 7th, in the " Diary of a Public Man," says of 
Seward : " He seemed inclined to think that a mode might be found 
of receiving them and negotiating with them, without in any way 
committing the government to a recognition of the government which 
they assume to represent. 

" I found it difficult, indeed I may say impossible, to make Mm admit 
the hopelessness of looking for such a thing— [not italicized in the origi- 
nal]— but I told him frankly that I saw no earthly reason why he 
should uot informally and in a private way obtain from these gentle- 
men — all of them, as he knew, honorable and very intelligent men — 
some practical light on the way out of all this gathering perplexity, 
if, indeed, they have any such practical light to give. He then gave 
me to understand that this was exactly what he had done and meant 
to do, and he repeated his conviction that the evacuation of Fort 
Sumter would clear the way for a practical understanding out of 
which an immediate tranquillization of the country must come, and 
in the not distant future a return of all the seceding states to their 
allegiance."— 129 North American Revieic, 490. 

112 



THE INADEQUACY OF SEWARD'S POLICY 

their dignity demanded a formal announcement of their 
presence in Washington and a request for an official 
audience, so as to state the object of their mission. 
Such a communication was left at the Department of 
State on March 13th, with the statement that an answer 
would be called for on the next day. When the secretary 
of the commission came for the answer, he was told that 
time had not been found to prepare it, but that its 
prompt delivery at the hotel of the commissioners might 
be relied on. As it did not come, the secretary went to 
the department, on the 15th, to learn the cause of the 
delay. He was told that a reply was then preparing. 1 

The immediate rejection of the request of the commis- 
sioners seemed inevitable. Whenever it should come, 
they would have to withdraw. Then the channel of 
peaceful communication between the two governments 
would close and warlike demonstrations must soon fol- 
low. This would mark the end and utter failure of 
Seward's policy. Unless he could control the patience 
of the commissioners it would be impossible for him to 
carry out his plans. This prospect must have been most 
painful. In his whole public career there was nothing 
to which he had clung so fondly. He had a great repu- 
tation as a political seer, and his pride did not lag behind 
his reputation. 

While still distressed by the dilemma, on March 15th, 
Justice Nelson, of the United States Supreme Court, 
laid before him some opinions to the effect that there 
were serious constitutional objections to the employ- 
ment of coercive measures. Shortly afterward Kelson 
met his colleague, Justice John A. Campbell, and took 
him to Seward, hoping that he might help to overcome 
the immediate difficulties. Twelve years later Camp- 
bell described what occurred at the department: the 

1 Commissioners to Toombs, March 22d. 
II— h 113 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

Justices urged Seward to receive the commissioners; 
Seward regretted his inability to do so, and asked them 
to see Lincoln, Bates, and Blair ; he was confident that 
Jefferson Davis would not have sent the commission- 
ers if he had known the true state of affairs ; and he 
declared further that the evacuation of Sumter was as 
much as the administration could bear at one time. 
Campbell saw the force of the suggestion as to Sumter. 
Seward assured him, when he spoke of writing to Davis 
and of speaking to the commissioners, that Sumter would 
be evacuated before a letter could reach Montgomery, 
and that no action was contemplated as to the forts in 
the Gulf of Mexico. 1 

Accordingly, Campbell immediately reported to the 
commissioners Seward's desire to preserve the peace, 
and left with them a written statement expressing " per- 
fect confidence" that Sumter would be "evacuated in 
the next five days " ; " that no measure changing the 
existing status of things prejudicially to the Southern 
Confederate States is at present contemplated " ; that an 
immediate demand for an answer to their communication 
would " be productive of evil and not of good " ; and he 
asked for a delay of ten days until the effect of the 
evacuation of Fort Sumter could be ascertained. 2 Of 
course the commissioners understood that Campbell ob- 
tained his information from Seward; in fact, all con- 
cerned must have known that there was no other source 
for such assurances. 

Heretofore it has sometimes been claimed that Camp- 
bell said more to the commissioners than he was au- 
thorized to do, and that Seward knew nothing about it. 
There is no basis for the claim. Only a few hours after 
Campbell, who was acting at Seward's request, received 
his instructions, he reported that he had told Crawford 

1 Crawford, 327, 328. 2 Crawford, 330. 

114 



THE INADEQUACY OF SEWARD'S POLICY 

" that no measure changing the existing status of things 
prejudicially to the Confederate States is at present con- 
templated by the administration." 1 It was thoroughly 
understood on all sides that the Confederacy would vio- 
lently resist any attempt to reinforce United States 
troops at any point within the claimed boundary of the 
seven seceded states. Notwithstanding Scott's order 
of the 12th to reinforce Fort Pickens, this assurance 
covered that fort as much, as Fort Sumter or any 
others. 

All parties concerned liked the new arrangement ; so 
this peculiar intercourse continued. On March 16th 
Campbell, understanding Seward's anxiety about an an- 
swer to the note of the commissioners, followed up his 

1 "I saw Judge Crawford, after leaving you to-day," Campbell 
wrote to Seward, March 15, 1861, "and communicated to him that I 
had entire confidence that Fort Sumter would be evacuated in five 
days, and that no measure changing the existing status of things preju- 
dicially to the Confederate States is at present contemplated by the 
administration. 

"That these conclusions imposed great responsibility upon the 
administration, and that this responsibility would be injuriously 
increased by any demand for an answer to the communication of 
the commissioners of the Confederate States, and insisted that an 
answer should not be requested until the effect of the evacuation 
of Fort Sumter on the public mind should be ascertained, and, at 
all events, that nothing be done for ten days. Judge Crawford 
agreed to my proposal, but said Mr. Forsyth's concurrence was 
necessary. Mr. F. could not be found, and it was agreed that as 
soon as he could be consulted that Judge C. would address me a note 
as to the result. 

" I have not yet heard from him. 

"I think that you need not concern yourself to make an answer for 
the present. As soon as I hear from the commissioners, I will iuform 
you. 

"Judge C. preferred to conduct the correspondence with General 
Davis, and I shall not (probably) write to the latter on the subject. 
I cautioned Judge C. not to speak of our intercourse, and not to ex- 
press any surmise as to the source from which my assurances were 
derived. I did not mention any name to him." — Seward MSS. 

115 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

report to Seward with these lines : " The commissioners 
have sent a telegram to Montgomery in order to obtain 
permission to do as desired. An answer will, probably, 
be received to-day. Nothing will be expected from you 
to-day on their part." 1 As anticipated, Toombs tele- 
graphed the commissioners to " wait a reasonable time 
and then ask instructions." 

At the expiration of the five days within w T hich 
Sumter was to be evacuated, Campbell was requested to 
make inquiries about the delay. On March 21st he con- 
ferred with Seward and again gave the commissioners a 
written statement that his "confidence" was "unabated" 
as to the facts stated on March 15th ; 2d, that no prej- 
udicial movement to the South is contemplated as re- 
spects Fort Pickens. I shall be able to speak positively 
to-morrow afternoon." 2 After a long consultation with 
Seward, on March 22d, Campbell made a third record 
of his " unabated confidence" that there was no ground 
for distrust as to Sumter, and that the condition of things 
at Fort Pickens was not to be altered prejudicially to 
the Confederacy. He advised against making any de- 
mands upon the United States, and said he should have 
knowledge of any change in the existing status. His 
memorandum w r as shown to Seward before it was de- 
livered : therefore Fort Pickens was expressly covered 
by the pledge. 3 Justice Nelson was present at each 
of the three interviews; Campbell showed the state- 
ments to him and obtained his sanction before giving 
them to the commissioners. Campbell published these 

1 Seward MSS. 

"Campbell's statement, printed in Crawford, 331. Campbell, as 
well as the commissioners, seems to have become somewhat suspicious^ 
for he took Justice Nelson with him for his "protection against the 
treachery of Secretary Seward and such other members of the Cabinet 
as he sees," as Toombs was informed. — Commissioners to Toombs, 
March 22d. 

3 Crawford, 331, 332. 

116 



THE INADEQUACY OF SEWARD'S POLICY 

facts only a few weeks later. 1 Kelson's loyalty would 
have made it morally obligatory to deny Campell's ac- 
count if it had not been correct. 

On March 24th the Russian Minister called upon com- 
missioner Roman and reported the following as the sub- 
stance of a conversation with Seward the day before : 
no coercion or blockade, the Secretary had said, would 
be attempted ; the seceding states would be allowed to 
collect the duties at their custom-houses, but the expense 
of their post-offices ought to be paid out of this revenue ; 
he hoped those states, if allowed to act quietly, would 
retrace their steps, and return to the Union, but if they 
persisted the} 7 should be permitted to depart in peace ; 
he had to fight the ultra-Republicans, but he was gain- 
ing ground and his policy would finally prevail. Could 
not an informal meeting with Roman be arranged for 
him at the Russian legation ? Seward and the Minister 
agreed that taking a cup of tea there two evenings later 
would furnish the best opportunity. Roman gladly ac- 
cepted the suggestion. 3 The next morning Seward sent 
his regrets ; and subsequently told the Minister that, 
after much reflection, he had declined, because he was 
afraid that the meeting might become known to the 
newspapers. The commissioners believed that it was 
because Seward was apprehensive of Horace Greeley, 
who had just arrived in "Washington. 3 They advised that 
the strongest possible force should be presented at Fort 
Pickens, so that there would be an " excuse " for its 
evacuation. They did not believe that the forts would 
be reinforced at the risk of a conflict. But it was still a 
question whether the administration was more afraid of 
the Confederate States or of the radical Republicans. 4 

1 McPherson's Rebellion, 110. 

' 2 Roman to Toombs, March 25th. See note to p. 135 post. 

1 Commissioners to Toombs, March 26th. 

* Ibid. 

117 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM II. SEWARD 

Until the last days of March, Seward's influence over 
the administration seemed to be undisturbed. Although 
Lincoln had not adopted his recommendations, he so 
carefully avoided direct antagonism to them that Seward 
and his friends— as well as Jefferson Davis 1 — continued 
to believe that they would prevail. What did the status 
at this time — near the end of March — indicate as to the 
efficiency of Seward's plan and methods if they should 
be allowed full sway? A fair point from which to 
judge them should be gained by a careful examination 
of these three questions : 

1. How did the Confederates regard and expect to 
meet his policy ? 

2. What conditions did the southern Unionists put 
upon its acceptance ? 

3. What did Seward's closest friends, and other Re- 
publicans, think of the outlook ? 

1. With profound complacency the Confederates re- 
garded Seward as their cat's-paw. " I have felt it my 
duty under instructions from your department, as well 
as from my best judgment," Crawford wrote to Toombs, 
March 6th, " to adopt and support Mr. Seward's policy, 
upon condition, however, that the present status is to 
be rigidly maintained. His reasons and my own, it is 
proper to say, are as wide apart as the poles : he is fully 
persuaded that peace will bring about a reconstruction 
of the Union, whilst I feel confident that it will build up 
and cement our confederacy and put us beyond the reach 
either of his arras or of his diplomacy." " It is well 
that he should indulge in dreams which we know are 
not to be realized," Forsyth and Crawford complacent- 
ly said, two days later. Because the Confederates were 
living under their own laws and were levying tribute 
upon the North, the commissioners felt that a continu- 

1 Toombs to commissioners, April 2d. 
118 



THE INADEQUACY OF SEWARD'S POLICY 

ance of quiet would be most conducive to a solidification 
of their government and to preparation for any emer- 
gency ; while it would tend to' give them character, 
power, and influence abroad. 1 The evacuation of Forts 
Sumter and Pickens would be pro tanto a recognition of 
independence. Obtaining Fort Pickens might be a work 
of time. " Still, invest the latter as Sumter was and it 
soon becomes a necessity." Crawford pointed out that, 
by procuring from Seward a pledge not to change the 
status, the Confederate States had won a great advan- 
tage, for they " were not bound in any way whatever to 
observe the same course toward it " — the United States. 
" We think, then, that the policy of ' masterly inactivity,' 
on our part, was wise in every particular." 2 As late as 
April 2d, the Confederate Secretary of State wrote to the 
commissioners : " It is a matter of no importance to us 
what motives may induce the adoption of Mr. Seward's 
policy by his government. We are satisfied that it will 
redound to our advantage, and, therefore, care little for 
Mr. Seward's calculations as to its future effect upon the 
Confederate States." At the same time Toombs instruct- 
ed the commissioners not to agree to maintain the present 
status except upon the condition that the United States 
troops should be withdrawn from both Sumter and Pick- 
ens. From the beginning these forts were linked to- 
gether for war or peace.' This soon became apparent. 

The commissioners had asked their government if dur- 
ing negotiations it would be practicable to collect the 
same duties as were required by the laws of the United 
States rather than by those of the Confederacy. March 

1 Commissioners, March 26th. " Crawford to Toombs, April 1st. 

3 On February 15th, a resolution of the Confederate Congress ex- 
pressed the opinion " that immediate steps should be taken to obtain 
possession of Forts Sumter and Pickens, by the authority of this gov- 
ernment, either by negotiations or force, as early as practicable." — 
1 War Records, 258. 

119 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

14th, Toombs answered : " The government of the Con- 
federate States can never agree that negotiations shall 
be made dependent on the non execution of our own 
laws. . . . Not even to avert war can we ever consent 
to suspend the operation of the laws which we are bound 
to execute." In a separate despatch of March 29th 
Roman expressed hopes that Seward would, "before 
long, return to his idea of having an informal interview 
with us, and that some plan, not for a final treaty of 
peace — he dares not go so far — but for a truce or ces- 
sation of hostilities, perhaps until the meeting of the 
next Congress, may be agreed upon." 

If the Confederates understood the needs of their own 
government, Seward's expectations were to be disap- 
pointed — unless he had some plan in reserve. 

2. John A. Gilmer, of North Carolina, and George W. 
Summers, of Virginia, probably stood closer to Seward 
than any other Southerners not Republicans. Gilmer 
indicated his belief that, in order to save the Unionists 
in the southern states from being " swept away in a tor- 
rent of madness," it would be necessary to withdraw the 
troops from all the fortifications in the Confederacy and 
leave the revenue laws unenforced, so as to avoid a 
resort to arms. 1 He thought that most of the states 
could be won back in less than two years. Likewise 
Judge Summers, in his great Union speech before the 
Virginia convention, maintained that there was neither 
cause nor power to retake the lost forts ; that there was 
no way for the United States to collect the customs in 
the seceded states ; that we were " bound to accept se- 
cession as an existing fact," for the seven states had 
" formed a new confederacy " and were " now perform- 
ing the functions of an independent government." 11 

1 For Gilmer's letters to Seward, see Appendix L. 
* At the same time he said he would regard that statesman as "nar- 
row and unphilosophical" who should consider the action of these 

120 



THE INADEQUACY OF SEWARD'S POLICY 

Moreover, the report of the committee on Federal re- 
lations had already indicated that more than half the 
members of the convention were practically defensive 
allies of the Confederacy. 1 Throughout March those 
who called themselves Unionists or conservatives held 
the immediate secessionists in check ; but it was the task 
of Sisyphus, and every day the burden grew heavier. 
Not even one hint has been found, in the many letters 
they wrote to Seward, that they would remain loyal if 
the Confederacy should be resisted. Lincoln's sarcastic 
exclamation — "Yes! your Virginia people are good 
Unionists, but it is always with an if!"* — was a perfect 
characterization of their attitude. And, as a matter of 
fact, those whom Lincoln so accurately called Seward 
and Weed's "white crows" soon became Confederates. 
Yet Seward expected such broken reeds to be the 
southern pillars of the Union ! 

3. The commissioners had frequently reported that 
the peace party at the North was growing. An edi- 
torial article in the New York Times of March 21st said 
that " there is a growing sentiment throughout the North 
in favor of letting the Gulf States go." Every week of 
quiet strengthened conservatives and abolitionists in the 
belief that it would be better to say, " Wayward sisters, 
depart in peace," than to risk the perils of a civil war. 
Neither the Times nor the Evening Journal accepted this 
view, but both papers suggested that an extra session of 
Congress would be a prerequisite of adopting a policy 



states as insurrectionary. He announced that the news received from 
Washington that morning [presumably from Seward per Welling] re- 
moved all doubt about a pacific policy and the evacuation of Sumter. 
" These states must be left to time, to their experiment, to negotiation, 
to entreaty, to sisterly kindness." — Speech of March 11, 1861, Semi- 
Weekly Richmond Enquirer, March 25th. 

1 American Annual Cyclopaedia, 1861, 732-34. 

* 1 Southern Historical Papers, 446. 

121 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM II. SEWARD 

of active resistance to secession. 1 Gilmer urged Seward, 
March 12th, to draw up a proclamation throwing upon 
Buchanan's administration the blame for the condition 
of affairs. To this Seward replied that the suggestions 
were "judicious." 2 There had been a very marked change 
of attitude since the previous winter, when the Evening 
Journal denounced Buchanan for not pursuing a vigorous 
policy. The almost free-trade tariff of the Confederacy 
had so demoralized importation at the North that the 
Times said, on March 30th : " With us it is no longer an 
abstract question — one of constitutional construction, or 
of reserved or delegated powers of the state or Federal 
government, but of material existence and moral posi- 
tion both at home and abroad." Douglas and most of 
the Democrats were known to be in favor of withdraw- 
ing the troops from both Sumter and Pickens, and recog- 
nizing as a fact what had taken place. The Republican 
Senators became more and more impatient, and Trum- 
bull finally introduced a resolution declaring that the 
true way to preserve the Union was to enforce in all the 
states the laws of the Union. 3 

So, as yet there was no sign of the refluent wave that 
was expected to sweep back into the Union its dismem- 
bered parts- in fact, all the appearances indicated that 
Seward's plans, as far as announced, were wholly inade- 
quate to save or restore the integrity of the nation. 

1 la a very significant editorial article on "Peaceful Secession," 
March 23d, the Evening Journal said that there should be no shedding 
of blood " by the general government, if it have not the needed force to 
carry on the war which the shedding of blood would initiate." As late 
as April 3d, a leading article in the Times said: "If he [the President] 
decides to enforce the laws, let him call Congress together and demand 
the means of doing it." 

2 See Appendix L, letter of April 11th. a Globe, 1860-61, 1519. 

122 



CHAPTER XXIX 

SEWARD'S STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY 

On March 28th the Senate adjourned. This promised 
to relieve the administration from criticism in that quar- 
ter. The New York Tribune of that morning contained 
a sensational despatch dated the previous day in Wash- 
ington, disclosing the fact that an order, which was 
Scott's, had been sent a fortnight before, to reinforce 
Fort Pickens with the four hundred troops on the Brook- 
lyn. On this 28th of March, also, expired the twenty-day 
delay, to which the commissioners had been authorized 
to consent. By this time, too, the conclusions of Fox, 
Hurlbut, and Lamon had become known. Hence it was 
to be expected that the administration would soon pub- 
licly and definitively announce its policy. Late that 
evening Lincoln called the members of his Cabinet into 
consultation to inform them that General Scott had rec- 
ommended that Fort Pickens as well as Fort Sumter 
should be evacuated. Lincoln showed considerable emo- 
tion in making the announcement. A painful silence 
followed, until Blair began to denounce Scott for " play- 
ing politician," and not acting as a general should in 
recommending the surrender of a fort that was regard- 
ed as impregnable. Those present understood that the 
remarks were aimed at Seward ; and in after years both 
Blair and Welles recorded their belief that Scott was 
acting as Seward's decoy. 1 

1 3 Nicolay and Hay, 394, 395 ; Welles, 58, 60, 65. 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

Owing to the intimacy between Scott and Seward, it 
was assumed that Scott's recommendation was really 
Seward's, adroitly and tentatively made in this way in 
order to avoid hazarding the Secretary of State's influ- 
ence with the administration. 

A continuation of peace was the prerequisite of suc- 
cess for Seward's policy. His attitude toward Fort 
Sumter was such as to warrant the belief that he would 
also favor the evacuation of Fort Pickens, if necessary 
to the avoidance of an outbreak. Since 1839, when 
Scott was used by Weed and Seward as a means to de- 
feat the nomination of Clay, 1 the man whom the coun- 
try admired as a soldier and ridiculed as a politician 
had been repeatedly employed by the shrewd New York 
leaders as a means of carrying out their plans. In 
1851-52 it was notorious that Scott was under the in- 
fluence of their political mesmerism. During the winter 
of 1860-61 Seward and Scott were working like hand 
in glove. Gwin explained how Seward cited Scott's 
change of attitude as evidence of the strength of the 
policy of peace. The letter of March 3, 1861, to Seward 
was thoroughly unconventional and suspicious. It said 
that to "conquer the seceded states" would require an 
army of three hundred thousand men, two hundred and 
fifty million dollars, and a garrison of thirty-five thou- 
sand men to protect Washington. Within three days 
this opinion was quoted to Toombs by the commission- 
ers, with the unimportant error of naming two hundred 
and fifty thousand men instead of three hundred thou- 
sand. The information was exactly in line with what 
Seward wanted the Confederate leaders at Montgomery 
to know. Welles subsequently asserted that when the 
Sumter question first came before the new Cabinet, 
Seward recommended that it be referred to Scott and 



2 Schurz's Clay, 178. 
124 



SEWARD'S STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY 

that his report be conclusive; and that Seward was, as 
yet, the only member who was aware that Scott had 
ceased to be a coercionist. 1 On the night of the 5th of 
March, Scott wrote for the President an opinion in entire 
harmony with Seward's ideas as to evacuating Sumter, 
and about the truce regarding Fort Pickens, entered into 
between the previous administration and some of the 
Confederates. 2 On March 6th Seward carried it away 
from the White House, before the President had ex- 
amined it, 3 and lent it to Stanton to be shown to Dix. 4 
On the 7th Lincoln requested Seward to return the paper 
so that he could study it. On March 5th, also, the Pres- 
ident had requested General Scott to use "all possible 
vigilance for the maintenance of all the places." On 
the 9th he learned that nothing had been done toward 
reinforcing Fort Pickens ; so, on the 11th, he put the 
order in writing. 5 Welles has recorded that on that day 
Scott was very eager to have a naval vessel — because 
overland communications were unreliable — take an army 
officer who should be bearer of a despatch instructing 
Captain Yogdes, of the Brooklyn, lying off the harbor 
of Pensacola, to disembark his men so as to strengthen 
Fort Pickens; but that by the evening of the 12th 
Scott had lost his "earnest zeal" and had concluded 
that it would suffice to send merely a written order to 
Yogdes. So this was done on March 12th. 6 It is hard- 
ly conceivable that Seward did not know of this order. 
It has been noticed that on March 11th Seward en- 
couraged Hunter to believe that he would receive the 
commissioners, and how, when he had to withdraw this 
encouragement, he soon gave Campbell assurances that 
there was no intention to change the status. This, with 

1 Welles, 59. 

2 3 Nicolay and Hay, 378. MS. kindly shown by Colonel Nicolay. 
* 2 Lincoln's Works, 8. A 2 Curtis's Buchanan, 529. 

6 3 Nicolay and Hay, 393. s Welles, 59, 60. 

125 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

reassurances at different times, kept the Confederates 
unaggressive for two weeks. The Tribune's disclosure 

no 

of March 28th about the order to reinforce Fort Pickens 
was undoubtedly known to Seward and Scott before the 
hour when Scott made his startling recommendation to 
evacuate that fort. Whether this recommendation was 
the result of fear lest the report of Scott's order might 
precipitate a war cannot be affirmed ; it is only certain 
that the report did not precipitate hostilities because it 
was immediately discredited. It is certain that by the 
evening of March 28th Seward knew that his repeated 
assertions that there was no intention to change the 
status were incorrect. Therefore, he was bound either to 
tell Campbell the truth or so to counteract the possible 
effects of the order to reinforce Fort Pickens as to make 
the change of status not "prejudicial" to the Confed- 
eracy. This could be done by inducing the Federal 
government to evacuate Fort Pickens. 

But there is still another mysterious thread. It should 
be remembered that Lincoln was calm in the belief that 
Vogdes had landed the troops according to Scott's or- 
der of the 12th and that Fort Pickens was absolutely 
safe. If Seward and Scott had no more information 
than others about affairs at Fort Pickens, they must 
have held the same opinion. As a matter of fact, the 
commandant had disobeyed Scott's instructions on the 
ground that they did not come from an official of suf- 
ficient rank to countermand the orders of Buchanan's 
Secretaries of War and of the Navy. But the adminis- 
tration did not hear of this until early in April. If 
Seward expected such an outcome, that would explain 
both why he had dared to give Campbell the assurances 
at different times since March 15th, and wh}' he did not 
hasten to undeceive him and the commissioners after 
March 28th. But if Seward, without informing the 
President, knew what would happen, he was party to a 

126 



SEWARD'S STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY 

plot. If there was such a plot, it was operated through 
Scott; and that would be ample reason for Scott and 
Seward to favor withdrawing the troops, and thereby 
closing the whole Pickens question as speedily as pos- 
sible. 

The Cabinet met again at noon, March 29th, and the 
President called once more for written opinions as to 
what should be done. 1 Chase, Blair, and Welles agreed 
that Fort Sumter should be relieved. Bates was non- 
committal; and Smith alone still stood with Seward for 
its evacuation. As to Fort Pickens, Welles and Bates 
were very urgent for reinforcement. Chase and Blair 
were so peremptory about relieving Sumter that they 
evidently considered it superfluous to be explicit about 
Pickens. Smith's advice plainly rested upon the pre- 
sumption that the evacuation of Sumter would be com- 
pensated for by rigorous measures elsewhere. The logic 
of Seward's former attitude meant that Pickens should 
not be held at the cost of peace. It was well known 
that the Confederates had several days before begun to 
apply in Pensacola harbor the choking-off policy that 
had been so successful in the neighborhood of Charles- 
ton. 2 The reception some members of the Cabinet gave 
Scott's recommendation of the previous day was suf- 
ficient to warn any one that it would be suicidal to 
come out positively in favor of it now. With these 
thoughts in mind it is interesting to notice the exact 
wording of Seward's response of March 29th: 

"First. The despatch of an expedition to supply or re- 
inforce Sumter would provoke an attack, and so involve a 
war at that point. 

" The fact of preparation for such an expedition would 
inevitably transpire, and would therefore precipitate the 
war — and probably defeat the object. I do not think it 

1 3 Nicolay and Hay, 429 ff. Cameron seems to have been absent. 
2 1 Moore's Rebellion Record, Doc, p. 42 ; 3 Nicolay and Hay, 431. 

127 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

wise to provoke a civil war beginning at Charleston and in 
rescue of an untenable position. 

"Therefore, I advise against the expedition in every 
view. 

" Second. I would call in Captain M. C. Meigs forth- 
with. Aided by his counsel, I would at once, and at every 
cost, prepare for a war at Pensacola and Texas, to he taken, 
liowever, only as a consequence of maintaining the posses- 
sions and authority of the United States. 1 

" Third. I would instruct Major Anderson to retire from 
Sumter forthwith." 2 

Because war would as certainly be brought on by 
the reinforcement of Pickens as by the resupplying 
of Sumter, it seems just to infer that Seward did not 
at this time intend to do either, but merely to continue 
to hold Pickens and to be ready for war " as a con- 
sequence of maintaining the possessions and authority 
of the United States." However, he must have realized 
that his original plans were almost sure to be rejected 
for those of the opposite faction in the Cabinet, and that 
the only way to maintain his supremacy was by means 
of some new and vigorous move. Undoubtedly he still 
hoped to continue through negotiation his policy of peace 
and procrastination, but he saw the importance of being 
ready to take the lead in any case. That afternoon he 
took Captain Meigs to the White House and urged 
Lincoln to put him in command of the three great Flor- 
ida fortresses on the Gulf — Pickens, Taylor, and Jeffer- 
son. 3 About the same time the President ordered the 
preparation of an expedition that should be ready to 
leave for Sumter by April 6th, but the use of which 
should depend upon circumstances. 4 

On Saturday, March 30th, Campbell had another in- 
terview with Seward and left with him a telegram from 
Governor Pickens inquiring the cause of the delay in 

1 Italics not in original. 2 3 Nicolay and Hay, 430. 

3 3 Nicolay and Hay, 434-36. 4 3 Nicolay and Hay, 433. 

128 



SEWARD'S STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY 

evacuating Sumter. Lanaon had led the Governor to 
expect that it would take place before that date. 1 This 
involved Lincoln, and Seward said that he could not 
give a definite reply until Monday, April 1st. Seward 
gave Campbell no ground to suspect that there had been 
any change of plans; for Crawford wrote to Toombs: 
" The result of that interview was to satisfy him [Camp- 
bell] entirely upon the good faith of the government in 
everything except the time as to when Sumter was to 
have been evacuated, and the truth in reference to 
that is the promise was made after the Cabinet and 
President had agreed to the order for evacuation, and 
the persons thus pledging its fulfilment had no reason 
to suspect that any influences whatever would delay 
its prompt execution." 2 By telegraph they expressed 
their confidence that "no attempt to reinforce Pickens 
has been or will be made without notice." 3 Somebody 
had persuaded the commissioners that the Tribune re- 
port about the order to reinforce Fort Pickens was de- 
signed to help the Republicans in some local elections. 4 

On Sunday, the 31st, Seward requested Meigs and 
Colonel Keyes, Scott's military secretary, to go to Scott 
and prepare a project for the relief of Fort Pickens, and 
bring it to the President before four o'clock. They 
made their report without having had time to see Scott, 
and Lincoln, through Seward, gave positive orders for 
Scott to carry it out. 6 The next day, April 1st, on Sew- 
ard's recommendation, Lincoln directed Lieutenant David 
D. Porter to " proceed to ISTew York, and, with the least 
possible delay, assume command of any naval steamer 
available. Proceed to Pensacola Harbor, and at any 
cost or risk prevent any expedition from the main-land 
reaching Fort Pickens or Santa Rosa." 6 A telegram 

1 Crawford, 337, 373, 374. 2 Despatch of April 1st. 

s March 30th. 4 Roman's despatch, March 29th. 

6 3 Nicolay and Hay, 436. 6 4 Naval Records, 108. 

ii.— i 129 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

from the President instructed the commandant of the 
New York navy-yard to "fit out the Powhatan to go to 
sea at the earliest possible moment under sealed orders"; 
and another order of the same date directed him " under 
no circumstances communicate to the Navy Department 
the fact that she is fitting out." ' Seward not only had 
the management of the whole movement, but Welles 
and Cameron were to know no more about it than if 
they were Confederates. Seward had given Lincoln's 
oral order to Scott; he had recommended Porter's ap- 
pointment and instructions. 2 Keyes, Meigs, and Porter 
made the preparations under his advice and that of 
Scott; and Scott prepared and gave to him, for the 
President's signature, the order for the departure of the 
expedition. 9 When the movement seemed to be en- 
dangered from lack of available money, Seward went 
to his department and took from the secret-service fund 
ten thousand dollars in gold, which was put at Meigs's 
disposal. 4 Nothing then known to others accounts for 
such acts as these. 6 

When Campbell called on the Secretary of State, 
April 1st, he was informed that the President was much 
disturbed by Governor Pickens's telegram and Lamon's 
pledge, for Lamon had had no commission or authority. 4 
Campbell asked what he should tell the commissioners 
about Sumter. Seward took up his pen and wrote that 

1 4 Naval Records of the Rebellion, 109. 

8 2 Lincoln's Works, 28. 3 3 Nice-lay and Hay, 439. 

4 Crawford, 411. 

s Lincoln signed the orders without having time to consider their 
meaning, and subsequently repudiated whatever interfered with the 
Fort Sumter expedition. The only defence that has ever been made 
of Seward's concealment from Welles and Cameron was that there were 
disloyal clerks in the War and the Navy Departments. The explana- 
tion does not explain why the Secretaries of these departments, as well 
as Seward, might not have kept the secret and avoided using any one 
under suspicion. The real reason will soon appear. 

6 Crawford, 337. 

130 



SEWARD'S STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY 

the President might desire to supply Fort Sumter, but 
would not undertake to do so without first giving notice 
to Governor Pickens. Campbell was greatly surprised 
by the statement, for he had supposed that evacuation 
was only a matter of time. Now he feared lest the 
suggestion that the fort might be provisioned should 
indicate a change of plan and cause the South Caro- 
linians to attack it. Seward expressed his belief that 
the fort would not be supplied. Campbell suggested 
that it would not be well to give the commissioners 
an answer that did not represent the purpose of the 
government. Seward then went to consult the Presi- 
dent. When he came back he wrote this sentence for 
Campbell to repeat to the commissioners as his own : 
" I am satisfied the government will not undertake 
to supply Fort Sumter without giving notice to Gov- 
ernor Pickens." 1 Seward's explanation of the opposi- 
tion to the plan of withdrawing from Sumter con- 
vinced Campbell that there had been no change of 
policy and that evacuation was merely delayed, or that 
the administration was waiting for Anderson to be 
starved out. 8 

By this time Seward recognized that he was in dire 
straits. 9 For months he had firmly believed he was the 
only man that could save his country from countless dis- 
asters. Now a course of action that was contrary to 
his previous plans, advice, and expectations was likely 
to begin. In fact, expeditions for the relief of the two 
critical points were already preparing. If the Sumter 

1 Crawford, 337, 333 ; McPherson, 111. 

2 Campbell to Davis, April 3d; 3 Nicolay and Hay, 411; Com- 
missioners to Toombs, April 1st ; Crawford, 338. 

3 In a brief note to Mrs. Seward, in Auburn, he wrote, April 1st : 
"But I am full of occupation, and more of anxieties. . . . Dangers 
and breakers are before us I wish you were near enough to share 
some of my thoughts and feelings, and fears, and trials." — 2 Seward, 
534. 

131 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

expedition should be ordered forward — and the current 
was very strong in that direction — the world would un- 
derstand that Seward's counsel had been rejected and 
that he had lost his power. It would humiliate him by 
making it plain that either he himself had been deceived 
or that he had tried to deceive others, and perhaps both. 
If the Fort Pickens expedition — which was Seward's 
almost exclusively — should be despatched as designed, 
and be successful, it would save a part of his prestige. 
But if either expedition should be carried out, southern 
Unionism would swing into secession, and a civil war — 
which he confidently believed would end in complete dis- 
union and the overthrow of his party — would soon break 
out. Was there no way to avert these calamities? 

Evidently as a last, desperate effort he laid this novel, 
elaborate, and clashing programme before the President : 

Some Thoughts for the President's Consideration, 
April 1, 1861. 

First. We are at the end of a month's administration, 
and yet without a policy either domestic or foreign. 

Second. This, however, is not culpable, and it has even 
been unavoidable. The presence of the Senate, with the 
need to meet applications for patronage, have prevented 
attention to other and more grave matters. 

Third. But further delay to adopt aud prosecute our 
policies for both domestic and foreign affairs would not 
ouly bring scandal on the administration, but danger upon 
the country. 

Fourth. To do this we must dismiss the applicants for 
office. But how ? I suggest that we make the local ap- 
pointments forthwith, leaving foreign or general ones for 
ulterior and occasional action. 

Fifth. The policy at home. I am aware that my views 
are singular, and perhaps not sufficiently explained. My 
system is built upon this idea as a ruling one, namely, that 
we must 

Change the question before the public from one 
upon slavery, or about slavery, for a question upon 
UNION OR disunion : 

132 



SEWARD'S STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY 

In other words, from what would be regarded as a party 
question to one of patriotism or union. 

The occupation or evacuation of Fort Sumter, although 
not in fact a slavery or a party question, is so regarded. 
Witness the temper manifested by the Republicans in the 
free states, and even by the Union men in the South. 

I would therefore terminate it as a safe means for chang- 
ing the issue. I deem it fortunate that the last adminis- 
tration created the necessity. 

For the rest, I would simultaneously defend and rein- 
force all the forts in the Gulf, and have the navy recalled 
from foreign stations to be prepared for a blockade. Put 
the island of Key West under martial law. 

This will raise distinctly the question of union or dis- 
union. I would maintain every fort and possession in the 
South. 

FOR FOREIGN NATIONS 

I would demand explanations from Spain and France, 
categorically, at once. 

I would seek explanations from Great Britain and Rus- 
sia, and send agents into Canada, Mexico, and Central 
America to rouse a vigorous continental spirit of indepen- 
dence on this continent against European intervention. 

And, if satisfactory explanations are not received from 
Spain and France, 

Would convene Congress and declare war against them. 

But whatever policy we adopt, there must be an ener- 
getic prosecution of it. 

For this purpose it must be somebody's business to pur- 
sue and direct it incessantly. 

Either the President must do it himself, and be all the 
while active in it, or 

Devolve it on some member of his Cabinet. Once adopt- 
ed, debates on it must end, and all agree and abide. 

It is not in my especial province ; 

But I neither seek to evade nor assume responsibility.' 

Even if Seward had not supplemented these proposi- 
tions by having certain naval officers transferred so that 
they came into his plans, 2 we should have no doubts as 
to who expected to take command. Lincoln had as yet 

1 2 Lincoln's Works, 29. 
•' 3 Nicolay and Hay, 439-41 ; Welles, 69, 70. 
133 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

given few, if any, public indications of possessing greater 
abilities than such men as Bates, Smith, and Welles. 
His policy — or, rather, his lack of one — during March 
cannot be defended successfully ; it can only be ex- 
plained and excused. He had halted between two opin- 
ions and had acted on none. 

It was Seward's foreign policy that was most star- 
tling. It resembled a reckless invention of a mind 
driven to desperate extremes, as the sole means of escape 
from ruin, rather than a serious outline for national and 
international action. Two or three days before the 
''Thoughts" were written, the newspapers reported that 
a revolution had overthrown the Dominican republic 
and had raised the flag and proclaimed the sovereignty 
of Spain. For some time, too, it was well known that 
France, Spain, and Great Britain were considering the 
question of intervening in Mexico in order to redress 
and stop the wrongs that their subjects had suffered 
from the anarchy and violence there. It was also 
rumored that a plan was developing to put a European 
prince upon a Mexican throne. Citizens of the United 
States had been subjected to so many outrages in Mexico 
that Buchanan had recommended to Congress that for- 
cible intervention should be resorted to, but our domes- 
tic affairs had engrossed the attention of the statesmen 
at the Capitol. The three European powers had not 
yet reached any agreement ; and it was wholly unwar- 
rantable for the United States to assume that they in- 
tended to do more than enforce their just claims. As 
to Russia, the basis for demanding an explanation was 
to be found in the false reports in southern newspapers 
and in political circles in Washington that she was about 
to open diplomatic relations with the Confederacy. 1 



1 The following letter from the Assistant Secretary of State of 
that time is especially interesting because the diplomatic archives 

134 



SEWARD'S STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY 

How did it happen that such a gorgeous and danger- 
ous scheme found lodgment even in a mind as imagina- 
tive and bold as Seward's? He had earl}'' observed how 
advantageously public men can appeal to popular pas- 
sions in dealing with foreign relations, and on a few 
occasions he had shown that he could outstrip all rivals 
when he really cared to do so. Yet even when advo- 
cating a policy that pointed straight toward war, he 
had generally taken pains to show that he deprecated 

furnish no clew to an understanding of Seward's proposition in re- 
spect to Russia : 

"Montrose, N. Y., June 2, 1894. 

"My dear Sir : — Your letter of the 28th is received. 

" Russia, at the outbreak of the War of 1812, offered her friendly 
mediation to prevent hostilities between the United States and Great 
Britaiu. Animated by the same spirit, she sought, early in 1861, to 
avert the threatened hostilities between the South and the Union. 
The Russian Minister at Washington, Mr. Stoeckl, had an intimate, 
personal acquaintance with Slidell, Benjamin, and other southern 
Senators, and he went to the very verge of diplomatic prudence in his 
efforts to bring them into a good understanding with the Lincoln ad- 
ministration. Of course these efforts were made with a view of keep- 
ing them in the Union. Equally of course, perhaps, the secessionists 
chose, in their published correspondence, and in the press, to claim 
that these were intimations on the part of Russia of a design to mani- 
fest ' sympathy with the South ' and to ' recognize ' and 'open diplo- 
matic relations with the Confederacy.' You will find plenty of ref- 
erences to this in the Confederate Records, and in the newspapers of 
that day. The ' explanation ' sought from Russia by the Secretary of 
State was not of anything she had done, but of the purposes so osten- 
tatiously imputed to her. Prince Gortschakoff, as soon as he realized 
the situation, and even before being called upon, gave the unequivocal 
assurance of Russia's sympathy with the Union, which you will find 
in the Diplomatic Correspondence of 1861. The intercourse between 
the Russian Minister and the southern Senators came to an abrupt ter- 
mination when the first gun was fired at Sumter. 

" In regard to France and Spain and Great Britain, you have al- 
ready studied out the causas rerum. 

" Very truly yours, 

(Signed) "Frederick W. Seward. 
" Mr. Frederic Bancroft, 

"Washington." 

135 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM II. SEWARD 

actual hostilities. In speaking on the Hungarian ques- 
tion, in 1852, he said he would " never counsel it [war] 
except on the ground of necessary defence." 1 As has 
been noticed, he reproached Soule, in 1853, for exciting 
the American people against some of the European 
powers. " I cannot sympathize with such a spirit," 
he declared. " A war between the two continents 
would be a war involving not merely a trial [as to] 
which was the strongest, but [it would involve] the in- 
tegrity of our republic." 3 As late as January 12, 1861, 
he plaintively asked in the Senate : " Have foreign na- 
tions combined, and are they coming in rage upon us ? 
No. So far from being enemies, there is not a nation 
on the earth that is not an interested, admiring friend." 3 
He now ignored all these solemn opinions of the past. 
He was zealous to do what would be most certain to 
make enemies of great nations and justify their com- 
bining and "coming in rage upon us." He would let 
neither expedition depart until he had stirred up a for- 
eign war as the main -spring of his policy, for it was 
the prerequisite of changing the issue. 4 Why, in our 

1 1 Works, 202. 

9 3 Works, 616. Again, in 1856, when it looked as if we were to 
have a conflict with England, he was careful not to glorify war: " Al- 
though I helieve war sometimes justifiable, I regard it always, never- 
theless, as a calamity and an evil. I do not agree with either those 
who suppose it contributes to national prosperity or those who regard 
it as a salutary discipline of states." — Globe, 1855-56, Apdx., 79. 

3 4 Works, 662. 

4 This must have been the case unless he had lost his reason. If 
only the Fort Pickens expedition had gone forward, even that would 
soon, if not immediately, have precipitated a civil war. There was 
no possibility for Seward to receive answers to the demands on the 
different powers and get Congress together before June. Moreover, 
he had expressly said that he would "simultaneously defend and 
reinforce all the forts in the Gulf, and have the Navy recalled from 
the foreign stations to be prepared for a blockade." Two months, 
at least, would have been required for this. He certainly did not ex- 
pect that mere talk of a foreign war would "change the issue"; nor 

136 



SEWARD'S STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY 

critical condition, it would not have sufficed to pick a 
quarrel with one foreign nation at a time does not ap- 
pear, unless it was that he was so bent on speedily 
having a conflict of that kind that he sought it in 
several quarters so as to avoid delay and disappoint- 
ment. 

Seward's theory of the unifying effect of a foreign 
war had long been revolved in his mind. At the din- 
ner of the New England Society he had declared that 
if New York should be attacked by any foreign power 
"all the hills of South Carolina would pour forth their 
population to the rescue." l During the war of 1812 
Jefferson had maintained, Seward said in the speech of 
January 12th, " that states must be kept within their 
constitutional sphere by impulsion, if they could not be 
held there by attraction. Secession was then held to 
be inadmissible in the face of a public enemy." 2 The 
news about Santo Domingo came just at the time when 
Seward was in the most distressing circumstances. So 
he resolved to test his theory. 

A third person, viewing the problem as it seemed to 
be laid before the President by the " Thoughts," would 
have expected that Seward's exit from the Cabinet 
would soon follow. But when, just before the inaugu- 
ration, Lincoln insisted that Seward should share his 
responsibilities and help keep the Republican factions 
together for the welfare of the nation, it meant that 
personal eccentricities, however great, were not to have 
much weight. So with the most perfect self-posses- 
sion the President replied that he had pursued " the 

could he have imagined that after a civil war had begun a foreign war 
in addition would have been a panacea. Therefore, it is believed that 
the projects spoken of in the "Thoughts "were to take precedence to 
all other plans. Otherwise, how could "all agree and abide"? The 
opinion of March 15th supports this view. See ante, p. 100, last sen- 
tence. ' 4 Works, 649. * 4 Works, 653. 

137 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

exact domestic policy you now urge, with the single ex- 
ception that it does not propose to abandon Fort Sum- 
ter," and added : 

"Again, I do not perceive how the reinforcement of 
.Fort Sumter would be done on a slavery or a party issue, 
while that of Fort Pickens would be done on a more 
national and patriotic one. 

" The news received yesterday in regard to St. Domingo 
certainly brings a new item within the range of our foreign 
policy ; but up to that time we have been preparing circu- 
lars and instructions to ministers and the like, all in per- 
fect harmony, without even a suggestion that we had no 
foreign policy." 

As to Seward's suggestion about adopting an energetic 
policy and having some one for an absolute leader, he 
said : 

" I remark that if this must be done, I must do it. 
When a general line of policy is adopted, I apprehend 
there is no danger of its being changed without good 
reason, or continuing to be a subject of unnecessary de- 
bate ; still, upon points arising in its progress I wish, and 
I suppose I am entitled to have, the advice of all the Cabi- 
net."' 

Of course Seward's "Thoughts" in no way interrupted 
the preparation of the two expeditions to go South. The 
Powhatan and other ships were made ready during the 
first days of April. By the 4th Lincoln had decided to 
attempt the relief of Fort Sumter. On the 5th Secre- 
tary Welles, with the approval of the President, ap- 
pointed Captain Mercer naval commander of the Sumter 

1 It was natural for the President not to be altogether satisfied with 
what Scott had done, or to feel quite certain as to what he might do. 
So, also on April 1st, he sent him these lines : "Would it impose too 
much labor on General Scott to make short, comprehensive daily re- 
ports to me of what occurs in his department, including movements 
by himself, and under his orders, and the receipt of intelligence ? If 
not, I will thank him to do so." — 2 Lincoln's Works, 30. 

138 



SEWARD'S STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY 

fleet, and instructed him to take the Powhatan as the 
flag-ship — the Powhatan already assigned to Porter, 
the naval commander of the Pickens expedition. After 
Mercer had taken possession of her, on the 6th, Porter 
appeared, showed his orders signed by the President, 
and demanded control because the President's command 
took precedence. Before Mercer recognized the superi- 
ority of the President's instructions to those of the 
Secretary of the Navy, the confusion was reported to 
Seward, who took the telegram to Welles. Then both 
went to the White House, each hoping to win the Presi- 
dent's approval. Kegarding the Sumter expedition as 
the more urgent, and the Powhatan as of vital impor- 
tance to it, Lincoln quickly gave his support to Welles. 
Seward objected and made excuses, but Lincoln was per- 
emptory. Then the Secretary of State telegraphed these 
words to Porter : " Give up the Powhatan to Mercer. — 
Seward." By this time Porter had superseded Mercer 
and was on the way to Fort Pickens, but he was soon 
overtaken. Having successfully maintained a few hours 
before that an order signed by the President outranked 
one by the Secretary of the Navy, he was in no mood 
to admit that the presidential order could be swept 
away by a few words telegraphed in the name of Sew- 
ard ; therefore, he held his course, and other parts of 
this expedition soon followed. 1 

It was a striking exhibition of Seward's mental state 
at the time that he should fail to send the command 
in the President's name, when within a few hours the 
administration had been sorely distressed by two mis- 
takes of just this kind — one of which Seward was then 
trying to correct. The other related to Scott's order of 
March 12th to reinforce Fort Pickens. That very after- 



1 For particulars about many of the facts stated in this paragraph, 
see 4 Nicolay and Hay, chap. i. 

139 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

noon of April 6th a special messenger from Pensacola 
harbor had reported that the United States officer in com- 
mand there had declined to land troops at Fort Pickens, 
because, as has been mentioned, instructions from Scott 
could not be recognized as overruling those of Buchanan 
issued by his Secretaries of War and of the Xavy. 

During the first days of April Seward's communi- 
cations with the Confederate commissioners came to a 
climax. After April 1st the reports that hostile move- 
ments were preparing grew more positive from day to 
day. On the 4th the commissioners credited the rumor 
that the United States intended to resist the acquisition 
of Santo Domingo by Spain. The next day they sus- 
pected that this might be a ruse. By the evening of 
the 6th they thought the armaments were to be used 
against Fort Pickens, and perhaps against Sumter. 1 
Early the following (Sunday) morning Campbell was 
again called in. He then sent a note to Seward, stat- 
ing that various reports had caused the commissioners 
" anxiety and concern for two or three da}V; that he 
had repeated to them the assurances that the adminis- 
tration would give notice to Governor Pickens before 
attempting to supply Sumter, and that he (Campbell) 
" should have notice whenever any measure changing 
the existing status prejudicially to the Confederate 
States is contemplated as respects Fort Pickens." He 
concluded with these sentences: "I do not experience 
the same anxiety or concern as they express. But if 
I have said more than I am authorized, I pray that you 
will advise me." 2 To this inquiry Seward answered, 
without date or signature : " Faith as to Sumter fully 
kept ; wait and see ; other suggestions received, and will 
be respectfully considered." 3 Campbell understood this 

1 Telegrams to Toombs of the dates mentioned. 
* This is quoted from the copy preserved by the commissioners. 
3 Crawford's Genesis, etc., 340. The copy that the commissioners 

140 



SEWARD'S STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY 

to mean that Governor Pickens should have notice be- 
fore an attempt should be made to supply Sumter, but 
that the assurances as to Fort Pickens were no longer 
to be depended on. 1 

Sufficient had been learned to convince the commis- 
sioners that a " hostile movement " was on foot and 
that an expedition had sailed against the Confederate 
States. " It may be Sumter and the Mississippi. It is 
almost certain that it is Pickens and the Texas frontier."* 
That evening the commissioners' secretary informed the 
Assistant Secretary of State — the Secretary not being at 
home — that an answer to the commissioners' note of 
March 12th would be called for the following afternoon. 8 

Seward's formal reply, which was dated March 15th, 
was found to be a clear and positive denial of all the re- 
quests and presumptions of the Confederate commission- 
ers. In the events that had occurred in the seven 
states he saw 

"not a rightful and accomplished revolution and an inde- 
pendent nation, with an established government, but rather 

took of Campbell's letter, to which this was a reply, contains nothing 
to call forth the last eight words. It seems likely that after the com- 
mission's copy of Campbell's note was made, he added his offer to go 
to Montgomery, to which Crawford refers (ibid.), and to which Sew- 
ard's eight words were probably an answer. 

' This is shown by his written statement to the commissioners, 
which is reflected in the following letter to Seward : 

" Washington City, April 7, 1861. 

"Dear Sir: — I have said to the commissioners to-day I believe 
that the government will not undertake to supply Sumter without 
notice to Governor Pickens. 

" I have said further that, heretofore, I have felt justified in say- 
ing ' That whenever any moasure changing the existing status as re- 
spects Fort Pickens prejudicially to the Confederate States is con- 
templated I should have notice,' but that I do not feel at liberty to say 
this now. ,. Very respectful]y> (ij a Campbell „ 

2 Telegram of April 7th. —Seward MSS. 

3 Memorandum of the secretary in the records of the commission. 

141 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

a perversion of a temporary and partisan excitement to the 
inconsiderate purpose of an unjustifiable and unconstitu- 
tional aggression upon the rights and the authority 
vested in the Federal government, and hitherto benignly 
exercised, • . . for the maintenance of the Union, the 
preservation of liberty, and the security, peace, welfare, 
happiness, and aggrandizement of the American people." 
For a cure of the evils, he said, he looked patiently 
and confidently " to regular and considerate action of the 
people of those states, in co-operation with their brethren 
in the other states, through the Congress of the United 
States, and such extraordinary conventions, if there shall 
be need thereof, as the Federal Constitution contemplates 
and authorizes to be assembled." 1 

In a long rejoinder the commissioners reproached 
Lincoln's administration for being " persistently wedded 
to those fatal theories of construction of the Federal 
Constitution always denied by the statesmen of the 
South," and they tried to make it appear that the United 
States were responsible for the impending war because 
no negotiations would be entered into with the repre- 
sentatives of the Confederacy. They had no fear of the 
results; their people could never be subdued "while a 
freeman survives in the Confederate States to wield a 
weapon." They advised Seward to dismiss as delusions 
his hopes of bringing the Confederate States into sub- 
mission. Evidently angered by what he had said about 
a " perversion of a temporary and partisan excitement," 
they sarcastically replied : " If you cherish these dreams 
you will be awakened from them and find them as un- 
real and unsubstantial as others in which you have re- 
cently indulged." a On the 10th they reported their mis- 
sion to be closed. 

The ships of the Sumter expedition left New York on 
the 8th, 9th, and 10th. 3 In compliance with the promise, 
Governor Pickens was officially informed on the first 

1 McPherson's Rebellion, 109. 

s McPhcrson, 109, 110. 3 Crawford, 416. 

142 



SEWARD'S STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY 

date that an attempt would be made to put provisions 
into Fort Sumter ; but that, unless this should be resisted 
or the fort attacked, no troops or military supplies would 
be thrown in without further notice. 1 The sending of 
supplies to United States troops in a state that had 
seceded was regarded in the South as evidence of an in- 
tention to coerce the states. The Confederate leaders 
fully realized the undesirability of a conflict, but everj^ 
suggestion of force had to be resisted in order to keep 
up popular confidence and to win the actual support of 
a large majority of the people of the slave states that 
were still nominally loyal. They chose war and its 
necessary accompaniments of blood and destruction in 
order to preclude the possibility of a reaction in favor of 
union. The different batteries around the harbor opened 
a converging fire on Fort Sumter early on the morning 
of April 12th. Throughout that day, and until the after- 
noon of the next, Anderson and his men doggedly kept 
up the contest against vastly superior forces. Then, 
seeing no likelihood either of relief or of being able to 
hold out much longer, they agreed to capitulate. 

But for two unforeseen occurrences the result might 
have been different. A part of the fleet reached the 
rendezvous off Charleston harbor on the day the attack 
began, and in time to succor the fort if the other ships 
had arrived as was planned. A storm had scattered the 
tugs which were necessary to perform some of the work 
inside the harbor; and the ships that were ready for 
action waited for the Poiohatan — the Powhatan in 
which Porter was hastening to Fort Pickens — for she 
was counted upon as the head of the Sumter fleet and 
had been specially equipped for the most difficult part 
of the work to be done in Charleston harbor. Before 
Fox could organize a forward movement out of the 



2 Lincoln's Works, 32. 
143 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

meagre resources at command, the firing of the guns 
ceased. 

At Fort Pickens the conditions were favorable. A 
second order to land the troops already in the harbor 
had been issued and obeyed before the Seward-Porter 
expedition arrived. The coming of the ships with sup- 
plies and reinforcements made it possible to put the 
fort on a safe footing ; and thenceforth, throughout the 
war, the stars and stripes defied the neighboring Con- 
federate batteries. 

Seward's acts in connection with these expeditions 
have been the cause of two serious charges : First, that 
he wilfully tried to prevent the relief of Fort Sumter; 
and, second, that he acted dishonorably toward Justice 
Campbell and the Confederate commissioners. 

1. Welles and Blair were the chief accusers on the 
first charge. 1 Their suspicions began with the assump- 
tion that the Powhatan was taken out of the Sumter 
fleet. The President and the Secretary of the Navy 
each on April 1st sent instructions for the Powhatan 
to be fitted out as soon as possible. Lincoln's original 
intention was to have her go with the Pickens expedi- 
tion, and he issued instructions to this effect, as already 
mentioned. Welles expected to use the Powhatan as the 
flag-ship of the Sumter fleet, but did not give his orders 
until four days later. 2 It was natural that each should 
desire the Powhatan. After what has been learned of 
Seward's methods, it would hardly be warrantable to 
express confidence that his despatch to Porter was not 
the result of subtle calculation. But the probability 
that he was half -distracted by the occurrences of that 
day, and the well-known fact that he was the real chief 
of the expedition — these seem sufficient to explain his 
failure to telegraph the command in the President's name. 

1 Welles, 61-67. 2 3 Nicolay and Hay, 439. 

144 



SEWARD'S STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY 

It is not so easy to deal with what is known as the 
Harvey incident. "When the government seized the 
copies of the despatches in tbe Washington telegraph 
offices it was found that, on April 6th, James E. Har- 
vey had telegraphed to Charleston : " Positively deter- 
mined not to withdraw Anderson. Supplies go im- 
mediately, supported by a naval force under Stringham 
if their landing be resisted. — A Friend." 1 Harvey was 
a South Carolinian by birth, and had lately been a 
"Washington correspondent for several northern news- 
papers. A little later he became Minister to Portugal. 
Upon the discovery of his despatch, the New York Tri- 
bune, the Times, and many other newspapers demanded 
his immediate recall, for his act was akin to treason. 2 
A Senate committee also made a like demand, but with- 
out effect. "Why? Seward stood in the way. Not 
only had he given Harvey the information, but he knew 
of the telegram the day it was sent. Nevertheless, he 
allowed him to depart on his mission; and later, when 
everybody was boiling with indignation, Seward ex- 
plained that at first he himself was indignant and ad- 
vised the President to revoke Harvey's commission. 
" But thinking it over coolly," said Seward, " I thought 
it wrong to punish a man for his stupid foil}'', when 
really he had committed no crime!" 3 This attitude of 
easy indifference must be judged in connection with 
two facts already noticed : First, that at the time Sew- 
ard confided in a native Southerner the profound secrets 
of the Sumter expedition, he was himself conducting 
the Pickens enterprise with a degree of secrecy that did 
not permit knowledge of it to reach the Secretaries 
from whose departments the troops, vessels, and supplies 
were ordered ; and, second, that he had predicted that 

1 1 War Records, 287. 

2 Tribune, June 8, 10, 20, 1861 ; Times, June 7, 1861. 

3 4 Nicolay and Hay, 31, 32. 
ii.— k 145 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM II. SEWARD 

the fact of preparations for the relief of Sumter " would 
inevitably transpire." 1 The plain inference was that 
there would not be a similar danger in regard to one 
preparing for Fort Pickens. A priori it seemed to 
others that the likelihood of exposure would be consid- 
erably greater, for Fort Pickens was twice as far from 
New. York. 

Nevertheless, probably Blair and Welles have charged 
too much. If Seward had really meant to prevent the 
success of the Sumter expedition, it would only have 
been necessary for him to inform the commissioners 
indirectly. Then the fort would have been attacked 
and taken before the ships could leave New York. 
Harvey's telegram was discredited, and the Confederates 
continued to have suspicions merely, until Lincoln's 
messenger arrived. Seward was so eager to have the 
Pickens expedition succeed that he may have thought 
it would do no harm to let ail suspicions be directed 
toward Fort Sumter. But his well-known pledges that 
Sumter would be abandoned, his personal humiliation 
at being overruled, and his consequent inclination to let 
it be known in advance that he had no responsibility 
for or pride in that enterprise — these would seem to 
be sufficient to explain his amazing carelessness about 
one expedition, while the secrecy of another was so per- 
fectly guarded. 

2. As an exhibition of character and politics, the acts 
of the Confederate commissioners and Seward's com- 
munications with them are both to be regretted. The 
Confederate authorities felt deeply chagrined that their 
envoys to Washington had obtained neither direct 
recognition nor an official pledge -to continue the de- 
fenceless peace. Instead of either, a war had begun and 
the Confederacy had taken the initiative. They had 

1 Seward's opinions of March 15th and 29th. 
146 



SEWARD'S STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY 

based their chief reliance on Seward's hopes and pledges 
— on his all but fatal illusions. When he was overruled, 
their plans became worthless ; so they tried to make a 
scape -goat of him. 1 The pith of the charge was that 
Seward studiously deceived them by entering into and 
then violating a promise, a pledge, a contract even, by 
which the commissioners, in consideration of the assur- 
ance that Fort Sumter was to be evacuated, agreed 
temporarily to forbear to ask an answer to their note. 
It must be admitted that Seward was unwarrantably 
positive about Sumter. His misconception of the weight 
of the influences on his side deceived himself and cor- 
respondingly deceived the Confederates. Probably Lin- 
coln did not know all about the communications re- 
garding Fort Sumter until April 1st, when he promised 
that it should not be supplied without notice to Gov- 
ernor Pickens. Although Seward still expected evacu- 
ation, and so indicated to Campbell, all concerned under- 
stood that Lincoln's pledge took the place of Seward's 
earlier declaration. This pledge was faithfully kept, 
and the Confederates were allowed a generous margin 
of time between the actual notice and the arrival of any 
of the ships. How, then, do the accusers make their 

1 In a long letter of April 13, 1861, Campbell told Seward that the 
commissioners "conclude they have been abused and overreached," 
and he expressed his belief that any candid man would agree that 
'the equivocating conduct of the administration" was "the proxi- 
mate cause of the great calamity " of the outbreak of hostilities. — 
McPherson's Rebellion, 111. In a message to the Confederate Congress, 
April 29th, Jefferson Davis said: " The crooked path of diplomacy can 
scarcely furnish an example so wanting in courtesy, in candor, and 
directness as was the course of the United States government toward 
our commissioners in Washington."— 1 Davis's Confederate Govern- 
ment, 280. Almost a decade later, Alexander H. Stephens recorded 
it as his opinion for posterity that the commissioners "were met with 
an equivocation, a duplicity, a craft, and deceit which, taken alto- 
gether, is without a parallel in modern times !" — 2 War Between the 
States, 346. 

147 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

point? By juggling with the facts. They misrepre- 
sented that Seward's sentence, " Faith as to Sumter fully 
kept," referred to his original assurance that Sumter 
was to be evacuated, instead of to Lincoln's promise to 
give notice to Governor Pickens. The Confederate 
leaders in Washington, in Montgomery, and in Charles- 
ton correctly understood what that sentence meant, as 
their correspondence shows. 1 

Fortunately for Seward, at that time, they made 
their charges of deception in connection with Fort 
Sumter instead of Fort "Pickens. The reason was that 
the whole course of events was changed by the action 
in Charleston harbor, while that in Pensacola harbor at- 
tracted comparatively little attention. It is certain that 
Seward knew he was deceiving the Confederates between 
March 28th and April 7th. 2 Unless he had not heard 
of Scott's order of March 12th (which is altogether im- 
probable), or unless he was sure that it would be disre- 
garded contrary to Lincoln's expectations, the deception 
began on March 15th and continued until April 7th, when 
his failure to reply to Campbell's reference to Fort Pickens 
in the letter of that date led the Confederates to infer 
that, that fort was to be reinforced. 

Each side endeavored to overreach and outwit the 
other. From the previous midwinter until the second 

1 On April 7th, Governor Pickens telegraphed to the commissioners 
to get accurate information. Crawford replied the next day ; " We 
were reassured yesterday that the status at Sumter would not be 
changed without previous notice to Governor Pickens, but we have 
no faith in them. The war policy prevails in the Cabinet at this 
hour." On the 9th Crawford telegraphed to Beauregard, at Charles- 
ton, "The messenger [from Lincoln] doubtless speaks by authority. 
He gives the promised notice to Governor Pickens. Diplomacy has 
failed."— 1 War Records, 297. See also ibid., 283, 284, 286, 287, 289. 
There are other evidences in the MS. archives of the commission. 

2 See ante, pp. 126, 140, 141. 

148 



SEWARD'S STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY 

week in April, Seward was determined to prevent the 
outbreak of the civil war. So in secret interviews, 
anonymous notes, and indirect intercourse he gave as- 
surances that could surely be fulfilled only in case he 
instead of Lincoln should control affairs. This he was 
confident would be the case. He probably thought, too, 
that there was no need of great scrupulousness in deal- 
ing with men who were trying to destroy the Union. 

The numerous complications in which he so strangely 
involved himself were the outgrowth of two supreme 
illusions. The first was that the Southerners had stronger 
ties to the Federal government than to slavery, and 
that, if given time to reflect, they would not go to war 
in the interest of that institution. The second was that 
he alone could furnish and direct the policy — whether 
of peace, procrastination, and compromise, or of war, 
civil or intercontinental, or both — by which the coun- 
try was to be saved. His ambition was for the Union 
vastly more than for himself. He sought power and 
mastery of the administration and of all difficulties, not 
because he wanted the glory of a semi-dictatorship, but 
because he honestly believed that that was the way for 
him to serve and to save the nation. 



CHAPTER XXX 

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE. — SHAPING FOREIGN RELA- 
TIONS, 1861 

The Secretary of State is regarded as the highest 
political officer appointed by the President. Seward 
was fortunate in having had much experience in dis- 
cussing questions in foreign relations, for since 1857 he 
had been a member of the Senate committee on foreign 
affairs. He had a reputation for hospitality, affability, 
discretion, and adaptability. On the other hand, the 
exigencies of party leadership and his fondness for 
showy declarations and surprising prophecies had oc- 
casionally led him into saying some unpleasant things 
about European monarchies. In a public letter in 1846, 
he announced : " The monarchs of Europe are to have no 
rest while they have a colony remaining on this con- 
tinent." ' When advocating a welcome to Kossuth, he 
maintained : " This republic is, and forever must be, a 
living offence to Russia and to Austria and to despotic 
powers everywhere. You will never, by whatever hu- 
miliations, gain one friend or secure one ally in Europe or 
America that wears a crown." 2 At the same time he re- 
ferred to Napoleon III. as " the youthful and impatient 
Bonaparte, the sickly successor of the Romans." In 1856 
he mentioned the " treachery by which Louis Napoleon 
rose to a throne on the ruins of the republic," 3 and he 
pronounced the French Empire " a hateful usurpation." 4 

1 3 Works, 409. * 1 Worlcs, 184. 3 4 Works, 562. 

4 Globe, 1855-56, Apdx., 79. 

150 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Yet Napoleon, if he had ever heard of Seward's expres- 
sions, was able to overlook them and to treat the New 
York Senator with marked attention when he visited 
France in 1859. Seward had spoken of Great Britain in 
such terms as to cause himself to be regarded as especial- 
ly unfriendly. His remarks in the debates about the Irish 
" patriots" and the Clayton-Bulwer treaty were illustra- 
tions. 1 When discussing the latter subject he character- 
ized Great Britain to be the foreign power that was " the 
greatest, the most grasping, and the most rapacious in the 
world." " Without a war on our part, Great Britain 
will wisely withdraw and disappear from this hemisphere 
within a quarter of a century — at least within half a cen- 
tury." 8 The acquisition of Canada by the United States 
had long been known to be one of his favorite ideas.' 
Lord John B,ussell, the British Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, recorded his suspicions as early as 
February 20, 1861 — more than five weeks before the 
actual proposition of April 1st was made — that an at- 
tempt might be made to get up a quarrel with Great 
Britain in case other plans should fail to reunite the 
sections. 4 But wise nations let the past lie buried, unless 
some new issue stirs up old grievances or animosities. 

From 1820 to 1866 the Department of State at Wash- 
ington was located in a dingy little structure, two stories 

1 See ante, Vol. I., pp. 323 ff., 484 ff. 

2 Globe, 1855-56, 290, and Apdx., 79. 

' It was well known that he had spoken of this as a means of com- 
pensation to freedom for the acquisitions slavery had made on the 
South. (3 Works, 273 ; 4 Works, 442.) In the debate about the fish- 
eries in August, 1852, he said: "A war about these fisheries would 
be a war which would result either in the independence of the British 
provinces, or in their annexation to the United States. I devoutly 
pray that that consummation may come ; the sooner the better ; but 
I do not desire it at the cost of war, or injustice. I am content to 
wait for the ripened fruit which must fall." — 1 Works, 273. For 
other references about Canada, see post, p. 472. 

4 Parliamentary Papers, North America, No. 1, p. 13. 

151 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

high, which stood on ground now covered by the north- 
ern end of the Treasury building. Its corridors and 
rooms were small, and an English traveller wrote, early 
in 1861, that one would see much more bustle in the pas- 
sages leading to the council-room of a poor-law board 
or a parish vestry. 1 Here the most important years of 
Seward's life were to be spent. In 1866 the department 
was removed to the building, now occupied as an orphan 
asylum, at the corner of 14th and S Streets ET. W. 2 

The home personnel of the department numbered 
less than half as many as in 1899. For Assistant-Sec- 
retary, Seward chose his son Frederick. He was a law- 
yer by profession, but during most of the decade since 
his admission to the bar he had been associate-editor 
of the Albany Evening Journal. He had never held a 
public office, but journalism and intimate association 
with his father and Weed had made him familiar with 
political affairs. Although he had not completed his 
thirty-first year, he soon demonstrated that he possessed 
ability and good judgment. The chief clerk, William 
Hunter, was a man of uncommon energy,, then only a 
little past the middle -point of his nearly three -score 
years of valuable service in this department. At pres- 
ent there are a second -assistant secretary and a third- 
assistant secretary, and six distinct bureaus, each with a 
chief ; in Seward's time none of these offices existed. 

Not less important than the departmental officials at 
home were its leading representatives abroad. Both 
custom and the public service demanded that Buchanan's 
appointees abroad should give place to Republicans. 3 

1 Russell's Diary, 36. 

8 It remained there until 1875, when it was given its present fine 
quarters next to the War and Navy Departments in the gigantic gran- 
ite edifice south of Pennsylvania Avenue and east of 17th Street. — 
Gaillard Hunt, The Department of State, 202. 

3 Writing a few months later of the diplomatic service of Buchan- 

152 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Charles Francis Adams, Seward's close political and 
personal friend, succeeded George M. Dallas as Minister 
to Great Britain. Although known as a man of marked 
talent and character, Adams was without experience in 
diplomacy. It was, therefore, extremely odd in Amer- 
ican politics that a third Adams, in direct line, should 
represent his country at the Court of St. James. William 
L. Dayton was appointed in place of Charles J. Faulkner 
as United States representative at the Court of the 
Tuileries. His prominence in his party was regarded 
as establishing a just claim to so conspicuous a place, 
after it was not found practicable to make him a mem- 
ber of the Cabinet. For similar reasons Cassius M. Clay 
was sent to Kussia. Carl Schurz, then a young lawyer 
in Wisconsin, but already famous for his eloquent and 
effective antislavery speeches, was given the mission to 
Spain. Within a year he was transferred by request 
from the legation to the Federal army. George P. 
Marsh became the first United States Minister to the 
new Kingdom of Italy. He had essayed both politics 
and diplomacy, but his chief work had been done in 
philology. After Austria had given notice that Anson 
Burlingame would be persona non grata, John Lothrop 
Motley was received at Vienna with special favor. His 
Dutch Republic had already given him a world-wide 
reputation ; and a long letter that he published in the 

an's adminisl ration Seward, said: "Our representatives whom that 
administration bad placed in communication with foreign courts were 
in many cases equally demoralized, and in some, as we had reason to 
believe, absolutely disloyal. Agents of the insurrectionists were already 
understood to be living in European capitals invoking recognition of 
a pretended new confederacy, on the ground that the revolution which 
should precede it was already de facto accomplished. They inculcated 
the doctrine that the government of the United States could not, and 
that it would not, even though it should become necessar} r , maintain 
the Union by the employment of force." — Seward to Dayton, July 6, 
1861. MS. 

153 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

London Times, on the struggle in the United States, was 
the first, and perhaps the best, of the many impressive 
arguments addressed to Europe in behalf of the Federal 
Union. But no appointment of the new administration 
was quite so significant as that of Thomas Corwin. 
Mexico, bankrupt and the prey of political wolves, 
knew what it meant for the United States to send to 
her the man who, in that immortal protest against indulg- 
ing the passion for conquest, said that if he were a Mex- 
ican he would welcome the invading Americans " with 
bloody hands to hospitable graves." John Bigelow, the 
new consul at Paris, had for several years been associ- 
ated with William Cullen Bryant as one of the editors 
of the New York Evening Post. His energy, judgment, 
and knowledge of European affairs soon made him 
one of the most useful of Seward's coadjutors. After 
Dayton's death he became the Minister ; and from first 
to last his services during this period were unrivaled 
by those of any other representative abroad except 
Adams. 

When Lincoln was elected, the government was on 
friendly terms with all nations. France and Great 
Britain were the powers whose good -will was of the 
first importance to the United States. The relations 
with Great Britain had never been more agreeable. 
Toward the end of 1860 the Prince of Wales made a 
tour of the United States. The enthusiastic w r elcome 
he received brought out an exchange of hearty con- 
gratulations between the two countries, and many on 
each side rejoiced at the prospect of a long period of 
cordiality. Governor Morgan, of New York, gave an 
official reception and dinner in honor of the royal party. 
Seward was one of the guests and took special pride in 
the occasion, for he supposed that the Prince's visit was 
the result of a suggestion that he made to the British 

154 



SHAPING FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1861 

Minister a year or two before. 1 Between Americans 
and Frenchmen there was a traditional friendship that 
had some sentimental importance, but only little practi- 
cal force. The two peoples have so few traits and ten- 
dencies in common that they generally misjudge one 
another both as persons and as nations. The citizens of 
the United States could not forget that France Avas tol- 
erating the usurpations of Napoleon III., and the French 
were not pleased by the disapproval. However, no seri- 
ous ill-will was felt on either side. 

The diplomatic corps in "Washington had closely 
watched the course of events since November. The 
national capital was then a southern city in nearly 
every respect. Its aristocratic society was composed al- 
most entirely of persons who were not only slave-holders, 
but were also either leaders of secession or sympathizers 
with it. The representatives of foreign nations were 
brought into intimate relations with this class, and some 
of them received extremely pro -southern impressions. 
They in turn influenced the opinions of the Secretaries 
of Foreign Affairs of their respective governments. It 
was in this way, as well as by the declarations of south- 
ern sympathizers in Europe, that the political world 
abroad early came to take a favorable view of the power 
and prospects of the Confederacy. 

A great war concerns a large part of the civilized 
world, and the principals in such a conflict are greatly 
affected by the attitude foreign nations assume tow- 
ard them. These facts were early recognized by the 
Secretaries of State at "Washington and at Montgom- 
ery, respectively. Even Buchanan's paralytic adminis- 
tration raised its shriveled arm to warn Europe against 
interference. On February 28, 1861, Secretary Black 

1 2 Seward, 471. 
155 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

addressed a circular letter to our Ministers at the lead- 
ing foreign capitals, instructing them to use such means 
as they might consider proper and necessary to prevent 
the anticipated efforts of the Confederacy to obtain a 
recognition of independence. "This government has 
not relinquished its constitutional jurisdiction within 
the territory of those states, and it does not desire [!] 
to do so." It was evidently the right of this govern- 
ment, he said, to ask all foreign powers not to take any 
steps likely to encourage the revolutionary movement. 
An acknowledgment of the independence of the "Con- 
federated States" by any nation would tend to dis- 
turb the friendly relations, diplomatic and commercial, 
now existing between that nation and the United 
States. 1 Black's communication seemed perfunctory and 
lifeless. 

Nine days later Seward with vivacity and hope, "re- 
iterated and amplified " Black's instructions, as he sub- 
sequently wrote. 2 Our Ministers were informed that 
they were expected "to use "the greatest possible dili- 
gence and fidelity. ... to counteract and prevent the 
designs of those who would invoke foreign intervention 
to embarrass and overthrow the Eepublic." The Presi- 
dent entertained " full confidence in the speedy restor- 
ation of the harmony and unity of the government by a 
firm, yet just and liberal, bearing, co-operating with the 
deliberate and loyal action of the American people"; 
for the disturbances " had their origin only in popular 
passions, excited under novel circumstances of very tran- 
sient character." The advantage that any nation might 
derive from a connection with the disaffected portion 
of our country would be merely ephemeral, and would 
be counterbalanced by the evils that would flow from 
disunion. He regretted that the disturbances might 

1 Dip. Cor., 1861, 31. 2 Dip. Car., 1861, 37. 

156 



SHAPING FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1861 

cause foreigners some inconvenience, but he announced 
it as the policy of the administration to indemnify all 
persons suffering any injury. 1 These were not alto- 
gether accurate statements, but Seward believed they 
were ; and he had made an almost perfect expression of 
those considerations that are of the first importance in 
international relations. However, it was practically 
impossible to shape a definite foreign policy until after 
it could be known what the domestic one was to be. 
It has already been seen how this domestic policy, like 
a raft upon an inlet of the sea, drifted this way and that 
with the tide of public opinion. 

Lincoln's rejection of the programme Seward pro- 
posed on April 1st 8 rid it of its dangerous features. But 
what became of the offences — then considered to be so 
serious — of Spain, of France, of Great Britain, and of 
Russia ? 

As has been mentioned, a revolution under Spanish 
influences had lately overthrown the Republic of Santo 
Domingo and proclaimed the supremacy of the mother- 
country. On April 2, 1861, before he had received 
official information of this fact, Seward wrote to Tas- 
sara, the Spanish Minister at Washington, saying that 
this reported attempt " cannot fail to be taken as a first 
step in a policy of armed intervention by the Spanish 
government in the American countries which once con- 
stituted Spanish America." There was grave signif- 
icance in the following sentence : 

" I am directed to inform you and the government of 
her Catholic Majesty, in a direct manner, that, if they [the 
revolutionary acts] shall be found to have received at any 
time the sanction of that government, the President will 
be obliged to regard them as manifesting an unfriendly 
spirit towards the United States, and to meet the further 

1 Dip, Cor., 1861, 32, 33. - See ante, p. 132. 

157 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

prosecution of enterprises of that kind in regard to either 
the Dominican Republic or any part of the American con- 
tinent or islands, with a prompt, persistent, and, if possible, 
effective resistance." 1 

Two days later Minister Tassara made a discreet and 
soothing response, which did not especially change the 
aspect of the incident. Subsequently Spain replied so 
evasively that Seward anticipated that she would " in 
the end decide to recognize the revolution and to con- 
firm the authority proclaimed in the island of Santo 
Domingo in her name." Thereupon he instructed our 
charge d'affaires at Madrid to enter a protest against this 
assumption or exercise of authority — " a protest which, 
in every case, we shall expect to maintain." 8 Our new 
Minister, Carl Schurz, soon asked if the administration 
would have approved the action if his predecessor had 
broken off diplomatic relations with Spain on account 
of what had taken place. 3 Seward directed Schurz to 
confine his action to a protest. 4 On June 22d Seward 
wrote again, saying that he did " not think it would be 
expedient to divert its [Congress's] attention from the 
domestic subjects for which it is convened." s About a 
week later the Spanish Minister read to him the royal 
decree pronouncing the annexation of Santo Domingo 
to Spain; but the Secretary concluded that no further 
action on the part of the United States would be neces- 
sary. 6 When Schurz requested an explicit statement of 
the ulterior policy of the government, he was informed 
by the Secretary that there had been so many important 
questions demanding attention that time had not been 
found for the full consideration of this one ; so the sub- 

1 MS. The references to the MS. diplomatic correspondence of the 
United States are, when not otherwise stated, to the MS. archives of 
the Department of State. " Seward to Perry, May 21, 1861. MS. 

3 Schurz to Seward, June 5, 1861. MS. 4 June 10, 1861. MS. 

6 MS. ' Seward to Schurz, July 2, 1861. MS. 

158 



SHAPING FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1861 

ject was left to Congress at its next regular session, be- 
ginning in December. 1 This was Seward's graceful way 
of escape from making good the direct threats of a few 
months before. 

Spain pursued her own course in Santo Domingo. 
Instead of being a menace to the United States, although 
they were almost helpless, she could not consummate 
this little undertaking. For four years, and in vain, she 
poured out her money and sacrificed the lives of her 
soldiers in trying to get a permanent hold upon Santo 
Domingo ; but in 1865 her rule was thrown off and the 
black republic revived. 

France was the other power from which Seward had 
urged that explanations should be demanded " categor- 
ically, at once." Lincoln's rejection of the plan seems 
to have had a magical effect. The instructions to our 
Minister and the notes to the French legation show no 
trace of any except the most cordial relations between 
the two countries. Seward even had such confidence in 
Mercier, the French Minister at Washington, that with- 
in one day of the time when it was suggested that 
France must be called to account, he " confidentially " 
sent to Mercier a copy of the note just written to Tas- 
sara. The Secretary hoped to induce France to join us 
in the protest ; for, he wrote, she has " an interest in the 
preservation of peace and order scarcely less than that 
which has induced this protest on the part of the United 
States." 4 But France ignored his communication. 3 Sew- 
ward solicited the co-operation of Great Britain also 
in opposing the annexation of Santo Domingo, and he 
made not the slightest allusion to the offences on her 
part that were regarded as so serious on April 1st. The 
British government, however, reluctantly accepted what 



1 Seward to Schurz, August 14, 1861. MS. 2 MS. 

5 Seward to Schurz, June 22, 1861. MS. 
159 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

Spain had done, after Spain had declared that slavery 
should not be established in the new territory. 1 As to 
Russia, the records of the department do not indicate 
that as much as a whisper of complaint was made against 
her. " That power," Seward wrote, May 6, 1861, to our 
new Minister, Cassius M. Clay, "was an early, and it has 
always been a constant, friend. This relationship be- 
tween two nations so remote and so unlike has excit- 
ed much surprise." Instead of inviting the disfavor of 
Russia by demanding an explanation of a not serious in- 
discretion on the part of her Minister, Seward instruct- 
ed Clay to make it his business to inquire " whether the 
sluggish course of commerce between the two nations 

DO 

cannot be quickened and its volume increased." 2 So 
Russia continued to be our warmest friend. 

Thus it is seen how very different these results are 
from those contemplated in the " Thoughts for the 
President's Consideration," and how little occasion there 
was for proposing a course of action that would have 
been futile unless it had made both hemispheres blaze 
with war, — and then it would have been the most wicked 
and dangerous thing conceivable. 

The despatches written by Seward before the fall of 
Fort Sumter show a wholly erroneous conception of 
the impending struggle with the South. The instruc- 
tions of April 10th to Charles Francis Adams said that 
the President was not 

" disposed to reject a cardinal dogma of theirs [the seces- 
sionists], namely, that the Federal government could not 
reduce the seceding states to obedience by conquest, even 
although he were disposed to question that proposition. 
But, in fact, the President willingly accepts it as true. 
Only an imperial or despotic government could subjugate 

1 Seward to Schurz, June 21, 1861. MS. 

2 Dip. Cor., 1861, 293. 

160 



SHAPING FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1861 

thoroughly disaffected and insurrectionary members of the 
state." 



Seward believed that our system had " within itself, 
adequate peaceful, conservative, and recuperative forces."' 
Some have thought that, when he spoke of " reunion " 
through constitutional amendments, he implied that 
actual disunion had been effected. He doubtless had 
in mind merely the disruption of sectional fraternity and 
the cessation of actual co-operation, for his next sentence 
declared that the President would "not suffer the Fed- 
eral authority to fall into abeyance " nor aggravate ex- 
isting evils by attempts at coercion. 1 

Seward hoped to persuade European nations to accept 
his theory that the de facto sovereignty of the United 
States continued to exist within the Confederacy, al- 
though the Constitution and all signs of Federal authority 
— except in the Post Office Department, which was car- 
ried on at the expense of the loyal people— had been 
superseded by Confederate control, and although it was 
repeatedly announced that there was to be no military 
coercion, no ph} 7 sical attempt to prevent the Confederacy 
from perfecting its organization at home in every di- 
rection. From the beginning he proclaimed with con- 
fidence that the resources of the United States would 
be adequate to every emergency, and that the panic had 
nearly passed. There must be " no admissions of weak- 
ness in our Constitution, nor of apprehension on the part 
of the government." Suggestions of compromise must 

1 To the Minister to Prussia he wrote, March 22d: " The Union was 
formed upon popular consent, and must always practically stand on 
the same basis. . . . While it is the iutention of the President to 
maintain the sovereignty and rightful authority of the Union every- 
where with firmness as well as discretion, he at the same time relies 
with great confidence on the salutary working of the agencies I have 
mentioned [general and profound seutiments of loyalty] to restore 
the harmony and union of the states." — Dip. Cor., 1861, 37. 
II— l 161 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

not be listened to, and if Great Britain should decide 
to recognize the enemies of the republic, she should also 
prepare to enter into an alliance with them. Our op- 
position to British interference was not to rest on the 
ground of any favor. No moral question [i.e., slavery] 
that might be supposed to lie at the basis of our do- 
mestic conflict was to be brought into debate before 
the British government ; for it should not be forgotten 
that all the states " must always continue to be equal 
and honored members of this Federal Union, and that 
their citizens throughout all political misunderstandings 
and alienations still are and always must be our kindred 
and countrymen." There had been much dissatisfaction 
in England on account of the recent Morrill tariff law. 
Seward said that, in passing that law, the United States 
had a right to consider their own convenience. The 
liberal commercial policy that the Confederacy might 
be ready to offer would depend on peace for its ex- 
ecution. Great Britain's sagacity might be trusted to 
decide how likely peace would be in such circumstances, 
and what would become of this policy when a tariff 
was needed to furnish the sinews of war. "Kecogni- 
tion by her of the so-called Confederate States would be 
intervention and war in this country." Furthermore, 
were the different parts of the British Empire held to- 
gether by ties so strong that Great Britain could afford 
to set so dangerous a precedent as to encourage attempts 
at dismemberment ? Above all, the citizens of the United 
States and of Great Britain were of common descent, 
language, customs, sentiments, and religion. The govern- 
ment and people of Great Britain might mistake their 
commercial interests, but they could not be indifferent 
to their ambition for civilization and humanity. 

In the full text of this despatch there are a few sen- 
tences that warranted the conclusions of the correspon- 
dent of the London Times — when Seward read it to him 

163 



SHAPING FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1861 

on April 8th — that it contained an under-current of menace 
and an implication that England might wish to inter- 
fere. 1 The United States were, in fact, very weak, so 
far as making physical resistance to foreign nations was 
concerned. The thing next best to possessing strength 
was to display a confidence of possessing it ; for this 
would be a warning that if any power should yield to the 
temptation to intermeddle, its action would be prompt- 
ly resented. It was absolutely necessary to insist that 
the national integrity was only slightly impaired, and 
that the United States would demand and extend re- 
spect, which is the prerequisite of true friendship be- 
tween governments. Otherwise there was no likelihood 
of preventing an early recognition of the Confederacy. 

Lincoln's proclamation of April 15th, calling out sev- 
enty-five thousand militia, and summoning Congress into 
extra session on July 4th, was the administration's re- 
sponse to the forced evacuation of Fort Sumter. The 
sudden and immeasurable enthusiasm of which this proc- 
lamation was the occasion throughout the North was 
one of the greatest surprises in the history of the Unit- 
ed States. Two days later Jefferson Davis replied by 
issuing a proclamation offering letters of marque to 
persons willing to aid the new government by making 
reprisals upon the commerce of the United States. On 
the 19th Lincoln rejoined by proclaiming a blockade 
of the ports of the seven states of the Confederacy, 
and declaring that if any person, under any pretence, 
should molest a vessel of the United States, or the per- 
sons or cargo on board of her, he should be treated as a 
pirate. 2 

In the first important despatch to William L. Dayton, 
our new Minister to France, on April 22d, Seward ac- 

1 Russell's Diary, 70, 71. 

2 On April 27th another proclamation announced an intention to 
extend the blockade to North Carolina and Virginia. 

163 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM II. SEWARD 

knowledged the necessity of force to put down the revo- 
lution. With the increase of danger at home, his ex- 
pressions against foreign interference became stronger. 
Whatever else the President might consent to do, he 
would " never invoke or even admit foreign interference 
or influence in this or any other controversy in which 
the government of the United States may be engaged 
with any portion of the American people." After in- 
dicating that he had no apprehension of unfriendly 
action on the part of France, he recorded this warning 
to whom it might concern : 

"Foreign intervention would oblige us to treat those 
who should yield it as allies of the insurrectionary party, 
and to carry on the war against them as enemies. The 
case would not be relieved, but, on the contrary, would 
only be aggravated, if several European states should com- 
bine in that intervention. The President and the people 
of the United States deem the Union, which would then 
be at stake, worth all the cost and all the sacrifices of a 
contest with the world in arms, if such a contest should 
prove inevitable." 1 

A few days later Seward received an account of one 
of Faulkner's last conversations with Thouvenel, the 
French Minister of Foreign Affairs. Faulkner had told 
Thouvenel that the only solution of the difficulty between 
the North and the South would be to make alterations in 
the Constitution that would satisfy the seceding states, 
or peaceably to acquiesce in their assertion of sover- 
eignty. The instructions of May 4th, to Dayton, who 
was then on his way to Paris, show that Seward's ideas 
had taken definite shape : 

" You cannot be too decided or too explicit in making 
known to the French government that there is not now, 
nor has there been, nor will there be any the least idea 
existing in this government of suffering a dissolution of 
this Union to take place in any way whatever." 

1 Dip. Cor., 1861, 200. 
164 



SHAPING FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1861 

. . . "Tell Mr. Thouvenel, then, with the highest con- 
sideration and good feeling, that the thought of a dissolu- 
tion of this Union, peaceably or by force, has never entered 
into the mind of any candid statesman here, and it is high 
time that it be dismissed by statesmen in Europe." 1 

Faulkner's despatch and Seward's instructions were 
given to the press ; and the New York Times of the 7th 
reported that stocks rose two per cent, on account of 
the Secretary's declarations and the evidence afforded 
by current events that the government was determined 
"to meet this rebellion with vigor and resolution." 
Seward had made his language more emphatic each 
week, hoping to counteract the growing opinion in 
Europe that the United States government was lacking 
in courage and resources. 

But the most formidable danger was the activity 
that the diplomatic agents of the Confederacy were show- 
ing in Great Britain and in France. On March 16th 
William L. Yancey, Pierre A. Rost, and A. Dudley Mann 
were appointed special commissioners to those and other 
powers, for the purpose of securing recognition of the 
independence of the Confederate States and to negotiate 
treaties of friendship and commerce. Secretary Toombs 
instructed them that it was the confident expectation of 
the President and people of the Confederacy " that the 
enlightened government of Great Britain will speedily 
acknowledge our independence and welcome us among 
the nations of the world"; and that it was not regarded 
as "within the range of possibility" that the seceded 
states could be induced to re-enter the Union. 2 Yancey 
was primarily an orator and an agitator; he was a man 

l Dip. Cor., 1861, 207, 208. 

2 Toombs to Yancey et al., March 16th, 1861. MS. References to 
the MS. correspondence of all the Confederates are, unless otherwise 
stated, to the diplomatic archives of the Confederacy, in the United 
States Treasury Department. 

165 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

of fascinating manners, besides being a good representa- 
tive of the slave-holding aristocracy. Host was a French- 
man by birth, and, like Pierre Soule, he early gained 
distinction at the Louisiana bar, and became a judge of 
the supreme court of the state. It was expected that 
he could effectively address bis countrymen in their own 
language about their interests in the Confederacy, and 
especially in Louisiana. Mann had had much experience 
in both the diplomatic and the consular service of the 
United States. It was he that was sent on a special 
mission to Hungary when the Whig and the Democratic 
politicians pretended to be so eager to help her gain in- 
dependence. 

The commissioners reached London about the time 
the fall of Fort Sumter was reported. There had been 
a great change in public opinion during the past six 
months. Europe had watched secession spread from 
one locality to another, and from state to state, until it 
controlled a whole section and then organized itself into 
a confederation with a general government that was 
practically complete. No marked check had been put 
upon the movement by the United States. As Seward 
wrote: "Disunion, by surprise and impetuous passion, 
took the first successes, and profited by them to make 
public opinion in Europe." 1 Even the Sumter and the 
Pickens expeditions had evaded the main question as to 
whether the Washington government would reassert its 
authority over the whole country. The call for troops 
was the first decisive act. Many writers have taken 
more pains to formulate a grievance against Great 
Britain than, to reach a fair understanding of the reason 
and growth of her conclusions at this time. The world 
knew that the seceding states were " thoroughly disaf- 
fected and insurrectionary"; and when northern leaders 

l Dip. Cor., 1861, 51. 
166 



SHAPING FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1861 

like Douglas, supported by the official statement of the 
new Secretary of State, said that such states could not be 
subdued, Europe, and especially England, believed them. 
The revolution was so formidable, and apparently so 
complete, that all but comparatively few Englishmen 
concluded that a war against it would be unsuccessful, 
and therefore wrong. That such a man as Cobden shared 
this opinion is strong evidence that it was an honest 
conviction. 1 As has been said, " This state of public 
opinion was natural, and not a subject for complaint so 
much as for correction." 2 

Of course Great Britain and France had observed 
with a jealous eye our growth as a commercial rival; 
and it was with no pleasure that they had felt the ex- 
pansive force of our boastful democracy. Irish-Ameri- 
can agitators and blustering demagogues had done all 
they could to arouse the hatred of Englishmen. British 
conservatives, who feared the influence of democratic 
Liberals like Bright and Cobden, rejoiced when the 
greatest of democracies seemed to fail. Most English- 
men regarded high tariffs as acts of hostility, for they 
considered free -trade as a sort of international right. 
As far as commerce was concerned, the low tariff of the 
Confederacy quickly attracted sympathy. The French 
people had but little knowledge of the United States, 
because commercial and political relations between the 
two nations were not close. But there were, in fact, 
many French interests that would be injured by the dis- 
ruption of the Union. It was, therefore, good policy for 
the United States to give prominence to this fact and 
to cultivate an international friendship, so as to make it 
difficult for Napoleon to pursue his dynastic schemes. 

According to Faulkner's report, Thouvenel believed 
that the preservation of the Union would be beneficial 

1 2 Morley's Cobden, 372. 
3 Henry Adams, Historical Essays, 269. 
167 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

to the North, to the South, and to France. But Thou- 
venel had also declared that " the practice and usage of 
the present century had fully established the right of 
de facto governments to recognition when a proper case' 
was made out for the decision of foreign powers." 1 
About the same time, Lord John Russell, the British 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, assured George 
M. Dallas that there was no disposition to take any ad- 
vantage of the unpleasant domestic troubles in the 
United States ; but Dallas stated that English public 
opinion favored separation, and that it was expected that 
W. H. Gregory, a member of the House of Commons 
from Galway, would press a motion for the recognition of 
the Confederacy. 2 Early in May rumors of the issuance 
of letters of marque by the Confederacy, and of Lincoln's 
declaration of a blockade, reached London. Russell was 
much disturbed and requested Dallas to call. When 
Dallas appeared Russell informed him that the Con- 
federate commissioners were in the city; that although 
they had not yet been seen, he was not unwilling to meet 
them " unofficially" and that France and Great Britain 
had agreed " to take the same course as to recognition, 
whatever that course might be," as Dallas reported. 3 
About the same date Russell announced in the House of 
Commons that a British naval force sufficient to protect 
British shipping was to be sent to the coast of the Unit- 
ed States; and that it was the intention of the govern- 
ment to avoid taking any part in the American contest. 4 
When Seward learned these facts he became greatly 
excited. The agreement of the two great powers to 
act together seemed to be very threatening. It plain- 
ly indicated an expectation that by joint action they 
could safely pursue the policy best suited to their po- 
litical and commercial interests. The evident assump- 

1 Dip. Cor., 1861, 205. 2 Dip. Cor., 81, 82. 

3 Dip. Coi\, 84. 4 Dip. Cor., 84, 85. 

168 



SHAPING FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1861 

tion was that their lead would be followed by other 
nations, and that the United States would not be able 
to resist the force of the current. 1 A letter Seward 
wrote home, May 17th, gives this strange account of 
himself and of his aims : 

" A country so largely relying on my poor efforts to save 
it had [has] refused me the full measure of its confidence, 
needful to that end. I am a chief reduced to a subordinate 
position, and surrounded by a guard, to see that I do not 
do too much for my country, lest some advantage may re- 
vert indirectly to my own fame." 

. . . " They have misunderstood things fearfully, in 
Europe. Great Britain is in great danger of sympathizing 
so much with the South, for the sake of peace and cotton, 
as to drive us to make war against her, as the ally of the 
traitors. If that conies it will be the strife of the younger 
branch of the British stock, for freedom, against the older, 
for slavery. It will be dreadful, but the end will be sure 
and swift. My last despatches from Great Britain and 
France have shown that they were almost ready, on some 
pretext, to try and save cotton, at the cost of the Union. 
I am trying to get a bold remonstrance through the Cab- 
inet before it is too late." 2 

The long despatch of May 21st, to Adams, was the 
result. It began with the declaration that our relations 
with European powers had reached a crisis, and that it 
was necessary for our government " to take a decided 
stand, on Avhich not only its immediate measures but 
its ultimate and permanent policy can be determined and 
defined." 3 A few quotations will best indicate what this 
stand was : 

" Intercourse of any kind with the so-called commission- 
ers is liable to be construed as a recognition of the authority 

1 A few weeks later the British and the French Ministers at Wash- 
ington agreed that the hest way " of preventing an inconvenient out- 
break from this [the United States] government lay in making the 
course of Great Britain and France as nearly as possible identical." — 
55 British State Papers, 557. 

5 2 Seward, 575. 3 Dip. Cor., 1861, 87 ff. 

169 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

which appointed them. Such intercourse would be none 
the less hurtful to us for being called unofficial, and it 
might be even more injurious, because we should have no 
means of knowing what poiuts might be resolved by it. 
Moreover, unofficial intercourse is useless and meaningless 
if it is not expected to ripen into official intercourse and 
direct recognition. . . . You will, in any event, desist from 
all intercourse whatever, unofficial as well as official, with 
the British government, so long as it shall continue inter- 
course of either kind with the domestic enemies of this 
country. When intercourse shall have been arrested for 
this cause, you will communicate with this department 
and receive further directions." 1 

Because the joint action of France and Great Britain 
had been already announced, but not put into practice, 
Seward doubtless inferred that a protest against it just 
then would be ineffectual, and therefore unwise. It was 
too late to treat it theoretically and too soon to deal with 
it as a serious problem. So it was noticed in friendly 
and somewhat vague sentences and left to the future. 

" As to the blockade, you will say that by our own laws 
and the laws of nature, and the laws of nations, this gov- 
ernment has a clear right to suppress insurrection. An 
exclusion of commerce from national ports which have 
been seized by insurgents, in the equitable form of block- 
ade, is a proper means to that end. You will not insist 
that our blockade is to be respected, if it be not maintained 
by a competent force ; but passing by that question as not 
now a practical or, at least, an urgent one, you will add 
that the blockade is now, and it will continue to be, so 
maintained, and therefore we expect it to be respected by 
Great Britain. You will add that we have already revoked 
the exequatur of a Russian consul who had enlisted in the 
military service of the insurgents, and we shall dismiss 
or demand the recall of every foreign agent, consular or 
diplomatic, who shall either disobey the Federal laws or 
disown the Federal authority. 

"As to the recognition of the so-called Southern Con- 
federacy, it is not to be made the subject of technical def- 

i IHp. Cor., 1861, 88. 
170 



SHAPING FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1861 

inition. It is, of course, direct recognition to publish an 
acknowledgment of the sovereignty and independence of 
a new power. It is direct recognition to receive its am- 
bassadors, ministers, agents, or commissioners officially. 
A concession of belligerent rights is liable to be construed 
as a recognition of them. No one of these proceedings 
will pass unquestioned by the United States in this 
case. . . . 

" As to the treatment of privateers in the insurgent ser- 
vice, you will say that this is a question exclusively our 
own. We treat them as pirates. They are our own citi- 
zens, or persons employed by our citizens, preying on the 
commerce of our country. If Great Britain shall choose 
to recognize them as lawful belligerents, and give them 
shelter from our pursuit and punishment, the laws of na- 
tions afford an adequate and proper remedy. 1 

" These positions are not elaborately defended now, be- 
cause to vindicate them would imply a possibility of our 
waiving them. 

'• We are not insensible of the grave importance of this 
occasion. We see how, upon the result of the debate in 
which we are engaged, a war may ensue between the 
United States and one, two, or even more European na- 
tions. War in any case is exceptional from the habits, as it 
is revolting from the sentiments of the American people. 
Bat if it come it will be fully seen that it results from the 
action of Great Britain, not our own ; that Great Britain 
will have decided to fraternize with our domestic enemy 
either without waiting to hear from you our remonstrances 
and our warnings, or after having heard them. War in 
defence of national life is not immoral, and war in defence 
of independence is an inevitable part of the discipline of 
nations. 

" The dispute will lie between the European and the 
American branches of the British race. All who belong to 
that race will especially deprecate it, as they ought. It 
may well be believed that men of every race and kindred 
will deplore it. A war not unlike it between the same par- 
ties occurred at the close of the last century. Europe 
atoned by forty years of suffering for the error that Great 
Britain committed in provoking that contest. If that na- 
tion shall now repeat the same great error, the social con- 
vulsions which will follow may not be so long, but they will 

'Dip. Cor., 1861,89. 

171 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

be more general. When they shall have ceased, it will, we 
think, be seen, whatever may have been the fortunes of 
other nations, that it is not the United States that will have 
come out of them with its precious Constitution altered, 
or its honestly obtained dominions in any degree abridged. 
Great Britain has but to wait a few months, and all her 
present inconveniences will cease with all our own troubles. 
If she take a different course she will calculate for herself 
the ultimate as well as the immediate consequences, and 
will consider what position she will hold when she shall 
have forever lost the sympathies and affections of the only 
nation on whose sympathies and affections she has a nat- 
ural claim. In making that calculation she will do well to 
remember that in the controversy she proposes to open we 
shall be actuated by neither pride, nor passion, nor cu- 
pidity, nor ambition ; but we shall stand simply on the 
principle of self-preservation, and that our cause will in- 
volve the independence of nations and the rights of human 
nature." 1 

The instructions as sent differed in several important 
respects from their original form. The " remonstrance " 
laid before the Cabinet was " bold " to the point of de- 
fiance. It contained words and sentences that would 
have warranted the inference that we desired war. 
Seward's plan was that Adams should give Russell a 
copy of this paper and then break off diplomatic relations 
with the British government, a rupture that should last 
as long as Russell continued to hold either official or 
unofficial intercourse "with the domestic enemies of this 
country." There had been wisdom in Seward's candid 
warnings that intervention would mean war, but hitherto 
he had been careful to keep diplomatic relations open so 
as to prevent matters from reaching a crisis. As yet he 
had no knowledge that Russell intended to do more than 
receive the commissioners unofficially. To assume that 
a serious offence has been committed, and then to send 
what is practically an ultimatum, and to cut off diplo- 

1 Dip. Cor., 1861, 90. 

172 



SHAPING FOREIGN RELATIONS, 18G1 

matic intercourse, is general^ regarded as the sort of 
bullying that a spirited nation must resent. Fortunately, 
Lincoln was as calm and firm as on April 1st. What he 
rejected then was not to be approved now, when it re- 
turned in a different form. He struck out most of the 
indiscreet expressions, and made the whole despatch 
harmless by directing Adams to regard it as strictly 
confidential. This placed a safe buffer between the 
British and the United States Secretaries. 1 

Seward had again fallen victim to the incomprehen- 
sible illusion that if, contrary to his firm belief, the 
Confederacy could not be peacefully undermined and 
negotiated out of existence, then a foreign war would 
be a "sure and swift" means of overcoming; the diffi- 
culties. Of course he did not, in the abstract, desire a 
foreign war any more than he did a civil one ; but 
he had the greatest fear of a conflict with the South, 
whereas he would not have hesitated to fight a few of 
the great powers of Europe. The only theory on which 
this illusion can be explained, even from his point of 
view, is that by giving full play to his imagination he 
was strengthened in the belief that the Union could not 
be restored unless the "chief" could get free from his 
"subordinate position" and push aside the "guard" 
that was preventing him from doing too much for his 
country, and that all could be accomplished by means 
of a foreign war, which would put him in control, be- 
cause it would grow out of questions within the prov- 
ince of his duties. He was reasoning as if the best way 
to surmount great obstacles were to make them twice 
or thrice as great. On the other hand, those who have 
tried to make it appear that Lincoln was a great diplo- 
matist because he pruned and altered Seward's draft, 

1 For the copies of the original draft, with Lincoln's alterations and 
comments, see 4 Nicolay and Hay, 470 ff., and 142 North American 
Review, 405 ff . 

173 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

have begun their measurements from the wrong point. 
In this instance it was Seward's recklessness, — not Lin- 
coln's wisdom, — that was remarkable. Lincoln here 
acted as Seward's sober second thought, just as Seward 
had been Lincoln's in the inaugural address, and was to 
be again, still more distinctly, in dealing with the Trent 
affair. 

A passage from a letter Seward wrote to Weed, May 
23d, shows that the Secretary was in a highly nervous 
and unjudicial state of mind : 

"The European phase is bad. Bnt your apprehension 
that I may be too decisive alarms me more. Will you con- 
sent, or advise us to consent, that Adams and Dayton have 
audiences and compliments in the Minister's Audience 
Chamber, and Toombs' emissaries have access to his bed- 
room ? Shall there be no compromise at home, and shall 
we compromise everything in Europe ? Private recogni- 
tion gives currency to southern bonds." 1 

As far as the Secretary of State had learned, Great 
Britain was still considering whether the declaration of 
a blockade and the issuance of letters of marque called 
for any official action on her part. 

It was about the middle of April that Lincoln and 
his Cabinet first began to discuss among themselves the 
relative advantages of attempting to close Confederate 
ports by law or proclamation, or to put them under 
naval blockade. A majority preferred to pronounce 
them closed, as the best means of weakening the Con- 
federates without seeming to acknowledge a state of 
war. 2 But the President had no power to do this in time 
of peace, and Congress was not to meet for nearly three 
months. If there was no way to cut off communica- 
tions with the Confederac}' except by resorting to a 
belligerent right, then the most effective right should be 

1 2 Seward, 576. . 2 Welles, 122 ff. 

174 



SHAPING FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1861 

exercised. Seward favored a blockade because the rules 
governing it were positive and well known. And as 
the question was one belonging to his department, the 
Cabinet yielded to his advice. 1 

According to international law, a blockade such as the 
United States proposed to adopt is permissible only be- 
tween belligerents. Its purpose is to isolate and weaken 
an enemy. That this may be done effectively, the mer- 
chantmen of neutral nations may be stopped and searched 
on the high seas, and in case they bear contraband of 
war for the enemy, or are bound for a blockaded port, 
they may be seized and brought before a prize court for 
condemnation. In calling for privateers to destroy the 
United States merchantmen, which were extensive car- 
riers of the goods of foreigners, the Confederacy was 
also resorting to a measure that is lawful onty in time 
of war. It was evident that both governments intended 
to exercise these special prerogatives. The prosecution 
of the respective plans of the Washington and the Mont- 
gomery governments was sure to have a very impor- 
tant influence upon the interests of all maritime nations. 
When arguing another question, subsequently, but speak- 
ing of the status as early as April 24, 1861, Seward said 
that " we supposed the French government would nat- 
urally feel a deep anxiety about the safety of their com- 
merce, threatened distinctly with privateering by the 
insurgents." 2 Writing to Adams, May 28, 1862, about 
" the position which the Federal government held a year 
ago," Seward declared : " Then it had been practically 
expelled, with all its authorities, civil, military, and na- 
val, from every state south of the Potomac, Ohio, and 
Missouri rivers, while it was held in close siege in this 
capital, cut off from communication with even the states 
which had remained loyal." 3 

1 Welles, 123. s Dip. Cor., 1861, 232. 

8 Dip. Cor., 1862, 102. 

175 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

Before it became definitely known that a blockade 
had been declared and that privateers had been called 
for, Dallas reported that on May 1st Eussell had " ac- 
quiesced in the expediency of disregarding mere rumor 
and waiting the full knowledge to be brought by my 
successor.'" This was subsequently misrepresented, and 
has often been stated historically as a positive promise 
to delay action until Adams's arrival, however well the 
rumors might be confirmed or however pressing political 
or commercial considerations might become. 

Authoritative reports of the American proclamations 
led Russell to decide by May 6th that the British gov- 
ernment was bound to recognize that the parties to the 
conflict w T ere in a position " to claim the rights and to 
perform the obligations attaching to belligerents." 2 So 
on May 13th — the day Adams reached London, and be- 
fore he had time to call at the Foreign Office — the British 
proclamation of neutrality was issued. It announced 
the government's purpose to preserve a strict neutral- 
ity in the hostilities " unhappily commenced between 
the government of the United States and certain states 
styling themselves the Confederate States of America." 
British subjects were warned that any violation of this 
neutrality would incur certain penal consequences. The 
important point was that this document officially con- 
ceded belligerent rights to the Confederates. The other 
maritime powers waited for Great Britain to take the 
lead, because the extent of her dominions and commerce 
in North America made the question most important to 
her. Within a few weeks France, Spain, the Nether- 
lands, Prussia, and other nations followed her example. 

Throughout Seward's secretaryship he frequently re- 
peated a long complaint against Great Britain on ac- 
count of the alleged injustice of recognizing that a state 

1 Dip. Cor., 1861, 84. ! 55 State Papers, 548, 549. 

17G 



SHAPING FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1861 

of war existed between the United States and the Con- 
federate governments, and thousands of books and ar- 
ticles have reiterated his unsound reasoning. For him 
and the others who wrote in the excitement of the time, 
there is some excuse, but a subsequent generation should 
easily avoid his error. Great Britain was neither espe- 
cially friendly nor especially unfriendly toward the 
United States : there was no occasion for either. The 
question of belligerency was one of fact, which had been 
settled by the respective acts of the hostile governments. 
It remained for Great Britain and the other powers to 
recognize this fact at once or whenever it might suit 
their convenience and interests. Therefore, there was 
not the slightest obligation on Russell's part — after re- 
ceiving reliable information as to what had taken place 
in America — to postpone a decision until he had heard 
Adams's argument. The temper in which Seward and 
Adams argued the question would seem to indicate that 
Russell showed superior diplomacy by doing all he could 
to avoid discussing the merits of a course that he knew 
would be taken in any case. If Great Britain had 
wished to manifest marked friendship for the United 
States, instead of assuming a position of strict neutral- 
ity, she had a good opportunity to do so by delaying 
action, and thereby influencing other nations to do the 
same. Although neither of the American governments 
had any substantial basis for expecting positive assist- 
ance, it will be seen again and again in the course of 
this narrative that it was the disappointment of this 
expectation that inspired the most frequent and bitter 
complaints on the part of each belligerent. 1 

1 The following letter of July 12, 1861, from Lord John Russell to 
Edward Everett is an accurate exposition of the opinions — some sound, 
others erroneous — that controlled the action of the British government 
during the first few months of the Civil War: 

. . . " Iu the interval before a fresh item arises I will write a few 
ii.— m 177 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM II. SEWARD 

By the time the despatch of May 21st reached Eng- 
land, the United States Ministers in London and in Paris 
respectively had concluded that the sympathy with the 
Confederacy was much less positive than they had sup- 
posed. They were informed that it was the custom of 
both France and Great Britain unofficially to receive 
such envoys as the Confederate commissioners, and to 
hear what they had to say. 1 Russell told Adams that 

lines as to our position. I shall say little as to yonrs. I respect the 
unanimous feeling of the North, and still more the resolutions not to 
permit the extension of slavery which led to the election of President 
Lincoln. But with regard to our course, I must say something more. 
There were, according to your account, eight million of free men in 
the slave states. Of these millions upwards of five have been for 
some time in open revolt against the President and Congress of the 
United States. It is not our practice to treat five millions of free men 
as pirates and to hang their sailors if they attempt to stop our mer- 
chantmen. But unless we meant to treat them as pirates and to hang 
them we could not deny them belligerent rights. This is what you 
and we did in the case of the South American colonies of Spain. Your 
own President and courts of law decided this question in the case of 
Venezuela. Your press has studiously confused the case by calling the 
allowance of belligerent rights by the name of recognition. But you 
must well know the difference. 

" It seems to me, however, that you have expected us to discourage 
the South. How this was to be done, except by waging war against 
them, I am at a loss to imagine. 

" I confess, likewise, that I can see no good likely to arise from the 
present contest. If on the 4th of March you had allowed the Con- 
federate States to go out from among you you could have prevented 
the extension of slavery and coufined it to the slave-holding states. 
But if I understand your Constitution aright you cannot do more in 
case of successful war, if you mean to adhere to its provisions and to 
keep faith with those states and parts of states, wherever slavery still 
exists, winch have not quitted the Union. 

" I regret the Morrill tariff and hope it will be repealed. But the 
exclusion of our manufactures was surely an odd way of conciliating 
our good-will." — MS. 

x Dip. Cot:, 1861, 104, 219. In an imprinted portion of the latter de- 
spatch, Dayton reported: "Besides, he [Thouvenel] said, he had re- 
ceived him [Rost] because he felt it a duty to get all the information he 
could and obtain knowledge of facts, in reference to matters of so 

178 



SHAPING FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1861 

he had seen the commissioners but twice, and had no ex- 
pectation of seeing them again. 1 Adams inferred that 
Russell meant this to be satisfactory to our government. 
He also suggested that, since her Britannic Majesty's 
Ministers had manifested a desire to modify the effects 
of their early precipitation, a corresponding tone would 
be advisable on the part of the Department of State. 2 
But before these opinions became known in Washing- 
ton, Seward had recovered his balance and was pen- 
ning friendly, even courtly, sentences to be read to Rus- 
sell and to Tliouvenel. 3 Perhaps he remembered that 
he himself had recently communicated, through three 
different intermediaries, with the Confederate commis- 
sioners to Washington, and would have met them if 
the President had not forbidden it. If the thought oc- 
curred to him that the intercourse might be no more 
profitable in one instance than it had been in the other, 
it was evidence of increasing wisdom. In any case he 
seems to have given up forever his irrational theory of 
the salutary effect of a foreign war. 

Americans would not have been so much alarmed had 
they not, at first, failed to comprehend just what the 
granting of belligerent rights meant. They also feared 
that the proclamation of neutrality w T as the beginning of 
a policy designed to help the Confederacy. The rush of 
events and the inaccuracy of reports prevented many 
even of the wisest men from forming correct opinions. 
When, on June 1, 1861, Great Britain issued an order in- 
much importance, from all possible sources. That for this purpose 
he had received all sorts of people. That on the same day he had re- 
ceived envoys from Garibaldi and the King of Naples. Besides this, 
he wished, he said, to inform Mr. Rost of the inutility of now seeking 
from the French government a recognition of the independence of the 
Southern Confederates." 

1 Dip. Cor., 1861, 104. 

2 Adams to Seward, June 14, 1801. MS. 
:i Dip. Cor., 1861, 98, 101, 221. 

179 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM II. SEWARD 

terdicting " the armed ships, and also the privateers, of 
both parties, from carrying prizes made by them into the 
ports, harbors, roadsteads, or waters of the United King- 
dom, or of any of her Majesty's colonies or possessions 
abroad," it was seen that this could not have been prompt- 
ed by partiality toward the Confederacy. " The notifi- 
cation is, in fact, an act of effective hostility against the 
South," said the New York Times, June 18th. It was a 
foregone conclusion that other nations would issue simi- 
lar decrees. Excluded from foreign ports, and kept out 
of their own by the blockade, where could Confederates 
take their prizes? If the reward should become very 
doubtful, privateers would not long remain on the ocean. 
Seward expected that it would be a death-blow to Con- 
federate privateering, and within a year he reported to 
Adams that the " pirates " had withdrawn. 1 Early in 
June, 1861, it was announced that Gregory's movement 
in the House of Commons to obtain the recognition of 
the Confederacy had been abandoned ; 2 but this was not 
true. 

These were manifestations of a decline of sympathy 
with the Confederacy, but there was no certain indication 
that Great Britain and France might not, in their own 
interests, take measures that would be very injurious to 
the cause of the Union. In fact, on June 15, 1861, they 
made their first attempt to carry out their plan of joint 
action — not to aid the new government, but to protect 
themselves. The French and the British Ministers ap- 
peared at the Department of State and asked to be re- 
ceived together. Knowing what this meant, Seward 
had them shown into the Assistant Secretary's room. 
He soon entered, smiling and shaking his head as he 
protested : " ~No, no. This will never do. I cannot see 



'Bernard's Neutrality of Great Britain, 133; Dip. Cor., 1802, 101. 
3 Dip. Cor., 1861, 103. 

ISO 



SHAPING FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1861 

you in that way." One Minister suggested that they 
were carrying out their instructions, and the other urged 
that the}'' should be allowed to state the object of their 
call. " No," said Seward, " we must start right about 
it, whatever it is. M. Mercier, will 3'ou do me the favor 
to come to dine with me this evening? There we can 
talk over your business at leisure. And if Lord Lyons 
will step into my room with me, now, we will discuss 
what he has to say to me." They pleasantly objected to 
the plan, but Seward positively declined to receive them 
together. Then he asked them to leave their papers, 
that he might examine them informally. 1 " Mr. Sew- 
ard's language and demeanor throughout the interview 
were calm, friendly, and good - humored," as Lyons re- 
ported to Russell. 2 

In looking over the documents he learned that the 
two governments intended to ask both the United States 
and the Confederacy to adopt certain rules making the 
property of neutrals and that of an enemy (if under a 
neutral flag) free from capture, when not contraband of 
war. This was also the first attempt to announce di- 
rectly to the United States that they were divided into 
two belligerent parties, between which other powers as- 
sumed the attitude of neutrals. To allow this plan to 
be carried out would have been an acquiescence both in 
the position of France and Great Britain toward the 
Confederacy and in their scheme to act jointly. There- 
fore, Seward promptly handed back the communica- 
tions and would not allow them to be formally pre- 
sented. This was one of the first positive signs Seward 
gave of talent for his new duties. There Avas diplomatic 
skill of the best quality in the way he thwarted the pur- 
poses of Russell and Thouvenel. 

1 This account closely follows that of Mr. F. W. Seward, who 
seems to have been preseut. — 2 Seward, 581; Dip. Cor., 1861, 106. 

2 55 State Papers, 560. 

181 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

The official explanations Seward made to Adams and 
to Dayton were strong, dignified, and in proper temper. 
To one he said : 

" The United States are still solely and exclusively sov- 
ereign within the territories they have lawfully acquired 
and long possessed, as they have always been. . . . They 
are living under the obligations of the law of nations, and 
of treaties with Great Britain, just the same now as here- 
tofore ; they are, of course, the friend of Great Britain, 
and they insist that Great Britain shall remain their friend 
now, just as she has hitherto been. Great Britain, by vir- 
tue of these relations, is a stranger to parties and sections 
in this country, whether they are loyal to the United States 
or not, and Great Britain can neither rightfully qualify the 
sovereignty of the United States, nor concede, nor recog- 
nize any rights, or interests, or power of any party, state, 
or section, in contravention to the unbroken sovereignty 
of the Federal Union." 1 

He would not enter into any argument of fact or of 
law; for the position was one of self-defence — "the pri- 
mary law of human action." The government was sen- 
sible of the importance of the step it had taken, and it 
still hoped that friendly relations might continue. He 
expressed a belief that Great Britain had acted inad- 
vertently or from exaggerated apprehensions of dan- 
ger to her commerce. He claimed that all that Great 
Britain then asked as a neutral had already been offered 
her as a friend. 2 

''We are anxious," he said, "to avoid all causes of mis- 
understanding with Great Britain ; to draw closer, instead 
of breaking, the existing bonds of amity and friendship. 
There is nothing good or great which both nations may 
not expect to attain or effect, if they remain friends. It 
would be a hazardous day for both the branches of the 
British race when they should determine to try how much 
harm each could do the other.'* 3 

1 Dip. Cor., 1861, 107. 

2 This refers to the offer of the United States to accede to the decla- 
ration of Paris, which will soon be noticed. 3 Dip. Cor., 1861, 108. 

182 



SHAPING FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1861 

Great Britain had also offered her services as medi- 
ator. Adams was instructed to say that the United 
States could not " solicit or accept mediation from any, 
even the most friendly quarter." 

Seward said that the fountains of discontent in every 
society were many, but that as yet only those lying 
nearest the surface had been disturbed. If the deeper 
ones should be opened, when could they be closed ? 
And then he concluded his impressive despatch with 
this very significant sentence: "It was foreign inter- 
vention that opened, and that alone could open, similar 
fountains in the memorable French revolution." ' 

One passage in the despatch to Dayton was peculiarly 
eloquent in expressing his determination to resist foreign 
interference, which he feared was coming : 

" Every uncorrupted nation, in its deliberate moments, 
prefers its own integrity, even with unbearable evils, to 
division through the power or influence of any foreign 
state. This is so in France. It is not less so in this coun- 
try. Down deep in the heart of the American people — 
deeper than the love of trade, or of freedom — deeper than 
the attachment to any local or sectional interest, or partisan 
pride or individual ambition — deeper than any other senti- 
ment — is that one out of which the Constitution of this 
Union arose — namely, American Independence — indepen- 
dence of all foreign control, alliance, or influence.'"' a 

In an unpublished despatch of July 1, 1861, to Day- 
ton, he made his clearest and most characteristic ex- 
planation of what the attitude of the government must 
be in regard to the action of the foreign nations that 
had recognized the belligerency of the " insurgents " : 

" Neither Great Britain nor France, separately nor both 
together, can, by any declaration they can make, impair 
the sovereignty of the United States over the insurgents, 
nor confer upon them any public rights whatever. From 
first to last we have acted, and we shall continue to act, 

1 Dip. Cor , 1861, 109. * Dip. Cor., 1861, 228. 

183 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

for the whole people of the United States, and to make 
treaties for disloyal as well as loyal citizens with foreign 
nations, and shall expect, when the public welfare requires 
it, foreign nations to respect and observe the treaties. 

"We do not admit, and we never shall admit, even the 
fundamental statement you assume — namely, that Great 
Britain and France have recognized the insurgents as a 
belligerent party. True, you say they have so declared. 
We reply : Yes, but they have not declared so to us. You 
may rejoin : Their public declaration concludes the fact. 
We, nevertheless, reply: It must be not their declaration, 
but the fact, that concludes the fact." 

It was probably a surprise to Seward that Thouvenel 
and Kussell made no complaint on account of his re- 
fusal to entertain their propositions. The fact was 
that these statesmen had come to a better understand- 
ing of the problems in hand. Although Thouvenel 
had told Host that recognition was merely a matter of 
time, the commissioners early concluded that Great 
Britain would take no final action until after the first 
decided Confederate success. 1 On June 10th Rost and 
Yancey wrote from Paris : " Our opinion is that the 
government of England simply waits to see which shall 
prove strongest, and that it is sincere in its expressed 
design to be neutral." They thought that all they could 
do was to influence public sentiment in an unobtrusive 
manner until some favorable event at home should fur- 
nish an occasion for them to press for recognition. On 
July 15th Yancey and Mann reported that Napoleon 
considered his European policy so important to France 
that he would wait to follow Great Britain's lead on the 
American question. It is uncertain how much Seward's 
threats had to do with the apparent moderation or cau- 
tion of either government. Adams believed that Great 
Britain's inclination to enter into negotiations with the 
Confederates would have been yielded to u in regular 

1 Commissioners to Toombs, May SI, 1861. MS. 

184 



SHAPING FOREIGN RELATIONS, 18G1 

course of time but for the warning which came from 
the other side of the Atlantic against precipitation. In 
lieu of the former rashness has come a proportionate 
timidity." l 

About the time Seward thought he had got rid of the 
most troublesome questions, a new one arose, although 
it was as yet merely theoretical. The administration 
had chosen the blockade as the surest way to weaken 
the Confederacy; but many continued to believe that it 
was a mistake to try to watch a coast three thousand 
miles in length. If the ports could be closed effective- 
ly by law, then the ships so widely scattered could be 
brought together and used to conquer southern cities 
and districts on the seaboard; and this would prevent 
the Confederates from concentrating their strength in 
front of Washington. It was understood that Great 
Britain and France would not respect an attempt to 
close the ports by proclamation. A civil war was then 
in progress in New Granada, and the government in that 
countiy had adopted this method against its insurgents. 
Russell told Adams that the British Cabinet, after con- 
sidering this case, had decided that in the event of in- 
surrection or civil war, a country could not close the 
ports that were de facto in the possession of the insur- 
gents ; for that would not be a blockade according to 
international law. 2 Before Adams's report of this con- 
versation reached the United States, Congress had au- 
thorized President Lincoln to close the ports held by 
the Confederates. It does not appear that Seward then 
wished the President to declare a paper blockade in this 
indirect way, but he considered it his duty to let no 
claimed right seem to lapse by failing to deny the Brit- 
ish dictum. What he did was to inform Great Britain 

1 Adams to Seward, June 21, 1891. MS. 
* Dip. Cor., 1861, 111. 
185 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM II. SEWARD 

that the law merely granted the authority; that the 
President approved the principle of the law, and would 
exercise the power whenever the safety of the nation 
required it. 

This was not asserted pugnaciously, but only with 
such clearness as suited the circumstances. Of course, 
he made it plain again that fear of war would not pre- 
vent the United States from exercising their rights, but 
even this was not said until after he had significantly 
and diplomatically^ remarked : 

"I may add, also, for myself, that however otherwise I 
may at any time have been understood, it has been an ear- 
nest and profound solicitude to avert foreign war that alone 
has prompted the emphatic and sometimes, perhaps, im- 
passioned remonstrances I have hitherto made against any 
form or measure of recognition of the insurgents by the 
government of Great Britain. I write in the same spirit 
now, and I invoke on the part of the British government, 
as I propose to exercise on my own, the calmness which all 
counsellors ought to practise in debates which involve the 
peace and happiness of mankind." ' 

This despatch bore the date of July 21, 1861 — the 
day of the first battle of Bull Run. He said that he 
could not close without again asking Great Britain to 
realize that the policy of the government was " based 
on interests of the greatest importance and sentiments 
of the highest virtue, and, therefore, is in no case likely 
to be changed, whatever may be the varying fortunes 
of the war at home or the actions of foreign nations on 
this subject, while the policy of foreign states rests on 
ephemeral interests of commerce and ambition merely. 
The policy of the United States is not a creature of the 
government, but an inspiration of the people, while the 
policies of foreign states are at the choice mainly of the 
governments presiding over them." 2 

1 Dip. Cor., 1861, 118. 2 Dip. Cor., 1861, 121. 

13G 



CHAPTER XXXI 

TWO DIPLOMATIC INCIDENTS: SEWARD AND THE DECLARA- 
TION OF PARIS; BRITISH AND FRENCH " NEGOTIATIONS " 
WITH THE CONFEDERACY 

It was inevitable that the differences of opinion as 
to the belligerency of the Confederacy would lead to 
other disagreements. In fact, nearly a month before 
any power had formally recognized that belligerency 
Seward formed a plan by which he hoped to remove 
all excuse for such action. But, after recognition, other 
steps naturally followed, and these were the cause of 
discussions in which much cleverness was displayed by 
the diplomatists on each side. 

A congress of the leading maritime powers of Europe, 
held in Paris in 1856, agreed to the following rules, 
which are commonly called the declaration of Paris : 

" 1. Privateering is and remains abolished. 

" 2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the 
exception of contraband of war. 

" 3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband 
of war, are not liable to capture under enemy's flag. 

"i. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be ef- 
fective ; that is to say, maintained by forces sufficient 
really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy." 

As the first three provisions were not well-established 
rules of international law, and were binding only upon 
the contracting nations, the other maritime states were 
invited to adopt them. In replying for the United States, 
Secretary Marcy pointed out several reasons why they 

187 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

could not be accepted by his country without disadvan- 
tage, unless certain alterations should be made. The 
first article was objected to, because the United States 
had not adopted the policy of keeping a large navy in 
time of peace, and, therefore, might find it important to 
use privateers in case of war. But it could be rendered 
acceptable, Marcy suggested, if all the private property 
of individuals, though belonging to belligerent nations, 
should be made exempt from seizure or confiscation 
in maritime war. 1 All efforts toward a realization of 
Marcy 's plan were unsuccessful. Buchanan's adminis- 
tration broke off the negotiations. 

Shortly after the fall of Fort Sumter, when the ques- 
tions of belligerency and of issuing letters of marque by 
the Confederacy arose, Seward saw that it might be ad- 
vantageous to the United States to change their position. 
Because the Confederacy had no merchant marine worth 
mentioning, probably the United States would have no 
occasion to send out privateers. Therefore, as far as 
the present conflict was concerned, the United States 
had practically nothing to lose by agreeing to abolish 
privateering. On the other hand, it was expected that 
much of the naval success of the Confederacy must 
depend on the destruction of northern merchantmen. 
Confederate privateers would also interfere with the 
goods of Europeans, especially when carried under our 
flag. If these privateers could be kept off the ocean, 
it would save the maritime nations much annoyance. 
Assuming that the adherence of the United States to 
the declaration of Paris would bring about this result, 
it was to be expected that the other powers would wel- 
come such a step. Here, then, Seward believed that he 
had a great opportunity to gain the advantages already 

1 Stated more fully in Marcy's instructions to the United States Min- 
ister to Belgium, July 14, 1856. MS. See also Dip. Cor., 1861, 34, 233. 

188 



THE DECLARATION OF PARIS 

mentioned, and a much greater one, of which he was 
careful not to speak at the beginning. 

On April 2-1, 1861, he instructed our Ministers to the 
leading European powers that the United States were 
willing to assent to the declaration pure and simple, if 
the Marcy amendment should not be acceptable.' He 
told Dayton that two motives induced the United States 
to assume this position, as far as France was concerned : 
" First, a sincere desire to co-operate with other pro- 
gressive nations in the melioration of the rigors of 
maritime war ; second, a desire to relieve France of any 
apprehension of danger to the lives or property of her 
people from violence to occur in the course of the civil 
conflict in which we are engaged." 2 A further motive 
is to be found in another despatch, which says : " In 
this way we expected to remove every cause that any 
foreign power could have for the recognition of the in- 
surgents as a belligerent power." 3 

The parties to the declaration of Paris agreed that 
they would make common cause among themselves in 
enforcing its articles. Some months after the original 
proposal of accession was made, Seward said that " we 
tendered it, of course, as the act of this Federal govern- 
ment, to be obligatory equally upon disloyal as upon 
lo} T al citizens." 4 It did not require the gift of prophecy 
to tell what would result in case the offer of accession 
on the part of the United States should be accepted. 

The governments of Great Britain and of France 
seemed to receive the proposition with favor, although 
the Queen's proclamation had already recognized the 
belligerency of the Confederacy when this subject was 
first presented. Lord John Kussell gave Adams to un- 
derstand that Lord Lyons had been authorized to enter 
into a similar agreement with our government. 

• Dip. Cor., 1861, 34-36. 2 Dip. Cor., 1861, 251. 

3 Dip. Cor., 1861, 233. 4 Dip. Cor., 1861, 232. 

189 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

Dayton early foresaw difficulties. Very ingenuously 
lie suggested to Seward that, since the British govern- 
ment had shut its ports against the Confederate priva- 
teers, and thereby greatly limited their privileges, the 
accession of the United States to the declaration had 
become less urgent ; and that because European nations 
had recognized the belligerency of the Confederacy, our 
becoming a party to the declaration would not affect 
that action. 1 

This was exactly what Seward did not wish to hear 
mentioned. So he very pointedly indicated to Dayton 
that he was reasoning from false premises in adopting 
the plea that the insurgents " were necessarily a bellig- 
erent power because the British and French govern- 
ments have chosen in some of their public papers to say 
they are so." a At the same time he distinctly informed 
Dayton that this was not to alter the purpose of the 
administration in regard to the declaration. It was 
Seward's nature to increase in persistency as the obsta- 
cles became greater. So both Adams and Dayton were 
directed to press forward with their tasks. "But in do- 
ing this," he said to Dayton, "you will neither unneces- 
sarily raise a question about the character in which this 
government acts (being exclusive sovereign) nor, on the 
other hand, in any way compromise that character in 
any degree." 3 This was significant. 

The foreign diplomatists had their eyes open from the 
start. On May 18th Russell wrote to Lord Lyons that 
her Majesty's government could not accept an offer on 
the part of the United States not to do any privateer- 
ing, " if coupled with the condition that they should 
enforce its renunciation upon the Confederate States, 
either by denying their right to issue letters of marque, 

1 Dip. Car., 1861, 220. 3 Seward to Dayton, July 1, 1861. MS. 

3 Dip. Cor., 1861, 234. 

190 



THE DECLARATION OF PARIS 

or by interfering with the belligerent operations of ves- 
sels holding from them such letters of marque." ' A 
fortnight later Lord Lyons said that it was undoubted- 
ly the purpose of the United States to make the parties 
to the declaration treat the Confederates as pirates; 2 
and Thouvenel early saw that this would be a logical 
demand. 

However, on July 18, 1861, Russell informed Adams 
that the British government would be ready to enter 
into a convention with the United States about their 
accession to the declaration, as soon as the United 
States should be prepared to make a similar agreement 
Avith France. 3 Conventions of identical import were 
drafted at London and at Paris, and were ready for sig- 
nature ; then there came a sudden halt. Dayton, who 
had been severely criticised by Seward, had the melan- 
choly satisfaction of reporting to the department that 
his "anticipations" had been "fully realized" ; for Russell 
and Thouvenel had each refused to negotiate except on 
the distinct understanding — and a written statement at 
the time of completing the arrangement — that the ad- 
mission of the United States to the declaration should 
have no bearing, directly or indirectly, on the question 
of our domestic difficulty. 4 The British and the French 
Secretaries clearly explained the reason for their de- 
mand : their governments had recognized the Confeder- 
ates as belligerents, and were bound to respect their 
right to arm vessels as privateers, while the United 
States had insisted upon regarding the privateers as 
pirates; therefore the United States might claim that all 
the parties to a convention " declaring that privateering 
was and remains abolished would be bound to treat 
the privateers of the so-called Confederate States as 
pirates." Both Russell and Thouvenel feared that, 

1 55 British State Papers, 555. 2 Ibid., 557. 

3 Dip. Cor., 1861, 116. * Dip. Cor., 1861, 242. 

191 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM II. SEWARD. 

without an explicit statement in advance, the agreement 
would lead straight to a dispute. 1 The British Secretary 
emphasized the importance of such precaution by refer- 
ring to the serious differences that had occurred about 
" the precise meaning of words and the intention of " 
those who made the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. The illus- 
tration was very pointed, so far as Seward was con- 
cerned; for, as has been noticed, he had argued on both 
sides of this troublesome question. 

Seward's replies showed that he felt little less than 
contempt for the reasoning of his two great oppo- 
nents. To admit a special explanation would virtually 
introduce a new and distinct article into the projected 
convention ; it " would, for the first time in the history 
of the United States, be to permit a foreign power to 
take cognizance of and adjust its relations upon assumed 
internal and purely domestic differences existing within 
our own country." 2 He also considered the proposition 
to be an unjust discrimination against the United States, 
because it aimed to treat the conditions here as excep- 
tional, without making a like provision for similar cir- 
cumstances in other countries in the future. The point 
was that there should be no distinction between a nation 
with a formidable insurrection and a nation that might 
some time have one. Nor would he admit that the ac- 
ceptance of the plain proposition of the United States 
would in any way involve the other powers in our in- 
ternal affairs. 

"But if such should be its effect, I must, in the first 
place, disclaim any desire for such an intervention on the 
part of the United States. The whole of this long corre- 
spondence has had for one of its objects the purpose of 
averting any such intervention. If, however, such an in- 
tervention would be the result of the unqualified execution 
of the convention by France, then the fault clearly must 

1 Dip. Cor., 1861, 145, 146, 242, 252. 2 Dip. Cor., 1861, 142. 

192 



THE DECLARATION OF PARIS 

be inherent in the declaration of the congress of Paris 
itself, and it is not a result of anything that the United 
States have done or proposed." 1 

It must often have been noticed, in the course of this 
narrative, that Seward had a fondness for an argument 
of this kind. It was delightfully theoretical, and su- 
perficially it seemed to be conclusive, although it avoid- 
ed the main question. On July 6, 1861, he called on 
Lord Lyons and explained the complications, as he 
viewed them, in which Dayton had involved the nego- 
tiations. He was very anxious that the accession of 
the United States to the declaration should at once 
take place, saying that its effect upon the states in 
revolt could be determined afterward. At the same 
time he assured the British Minister that the United 
States would do all in their power to protect the com- 
merce of friends from the attacks of the so-called priva- 
teers, and would hang the privateer crews as pirates. 
If Seward had not intended to use the adherence of 
the United States to the declaration as a lever to force 
the other powers to treat the Confederates as pirates, 
or at least to cease regarding them as belligerents, he 
might easily and unofficially have removed all such 
suspicions. On the contrary, the interview strength- 
ened Lyons's fears; so that he gave Russell the most 
emphatic warning that the only way to prevent " seri- 
ous disputes " in the future would be to state " formal- 
ly and distinctly beforehand" w 7 hat the effect would 
be on the Confederac}'. 3 Probably it was this advice 
that caused Russell to insist on the explanatory declar- 
ation. 

It is difficult either to understand how Seward could 
have expected Russell and Thouvenel to walk into such 
a trap in broad daylight, or how he could have profited 

1 Dip. Cor. , 1861, 251. s 55 State Papers, 566-67. 

ii.— N 193 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

by it in any case. They would not have accepted his 
theory of the significance of the accession of the United 
States, and this would only have made more conspicu- 
ous our connivance at the European recognition of Con- 
federate belligerency. Seward's claim, that there was 
no difference between a nation entirely at peace and one 
in circumstances like those of the United States at this 
time, could not be taken seriously. It was the differ- 
ence between a solvent man and an insolvent one, be- 
tween recognized sovereignty and disputed sovereignty, 
between peace and war. This was shown by the indis- 
putable fact that it was not possible for the United 
States to prevent the fitting out of privateers by the 
Confederates. Every other nation had the abilit}'-, when 
it became a party to the declaration, to carry out its 
pledges. For Seward to grant for the moment that 
it would be interference on the part of other powers to 
deal with Confederate privateersmen as if they were 
pirates, and then to pretend that, therefore, he could 
have had no such idea in mind, was to belie the chief 
purpose of his arguments for months. Dayton again 
summarized the whole situation when he wrote to 
Thouvenel: "If, therefore, the government of France 
shall consider that an unconditional execution of that 
convention will demand of it interference in our affairs, 
or will implicate it in any shape in the civil war now 
raging in our country, then it is obvious that this is not 
a proper time for her or for us to enter into such agree- 
ments." ' There is nothing to indicate that Seward 
would have accepted anything less than " the uncon- 
ditional execution of that convention." Therefore, he 
was plainly acting out of season, and he was furnishing 
his opponents with evidences of his lack of candor. 
These contentions were all the more unfortunate be- 



1 Dip. Cor., 1861,247. 
194 



THE DECLARATION OF PARIS 

cause they lessened the good results that would natural- 
ly have followed a wise and generous policy toward 
neutrals, which had doubtless been in Seward's mind 
from the beginning. 

"Regarding this negotiation as at an end/' he wrote to 
Adams, "the question arises, What, then, are to be the 
views and policy of the United States in regard to the 
rights of neutrals in maritime war in the present case? . . . 
We regard Great Britain as a friend. Her Majesty's flag, 
according to our traditional principles, covers enemy's 
goods not contraband of war. Goods of her Majesty's sub- 
jects, not contraband of war, are exempt from confiscation, 
though found under a neutral or disloyal flag. No depre- 
dations shall be committed by our naval forces or by those 
of any of our citizens, so far as we can prevent it, upon the 
vessels or property of British subjects. Our blockade, be- 
ing effective, must be respected." 1 

Here was the full assent of the United States, for the 
present war, to all except the first article of the dec- 
laration of Paris. It was gracefully given at last, and 
it must have been welcomed. Such an announcement, 
accompanied by the statement that Seward withdrew 
" from the subject carrying away no feelings of passion, 
prejudice, or jealousy," and a discreet reminder of the 
fact that in 1838 the United States passed a law to 
prevent their citizens from interfering with the Canadian 
rebellion, must have gone far toward allaying the ill- 
feelings that had been aroused. 

It should not be inferred from what has been said of 
Seward that Russell and Thouvenel were altogether art- 
less and frank. The commercial interests of their nations 
were greatly affected by our struggle, and their constant 
aim was to find out how far these interests could be pro- 
tected or benefited without getting into more serious 

1 Dip. Cor., 1861, 143. 
195 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

complications. The} 7- seemed to have but little senti- 
mental sympathy for either the North or the South. 
They hoped, but never felt quite confident, that the 
agreement of France and Great Britain to act together 
would work much like an offensive and defensive alli- 
ance, by making their respective disputes with the Unit- 
ed States practically identical because simultaneous. 

Before Seward's proposition about the declaration of 
Paris had been made, Thouvenel and Russell had agreed 
on a plan that was better for French and British in- 
terests than the approval of all four articles of the 
declaration by both belligerents. 1 If the United States 
and the Confederacy could be induced to adopt the 
second and third articles — that a neutral flag protects 
an enemy's goods, and that the goods of a neutral are 
not subject to seizure even in an enemy's ship — contra- 
band of war excepted in both cases — then the commerce 
of France and of Great Britain would be free from 
everything except slight annoyances. If Confederate 
privateers should roam the ocean and seize the ships 
and goods of citizens of the North, all the better for 
other commercial nations ; for it would soon cause the 
commerce of the United States to be carried on under 
foreign flags, especially the British and the French. 
The rule of international law about blockades was so 
positive that no special approval of that article was 
necessary. This was the first important plan that the 
two powers tried to carry out by means of impressive 
joint action. 

The parties to the declaration of Paris agreed that 
it could be accepted only as a whole, and that the ac- 
ceding nations should enter into no subsequent arrange- 
ment on maritime law in time of war without stipulating 
for a strict adherence to the four articles. In direct vio- 



55 State Papers, 547-50. 
196 



"NEGOTIATIONS" WITH THE CONFEDERACY 

lation of this pledge, Great Britain and France pursued 
their project, as these instructions from Kussell to Lyons 
show : " Her Majesty's government expect that these 
proposals will be received by the United States govern- 
ment in a friendly spirit. If such shall be the case, you 
will endeavor to come to an agreement on the subject, 
binding France, Great Britain, and the United States." ' 

It has been noticed 2 how Seward outwitted Lyons 
and Mercier when they called to submit this proposition. 
The communications with the Confederacy were less 
disappointing. Under date of July 5, 1SG1, Lord Lyons 
requested the British consul at Charleston, South Caro- 
lina, to get the Confederate government to consent 
to the observance of the two articles about the rights 
of neutrals. Lyons specially cautioned Consul Bunch 
against taking any action that might seem to raise the 
question of the recognition of the Confederacy by Great 
Britain, and he advised him neither to go to Richmond 
nor to deal directly "with the central authority which 
is established there." He suggested that by explain- 
ing the matter verbally to Governor Pickens, the latter 
might be able to obtain from the Confederate govern- 
ment both an official recognition of the rights secured 
to neutrals by the two articles and an admission of re- 
sponsibility for its privateers. Lyons also informed 
Bunch that similar instructions had been sent by the 
French government to its representative there, and 
that the two consuls were expected to act in "strict 
concert." 3 

As Governor Pickens was absent from Charleston, the 
consuls secured the services of William Henry Trescot, 
who was an experienced diplomatist. The whole scheme 
was unfolded to him, and he set out for Richmond to 



1 55 State Papers, 554. s See ante, p. ISO ff. 

3 Bernard's Neutrality of Great Britain, etc., 181, 182. 

197 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

interview the Confederate President. Davis was met 
at Gordonsville, returning from the first battle of Bull 
Hun. As soon as Davis understood the proposition, he 
inquired why it had not come through his accredit- 
ed commissioners. This was partially answered by re- 
minding him that Yancey, Host, and Mann had not yet 
been officially received, and that Seward had declared 
that in case they should be, the United States would 
regard it as a casus belli. The agent advised that the 
best way to bring about their reception would be for 
the President to let it be informally known that the 
proposal had been received with favor, and to say that 
the commissioners would give the official answer. It 
was suggested that this would probably lead to recogni- 
tion ; and if Seward's threat was meant, Great Britain 
and France would be brought into the war as the allies 
of the Confederacy. Davis's dissatisfaction with the 
way the negotiations had been opened seemed to cloud 
his perception of the possible advantage. But he may 
have thought that any attempt to go beyond the course 
suggested by the representatives of Great Britain and of 
France would react against the Confederacy. So he 
merely gave his general approval, and promised to refer 
the question to Congress. 1 On August 13th the Con- 
federate Congress passed a series of resolutions approv- 
ing all the articles of the declaration of Paris except 
the one referring to privateers. The "right of priva- 
teering " was especially emphasized. 

The British consul rightly considered that the wishes 
of her Majesty's government had been "fully met"; 
for the abolition of privateering had not been requested. 
Bunch described privateering as "the arm upon which 
they [the Confederates] most rely for the injury of the 

1 This paragraph is based on Bunch's report (Bernard, 182-84) and 
the statements of Mr. Trescot to the author. 

198 



"NEGOTIATIONS" WITH THE CONFEDERACY 

extended commerce of their enemy." In any case, 
the special interests of France and Great Britain were 
shielded by the approval of the second and third articles. 
Toward the close of his despatch Consul Bunch spoke 
of " the accession of the Confederate States to the dec- 
laration of Paris," and added : " The negotiation ' hav- 
ing thus been brought to a close, the President expressed 

to Mr. [Trescot] his hope that the existence of 

those extended relations of commercial intercourse which 
had rendered the application now made to him by the 
governments of France and England a necessity in the 
view of those nations, would materially contribute to 
hasten a formal recognition of the new Confederacy. . . ." 
This was certainly not the language one would expect to 
hear from the representative of a neutral power which 
had repeatedly declared its intention merely to recog- 
nize a state of war. Nor is it likely that any officer in 
the diplomatic service would have employed such in- 
cautious expressions, whatever the real position of his 
government. Bunch was merely a consul, and his van- 
ity seems to have been highly excited by the unusual 
task given him. Later it appeared that he had ex- 
pressed himself much more strongly. 

Seward learned by chance of the doings of Consul 
Bunch. Early in August, 1861, he was informed by 
telegraph that one Robert Mure, of Charleston, was 
soon to sail from New York for England as bearer of 
despatches from the Confederate government to the 
British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Mure 
was arrested, and in his possession were found papers 
indicating that Consul Bunch had been carrying on 
something like diplomatic negotiations with the Con- 
federacy. One showed that he had declared that the 
first step toward recognition had been taken. Seward 



1 Lyons used the same word in his despatch to Bunch. 
199 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM II. SEWARD 

reviewed the case, and instructed Adams to request that 
Bunch should be removed. 1 

In reply to the charges, Earl Russell 3 said that Bunch 
had been directed to express to the authorities of the so- 
called Confederacy the desire of England and France 
that the second, third, and fourth articles of the declara- 
tion of Paris should be observed ; that he had acted on 
instructions, and therefore could not be dismissed. Bus- 
sell disclaimed all responsibility for the assertion that 
the first step to the recognition of the southern states 
by Great Britain had been taken; her Majesty's gov- 
ernment had not recognized, and was not prepared to 
recognize, the so-called Confederate States as a separate 
independent state. 3 

Seward replied on October 23d that there was a law 
of the United States that forbade any person not spe- 
cially appointed or duly recognized by the President 
from taking part in any political correspondence with 
the government of any foreign state whatever, with an 
intent to influence the measures of a foreign govern- 
ment. Moreover, the proper persons to represent the 
interests of Great Britain were the diplomatic agents; 
nor could the United States government permit an 
officer exercising consular privileges by its consent to 
hold communications with the insurgents. Eussell had 
implied that because Great Britain had recognized the 
Confederates as belligerents, she might properly treat 
with them in regard to the rights of neutrals. As far 
as Seward's attitude was concerned, this was like under- 
taking to strengthen a disputed claim by increasing its 
scope and significance ; it made a denial all the more 
urgent. Seward boldly reasserted his determination to 

1 JMp. Cor., 1861, 131-33. 

2 He had recently become an earl; but, because be preferred it, be 
continued to be called by bis former title. 
z Dip. Cor., 1861, 156,157. 

200 



"NEGOTIATIONS" WITH THE CONFEDERACY 

maintain his position toward the Confederates and not 
to permit Great Britain to free herself from any of her 
obligations to the United States. " Still adhering to this 
position, the government of the United States will con- 
tinue to pursue, as it has heretofore done, the counsels 
of prudence, and will not suffer itself to be disturbed by 
excitement. It must revoke the exequatur of the con- 
sul, who has not only been the bearer of communica- 
tions between the insurgents and a foreign government, 
in violation of our laws, but has abused equally the con- 
fidence of the two governments by reporting, without 
the authority of his government, and in violation of 
their own policy as well as of our national rights, that 
the proceeding in which he was engaged was in the 
nature of a treaty with the insurgents, and the first step 
towards a recognition by Great Britain of their sover- 
eignty." ' 

He made his victory more complete and less irri- 
tating by paying a compliment to Lord Lyons because 
he had " carefully respected the sovereignty and the 
rights of the United States," and by saying that the 
consular privileges that had been taken from Bunch 
would be "cheerfully allowed to any successor whom 
her Majesty may appoint, against whom no grave per- 
sonal objections shall exist." Adams, with perfect tact, 



1 " Secondly, the communication of the British and French gov- 
ernments to the insurgent cabal at Richmond through Mr. Bunch was 
a proceeding that could not fail to alarm the American government 
and people. When the fact happened to become known to us, I had 
just become satisfied, though in confidential communications, that the 
British government was prepared lo assume a tone that should repel 
the prevailing presumption of its inclinations to a recognition. But 
the offensive correspondence of the British government left us no 
alternative but to exercise our right to revoke the exequatur of the 
offending consul. It was done, however, on the grounds of his having 
rendered himself personally obuoxious." — Seward to Adams, Novem- 
ber 30, 1861. MS. 

201 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

communicated these sentiments to Russell. Russell re- 
garded Adams's assertion, that the only authority in 
the United States to which any diplomatic communica- 
tion whatever might be made was the government of 
the United States, as open to serious objection both on 
questions of law and of fact. He considered it unrea- 
sonable either to address the United States concerning 
some grievance in New Orleans or Galveston (which it 
w r as not within the power of the United States govern- 
ment to correct) or to submit to any serious hardship, 
actual or apprehended, without attempting to have the 
Confederacy redress or avert it. 1 

Adams warded off the blows with skill. If Russell's 
argument in regard to Great Britain's grievances against 
the Confederacy was one ad hoc, it must have meant 
that he thought the same diplomatic agent should be 
accredited to the United States and to the authorities 
organized for their overthrow. No self-respecting- 
nation could admit such a practice. It was entirely 
true, as Russell suggested, that cases might arise in 
New Orleans and elsewhere which the United States 
government could not remedy. But in bringing for- 
ward such an argument he w r as taking up a two-edged 
sword. There are many injuries suffered by a nation's 
subjects in a foreign country which can only be corrected 
or compensated for after long periods of delay. With 
fine sarcasm and perfect diplomacy Adams remarked 
that he supposed it was Great Britain's desire to protect 
her interests in regions where the authority of the United 
States was suspended that had induced her to release 
the United States " from responsibility for such reclama- 
tions by adopting the policy of granting to the insur- 
gents the rights of a belligerent." 

When Seward announced the purpose of the United 



1 Dip. Cor., 1862, 7-9. 
202 



"NEGOTIATIONS" WITH THE CONFEDERACY 

States to withdraw the exequatur of Consul Bunch, 
that might well have been regarded as the end of the 
dispute, unless Great Britain intended to engage in 
similar negotiations in the future. Russell su£nrested 
that this might be necessary. But if it became so, the 
British representatives were careful to preserve perfect 
secrecy. 

On May 20, 1861, the Secretary of State informed the 
Russian Minister, Edward de Stoeckl, that the official 
acts of Edward W. Barnwell, the acting Russian consul 
at Charleston, would no longer be recognized, as he had 
joined the niilitar}'- forces in an insurrection against the 
United States. 1 In the instructions of the next day to 
Adams, Seward said that this method would be strictly 
followed in the future. 2 But the exequatur of Bunch's 
French colleague was not revoked. The presumption 
is that after Seward had refused to recognize the joint 
action of the two powers, he thought it important not 
to give them a common grievance. 

The whole incident was well suited to impress Great 
Britain and France with the idea that, whatever Seward's 
other qualities might be, he could not be frightened by 
foreign combinations. If there had been a suspicion 
that he would accept any serious interference rather 
than make good his threat about war, it waned thence- 
forth. In fact, the belief was spreading in Europe that 
he was counting on a foreign war as part of a plan of 
victory and reunion. 

1 Chief Clerk Michael to author, August 16, 1899. 

2 See mite, p. 170. 



CHAPTER XXXII 

" KING COTTON," TnE BLOCKADE, AND THE EUROPEAN IN- 
CLINATION TO INTERFERE, 1861 

Pekhaps no great revolution was ever begun with such 
convenient and soothing theories as those that were ex- 
pounded and believed at the time of the organization of 
the Confederacy : Probably there would be no war at 
all ; but if there should be one, northern sympathizers 
with the South would make it easy for the Confederates 
to drive back the United States forces, if perchance they 
should venture upon southern soil. In any case, hostil- 
ities could not last long, for France and Great Britain 
must have what the Confederacy alone could supply, 
and therefore the} 7- could be forced to aid the South, as 
a condition precedent to relief from the terrible distress 
that was sure to follow a blockade. Of course these 
theories were employed to prevent the people from per- 
ceiving that the hazards of secession were more danger- 
ous than any demonstrations the Republican administra- 
tion might make against slavery. Because the prophets 
overlooked the possibility — soon to be a fact — that the 
Confederacy might at first be without a single ship of 
war, it did not occur to them that cotton, although 
" King," might be a suppliant monarch. 

There were three distinct means by which the United 
States undertook to conquer the Confederacy : by mili- 
tary and naval operations, aimed directly at its accumu- 
lated resources ; by a blockade of southern ports, so as 
to cut off the exchange of its money and superfluous 

204 



"KING COTTON" AND TUE BLOCKADE 

products for articles and materials important to the 
prosecution of the "war and to the comfort of the people ; 
and by keeping foreign countries aloof from the contest, 
so as to bar them from giving the Confederacy either 
moral or material support. The military and naval feat- 
ures, as such, do not come within the scope of this nar- 
rative ; and even the blockade is important to it only in 
connection with the diplomatic questions to which it 
gave rise. It was early recognized that to ward off for- 
eign intervention, aid, or substantial sympathy, was the 
most important task before the Secretary of State. 

The President's proclamations of April 19th and 27th 
were not designed to mark the actual beginning of the 
blockade ; they were merely explicit declarations of in- 
tention. This was prudent, for otherwise the United 
States would have deserved more than the ridicule of 
all maritime nations. Although there were about 
forty ships in the United States navy, only three were 
immediately available for the service of closing one 
hundred and eighty-five harbor openings. 1 Nearly all 
the others had been ordered to foreign stations by 
Buchanan's peace-loving administration, and the re- 
mainder were either unserviceable or were already en- 
gaged in important enterprises. In such circumstances 
it was evident that the Secretary of the Navy must be 
very energetic and the Secretary of State very diplo- 
matic to make the injury to the Confederacy greater 
than the danger likely to result to the United States 
from the attempt to shut off commerce between Con- 
federate ports and foreign nations ; for a blockade that 
was only partially effective would give just grounds for 
complaint, and would be sure to create sympathy w T ith 
the new government. 



1 4 Spear's History of Our Navy, 32 ; Soley's The Blockade and tlie 
Cruisers, 26. 

205 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEVVAKD 

From the extent of British interests involved, it was 
to be expected that Lord Lyons would early obtain from 
Seward an explicit statement as to the leading features 
of the forthcoming blockade. As the conversation took 
place before the end of April, 1 it was too soon for 
Seward to be clear and positive on all questions that 
might arise ; but Lyons reported that as far as the 
Secretary's "assurances in general terms" went, "noth- 
ing could be more satisfactory." Seward's expectation 
was that the blockade would not be announced publicly 
at each port, but that no vessel would be liable to seizure 
that had not been individually warned. This was very 
discreet. If there should be no United States ship to 
serve notice, there would be no obstacle to entering the 
port, and therefore no ground for complaint ; on the 
other hand, the presence of a United States ship would 
be an actual demonstration of an effective blockade. 
When it was suggested that it would be impossible to 
watch the entire coast beyond the Chesapeake, Seward 
replied that it would all be blockaded, and blockaded 
effectively. He stated that the foreign vessels in port 
at the time of the beginning of the blockade would be 
allowed to leave with their cargoes. And, he added, 
if any of the rules should seem to bear with undue 
severity on British ships, he would be ready to consider 
any representations as to the equities of the matter. 
His confidence of success seems less surprising when 
we know that on the day of Lincoln's first proclama- 
tion of a blockade twenty steamers were ordered to be 
purchased and armed. 3 

G. J. Pendergrast, commander of the United States 
home squadron, issued a proclamation at Fortress Mon- 
roe, Virginia, April 30th, declaring that he had a force 



1 Lyons to Russell, May 2, 1861, quoted Bernard, 228-30. 
5 2 Seward, 559. 

206 



"KING COTTON" AND THE BLOCKADE 

sufficient to carry out the blockade of the Virginia and 
North Carolina coasts, and that all vessels coming from 
a distance would be warned off. Otherwise difficulty 
would have arisen with the first seizure on the North 
Carolina coast, for, as no blockaders were there, it was 
not actually blockaded. 

By the purchase and arming of many merchant-ves- 
sels and the recall of governmental ships from foreign 
ports, the actual blockade rapidly extended southward, 
although at first it skipped some important ports. The 
usual practice was to regard the President's April proc- 
lamations as general notices ; then the announcement of 
the commander of the ship or of the fleet appearing 
before such ports as Charleston, Savannah, or Mobile 
marked the actual beginning of the blockade, although 
vessels coming from a distance were not seized without 
due warning unless there was a fair presumption against 
them. It was two or three months before there was 
much danger, except at a few points, in attempting to 
run the blockade. As time went on and knowledge of 
the blockade might be assumed, the practice of individ- 
ual warning was given up, and a merchantman bound 
for any Confederate port was liable to capture at sea, 
as international law allowed. 

Another feature of this blockade was the question of 
its continuance, under certain conditions. The repudi- 
ation of paper blockades compels the continual, but not 
the continuous, presence of ships, so as to introduce at 
least a decided element of danger to blockade-runners. 
In .May, 1861, the Niagara began the blockade at Charles- 
ton, but after a few days she left the port unwatched. 
Lord Lyons sent a note to Seward expressing the ex- 
pectation that if the blockade was to be begun again, it 
would only be after due notification and the regular 
period had elapsed for the departure of neutral vessels 
with cargoes. Seward replied that the blockade at 

207 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

Charleston had been " neither abandoned, relinquished 
nor remitted " ; that the intention of the government 
was to have the Harriet Lane replace the Niagara, but 
she had been delayed a day or two by accident; that he 
did not consider the blockade impaired by a temporary 
absence, but that it would remain in effect until notice 
of its discontinuance should be given by proclamation 
of the President ; that the purpose was to maintain it 
constantly and vigorously. Seward's claim was arbi- 
trary, but Great Britain did not find it worth while to 
insist on the established rule that in case a blockade is 
voluntarily raised, fresh notice must be given should a 
reinvestment be decided on. 1 

The first effects of the blockade were very encourag- 
ing to the United States. The ships in southern ports 
that were allowed to leave with their cargoes were not 
many. Nearly all foreign shippers and ship-owners im- 
mediately adopted the prudent course of avoiding the 
Confederacy ; so the supply of foreign goods was largely 
cut off. This was no surprise to the would-be founders 
of a new nation ; in fact, they believed that this discon- 
tinuance in the profitable exchange of southern products 
for European goods would lead to a demonstration of 
the full power of "King Cotton." From the beginning, 
sailing vessels and small steamers stole out through the 
blockade at many places. But their cargoes of cotton 
and tobacco were never large. In returning — if not 
captured — they brought in contraband of war and arti- 
cles of general use, not heavy or bulky in proportion 
to their value. Such craft were the blockade-runners. 

1 Douglas Owen's Declaration of War, 9 ; see Bernard, 237 flf., for 
the correspondence and comment. " When the Niagara arrived off 
Charleston on the 11th of May, she remained only four days ; and, ex- 
cept for the fact that the Harriet Lane was off the bar on the 19th, 
there was no blockade whatever at that point for a fortnight after- 
ward." — Soley, 35; see also p. 84. 

208 



"KING COTTON" AND THE BLOCKADE 

Their fortunes and misfortunes were strange and thrill- 
ing, and but for their assistance the Confederacy could 
hardly have lived two years. 

It was foreseen that some of the industries of En«-- 
land and of France were to be greatly embarrassed by 
the blockade. Yet there was so general an expectation 
that the South could not be conquered, and that the 
attempt would not continue long, that many concluded 
that foreign aid to the Confederacy would be unneces- 
sary, even to the realization of any selfish aims. Sew- 
ard's bold warnings against interference made such 
opinions most expedient. The blockade had scarce- 
ly begun when Mercier recommended that France and 
Great Britain should insist on having it opened for the 
exportation of cotton. 1 About the same time Lord 
Palmerston, the Premier of the British Cabinet, said that 
he would count the day on which he could put an end 
to the American war one of the happiest of his life ; but 
the shrewd old statesman, who had no scruples against 
profitable interference, saw that the attempt would then 
lead to more harm than good. 2 Europe was, indeed, 
without the markets and supplies of the South, but those 
of the North remained open and were never more valu- 
able. If Seward's language was to be taken seriously, it 
meant that an attempt by one or more foreign nations 
to disregard the blockade would cause war and entail 
a loss in trade with the North, perhaps without any 
substantial gain from commerce with the South. None 
of the powers could figure out a profitable bargain in such 
an enterprise. So Great Britain and France continued 
to postpone action on this question, confident that a 
decisive battle would soon convince the United States 
that the Confederacy was invincible. Then European 



1 2 Walpole's Russell, 344 ; 2 Ashley's Palmerston, 210. 
8 Ashley's Palmerston, 208. 
ii.— o 209 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

intervention, it was expected, would mean peace — not 
war, as Seward had proclaimed. 

When the news of the Confederate victory at Bull 
Kun, July 21, 1861, reached London, early in August, 
the commissioners hastened to request an informal in- 
terview with Earl Kussell; but he cruelly asked them to 
put their communication in writing. About this time 
they reported that they had " not received the least 
notice or attention, official or social, from any member 
of the government," and that they differed among them- 
selves as to whether they should press for a definite an- 
swer on the question of recognition. 1 In the formal plea 
made to Russell, a few days later, they informed him 
that there was an average crop of cotton which would 
be delivered on the wharves " when there shall be a 
prospect of the blockade being raised, and not before." 
The blockade had often been broken at several points, 
they said. It was for the neutral powers, whose com- 
merce had been so seriously damaged, to determine how 
long such a blockade should last. 2 But Russell con- 
tinued to show no signs of great concern. 

Optimism was so great a factor in Seward's diplomacy 
that it is difficult to distinguish when his cheerful and 
confident expressions represented his real opinions and 
when they were announced merely to encourage others. 
Shortly before the battle of Bull Run he wrote to Adams 
that the " possibility of foreign intervention, sooner or 
later, in this domestic disturbance is never absent from 
the thoughts of this government." 3 He must have 

1 Commissioners' despatch of August 7th. 

2 British Parliamentary Papers, 1862, North America No. 1, 63-68. 

s Dip. Cor., 1861, 117. This despatch bore the date of July 21, 1861, 
which was Sunday and the day of the battle. The character of the 
greater part of it, and Mr. F. W. Seward's account of what the Secre- 
tary did that day (2 Seward, 598), indicate that all but the last para- 
graph was drafted before the 21st. 

210 



EUROPEAN INCLINATION TO INTERFERE 

feared intervention after that battle; but instead of 
showing any serious apprehensions, he rejoiced that the 
defeat would call forth increased resources and com- 
pel a careful reorganization of the army. 1 In an unpub- 
lished despatch of September 5th, he informed Dayton : 

"I am not reposing in the expectation of disinterested 
sympathy or favor towards our cause, in any foreign conn- 
try, but I feel it to be necessary that we should obtain time 
for the complete organization of the powers of the govern- 
ment before suffering the possible foreign complications of 
our positions to take effect. That assumption is now suffi- 
cient to repose upon. I feel assured that foreign nations 
will from this time forward hesitate more and more about 
adopting a policy that shall be hostile to this Union. We 
shall have returning friendship just in the degree that we 
shall be able to show that we do not need it." 

Later in the same month he wrote home saying that his 
fears of intervention were subsiding, for " the prestige 
of secession is evidently wearing off in Europe." a He 
was likely to speak of the best and to prepare for the 
worst. Undoubtedly he was bearing in mind Adams's 
advice that the English supply of cotton would last un- 
til the middle of September, and that there was no dan- 
ger of a change of policy in the mean time, but that it 
was uncertain whether there would subsequently be an 
attempt to break the blockade. 3 He certainly knew 
that the two greatest European powers were only wait- 
ing for a good opportunity to get cotton without taking 
a war with it. 

Although not especially significant, Confederate 
victories during the summer and early in September 
strengthened the belief of the Confederates that Great 
Britain and France would soon be impressed by their 
military power. They also considered the beginning of 

1 Dip. Cor., 1861, 123, 236. 2 2 Seward, 621. 

3 July 12, 1861. MS. 

211 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

the scarcity of cotton in France and England as very 
favorable to European interference. Before the end of 
August it was decided to " disunite " the diplomatic 
trio, and to send James M. Mason and John Slidell as 
commissioners to Great Britain and to France, respec- 
tively. Both ranked high among the Confederate 
leaders, and while in the United States Senate they had 
much to do with the foreign policies of Pierce and of 
Buchanan. Mason was a distinguished member of a 
distinguished Virginia family, and Southerners believed 
that he would be more than a match for Adams; while 
Slidell, like Post and Soule, was intimately associated 
with the Creole aristocracy of Louisiana, who felt more 
at home in Paris than in New York city. 

Seward had said that the United States were not dis- 
turbed by a British order sending three regiments to 
Canada and some armed vessels into American waters. 
Nevertheless, it was wise for him to find a new way to 
let Europe know that our measures for defence could be 
greatly increased. So, on October 14, 1861, he addressed 
a circular letter to the governors of the states either on 
the seaboard or on the Great Lakes, asking them to bring 
to the consideration of their respective legislatures the 
question of perfecting their military defences. It was 
suggested that if the states should undertake this work, 
Congress would undoubtedly provide for their reim- 
bursement. The reason he gave for the request was 
that agents of the Confederacy had tried to invoke 
European intervention, and, taking advantage of the 
embarrassments of agriculture, manufactures, and com- 
merce in foreign countries, resulting from the insurrec- 
tion they had inaugurated at home, they sought to in- 
volve our common country in controversies with powers 
with whom we ought to maintain peaceful relations. 
The prospect of any such disturbance was then, he said, 
less serious than it had been at any previous period of 

212 



EUROPEAN INCLINATION TO INTERFERE 

our trouble. Nevertheless, it was necessary " to take 
every precaution that is possible to avert the evils of 
foreign war." ' 

Seward's circular had hardly been sent out when the 
conditions became more favorable to foreign interfer- 
ence. On the 15th of October it was reported that 
Mason and Slidell had started on their mission. 3 In 
fact, the swift little Theodora had escaped with them 
from Charleston, unseen by the blockading fleet, which 
seemed to be sleeping in the darkness of the early 
morning of October 12th. Rumor said that they had 
gone in the Nashville, and would be borne direct to 
Europe ; and, of course, their escape would be good evi- 
dence of the ineffectiveness of the blockade. In the 
hope of intercepting them, Commander J. B. Marchand, 
with t\\Q James Adger, the fastest warship available, was 
ordered out from New York, and hastened to the neigh- 
borhood of the entrance to the English Channel, expect- 
ing to catch the Nashville, whether bound for England 
or for France. Then, on October 21st, came the disas- 
ter at Ball's Bluff. Although it was a comparatively 
small engagement, the mismanagement and destruction 
of the Union forces greatly helped to increase the pres- 
tige of the Confederates. 

During this month, too, when Seward was in the 
midst of the somewhat dangerous correspondence with 
Great Britain about Consul Bunch's performances and the 
imprisonment of British subjects, signs of dire ill-omen 
came from France. A deficient harvest and the scarcity 
of cotton were beginning to cause such fear of approach- 
ing distress, that from the chambers of commerce and 
from manufacturing and business centres there arose 
petitions and cries for relief — relief by supplying its 
factories with cotton, the raw material without which, 

1 3 Moore's Rebellion Record, Docs., p. 193. 
'-' 1 Naval Records, 113. 
213 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

it was claimed, hundreds of thousands of persons would 
soon be unable to earn the barest necessities of life. 

The outlook was so serious that Thouvenel sent to 
Mercier some instructions to be laid before Seward, 
which indicated that the French government was on the 
verge of demanding that the blockade should at least 
be made less severe. ThouvenePs leading ideas, as re- 
viewed by Seward in an unpublished despatch of Octo- 
ber 30, 1861, to Dayton, may be summarized as follows : 
European nations suffered more from the interruption 
of their commercial intercourse with the United States 
than with any other country. The blockade had para- 
lyzed French commerce with the Confederate States. 
France would, nevertheless, wait patiently if the prolon- 
gation of the war were not likely to produce new and 
grave perils. Cotton had been so extensively used that 
nothing could be substituted for it. France annually 
consumed enough for the manufacture of tissues worth 
nearly one hundred and fifty million dollars. Two 
hundred thousand bales of this cotton came from the 
United States. If the supplies should fail, many in 
Alsace and in Normandy would be in danger of starva- 
tion. Complaints had already begun to come in from 
the commercial cities, and if it should be impossible to 
make new purchases, the people would address them- 
selves to the government for relief. Thouvenel inquired 
if the time had not arrived to consider future dangers 
and avert them while there still remained freedom of 
action. He had expected that the United States would 
make some concessions to lessen Europe's embarrass- 
ments from the scarcity of cotton. France, at least, 
was no longer able to postpone an examination of the 
question. He then asked — which was the significant 
point — the United States to modify the blockade so as 
to allow foreign consumers to secure supplies of cotton. 
He thought that such an arrangement would not have 

214 



EUROPEAN INCLINATION TO INTERFERE 

an unfavorable effect upon the United States, but would 
call forth the good-will of other nations. 

Thouvenel's expressions were diplomatic and not 
decidedly unfriendly, but there was a suggestion of a 
threat in the problem presented, which was likely to 
excite alarm. France had no right in international law 
to demand American cotton for her factories, but in the 
face of popular distress and outcries for relief, every 
government is prone to resort to arbitrary measures. 
Seward did not know to what extent the agreement 
between Great Britain and France to act jointly might 
be carried. The rumors prevalent a few months before 
about intervention in Mexico were now confirmed. Such 
an enterprise would naturally draw Napoleon closer to 
the Confederacy, and open a wide field for intrigues. 
Was this warning about the scarcity of a very impor- 
tant raw material merely statesmanlike foresight, or 
was it an introduction to something else ? 

Seward, in replying, affected to regard Thouvenel's 
suggestions as a candid statement of real but unfounded 
apprehensions. The President was represented as still 
having the question under consideration ; so Seward's 
despatch, addressed to Dayton, was largely tentative: 

" I do not altogether agree with Mr. Thouvenel in regard 
to the imminence or even the seriousness of the evils which 
he apprehends in France. The very vigor of modern com- 
merce which makes the shocks which result from its occa- 
sional interruption so painful, enables it to seek out relief 
or mitigation in a speedy change of its movements. My 
observation, moreover, would lead me to believe that what 
the manufacturing interest of France is likely to need most 
and soonest is supplies, not of material, but of provisions, 
and that the customary purchases of cotton would be un- 
availing for the relief of her people without a restoration 
of the market for her cotton, silken, and fancy fabrics and 
her wines, which notoriously have heretofore been found 
in the more northern and western of our states, and which 
the war has temporarily closed." . . . 

215 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

Then, in a careful statement of the general nature of 
the commerce between the United States and France 
and Great Britain — such a statement as one would ex- 
pect a tariff-for-revenue-only Democrat to make — he con- 
tinued : 

"There are three leading commercial nations on the 
earth — namely, the United States, France, and Great Brit- 
ain. The two last, with less range of production, have the 
advantage of greater capital and mechanical skill and labor. 
The former, with a new and unexhausted continent for its 
home, excels in bread and in materials for manufacture. 
The United States consume European fabrics and lux- 
uries, and France and Great Britain naturally rely upon 
its for provisions and vegetable and mineral productions 
needed in manufacture. Virtually the three nations, 
though politically divided, constitute only one great so- 
ciety or commonwealth. The wheels of industry in each 
country move with a certain dependence on the corre- 
sponding wheels which are kept in operation in the other 
countries, and, all moving together, they work out a com- 
mon prosperity for all of them. Civil war in either coun- 
try, in just the extent that it is flagrant and obstinate, 
suspends the wheels which it finds in motion there, and 
consequently disturbs and retards the accustomed opera- 
tions of industry in the other two countries." 

. . . "The Union made the commerce whose obstruc- 
tion France deplores. Let the Union fall, then not only 
will that obstruction continue, but with it the highly per- 
fected and thoroughly adapted systems of production, ex- 
change, and consumption, which hitherto have existed in 
all three of the countries, will disappear forever." 

..." We have adopted, as necessity required, the legiti- 
mate means to save the Union, regardless of remonstrances 
from any quarter, and we have adopted no other." 

In answer to the request for a relaxation of the block- 
ade, Seward said that it was the desire of the govern- 
ment in restoring the Union to use the least harmful 
means ; but to comply with Thouvenei's suggestions 
would give all the gain to others, and leave to the United 
States all the losses and hazards. ~No mention had been 

216 



EUROPEAN INCLINATION TO INTERFERE 

made as to how much cotton was desired, or of what 
would be given in exchange for it. Isor had it been 
explained how a mitigation of the blockade could be 
made compatible with Federal sovereignty. More- 
over, there had been no statement of the advantages 
that might be expected to accrue to the United States. 
It had, indeed, been said that allowing France to have 
cotton would prevent an accumulation of difficulties. 
" Our respect for France forbids us from supposing 
that Mr. Thouvenel is to be understood as implying 
that she will adopt any injurious or hostile polic}', 
whether in arms or without, if we should refuse to 
yield a concession, which, although desirable for her 
own welfare, is, nevertheless, solicited as a favor and 
not claimed as a right." Lest this might be mistaken 
for timidity or obtuseness, he warned France that al- 
though the United States had not been ambitious for 
the isolation of this continent, they were not insensible 
that the} T had resources sufficient to enable them to rise 
above the necessity of maintaining existing relations 
with the old world. Europe had planted slavery here, 
he said, and we were waiting for its extirpation. " But 
when European nations shall think of intervening to 
maintain it here for their own advantage and to the 
subversion of our own government, they will, I am 
sure, calculate not only the cost but the probabilities of 
success in an enterprise which the conscience of the 
civilized world would forever reprobate and condemn. 
We do not expect any such proceeding on the part of 
France." 

Turning from " this unpleasant phase of the subject 
to intimations of more agreeable import," Seward sug- 
gested that Thouvenel had neglected to mention the 
form and extent in which the good-will, of which he had 
spoken, might be expected to come, and that he had not 
indicated " the grateful states by which it is to be exer- 

217 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

cised." This showed that no complete proposition had 
yet been made. Then in a few sentences he put upon 
France the responsibility for the delay, and he made it 
easy for her to show if her purposes were friendly : 

"Heretofore France has advised ns that she was acting 
upon agreement with Great Britain in all that concerns our 
affairs. We are not informed whether hereafter that power 
is to act towards ns in an improved spirit, while the confi- 
dence imposed upon me by Mr. Thouvenel does not even 
allow me to seek any explanation on the subject from Great 
Britain herself. 

" It is left equally obscure with whom the combination 
can be formed by us, or what is the nature of the combina- 
tion itself which it is suggested the President can make 
with a view to disperse the difficulties with which our posi- 
tion is, in the judgment of Mr. Thouvenel, surrounded. 

" I am sure that Mr. Thouvenel will admit that these re- 
flections are natural and just. They suggest these inquiries : 
First, if we should relax our blockade, as Mr. Thouvenel 
proposes, will France thereafter maintain an attitude of 
cold indifference to our exertions for the preservation of 
the American Union, with its inestimable blessings, or will 
she regard the struggle as one virtuous in its nature, noble 
in its object, and needful to the best interests of mankind ? 
If France should so regard it, to what extent would she 
exert her own great influence to cause it to be so regarded 
by other nations ? If we make the concession required of 
ns, are we still to be held to the strict law of maintaining a 
blockade with adequate force at every port on our sea-coast 
of three thousand miles, or shall we be challenged when we 
proceed to close the ports usurped by our own disloyal citi- 
zens, without provoking the intervention of the parties 
whom we shall have sacrificed so much to favor thus in a 
season of distress ? Shall pirates preying upon our com- 
merce be sheltered, supplied, and armed in the ports of the 
nations to whom we have opened, at our own cost, a trade 
from which by the law of nations they had been rightfully 
excluded?" 

Dayton was instructed to ask confidentially for in- 
formation on these points. Seward did not believe that 
the struggle would be as protracted as Thouvenel sup- 

218 



EUROPEAN INCLINATION TO INTERFERE 

posed, and be felt confident that the United States 
would "be in free possession of some or all of those 
ports " " long before France or any other nation shall 
be brought to such distress as he apprehends." Then 
"our own commerce and that of the world" would be 
restored to their former flourishing condition. 

This was one of Seward's great despatches; perhaps 
it was the greatest, if we consider his perfect balance 
and the diplomatic way in which he seemed to ignore 
what was menacing, while he adroitly let Thouvenel see 
what the result would be if the implied threats should 
be carried out. Like the man in the proverb who went 
out for wool and came back shorn, Thouvenel, instead of 
receiving such a response as he bad sought, found himself 
confronted with a request for a careful exposition of the 
attitude France would assume under certain conditions ; 
and this request had been made with such perfect skill 
that the great Frenchman had to comply with it or 
change the current of his inquiries. Either course 
would be a decided gain to the United States. Although 
Seward wrote at a time when he was in the midst of 
"intense anxiety and severe labor," and thought it 
doubtful whether the government could escape the yet 
deeper and darker abyss of foreign war, 1 the despatch 
showed no signs of impatience or irritability. 

1 A letter to Mrs. Seward, written on the next day, shows that Sew- 
ard's temperament had not changed, but he had learned to exercise 
more self-control in his official communications : 

"The pressure of interests and ambitions in Europe, which dis- 
unionists have procured to operate on the Cabinets of London and 
Paris, have made it doubtful whether we can escape the yet deeper 
and darker abyss of foreign war. The responsibility resting upon me 
is overwhelming. My associates, of course, can differ with me about 
what I ought to do and say, but not advise me what to do and say. I 
have worried through, and finished my despatches. They must go 
for good or evil. I have done my best. I thought that my health 
would fail, but uow I am well and cheerful, and hopeful as ever." — 
2 Seward, 627. 

219 



THE LIFE. OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

"King Cotton" had not yet justified the expectations 
formed of him, but there was still an apparently sub- 
stantial basis for confidence in his power. In a message 
of November 18, 1861, Jefferson Davis warned Europe, 
over the shoulders of the Confederate Congress, that it 
was "plain that a long continuance of this blockade 
might, by a diversion of labor and investment of capital 
in other employments, so diminish the supply as to bring 
ruin upon all those interests of foreign countries which 
are dependent on that staple " ; and it remained to be 
seen, he said, how far the war might "work a revolution 
in the industrial system of the world." 

Of course Seward could not know either the amount 
of distress that would be caused on account of the lack 
of cotton, or the political considerations that might in- 
duce France or Great Britain, or both of them, to inter- 
fere. As a matter of fact, Palmerston and Russell thought 
it still too soon to act, although France would have been 
ready to join in serving notice on the belligerents that 
they must make up their quarrels or count the two great 
powers as their enemies. If the policy was to be changed 
Russell believed that it should be done on a grand scale. 1 
All interested parties looked forward with hope or fear 
to the meeting of the British and the French Parlia- 
ments early in 1SG2, when, it was thought, some definite 
policy would be adopted. The strength of Seward's 
diplomacy so far had been in its fearlessness, not in any 
ability to win European sympathy for the North. But 
he now realized the importance of trying to influence 
the two great governments by bringing the press and 
the clergy, and then the people, to a correct understand- 
ing of the causes and purposes of the Civil War. This 
intention seems to have taken a definite shape in his mind 
in October, 1S61. 



1 2 TValpole's Russell, 344 ; 2 Ashley's Palmerston, 28. 
220 



EUROPEAN INCLINATION TO INTERFERE 

The original plan was to send Edward Everett, J. P. 
Kennedy, Archbishop Hughes, and Bishop Mcllvaine to 
Europe. Subsequently Robert C. Winthrop was also in- 
vited. 1 But of the five only the two ecclesiastics found 
it practicable to accept; and the Archbishop even made 
his acceptance conditional on having Thurlow Weed 
for a colleague. Seward was afraid of the criticism 
that might be occasioned by Weed's appointment, for 
most of the strong antislavery men had not forgiven 
Weed for favoring compromise the previous winter. 
Finally, Seward's fears were so far overcome as to 
allow Weed to go abroad "as a volunteer," while the 
expenses of the others were to be paid by the govern- 
ment. 2 It was believed that Weed could correct many 
of the erroneous impressions in the minds of French and 
English journalists and public men, and also undo some 
of the work of the Confederate press-agents. Bishop 
Mcllvaine, of the Protestant Episcopal Church, was ex- 
pected to develop among English clergymen a sentiment 
against the Confederacy, the corner-stone of which was 
slavery. Archbishop Hughes bore Seward's important 
reply to Thouvenel, and it was hoped that his distin- 
guished rank would help him to win for the North the 
sympathy of Napoleon, of the Pope, and of other Cath- 
olics high in church and state. General Scott, who had 
retired from the army and was going abroad for his 
health, had in vain coveted a semi-diplomatic position. 3 
All set out early in November. Scott and Weed sailed 
together; and it was odd that they should narrowly 
escape capture by the Nashville,* which was supposed 
to have Mason and Slidell aboard. But, in fact, these 
Confederates were then sailing northward in a United 
States warship. And an incident had occurred that 

1 Winthrop to Seward, November 12th. Seward MSS. 
5 1 Weed, 634-38; 3 Seward, 17-19. 
3 3 Seward, 20. 4 3 Seward, 20. 

221 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

was to change the point of immediate danger from 
Paris to London and to make the all-important ques- 
tion not one about cotton and European interference 
in America, but of American interference with neutral 

rights. 



CHAPTER XXXIII 

THE TRENT AFFAIR 

A few days after Mason and Slidell escaped from 
Charleston, the Theodora landed them at Cardenas, 
Cuba, whence they leisurely proceeded to Havana, to 
take the Trent, a British packet running between Vera 
Cruz and St. Thomas. Captain Wilkes, in the San 
Jacinto, was on the southern coast of Cuba, when he 
heard of the Theodora and her important passengers. 
He hastened to Havana, hoping to capture the little 
blockade-runner ; but being too late, he concluded to 
try to catch the diplomatists elsewhere. He was ly- 
ing in wait in the Bahama Channel, November 8th, 
when the Trent came along. A shot and then a shell 
fired across her bow halted her. "Wilkes sent an of- 
ficer and an armed guard aboard. Her captain refused 
to show the ship's papers or the passenger - list ; but 
Mason and Slidell and their two secretaries were rec- 
ognized and forcibly removed to the San Jacinto, not- 
withstanding the angry protests of the officers of the 
British ship. The Trent was then permitted to con- 
tinue on her course. From St. Thomas many of the 
passengers and at least one of the officers went direct 
to London and spread the news of the exciting inci- 
dent. The San Jacinto proudly bore off her prize to the 
United States, and in a few days the would-be envoys 
extraordinary at the Courts of the Tuileries and of St. 
James were prisoners in Fort Warren, near Boston. 
But their surprise was as nothing compared with the 

223 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

state of public feeling in the United States and in Great 
Britain. 

A few days before the news of the Trent affair 
reached London, Captain Marchand appeared in Eng- 
lish waters with the James Adger, and coaled and took 
on supplies at Southampton. As it was known by this 
time that Mason and Slidell were going to Europe via 
the West Indies, it was assumed that Marchand's in- 
structions were to seize the Confederate emissaries in 
in a British merchantman. Before Adams had had an 
opportunity to explain to Palmerston that Marchand 
was looking for the Nashville — to the capture of which 
Great Britain could have taken no exception — a British 
warship was sent out to prevent Marchand from inter- 
fering with neutral rights; and the newspapers and the 
government were expecting something sensational near 
home. 1 The erroneous inference about Marchand's in- 
structions "was not corrected outside of a small circle; 
therefore, when Wilkes's exploit was reported it was 
widely assumed that he had acted on orders. England 
was soon ablaze with indignation at the alleged insult 
to British sovereignty. Interest, prejudice, and politics 
worked together. Many persons endeavored to use the 
affair so as to help forward the plan of breaking the 
blockade and recognizing the Confederacy. "The whole 
feeling of the people," one of Seward's English friends 
wrote, " has undergone a change. Sympathy was but cold- 
ly expressed for the South. Now it is warm and univer- 
sal." 2 The newspapers, led by the London Times, used 
the most violent language toward the United States, and 
-were extremely bitter against Seward. It was charged 
and widely believed that an affront had been intended and 
a war sought. Seward's earlier declarations about Can- 
ada and his letter to the governors of the states bordering 

1 115 War Records, 1078, 1104. 
2 Charles Mackay, llo War Records, 1107. 
224 



THE TRENT AFFAIR 

on the Great Lakes or the Atlantic were understood to 
mean that he desired a war for the purpose of annexing 
Canada. It was especially unfortunate that such liberal- 
minded and devoted allies of the North as Bright, Cob- 
den, the Duke of Argyll, the Duchess of Sutherland, and 
others regarded Seward as unfriendly to Great Britain. 1 
The recounting of two incidents that had occurred 
within a year greatly prejudiced the minds of the Brit- 
ish Cabinet against him. In April, 1861, it was rumored 
that the Confederates had purchased the Peerless, a 
ship lying at Toronto, to be used as a commerce-de- 
stroyer, and that she was to go down the St. Lawrence 
under the British flag and be delivered to them at sea. 
Seward demanded that Lord L} T ons should take im- 
mediate action to prevent this, but the British Minister 
explained that his relation to Canada made compliance 
impossible. Seward then declared that he would have 
the ship seized by our naval forces, and without inform- 
ing the British government he despatched George Ash- 
mun to Toronto on an official mission. Lords Bussell 
and Lyons inferred from this action that Seward thought 
he could overawe Great Britain. They entered their 
solemn protests. Ashmun was recalled as unceremoni- 
ously as he was sent ; the Peerless did not go to the 
Confederates ; and perhaps it was Seward's summary 
course that prevented it. But his first conspicuous act 
in foreign affairs had made an unfavorable impression. 3 
The other incident was thoroughly trifling except in its 
effect. During the festivities when the Prince of "Wales 
was in Albany, late in 1860, Seward chaffingly remarked 
to the Duke of Newcastle that he was soon to be in a 
position where it would be his duty to insult Great 
Britain, and he should proceed to do so. The Duke 
took the remark seriously, and as Colonial Secretary re- 

1 4 Pierce, 30, 31 ; 3 Rhodes, 532, 533; 3 Seward, 30, 31. 

2 Dip. Cor., 1861, 105, 106, 112; 2 Walpole's Russell, 342, 343. 
n.— p 225 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

ported it to his colleagues. The newspapers soon sent 
the story forth on every breeze. 

Under these influences the government and the peo- 
ple were soon ready for action. It was a time for Lord 
Palmerston, the Prime Minister, to indulge his passion 
for driving the wheel close to the precipice so as to 
show how dexterously he could avoid going over it, as 
Cobden said. Lord Eussell quickly drafted an emphatic 
ultimatum, and sent it to the Queen for approval. But 
the benevolent Victoria was in no mood for war, for the 
Prince Consort was in his last illness. They scrutinized 
the draft and returned it with recommendations that 
were wise, charitable, and designed to show that the sole 
purpose of the demand upon the United States was to 
protect the dignity and sovereignty of Great Britain. 

Eussell adopted the suggestions, and, on November 
30th, instructed Lord Lyons to demand that the United 
States should release the four men and make a suita- 
ble apology. In another note of the same date he di- 
rected that if this should not be done after a delay of 
seven days, the British Minister should hasten to Lon- 
don with the entire legation and its archives. Eussell 
seems to have concluded, by the next day, that this was 
too threatening a mode of procedure with a man of 
Seward's supposed fighting propensities. So Lyons 
was privately requested not to carry the despatch with 
him when he first brought the matter to Seward's 
attention; the President and the Secretary should be 
left to choose their own course, and anything like 
menace should be avoided. After the administration 
had had time to consider the facts, then the formal 
despatch should be read to Seward. If the Confed- 
erates should be liberated the British Cabinet would be 
" rather easy about the apology." 1 Nevertheless, prepa- 

1 2 Walpole's Russell, 346. 
226 



THE TRENT AFFAIR 

rations for war were pushed forward in all directions. 
As one of Palmerston's biographers has said : " In three 
weeks from ten thousand to eleven thousand troops 
were on their way across the Atlantic, and our naval 
force at that station was nearly doubled. The English 
public was certainly in a great rage." ' 

Perhaps the most significant signs of the time were 
the expressions of rapture on the part of Confederates 
in Richmond, London, and Paris alike. But this was 
not known in the North until a week or two later. They 
were confident that the Trent affair would involve the 
United States in a foreign war, turn Great Britain into 
an ally of the South, and soon bring victory and inde- 
pendence to the Confederacy. In ecstasy A. Dudley 
Mann congratulated R. M. T. Hunter, Toombs's suc- 
cessor as Confederate Secretary of State, that recog- 
nition by Great Britain was not much longer to be de- 
layed, and added: "An hour after the Cabinet decided 
upon its line of action with respect to the outrage com- 
mitted by the San Jacinto, I was furnished with full 
particulars. What a noble statesman is Lord Palmer- 
ston!" 2 

In the North there was a great outburst of joy over 
the seizure. "We do not believe the American heart 
ever thrilled with more genuine delight," said an edito- 
rial article in the New York Times of November 17th. 
" As for Commodore Wilkes and his command, let the 
handsome thing be done. Consecrate another Fourth 
of July to him. Load him down with services of plate 
and swords of the cunningest and costliest art." Sev- 
eral features that were largely accidental contributed 
to raise the rejoicing to the highest pitch. Excepting 
Davis and Floyd, probably Mason and Slidell were at 
this time the most generally hated of all the Confeder- 

1 2 Ritchie's Palmerston, 319. 2 115 War Eecords, 1236. 

227 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

ates. Mason was the author of the fugitive-slave law, 
and was supposed to have done most to get Virginia to 
join the Confederacy ; whereas Slidell, a Northerner by 
birth and education, had become one of the most effective 
champions of slavery and secession. If they succeeded 
in reaching Europe they would be strong evidence against 
the efficiency of the blockade. The supposition that they 
had gone in a Confederate ship left in the minds of the 
people of the North only a question of the possibility of 
their capture, without any thought of interfering with 
the rights of any neutral nation. There had been so few 
victories and so many disappointments that the smallest 
success would have been welcomed and exaggerated. 
Wilkes's exploit was so picturesque, and it came at a 
moment when a whole section was anxious, that it acted 
like touching a match to powder. Wilkes immediately 
became a hero — a second and victorious Anderson. 
Grave, learned, and experienced men in Boston ap- 
plauded his act and feted him as soon as he came ashore. 
The Secretary of the Navy rushed with the crowd and 
sent official and gushing congratulations " for the great 
public service you have rendered in the capture of the 
rebel emissaries." When Congress met, on December 
2d, the House could not wait to complete the routine 
of its organization before passing a resolution thank- 
ing Wilkes " for his brave, adroit, and patriotic conduct 
in the arrest and detention of the traitors, James M. 
Mason and John Slidell." 1 The rejoicing was at first 
an expression of national pride rather than of defiance 
of Great Britain, although the popular antipathy to her 
had become greatly embittered during the past few 
months. Later, when threatening signs appeared on 
the horizon, many men became desperate and foolhardy 
at the prospect of having our blockade broken and our 

1 Globe, 1861-62, 5. 
228 



THE TRENT AFFAIR 

cities bombarded. Reckless patriotism seemed to be 
all-important. The very elements of international law- 
were quite forgotten or strangely misrepresented. 

Fortunately there were some important exceptions. 
Charles Sumner, who was chairman of the Senate com- 
mittee on foreign affairs, early and repeatedly advised 
the President that the seizure could not be successfully 
defended. On November 28th Thomas Ewing wrote to 
Lincoln that " we ought not to vouch as authority pre- 
vious aggressive acts of England at a time when she was 
a swaggering bully on the ocean." If we did, Great 
Britain, at war ten years to our one, could "stretch 
the law against us to the same point." He thought 
the best way to treat the incident would be to let her 
lay down the law, and for the United States to agree to 
anything favorable to neutral vessels, their cargoes and 
passengers. 1 Lewis Cass telegraphed similar opinions 
to Seward, December 18th ; and in a letter the follow- 
ing day he said that a war with Great Britain would go 
far toward preventing the restoration of the rebel states ; 
he ridiculed the "laudations bestowed upon Captain 
Wilkes for his courage in taking three or four unarmed 
men out of an unarmed vessel," and added : " As for any 
injury which these rebel agents could do us in Europe, 
it is all nonsense." 2 On December 16th Robert J. 
Walker also very forcibly presented the political and 
national interests involved. " Those who would unneces- 
sarily involve the United States in a w r ar with Great 
Britain were allies of the southern rebellion, he said ; 
and the statesmen who from want of courage and firm- 
ness subjected the country to such a war would "meet 
the execrations of the American people and of the 
friends of liberty throughout the world, and will join 
the wretched caravan of infamy of which Buchanan is 

1 115 War Records, 1103. 5 115 War Records, 1132. 

229 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

at present the only leader." He believed that the 
popular clamor would soon pass away. 1 George Tick- 
nor Curtis maintained, in a Boston newspaper, that, 
whether the capture was justifiable or not, the prisoners 
could not be held because Wilkes had voluntarily let 
the ship go free, and thereby had made it impossible 
to obtain the required judgment of a judicial tribunal. 
" Our countrymen have not so little intelligence or so 
much false pride as not to be able or willing to see that 
a principle important to the peace of the world is in- 
volved in this case." This argument was probably in 
Seward's hands by December 22d. 2 

From several of the most sober-minded Americans 
abroad came some very significant comments. Adams, 
whose wisdom increased with the emergency, strongly 
advised, on December 3d, against approving Wilkes's 
act, "unless we are ready also to assume their [Great 
Britain's] old arrogant claim of the dominion of the 
seas. Our neutral rights are as valuable to us. as ever 
they were, whilst time has reflected nothing but credit 
on our steady defence of them against superior power." 3 
Three days later he wrote again to Seward : " Ministers 
and people now fully believe it is the intention of the 
government to drive them into hostilities. . . . My 
present expectation is that by the middle of January, 
at furthest, diplomatic relations will have been sundered 
between the two countries, without any act of mine." * 
A passage in an unpublished despatch that Dayton sent 
from Paris, December 3d, was still more discomfiting : 

" It is very evident, however, that upon this question we 
will have scarcely a friend among the press or public men 
iu Europe. The" impression here, as in England, is getting 
to be general that we are a power reckless of the obligations 
of international lata. ... I have been asked by intelligent 

1 115 War Records, 1127-29. B 115 War Records, 1137-39. 

3 115 War Records, 1116. 4 115 War Records, 1119, 1120. 

230 



THE TRENT AFFAIR 

gentlemen here why it was that you seemed so determined 
' to pick a quarrel ' with England. It was vain to answer 
that no such determination did or could exist ; that under 
present circumstances it would be an act of folly, little 
short of madness ; they would not believe me. . . . Still I 
cannot but feel that, right or wrong, this seizure of the 
Confederate commissioners on board a British ship has 
come at a most inopportune moment." 

Thouvenel informed Dayton about this time that, in 
case of war, the moral force of French opinion would 
be against the United States, and that all the maritime 
powers with whom he had conferred agreed that Wilkes 
had violated international law. 1 On December 5th 
John Bigelow wrote to Seward that the Trent affair was 
" universally regarded here [in Paris] by the press, the 
people, and the government, as a rude assault upon the 
dignity of a neutral nation." 2 He also prepared a letter 
expressing the belief that the United States would sur- 
render the Confederates if Great Britain should adopt 
the liberal policy long favored by our government. 
Weed had it signed by General Scott, then in Paris. 3 
This so-called Scott letter was published there as early 
as December 4th. 4 It was quoted throughout Europe, 
and appeared in the New York Times of December 19th. 
Weed's reports and opinions sent to Seward were very 
positive in opposition to approving Wilkes's act, and 
must have had much weight. 5 

1 Dip. Cor., 1862, 307. 2 Seward MSS. 

s 1 Weed, 655, 656. 4 3 Seward, 27, 28. 

5 Here are a few sentences: — December 2d: "I saw a letter from a 
high source from London, in which it is again said that you want to 

provoke a war with England for the purpose of getting Canada 

You are in a ' tight place,' and I pray that you may be imbued with 
the wisdom the emergency requires. This is true." December 4th: 
" Systematic agencies and efforts must have been employed to poison 
both the English government and people against you. It crops out 
in the London journals through all their articles. . . . All around they 
[your friends] found people fortified with evidences of your hostility 
to England." December 6 th: "What I mentioned yesterday about 

231 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

But what were Seward's acts and thoughts during 
the five weeks between the time of learning of the inci- 
dent and of being informed of Great Britain's attitude? 
Several years afterward Gideon Welles stated that at first 
" no man was more elated and jubilant over the capture 
of the emissaries than Mr. Seward." 1 This is not improb- 
able ; were it otherwise Seward would have been a rare 
exception. Postmaster- General Blair, alone of all the 
members of the Cabinet, is known to have immediately 
judged the affair correctly. 2 Seward's habits and associ- 
ations were most likely to lead him to regard the prob- 
able political results as being of prime consideration. 
Whatever may have been his first impulses or private 
opinion, he was certainly non-committal so far as the 
public knew. Three facts of importance are now known : 
that he believed France, and perhaps Great Britain, to 
be on the verge of intervention of some sort ; that he 
had so earnestly deprecated European interference, and 
the war sure to follow, as to send abroad special com- 
missioners, and to employ his best faculties to try to re- 
move all excuses for less amicable relations ; and that 
the Trent incident was wholly unexpected and antagon- 
istic so far as Seward and the diplomatic plans of the 
administration were concerned. His habitual tenacity 
of purpose was likely to hold him to his policy of avoid- 
ing a war. But there was the popular applause of 
Wilkes ; and it always made Seward very unhappy to 
find that the people were against him, unless he felt confi- 

tbe Duke of Newcastle is too true. Whatever you said to him has 
been used, first, to put the Ministry against you, and has now been 
given to the newspapers. . . . God graut that you also foresaw tbe 
wisdom of concession to English tenacity about the honor of its flag. 
Everything here is upon a war footing. Such prompt and gigantic 
preparations were never known. ... I was told yesterday, repeat- 
edly, that I ought to write the President demanding your dismissal." 
—3 Seward, 27-29. 

1 Lincoln and Seward, 185. 2 Welles, 186, 187. 

232 



THE TRENT AFFAIR 

dent of quickly winning them back to his side. In such 
circumstances the shrewd politician tries to wear a com- 
placent look, while he waits until compelled to decide. 

In a confidential despatch of November 27th Seward 
informed Adams that Wilkes had acted without instruc- 
tions, and that, as Lord Lyons had not referred to the 
incident, "I thought it equally wise to reserve our- 
selves until we hear what the British government may 
have to say on the subject." Three days later he wrote 
that " we think it more prudent that the ground taken 
by the British government should be first made known 
to us here, and that the discussion, if there must be one, 
shall be had here." 1 The slightest hint as to what was 
to be the policy of the government would have been of 
the greatest utility to Adams and "Weed ; but Weed 
complained, as late as December 31st, " I have not 
heard a syllable from you." 3 Evident^ Seward did not 
come to a definite conclusion until a few days after he 
knew the attftude of Great Britain. 

On December 19th Lord Lyons acquainted Seward 
with the general nature of Russell's leading despatch. 
With perfect diplomacy the British Minister expressed 
his willingness to accept Seward's suggestions as to the 
easiest way to accomplish the arrangement Great Britain 
demanded. Lyons reported that Seward received the 
communication "seriously and with dignity, but with- 
out any manifestation of dissatisfaction "; he asked for 
two days' time before giving an opinion, and expressed 
himself as " very sensible of the friendly and conciliatory 
manner" in which the case had been presented. 3 Yv r hen 
Lord Lyons called again, Saturda}', December 21st, 
Seward frankly said that other pressing duties had 
prevented him from fully mastering this question, and 
he requested that the formal presentation of the case 

1 115 War Records, 1102, 1109. * 3 Seward, 32. 

3 115 War Records, 1135. 

233 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

might be postponed until Monday. On Monday morn- 
ing, the 23d, the British Minister returned, read the 
despatch, and left a copy, which Seward promised to 
lay before the President immediately. 1 

By this time Seward had a clear idea of the state 
of public opinion in Europe. Adams's warning and 
very impressive despatch of December 3d reached the 
department December 21st. 2 By the same date he had 
undoubtedly read Weed's letter of the 2d, the so-called 
Scott letter, and the London and Paris papers of three 
or four days after the excitement burst forth. Day- 
ton's despatch of the 3d and Adams's of the 6th arrived 
on the 24th and 25th, respectively. 3 Bigelow's letter 
was in Seward's hands on the 25th. 4 Probably all of 
Weed's letters prior to December 7th had been received 
by the 24th or the 25th. And the opinions of Ewing, 
Cass, Walker, George Ticknor Curtis, and many others 
were before him several days earlier. 

The President and the Secretary of State did not 
agree when they reviewed the case. Lincoln said : 
" Governor Seward, you will go on, of course, preparing 
your answer, which, as I understand it, will state the 
reasons why they ought to be given up. Now, I have 
a mind to try my hand at stating the reasons why they 
ought not to be given up. We will compare the points 
on each side." '° 

The principal feature of the President's draft was a 
proposal to arbitrate the Trent incident and to bring 
into view the precedents in analogous cases and the posi- 
tion Great Britain had assumed toward the existing re- 
bellion. Doubtless because it was found to be unsuited 

1 115 War Records, 1142. 

2 Department memorandum, on despatch. 

3 Department memorandum. 

4 Seward's autograph memorandum on the letter. 

5 3 Seward, 25. 

234 



THE TRENT AFFAIR 

to the actual conditions, it was not even shown to the 
Cabinet. 1 

Up to ten o'clock in the morning of Wednesday, the 
25th, when Seward's draft was ready to be laid before 
the Cabinet, no one except Blair and Seward seems to 
have favored a full compliance with the British demand. 
"It was considered on my presentation of it on the 25th 
and 26th of December," Seward wrote to Weed. " The 
government, when it took the subject up, had no idea of 
the grounds upon which it would explain its action, nor 
did it believe that it would concede the case. Yet it 
was heartily unanimous in the actual result after two 
da}^s' examination, and in favor of the release." 2 Doubt- 
less all the influences that Seward had felt were brought 
to bear upon his colleagues. Sumner attended the Cabi- 
net conference on Christmas-day and read letters from 
Bright and from Cobden showing how much they depre- 
cated war and how difficult it was to avoid it without 
the surrender of the Confederates. 3 A despatch from 
Thouvenel to Mercier was also considered. 4 It fully 
confirmed the reports about France's attitude. Undoubt- 
edly she was glad to find Great Britain reversing her 
practice ; but what must have surprised and impressed 
the administration was the apparently sincere and almost 
affectionate appeal to our government not to commit the 
fatal error of trying to defend what had been done. 6 
Bates came early to Seward's support. He told his 
colleagues that to go to war with England would be 
"to abandon all hope of suppressing the rebellion"; 
that it would sweep our ships from southern waters, 
ruin our trade, and bankrupt our treasury. Yet "there 
was great reluctance on the part of some of the mem- 
bers of the Cabinet — and even the President himself — 

1 5 Nicolay and Hay, 34. 2 2 Weed, 409 ; 3 Seward, 42, 43. 

3 3 Rhodes, 529 ff. ; 4 Pierce, 59. 4 5 Nicolay and Hay, 36. 
6 Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 8, 37th Cons., 2d Sess., pp. 13-15. 

235 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

to acknowledge these obvious truths." 1 The risk of a 
conflict with Great Britain was the decisive influence for 
concession. That there should have been two opinions 
about it is now almost incomprehensible. We may 
assume with confidence that this peril, emphasized by 
the advice of Adams, Weed, Bigelow, and Dayton, was 
the chief factor in Seward's conclusions. 

Bates also recorded, with perfect candor and truth, 
why so many still hesitated : " The main fear, I believe, 
was the displeasure of our own people— lest they should 
accuse us of timidly truckling to the power of England." 
The long session on Christmas-day did not suffice ; so 
the consideration of the question was continued on the 
next day. At last, on the 26th, " all yielded to, and con- 
curred in, Mr. Seward's letter to Lord Lyons, after some 
verbal and formal amendments." 2 It had already been 
rumored that Mason and Slidell were to be released, 
probably at the same hour in which the Cabinet was giv- 
ing its approval to Seward's draft. John P. Hale told 
the Senate that he had talked with many gentlemen 
about the question, but "not a man can be found who is 
in favor of this surrender; for it would humiliate us in 
the eyes of the world, irritate our own people, and sub- 
ject us to their indignant scorn." 3 It seems likely that 
this statement represented the opinion of four -fifths, 

1 Quoted 5 Nicolay and Hay, 36. Sumner saw the danger as clear- 
ly as Bates. "War with England involves— (1) Instant acknowledg- 
ment of rebel states by England, followed by Fiance; (2) Breaking 
of the present blockade, with capture of our fleet — Dupont and all ; 
(3) The blockade of our coast from Chesapeake to Eastport; (4) The 
sponging of our ships from the ocean; (5) The establishment of the 
independence of rebel states; (6) Opening of these states by free- 
trade to English manufacturers, which would be introduced by contra- 
band into our states, making the whole North American continent a 
manufacturing dependency of England. All this I have put to the 
President." — Sumner to Lieber, December 24th. — 4 Pierce, 58. 

'-' Bates's diary. Quoted 5 Nicolay and Hay, 36. 

3 Globe, 1861-62, 177. 

236 



THE TRENT AFFAIR 

perhaps nineteen-twentieths, of the people of the United 
States. 

If Seward had known at first that "Wilkes's act was 
contrary to international law, he would have foreseen 
that Great Britain would insist on the surrender of the 
prisoners, and that it would be easier to defend effec- 
tively a voluntary release than one that resulted from 
a demand. 1 Moreover, at the beginning, public opinion 
could have been quietly influenced if not controlled. 2 
But after five weeks, when passions had become aroused 
and thousands of prominent men were committed in 
approval of the action of Wilkes, it was much more 
difficult. Seward's predicament at last was very pecu- 
liar ; the prisoners had to be released, but it was impor- 
tant to justify this release in such a way as not to arouse 
the resentment of the great popular majorit}^ or either 
to offend the House of Bepresentatives or humiliate the 
Secretary of the Navy. Otherwise the administration 
would find itself greatly weakened, and perhaps unable 
to command sufficient support to save the Union. So 
it is not surprising that this reply to Russell is the most 
studied and elaborately adroit paper that ever came 
from Seward's pen. 3 After reviewing the leading facts 
connected with the incident, he proceeds to discuss it in 
its legal aspects : 

" The question before us is, whether this proceeding was 
authorized by and conducted according to the law of na- 
tions. It involves the following inquiries : 

1 Lord Lyons, in explaining his own non-committal attitude pend- 
ing instructions, said : " The American people would more easily tol- 
erate a spontaneous offer of reparation made by its government from 
a sense of justice than a compliance with a demand for satisfaction 
from a foreign minister." — 115 War Records, 1095. 

2 Lyons considered the press moderate at first. — Ibid., 1100. 

3 The full text is printed in Senate Ex. Doc. No. 8, 37th Cong., 2d 
Sess.; 115 War Records, 1145 ; Bernard, 201. 

237 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

" 1st. Were the persons named and their supposed de- 
spatches contraband of war ? 

" 2d. Might Captain Wilkes lawfully stop and search the 
Trent for these contraband persons and despatches ? 

"3d. Did he exercise that right in a lawful and proper 
manner ? 

" 4th. Having found the contraband persons on board, 
and in presumed possession of the contraband despatches, 
had he a right to capture the persons ? 

" 5th. Did he exercise that right of capture in the man- 
ner allowed and recognized by the law of nations ? 

" If all these inquiries shall be resolved in the affirma- 
tive, the British government will have no claim for rep- 
aration. 

"I address myself to the first inquiry — namely, were the 
four persons mentioned, and their supposed despatches, 
contraband ? 

" Maritime law so generally deals, as its professors say, 
in rem, that is with property, and so seldom with persons, 
that it seems a straining of the term contraband to apply 
it to them. But persons, as well as property, may become 
contraband, since the word means broadly ' contrary to 
proclamation, prohibited, illegal, unlawful.' 

" All writers and judges pronounce naval or military 
persons in the service of the enemy contraband. Vattel 
says war allows us to cut off from an enemy all his re- 
sources, and to hinder him from sending ministers to 
solicit assistance. And Sir William Scott says you may 
stop the ambassador of your enemy on his passage. De- 
spatches are not less clearly contraband, and the bearers or 
couriers who undertake to carry them fall under the same 
condemnation. 

" A subtlety might be raised whether pretended min- 
isters of a usurping power, not recognized as legal by either 
the belligerent or the neutral, could be held to be contra- 
band. But it would disappear on being subjected to what 
is the true test in all cases — namely, the spirit of the law. 
Sir William Scott, speaking of civil magistrates who are ar- 
rested and detained as contraband, says : 

" ' It appears to me on principle to be but reasonable 
that when it is of sufficient importance to the enemy that 
such persons shall be sent out on the public service at the 
public expense, it snould afford equal ground of forfeiture 
against the vessel that may be let out for a purpose so in- 
timately connected with the hostile operations/ 

233 



THE TRENT AFFAIR 

" I trust that I have shown that the four persons who 
were taken from the Trent by Captain Wilkes, and their 
despatches, were contraband of war. 

" The second inquiry is whether Captain Wilkes had 
a right by the law of nations to detain and search the 
Trent. 

"The Trent, though she carried mails, was a contract or 
merchant vessel — a common carrier for hire. Maritime 
law knows only three classes of vessels — vessels of war, 
revenue vessels, and merchant vessels. The Trent falls 
within the latter class. Whatever disputes have existed 
concerning a right of visitation or search in time of peace, 
none, it is supposed, has existed in modern times about the 
right of a belligerent in time of war to capture contraband 
in neutral and even friendly merchant vessels, and of the 
right of visitation and search, in order to determine wheth- 
er they are neutral, and are documented as such according 
to the law of nations. 

" I assume in the present case what, as I read British 
authorities, is regarded by Great Britain herself as true 
maritime law: That the circumstance that the Trent was 
proceeding from a neutral port to another neutral port does 
not modify the right of the belligerent captor. 

" The third question is whether Captain Wilkes exercised 
the right of search in a lawful and proper manner. 

"If any doubt hung over this point, as the case was pre- 
sented in the statement of it adopted by the British govern- 
ment, I think it must have already passed away before the 
modifications of that statement which I have already sub- 
mitted. 

"I proceed to the fourth inquiry — namely: Having 
found the suspected contraband of war on board the Trent, 
had Captain Wilkes a right to capture the same ? 

"Such a capture is the chief, if not the only recognized, 
object of thu permitted visitation and search. The princi- 
ple of the law is that the belligerent exposed to danger 
may prevent the contraband persons or things from apply- 
ing themselves or being applied to the hostile uses or pur- 
poses designed. The law is so very liberal in this respect 
that when contraband is found on board a neutral vessel, 
not only is the contraband forfeited, but the vessel which 
is the vehicle of its passage or transportation, being tainted, 
also becomes contraband, and is subjected to capture and 
confiscation. 

" Onlv the fifth question remains — namelv : Did Captain 

239 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

Wilkes exercise the right of capturing the contraband in 
conformity with the law of nations ? 

" It is just here that the difficulties in the case begin. 
What is the manner which the law of nations prescribes 
for disposing of the contraband when you have found and 
seized it on board of the neutral vessel ? The answer 
would be easily found if the question were what you shall 
do with the contraband vessel. You must take or send 
her into a convenient port, and subject her to a judicial 
prosecution there in admiralty, which will try and decide 
the questions of belligerency, neutrality, contraband, and 
capture. So, again, you would promptly find the same 
answer if the question were, what is the manner of pro- 
ceeding prescribed by the law of nations in regard to the 
contraband, if it be property or things of material or pe- 
cuniary value ? 

" But the question here concerns the mode of procedure 
in regard, not to the vessel that was carrying the con- 
traband, nor yet to contraband things which worked the 
forfeiture of the vessel, but to contraband persons." 

. . . "But only courts of admiralty have jurisdiction in 
maritime cases, and these courts have formulas to try only 
claims to contraband chattels, but none to try claims con- 
cerning contraband persons. The courts can entertain no 
proceedings and render no judgment in favor of or against 
the alleged contraband men. 

" It was replied all this was true ; but you can reach in 
those courts a decision which will have the moral weight 
of a judicial one by a circuitous proceeding. Convey the 
suspected men, together with the suspected vessel, into 
port, and try there the question whether the vessel is con- 
traband. You can prove it to be so by proving the sus- 
pected men to be contraband, and the court must then 
determine the vessel to be contraband. If the men are 
not contraband the vessel will escape condemnation. Still, 
there is no judgment for or against the captured persons. 
But it was assumed that there would result from the de- 
termination of the court concerning the vessel a legal 
certainty concerning the character of the men." 



" In the present case, Captain Wilkes, after capturing 
the contraband persons and making prize of the Trent in 
what seems to be a perfectly lawful manner, instead of 
sending her into port, released her from the capture, and 

240 



THE TRENT AFFAIR 

permitted her to proceed with her whole cargo upon her 
voyage. He thus effectually prevented the judicial exam- 
ination which might otherwise have occurred." 



" I have not heen unaware that, in examining this ques- 
tion, I have fallen into an argument for what seems to be 
the British side of it against my own country. But I am 
relieved from all embarrassment on that subject. I had 
hardly fallen into that line of argument when I discovered 
that I was really defending and maintaining, not an exclu- 
sively British interest, but an old, honored, and cherished 
American cause, not upon British authorities, but upon 
principles that constitute a large portion of the distinctive 
policy by which the United States have developed the re- 
sources of a continent, and thus becoming a considerable 
maritime power, have won the respect and confidence of 
many nations. These principles were laid down for us in 
1804, by James Madison, when Secretary of State in the 
administration of Thomas Jefferson, in instructions given 
to James Monroe, our minister to England. Although 
the case before him concerned a description of persons 
different from those who are incidentally the subjects of 
the present discussion, the ground he assumed then was 
the same I now occupy, and the arguments by which he 
sustained himself upon it have been an inspiration to me 
in preparing this reply." 



" If I decide this case in favor of my own government, 
I must disavow its most cherished principles, and reverse 
and forever abandon its essential policy. The country can- 
not afford the sacrifice. If I maintain those principles, 
and adhere to that policy, I must surrender the case itself. 
It will be seen, therefore, that this government could not 
deny the justice of the claim presented to us in this respect 
upon its merits. We are asked to do to the British nation 
just what we have always insisted all nations ought to do 
to us. 

" The claim of the British government is not made in a 
discourteous manner. This government, since its first 
organization, has never used more guarded language in a 
similar case. 

" In coming to my conclusion I have not forgotten 
that if the safety of this Union required the detention of 
q 241 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

the captured persons it would be the right and duty of 
this government to detain them. But the effectual check 
and waning proportions of the existing insurrection, as 
well as the comparative unimportance of the captured per- 
sons themselves, when dispassionately weighed, happily for- 
bid me from resorting to that defence." 

"Nor have I been tempted at all by suggestions that 
cases might be found in history where Great Britain refused 
to yield to other nations, and even to ourselves, claims 
like that which is now before us. ... It would tell little 
for our own claims to the character of a just and magnani- 
mous people if we should so far consent to be guided by 
the law of retaliation as to lift up buried injuries from 
their graves to oppose against what national consistency 
and the national conscience compel us to regard as a claim 
intrinsically right. 

"Putting behind me all suggestions of this kind, I pre- 
fer to express my satisfaction that, by the adjustment of 
the present case upon principles confessedly American, 
and yet, as I trust, mutually satisfactory to both of the 
nations concerned, a question is finally and rightly settled 
between them, which, heretofore exhausting not only all 
forms of peaceful discussion, but also the arbitrament of 
war itself, for more than half a century alienated the two 
countries from each other, and perplexed with fears and 
apprehensions all other nations. 

"The four persons in question are now held in military 
custody at Fort Warren, in the state of Massachusetts. 
They will be cheerfully liberated. Your lordship will please 
indicate a time and place for receiving them." 

This paper was highly characteristic of Seward. The 
opportunity to perform some great act that would save 
his country from grave calamity had come at last. He 
held the pen and he was master of the situation, as 
had often been the case in much less imposing circum- 
stances in former years. This answer was written in 
that graceful, flowing, self-confident style peculiar to 
his ambitious efforts. It glided lightly over the difficult 
places, substituting for thorough argument here a plau- 
sible assumption, there a crafty implication. It elabo- 

242 



THE TRENT AFFAIR 

rated and triumphantly dwelt upon the points that were 
most important to the special purposes. It fascinated 
and flattered the audience to whom it was chiefly ad- 
dressed. To most Northerners — who could not judge 
whether his arguments were sound or fallacious — the 
idea that by surrendering th^ Confederates the United 
States were maintaining their consistency and catching 
Great Britain in a trap, and the sheer impudence of say- 
ing that they would be kept if it were a matter of im- 
portance to hold them — these points were greeted with 
merriment and self- congratulation, and were regarded 
by a great many as removing all question of fear or 
humiliation. 

Those who had been as mad and reckless as anarchists 
and would have sacrificed the integrity of the nation 
to the stubborn resolve to retain the prisoners — and 
thereby increase their value to the Confederacy ten 
thousand -fold — soon forgot their folly and joined in 
the chorus in praise of Seward. The change that came 
over the learned international lawyer, R. IL Dana, illus- 
trates the magic of Seward's art. In November Dana 
wrote to Adams, " Wilkes has done a noble thing and 
done it well " ; but subsequently he said : " Mr. Seward 
is not only right, but sublime. It was a little too 
sublimated, dephlegmated, and defecated for common 
mortals, but I bow to it as to a superior intelligence." 1 
Robert C. Winthrop sent Seward his congratulations, 
remarking that if it required courage to hold Mason 
and Slidell in the face of overwhelming and threat- 
ening armaments, it required still more courage to give 
them up in persence of so many violent popular dem- 
onstrations on both sides of the Atlantic.' 2 The New 
York Tribune of December 30th said : " We believe 
the administration is stronger with the people to-day 

1 2 Adams's Dana, 259, 2G1. 

2 December 31st. Seward MSS. 

243 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

than if Mason and Slidell had never been captured or 
their surrender had been refused." 

London became jubilant at the first rumor of a fav- 
orable settlement. Stocks went up and congratula- 
tions were general. Under date of January 10, 1862, 
Adams wrote : " The satisfaction expressed in this city 
everywhere, excepting among the small society of the 
Confederate emissaries and the party which habitually 
looks to war as an attractive pastime, stands in remark- 
able contrast with the feelings which animated almost 
everybody six weeks ago." On the receipt of Seward's 
reply, Russell promptly informed Lyons that it gave 
"her Majesty's government great satisfaction to be 
enabled to arrive at a conclusion favorable to the main- 
tenance of the most friendly relations between the two 
nations." 

Seward's comments on his own acts were always in- 
teresting. We have noticed how general had been the 
excitement and determination to keep the Confederate 
prisoners, regardless of all consequences. On the 27th 
the Secretary informed Adams that " the United States 
have maintained calmness, composure, and dignity dur- 
ing all the season while the British people have been so 
intensely excited, and that in this, as in every other case, 
they have vindicated not only their consistency but 
their principles and policy, while measuring out to Great 
Britain the justice which they have always claimed at 
her hands." To Weed he wrote the same day : " You 
will see what has been done. You will know who did 
it. You will hardly be more able to shield me from the 
reproaches for doing it than you have been to shield 
me in England from the reproaches of hostility to that 
country, and designs for war against it." ' About a fort- 
night later a letter to Mrs. Seward contained these sen- 

1 3 Seward, 34. 
244 



THE TRENT AFFAIR 

tences : " For the past ten da) T s the public has expressed 
itself indebted to me for the performance of a task that 
it had before thought impossible. But the day before 
it was done it would have voted me incompetent to do 
any good thing. So, probably, it will be ready to do 
again, ten days hence." 1 Weed had favored dealing 
quietly and directly with the question. Seward subse- 
quently explained his own course as follows : " I am 
under the necessity of consulting the temper of parties 
and people on this side of the water quite as much as 
the temper of parties and people in England. If I had 
been as tame as you think would have been wise in my 
treatment of affairs in that country, I should have had 
no standing in my own." 2 

Mason and Slidell and their secretaries were, on Janu- 
ary 1, 1862, taken from Fort Warren to Provincetown, 
Massachusetts, about forty miles distant, and there put 
on a British sloop of war. They were then borne to St. 
Thomas, whence they continued their journey to Eng- 
land. 

While they were on their voyage a vessel with a de- 
tachment of troops that were expected to be used against 
the United States, finding the St. Lawrence river full 
of ice, had entered Portland harbor. When permission 
was asked for them to cross Maine, Seward promptly 
ordered that all facilities should be granted for " land- 
ing and transporting to Canada or elsewhere troops, 
stores, and munitions of war of every kind without ex- 
ception or reservation." 3 This was regarded as a most 
ludicrous climax, and a capital joke on Great Britain; and 
it was said that the London Times refused to publish Sew- 
ard's letter of permission. It was a very happy ending. 

It is important to know whether Seward's argument 

1 3 Seward, 46. 5 1 Weed, 640. 3 115 War Records, 186. 

245 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

was as sound as it was successful, according to popular 
opinion. There is no question that the carrying of 
officers in either the military or naval service of the 
enemy renders a neutral ship subject to seizure and 
condemnation. There were no persons in the naval 
or military service of the Confederacy on the Trent, 
nor were despatches of any kind found; so the seizure 
of the ship could not be justified by this rule. To 
defend what had been done, Seward undertook to main- 
tain the novel proposition that Mason and Slidell — 
diplomatic agents, proceeding between neutral ports in 
a ship as free from Confederate control as any packet 
between Calais and Dover — were contraband of war. 1 
He based his claim on these three references : 

[1.] " Vattel says war allows us to cut off from an en- 
emy all his resources, and to hinder him from sending min- 
isters to solicit assistance." [2.1 "And Sir William Scott 
says you may stop the ambassador of your enemy on his 
passage." 

. . . [3.] "Sir William Scott, speaking of civil magis- 
trates who are arrested and detained as contraband, says : 

" ' It appears to me on principle to be bnt reasonable 
that when it is of sufficient importance to the enemy that 
such persons shall be sent out on the public service at the 
public expense, it should afford equal ground of forfeiture 
against the vessel that may be let out for a purpose so in- 
timately connected with hostile operations.'" 

It is not a little surprising that Seward should sup- 
port so novel a claim by citations so vague, and with- 
out referring to or explaining the circumstances under 
which his authorities announced these opinions. What 
Vattel said was that an enemy's people might be at- 
tacked and seized wherever there was a right to commit 

1 " Und wenn etwas feststcht, ist es das Princip, dass feindliche, 
mchtrnilitarische Staatsangehorige am Bord neutraler Schiffe der 
Gefangennehmung durch den anderen Kriegfi'ihrenden nicht unter- 
lit'gen." — Marquardsen, Der Trent-Fall, 74. 

246 



THE TRENT AFFAIR 

acts of hostility. Yattel gave a perfectly clear illustra- 
tion of his meaning. There was no right to commit a 
hostile act on board the Trent, unless she had forfeited 
her neutrality by carrying contraband of war ; but that 
was what Seward was undertaking to prove. He as- 
sumed an analogy where there was none, and then used 
his false assumption to support his contention. 1 

Seward's second reference was to Sir William Scott, 
who was quoting Vattel and considering the case of the 
Caroline. The Caroline was a Swedish vessel that had 
been engaged as one of a fleet of French transports 
under the control of French military and naval officers.* 
She thereby ceased to be a neutral and became a bel- 
ligerent ship; and England, then at war with France, 
had a right to commit acts of hostility against her. 
There was no real similarity between the case of the 
Caroline and that of the Trent. And what the learned 
judge actually said furnishes no support for Seward's 
claim. 3 



1 Vattel's passage is as follows : "On the breaking out of a war, we 
cease to be under any obligation of leaving the enein}' to the free en- 
joyment of his rights; on the contrary, we are justifiable in depriving 
him of them, for the purpose of weakening him, and reducing him to 
accept of equitable conditions. His people may also be attacked and 
seized wherever we have a right to commit acts of hostility. Not 
only, therefore, may we justly refuse a passage to the ministers whom 
our enemy sends to other sovereigns; we may even arrest them if they 
attempt to pass privately, and without permission, through places be- 
longing to our jurisdiction. Of such proceeding the last war fur- 
nishes a signal instance. A French ambassador, on his route to Berlin, 
touched, through the imprudence of his guides, at a village withm 
the electorate of Hanover, whose sovereign, the King of England, was 
at war with France. The minister was there arrested, and afterward 
sent over to England. As his Britannic Majesty had in that instance 
only exerted the rights of war, neither the court of France nor that of 
Prussia complained of his conduct." — Chitty's translation of Vattel, 
book 4, chapter 7, section 85. 

2 Dana's Wheaton's International Law, 639, 640. 

3 " I have before said that persons discharging the functions of em- 

247 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

The third reference was to the decision in the case of 
the Orozembo, and was still more deceptive. The Oro- 
zembo was an American vessel that had been ostensibly 
chartered by a merchant of Lisbon, who subsequently 
had her fitted up for the reception of three military 
officers, and two persons in the civil departments in the 
government of Batavia, who, under appointment of the 
Dutch government, had come from Holland to take their 
passage to Batavia. This made the Orozembo a Dutch 
transport, subject to seizure and condemnation by Hol- 
land's enem}r, England. The carrying of military per- 
sons was regarded as conclusive evidence of the fact. 
The judge proceeded to speculate as to the significance 
of carrying the civil persons : 

" In this instance the military persons are three, and 
there are, besides, two other persons, who were going to be 
employed in civil capacities in the government of Batavia. 
Wlietlier the principle would apply to them alone, I do not 
feel it necessary to determine. I am not aivare of any case 
in which that question has been agitated; but it appears to 
me, on principle, to be but reasonable that whenever it is 
of sufficient importance to the enemy that such persons 
should be sent on the public service at the public expense, 
it should afford equal ground of forfeiture against the ves- 
sel that may be let out for a purpose so intimately connected 
with the hostile operations." 1 

bassadors are, in a peculiar manner, objects of the protection and 
favor of the law of nations. The limits that are assigned to the 
operations of war against them, by Vattel, and other writers upon 
those subjects, are, that you may exercise your right of war against 
them, wherever the character of hostility exists. You may stop the 
embassador of your enemy on Ids passage ; but when he has arrived, 
and has taken upon himself the functions of his office, and has 
been admitted to his representative character, he becomes a sort 
of middle -man, entitled to peculiar privileges, as set apart for the 
protection of the relations of amity and peace, in maintaining which 
all nations are, in some degree, interested." — 6 Robinson's Reports, 
467-69. 

1 6 Robinson's Reports, 434. Only the words "on principle" are 
italicized in the original. 

248 



THE TRENT AFFAIR 

Dana said of the opinion regarding the Orozembo: "Even 
as a dictum, it does not touch the case of a neutral vessel 
not let out as a transport, and merely having civil officers 
of a belligerent government on board, without other cir- 
cumstances tending to show the vessel herself to be in 
the enemy's service." l 

It was by such means that Seward made it appear 
that Mason and Slidell Avere contraband of war. After 
this feat it was like sailing with the wind and the cur- 
rent — in fact, argument was superfluous — to show that 
"Wilkes had a right to stop and search the Trent; that 
the right was lawfully and properly exercised ; and 
that, having found these " contraband persons," he had 
a right to capture them. Up to this point the Sec- 
retary, the captain of the San Jacinto, and the stormy 
multitude of hero-worshippers, were all in perfect accord 
as to the incident. By a long course of reasoning that 
was essentially sound, except in the first premise as to 
contraband, Seward maintained that by releasing the 
Trent, instead of bringing her into port for judicial 
examination and condemnation, "Wilkes let slip the 
only chance of obtaining a legal justification for the 
seizure. He dealt mildly and cleverly with " the hu- 
mane motive " and the " combined sentiments of pru- 
dence and generosity " that led to the release, and he 
declared, "This government cannot censure him for this 
oversight." So Wilkes himself may even have felt com- 
plimented, although the net result was a condemnation 
of his action. 

Seward's course committed him to some very remark- 
able absurdities. In order to sustain his position, he had 
to cite irrelevant British decisions and to subordinate the 
principles and steady practice of his own county, which 

1 Dana's "Wheaton's International Law, 641 ; see also 2 Baker's Hal- 
leck's International Laic (1893), 298 ff. 

249 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

favored increasing the rights of neutrals and restrict- 
ing belligerent interference. After countless declara- 
tions, during eight months, that the Confederates were 
not belligerents, but insurgents, his whole argument 
rested on the fact that they were belligerents and that 
their diplomatic representatives were to be likened to 
ambassadors of independent states. In the hope of re- 
moving Great Britain's apprehensions, as well as to 
prevent giving any excuse for an alliance with the Con- 
federacy, he had declared, less than four months before, 
that no depredations would be committed by citizens of 
the United States, so far as it could be prevented, upon 
the vessels or property of any British subjects. 1 He 
now solemnly enunciated a doctrine that would justify 
American naval officers in seizing and bringing to New 
York or Boston neutral packets, wherever they could 
be found, transporting Confederate diplomatic agents 
or despatches. French, British, or German ships ply- 
ing between European ports might be captured in the 
British Channel, the Mediterranean, or anywhere on the 
high seas, if they carried Yancey or Kost, or despatches 
to them, even between England and the Continent. 
The oft - quoted Scotch verdict of " Not guilty — but 
don't do it again," was not more illogical than Seward, 
who undertook to avoid a casus belli by maintaining a 
doctrine that would surely throw the United States into 
war with every nation against whose ships it should be 
enforced. 2 

1 See ante, p. 195. 

2 As soon as Russell received Seward's communication he informed 
Lyons that the British government disagreed with some of the con- 
clusions, which he would discuss in a few days, and added: "In 
the mean time it will be desirable that the commanders of the U. S. 
cruisers should be instructed not to repeat acts for which the British 
government will have to ask redress and which the United States 
government cannot undertake to justify." — 115 War Records, 1171. 

To Seward's interjected and gratuitous declaration that "if the 

250 



THE TRENT AFFAIR 

The thorough method of Russell's formal reply to 
Seward's leading contentions in international law indi- 
cates that he supposed the note was for the British 
government. And one would naturally expect Seward 
to take pride in defending, to the utmost, the position 
that he had taken in this cause celebre. The document 
was, indeed, addressed to Lord Lyons, and was for- 
warded to the British Foreign Office ; but it was, in 
fact, written to the American people. And it had ac- 
complished its chief purpose long before it reached 
London. So it is not surprising to find that what 
Seward called his "rejoinder" 1 merely declared : "The 
differences stated by Earl Russell involve questions of 
neutral rights in maritime warfare which, though of 
confessed importance, are not practically presented in 
any case of conflict now existing between the United 
States and Great Britain"; and then, in direct contradic- 
tion to his argument that diplomatic representatives 
were contraband of war, he said that the United States 
would follow or lead in any movement that promised to 
meliorate the law of maritime war in regard to neutrals. 2 

Two later Secretaries of State, who were good judges 
as to what was politic and sound, have criticised Sew- 
ard's argument. Hamilton Fish wrote at the time : 

" In style it is verbose and egotistical ; in argument 
flimsy ; and in its conception and general scope it is an 
abandonment of the high position we have occupied as a 

safety of this Union required the detention of tbe captured persons, 
it would be the right and duty of this government to detain them," 
Russell replied that "Great Britain could not have submitted to the 
perpetration of that wrong, however flourishing might have been the 
insurrection in the South, and however important the persons capt- 
tured might have been." — Dip. Cor., 1862, 253. 

1 Dip. Cor., 18G2, 316. 

2 115 War Records, 1199. Marquardsen tauntingly remarked, after 
giving the text of Russell's reply of January 23, 1862: "Von einer 
Replik des amerikanischen Governments auf diese Auseinandersetzung 

251 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

nation upon a great principle. We are humbled and dis- 
graced, not by the act of the surrender of four of our own 
citizens, bnt by the manner in which it has been done, and 
the absence of a sound principle on which to rest and jus- 
tify it. . , . We might and should have turned the affair 
vastly to our credit and advantage; it has been made the 
means of our humiliation." 1 



James G. Blaine concludes his criticism of Seward's 
argument by saying : " It is to be regretted that we did 
not place the restoration of the prisoners upon franker 
and truer ground — viz., that their seizure was in viola- 
tion of the principles which we had steadily and reso- 
lutely maintained — principles which we would not aban- 
don either for a temporary advantage or to save the 
wounding of our national pride." 2 

Not only has Seward's dictum, that diplomatic agents 
are contraband of war, remained unsupported by author- 
ities on international law, but the United States have 
taken care to prevent the repetition of such a blunder 
as Wilkes made. Early in the war against Spain the 
" ' Instructions to Blockading Vessels and Cruisers,' pre- 
pared by the Department of State " said : 



"A neutral vessel carrying hostile despatches, when sail- 
ing as a despatch vessel practically in the service of the 
enemy, is liable to seizure ; but not when she is a mail 
packet and carries them in the regular and customary man- 
ner, either as a part of the mail in her mail bags, or sepa- 
rately, as a matter of accommodation and without special 
arrangement or remuneration. The voyages of mail steam- 
ers are not to be interfered with except on the clearest 
grounds of suspicion of a violation of law in respect of con- 
traband or blockade. 



hat man nichts weiter vernommen, und in tier That mochte es schwer 
sein, vom Sewardschen Standpunkte aus, in einer ferneren Discus- 
sion dagegen aufzukommen." — Der Trent-Fall, 174. 

1 4 Pierce's Sumner, 54. 2 1 Twenty Years of Congress, 585. 

252 



THE TRENT AFFAIR 

" A neutral vessel in the service of the enemy, in the 
transportation of troops or military persons, is liable to 
seizure." 1 

The highest type of statesmanship is to extricate 
one's country from danger in the best way. But that 
is not the only type. "Whether the last opportunity to 
save the Union should be thrown away depended upon 
Seward's decision to hold or to release Mason and 
Slidell. Had he favored retaining them, there was no 
one that could and would have overcome his influence. 
Therefore, what was done he did, and but for him it 
would not have been clone. That his argument was so 
effective, although unsound, was a tribute to his truly- 
marvellous skill in making bricks without straw. It 
was at least a political masterpiece. And, as the world 
of politics goes — but not as scholars think it should be — 
politicians that effectively serve the state are classed as 
statesmen. It sometimes happens that a general wins a 
great battle although he violates the most fundamental 
rules of strategy or tactics. A grateful country, whose 
failing cause he has saved, will not forget his service, 
even if military critics demonstrate that he wasted ten 
thousand lives and realized only a fraction of the possible 
victory. So, Seward's method was far from perfect, but 
what he accomplished was one of the greatest feats of 
the war-period, and has rightly given him lasting fame 
and honor in American history. 

1 Navy Department, General Order No. 492, June 20, 1898. 



CHAPTER XXXIV 

SEWARD AND THE POLITICAL PRISONERS, TO FEBRUARY, 1862 

Our record of Seward's various activities in 1861 is 
not yet complete. Although he performed a much 
larger proportion of the work of the department than 
any Secretary of State would now think of doing, it 
is doubtful if it consumed more than half the time and 
thought he gave to public affairs. Probably the detec- 
tion of political offenders and the control of political 
prisoners were the most distracting of all his cares. 

The tiring upon the Massachusetts regiment as it was 
hastening through Baltimore, April 19th, surprised and 
angered the North. Governor Hicks soon became 
alarmed lest the sympathizers with secession might be- 
come excited beyond control and precipitate a civil war 
in Maryland. Hoping to avert this, he wrote a letter to 
Seward requesting that northern troops should be en- 
tirely excluded, and suggested that Lord Lyons should 
be asked to act as mediator between the Washington 
and the Montgomery governments, so as to prevent an 
effusion of blood. 

Washington was still in extreme danger, and alarm 
had become panic. It was necessary for the administra- 
tion to temporize until northern troops should arrive. 
By direction of the President, Seward declared that 
" the force now sought to be brought through Mary- 
land is intended for nothing but the defence of this 
capital," and that the new route via Annapolis had been 
chosen with the expectation that it would be " the least 

254 



SEWARD AND THE POLITICAL PRISONERS 

objectionable." There had been times, he remarked, 
when United States soldiers were not unwelcome in 
that state ; and the actual sentiment of national inde- 
pendence was such that no domestic contention " ought 
in any case to be referred to any foreign arbitrament, 
least of all to the arbitrament of an European mon- 
archy." ' These were discreet expressions, considering 
the dangers of the hour ; but the people of the North, 
who had answered the call to arms with such patriotic 
enthusiasm, had assumed that the period of hesitation 
and mere self-defence had ended. Lincoln and Seward 
at once became objects of criticism and warnings that 
must have startled them." 

1 1 Moore's Rebellion Record, Docs., p. 133. 

2 Moses II. Grinnell, one of the wealthiest and most influential of 
Seward's friends and followers in New York, wrote to him, April 25th : 
"The correspondence between the government and Governor Hicks 
does not suit our people. There is a deep sentiment in this quarter 
repugnant to concession, and I assure you there will be trouble 
among our people if there is the least appearance on the part of the 
government yielding to these rascals. I beg you to treat these villains 
[in Maryland] as they deserve. No more soft words to traitors. The 
Post of last evening gave you hard hits, and, I assure you, your name 
is freely spoken of and with some censure." Again, the next day, 
acting as the spokesman of " twenty-five as influential men as we 
have in New York," he asked that his views be laid before the Presi- 
dent, and added that the feeling was so strong that necessity if not 
patriotism would compel a response to it in order to prevent serious 
trouble. The correspondence with Hicks, he said, had caused intense 
indignation on the part of all classes. The New York Evening Post 
of April 24th asked : " How much longer is open rebellion to be met 
with assurances of distinguished consideration? How many more 
days will the government spend in elegant letter-writing?" From 
Erie, Penn., II. Ely reported, April 27th, that there was great dissatis- 
faction because a clear and free passage had not been made through 
" the rebel city Baltimore." "You must demolish it if necessary, and 
at once, or the strong indignation sentiment now resting upon the 
rebels will be turned upon the administration." N. P. Tallmadge, who 
had all along been for a peaceful solution, declared, April 28th, that 
the people would "not brook unnecessary delay. They require ac- 
tion — prompt and vigorous action — and they will not hold the admiu- 

255 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

At first Lincoln was unwilling to do more than order 
General Scott, in case the Maryland legislature should 
attempt to arm the people against the United States, to 
adopt the most efficient measures to prevent it, even to 
the extent of bombarding their cities, and, " in the ex- 
tremest necessity, suspending the writ of habeas corpus." ' 
But there was so strong a current toward secession — 
and the secession of Maryland would put the national 
capital at the mercy of the Confederates — that on April 
27th, the President authorized Scott to suspend the 
writ anywhere between Washington and Philadelphia. 
This rendered it less difficult to deal with the most 
dangerous men. Soon the authority Avas used and 
arbitrary arrests began to be made : the Baltimore 
marshal of police, the police commissioners, and other 
men of prominence were seized and sent to a United 
States fort. According to a plan devised by Seward, 
Dix, and General Banks, several members of the Mary- 
land legislature that were expecting to push through 
an ordinance of secession the next day were arrested 
in September, 1861, and treated like the other political 
prisoners. 

One of the earliest cases was that of John Merryman, 
arrested hear Baltimore by United States military offi- 
cers because he was lieutenant in a company organized 
to aid the Confederacy. Chief Justice Taney issued a 
writ of habeas corpus commanding Major - General Cad- 
walader, who had Merryman in custody, to appear be- 
fore the court with the prisoner and explain the cause 

istration guiltless in any other course. This rebellion must be crushed 
out in the least possible time. Such a course will be the most econom- 
ical in money and lives. You must not wait for the deliberations of 
Congress. Act whilst the spirit is up — let it not die down by the dis- 
couragement of delay. Make an example now that will last for all 
time — so that treason will not again show its head — and so that the 
southern right of secession will never again be exercised." — Seward 
MSS. 2 2 Lincoln's Works, 38. 

256 



SEWARD AND THE POLITICAL PRISONERS 

of the arrest and the detention. Following the Presi- 
dent's orders, Cadwalader declined to obey. The Chief 
Justice then delivered an elaborate opinion declaring 
that Congress alone had a right to suspend the writ. 
Numerous learned lawyers soon took up this important 
question, and a great discussion was begun, which is not 
likely to end so long as the Constitution merely author- 
izes the suspension without saying whether it shall be 
decreed by the President or by Congress. 

With the administration the question was primarily 
one of political necessity. It was summed up in this 
sentence in Lincoln's message to Congress in July: "To 
state the question more directly, are all the laws but 
one to go unexecuted and the government itself to go to 
pieces lest that one be violated?" 1 Lieber said: "The 

1 The following paragraphs from Stanton's order of February 14, 
1862, represent the views of the administration as to the political ne- 
.cessity : 

"Every department of the government was paralyzed by treason. 
Defection appeared in the Senate, in the House of Representatives, in 
the Cabinet, in the Federal courts ; ministers and consuls returned 
from foreign countries to enter the insurrectionary councils or land or 
naval forces ; commanding and other officers of the Army and in the 
Navy betrayed our councils or deserted their posts for commands in 
the insurgent forces. Treason was flagrant in the revenue and in the 
post-office service, as well as in the territorial governments aud in the 
Indian reserves. 

" Not only governors, judges, legislators, and ministerial officers in 
the states, but even whole states, rushed one after another with apparent 
unanimity into rebellion. The capital was besieged and its connection 
with all the states cut off. 

"Even in the portions of the country which were most loyal po- 
litical combinations and secret societies were formed furthering the 
work of disunion, while from motives of disloyalty or cupidity, or 
from excited passions or perverted sympathies, individuals were 
found furnishing men, money, and materials of war and supplies 
to the insurgents' military and naval forces. Armies, ships, fortifica- 
tions, navy-yards, arsenals, military posts, and garrisons, one after an- 
other, were betrayed or abandoned to the insurgents. 

" Congress had not anticipated and so had not provided for the 
ii.— it 257 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

whole .Rebellion is beyond the Constitution. The Con- 
stitution was not made for such a state of things ; it was 
not dreamt of by the f ramers." l 

Good Unionists frequently complained of having to 
send their sons to fight Confederates while men more 
dangerous than if armed remained behind and were un- 
disturbed in furnishing aid and encouragement to the 
enemy. From the latter part of July, 1861, a very im- 
portant feature of the war-policy was to make political 
spies and Confederate sympathizers fear northern prisons 
as much as soldiers do the enemy's cannon. Until the 
middle of February, 1862, Seward had supreme control 
of the system by which nearly a thousand men were 
seized in different parts of the country and hurried off 
to one of three or four forts in the East. 

The logical chief of such an organization was the 
Attorney-General or the Secretary of War. The De- 
partment of State alone of all the executive branches 
of the government had no officers in any of the states. 
Why was such a charge assigned to the member of the 

emergency. The municipal authorities were powerless and inactive. 
The judicial machinery seemed as if it had been designed not to sus- 
tain the government, but to embarrass and betray it." 

"In this emergency the President felt it his duty to employ with 
energy the extraordinary powers which the Constitution confides to 
him in cases of insurrection. He called into the field such military 
and naval forces unauthorized by the existing laws as seemed neces- 
sary. He directed measures to prevent the use of the post-office for 
treasonable correspondence. He subjected passengers to and from 
foreign countries to new passport regulations, and he instituted a 
blockade, suspended the writ of habeas corpus in various places, and 
caused persons who were represented to him as being or about to en- 
gage in disloyal and treasonable practices to be arrested by special 
civil as well as military agencies, and detained in military custody 
when necessary to prevent them and deter others from such practices." 
— 115 War Records, 222. See also Henry Wilson's remarks in the 
Senate, December 16, 1861, Globe, 92. 

1 Life and Letters, 340. 

258 



SEWARD AND THE POLITICAL PRISONERS 

Cabinet whose functions were to look after interna- 
tional relations? Important new responsibilities that 
did not clearly devolve upon others were often assumed 
by Seward as a matter of course. If he was not the 
wisest member of the administration, he was the most 
alert, the most energetic, and the best informed as to 
the greatest number of important questions. These 
traits, together with his ambition and Lincoln's wise 
recognition of his strong qualities, made him not the 
head of the administration, but in many respects the 
most active force in it. 

Lincoln was responsible for the suspension of the writ 
of habeas corpus and Seward for the system, that soon 
developed therefrom. Because it was arbitrary, largely 
secret, and altogether unusual, it was either attacked 
too bitterly or defended without candor. Some of its 
features bore a striking resemblance to the most odious 
institution of the ancieii regime in France — the Bastile 
and the lettres de cachet. A just war and a brutal mas- 
sacre are very similar in some respects, but the motive 
may make one noble whereas the other is horrible and 
fiendish. If Seward had carried on his system in time 
of peace, he would have been the most despicable tyrant 
of the century. Its sole moral justification must rest 
upon its necessity. If there was no .other means ade- 
quate to cope with the enemies of the government, 
then history will justify this method. On the other 
hand, if it was more far-reaching and severe than the 
circumstances demanded, then Seward will not be held 
blameless. But let us see first what Seward's system 
was. 

Corresponding with the commercial blockade of the 
Confederacy, the Secretary of State created a sort of 
personal blockade of the North by requiring passports 
of all persons entering or leaving the United States. 
He appointed special agents at such places as Detroit, 

209 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

Niagara Falls, House's Point, and Portland, Maine, to 
intercept men under suspicion. In nearly every other 
respect he employed the officers of the other depart- 
ments and of different localities, such as the military 
commanders, the United States marshals, and the heads 
of the municipal police. 

The chief places used as prisons were Fort Warren, in 
Boston harbor, Fort Lafayette, in New York harbor, 
and Fort McIIenry, near Baltimore. Others, like the 
Capitol prison, which stood near the site of the new Con- 
gressional Library building, Forts Delaware, Hamilton, 
and Monroe, and some of the military camps in the West, 
were used for political prisoners detained for short pe- 
riods. 

Arrests were made for any one of many reasons : 
where men were suspected of having given, or intend- 
ing to give, aid or comfort to the enemy in any substan- 
tial way, — as by helping in the organization of troops, 
by supplying arms or provisions, or selling the bonds of 
the states in secession ; by public or private communica- 
tions that opposed United States enlistments or encour- 
aged those of the Confederacy ; by expressing sympathy 
with the South or attacking the administration; by be- 
longing to organizations designed to obstruct the prog- 
ress of the war — in fact, for almost any act that indi- 
cated a desire to see the government fail in its effort 
to conquer disunion. There was, of course, a great dif- 
ference in the character of the evidence in different 
cases. Intercepted correspondence often told of treason- 
able acts or purposes. Perhaps some ardent Unionist, 
or some one merely for personal reasons, reported that 
John Smith in Maryland or Michigan was holding com- 
munications with, or forwarding the letters of, Confed- 
erates in the South or in Canada ; that Thomas Jones, 
of New Orleans, who was to arrive in a few days, was 
a bearer of important despatches from the Confeder- 

260 



SEWARD AND THE POLITICAL PRISONERS 

ate commissioners in Europe to their government ; that 
Richard Brown, of Georgia, was in New York selling 
bonds and was on his way to negotiate a Confederate 
loan abroad. In not a few cases the first notice the 
local officer or nearest United States marshal received of 
the case would be something like this actual telegram : 

"Department of State, Washington, August 17, 1861. 
"John A. Kennedy, Superintendent of Police, New York: 
" Arrest Charles Kopperl, of Carroll County, Missis- 
sippi, now in your city, and send him to Fort Lafayette. 

" William II. Seward." l 

The person suspected of disloyalty was often seized at 
night, searched, borne off to the nearest fort, deprived 
of his valuables, and locked up in a casemate, or in a bat- 
tery generally crowded with men that had had similar 
experiences. It was not rare for arrests regarded as 
political to be made by order of the Secretary of War or 
of some military officer; but, with only a few exceptions, 
these prisoners came under the control of the Secretary 
of State just as if he had taken the original action. 

For a few days the new-comer usually varied reflec- 
tion and loud denunciations of the administration. But 
the discomforts of his confinement soon led him to seek 
his freedom. When he resolved to send for friends and 
an attorney, he was informed that the rules forbade vis- 
itors, except in rare instances, that attorneys were en- 
tirely excluded, and the prisoner who sought their aid 
would greatly prejudice his case. Only unsealed let- 
ters would be forwarded, and if they contained objec- 
tionable statements they were returned to the writer 
or filed in the Department of State with other papers 
relating to the case. There still remained a possibility, 
it was generally assumed, of speedy relief by appeal 

1 115 War Becords, 485. 
261 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

to the Secretary in person. Then a long narrative, 
describing the experiences of a man "whose innocence 
was equaled only by his misfortunes, was addressed to 
the nervous, wiry, all-powerful man keeping watch over 
international relations, political offenders, and affairs 
generally. The letter was usually read by the Chief 
Clerk or Assistant Secretary, and then merely filed. 
A second, third, and fourth petition for liberation and 
explanations was sent to the department — but with no 
result save that the materials for the study of history 
and human nature were thereby enlarged ; the Secre- 
tary was calm in the belief that the man was a plotter 
and could do no harm while he remained in custody. 

Meantime it often happened that prisoners that had 
first been confined in forts west or south of New York 
were forwarded to Fort Lafayette or Fort Hamilton to 
prevent overcrowding or to take prominent men far 
from their homes and sympathizers. This was the case 
with the Marylanders. A large proportion of those who 
were held more than a few weeks finally reached Fort 
Warren. 

Ere all this progress in captivity had been made, 
friends and relatives had strenuously attempted to get 
a hearing before the Secretary. Probably they had 
enlisted the influence of some prominent Republican 
or "old -line" Whig who knew Seward. From differ- 
ent sources came a variety of pleas: the captive was 
in feeble health ; or if, possibly, his associations and 
sentiments had not been as loyal as could be wished, he 
had committed no act of treason ; or he had an invalid 
wife and a family of children entirely dependent upon 
his support; or imprisonment made a martyr of him 
and was creating much opposition to the government, 
which would soon disappear if he were given his free- 
dom ; or the alleged offence had been too highly colored 
by a revengeful enemy or by a too zealous official. In 

262 



SEWARD AND THE POLITICAL PRISONERS 

most instances from one to three months elapsed be- 
fore definite action was taken b}' the department. If 
it seemed likely that the offender would resort to dis- 
I0311I acts in the future, the appeals were rejected. If the 
Secretary became convinced that there might be some 
mistake, he caused a special examination to be made of 
the case. Where adequate punishment seemed to have 
been already inflicted, the prisoner was released on con- 
dition of swearing allegiance to the United States and 
of promising to do no act hostile to the prosecution of 
the war or tending to aid or encourage the Confeder- 
ates. If the arrest had been made without due cause, 
no prerequisites of release were required. 1 

1 Here are copies of abstracts of a few cases taken from the Depart- 
ment's Record-book of "Arrests for Disloyalty": 

" This man [Dr. Edward Johnson] was arrested by order of Gen- 
eral Dix and committed to Fort McHenry about July 8, 1861, and from 
thence transferred to Fort Lafayette by order of the Secretary of 
State. There are no papers on file in the Department of State show- 
ing on what charges he was arrested. An order was issued from the 
Department of State, dated September 13, 1861, directing Lieutenant- 
Colonel Martin Burke to release Johnson on his giving his parole to do 
no act and to give no information hostile or injurious to the United 
States. He was released September 17, 1861." — 115 War Records, 291. 

" This person [Joseph T. Ellicott] was arrested by order of General 
Porter, provost-marshal of Washington, and committed to the Thir- 
teenth Street Prison August 23, 1861. There are no papers on file in 
the Department of State showing why or on what charges he was 
arrested. Urgent application having been made for his release, the 
Secretary of State ordered his discharge on taking the oath of alle- 
giance and stipulating not to enter or correspond with the insurrec- 
tionary States. He was accordingly released October 10, 1861." — 
Ibid., 294. 

"Francis M. Fisk is a native of Rhode Island, but a resident of 
New Orleans. He was arrested at the instance of Governor Sprague 
at Providence, R. I., charged with the intention of taking his son 
Frank south to join the rebel army, and committed to Fort Lafayette, 
August 26, 1861, by order of the Secretary of State, dated August 24, 
1861. The charge against Mr. Fisk is supported by the affidavit of 
James E. Stevens that he boarded with Francis Fisk, son of Francis M. 
Fisk, in the family of Mrs. Mary Chamberlain ; that Francis M. Fisk 

263 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

Perhaps the four most famous cases and the ones for 
which the Secretary was then, and has since been most 
criticised were those of ex-Senator Gwin, ex-Governor 
Morehead, of Kentucky, Charles J. Faulkner, and ex- 
Senator George W. Jones, of Iowa. 

It was one of the dreams of the secessionists that 
California and at least a part of Mexico were to be in- 
corporated into the Confederacy. Gwin's southern ante- 
cedents, theories, sympathies, and associations caused a 
strong suspicion that he was enlisted in this enterprise. 
In October, 18G1, the postmaster of San Francisco wrote 
to Seward that Gwin, Calhoun Benham, and J. L. Brent 
had sailed from that port for New York, that they were 
"rank traitors" and were bound for the South. 1 General 
E. V. Sumner, who was a passenger on the same ship, 
became convinced of the disloyalty of the three men 
and put them under arrest. Several witnesses gave evi- 

came to the bouse of the said Mrs. Mary Chamberlain and told her, ' I 
am going to take my son Frank south to put [him] in the army.' An 
order was issued from the Department of State, dated September 30, 
1861, for the release of Fisk on his taking the oath of allegiance and 
giving his parole of honor to do no hostile act, etc. He was accord- 
ingly released October 2, 1861."— Ibid., 295. 

" William E. Wright, of Marion County, Ky., was arrested by Colo- 
nel R. W. Johnson, of the Kentucky Home Guard, on or about the 
24th of September, 1861, charged with having taken up arms against 
the government of the United States or otherwise aiding in the rebellion 
against the same. After his arrest he was sent by General Anderson 
to Indianapolis and then by order of the Secretary of State to Fort 
Lafayette, and was afterward transferred to Fort Warren. It appears 
by Wright's statements to some of his friends who petitioned for his 
discharge that he had been to Bowling Green, Ky., to sell horses, 
which were probably for the military service of the rebels, and that 
he had been in the State of Tennessee trying to make some money for 
bis family, by what kind of traffic is not stated. On the 11th day of 
January, 1862, Wright was released from confinement on taking the 
oath of allegiance with stipulations against future misconduct." — 
Ibid., 303. 

1 The documents in these cases are printed in 115 War Records, 
1009-20. 

264 



SEWARD AND THE POLITICAL PRISONERS 

cience going to show that books or papers, or both, sup- 
posed to be treasonable, were thrown overboard by one 
or more of these men. Shortly after the} r arrived in 
New York Seward ordered them to be sent to Fort La- 
fayette. 1 

Fortunately for the prisoners, George D. Prentice, the 
famous Louisville journalist and stanch Unionist, was 
Benham's brother-in-law. He hurried to "Washington 
and was surprised by Seward's cordiality and noncom- 
mittal answers to his request for the release of the three 
men. Prentice was given permission to visit them, and 
was invited to report his impressions. Among other 
things, he soon represented that before Gwin and Ben- 
ham sailed they asked General Sumner if they would 
incur any danger of arrest in embarking on the steamer, 
and were assured that they would not. This was re- 
garded by the administration as important. Although 
General Sumner did not intend to give an}' assurances, 
the three prisoners were released on parole to come to 
Washington for an interview. On December 10, 1861, 
they were unconditionally set at liberty, and an official 
memorandum stated that " the Secretary of State had 
been fully satisfied that no one of the parties had any 
disloyal purpose in his journey, and that the complaint 
that they bore treasonable despatches or correspondence 
and destroyed the same on the way to Panama is un- 
founded." 2 

It seems likely that this decision was due to Prentice's 
influence in behalf of a brother-in-law, who may have 

1 On searching Benham a letter -written by Gwin, February 8, 1861, 
■was found which contained the following sentences: "The cotton 
states are out forever. The border states will follow ; it is only a ques- 
tion of time. If no collision takes place reconstruction is barely possi- 
ble. The chances are there will be two republics, North and South, 
with amicable relations. Time will probably turn it into three." As 
has been noticed, Seward had been intimate with its writer for a 
month after that date. * 115 War Records, 1020. 

265 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

been suspected chiefly on account of his associations 
with the disloyal Gwin. This is one of the few cases 
where Lincoln evidently took the matter out of Seward's 
hands. 1 Gwin's subsequent actions were so hostile to 
the interests of the Union that it was a mistake not to 
restrict his liberty to some locality in the North where 
he could be watched. 3 

"Charles S. Morehead, of Kentucky, was arrested on 
the 19th day of September, 1861, accused of being ac- 
tively engaged in stirring up and promoting rebellion, 
and directly charged with treason on the oath of A. II. 
Sneed, marshal of the United States for Kentucky dis- 
trict," says the Department's Record-book. s Morehead 
was one of those border-state " Unionists " of the " white- 
crow " type, whose sympathies and interests were wholly 
southern. He had told Lincoln that "the true and wise 
policy was to withdraw the troops from Fort Sumter, 
and give satisfactory guaranties to the eight remaining 
slave-holding states, and that the seven seceding states 
would, not at once, but ultimately, by the mere force of 
gravitation, come back, and we should have a safer and 
firmer bond of union than ever." Otherwise, he said, 
Lincoln's hands would be stained with blood that could 

1 115 War Records, 1020. 

2 Toward the end of the sixties Prentice wrote a long letter ahout 
this case to John A. Marshall, who printed it in his hysterical "his- 
tory," American Bastile, 617-20. Prentice seemed to think it pecul- 
iarly outrageous that Seward did not at once grant his request and 
answer Ids letters. He claimed to have written four before receiviug 
an answer. Seward was not under the slightest obligation to reply at 
all. Only two letters are to be found, and they were both of the same 
date. The Secretary's reply four days later indicates that only these 
two letters had been received, and that an earlier answer had not been 
sent because he had been waiting for an opportunity to consult Gen- 
eral Sumner about the alleged assurance against arrest. — 115 War Rec- 
ords, 1016-18. 

3 For this case, see 115 War Records, 805-25; 2 Coleman's Crittenden, 
333-44. 

266 



SEWARD AND THE POLITICAL PRISONERS 

not be washed off by all the waters of the Atlantic and 
the Pacific. 1 Later, Morehead went to Georgia and 
spoke at Macon. His sentiments were not loyal to the 
Union, or he would neither have been urged to make 
a speech nor have lived to apologize for it months after- 
ward. As an ex-governor of more than ordinary ability 
and wealth he had much influence, which he used in 
opposition to men that were trying to put down seces- 
sion. 2 

His arrest was due to military initiative and Sew- 
ard's relations with Morehead began at Fort Lafayette. 
It was not altogether illogical for a man believing that 
the law of gravitation was the only legal bond of union 
and that he held his "liberty by deed in fee-simple 
from God Almighty," to feel that he was the victim 
of malice when his opportunities for opposing the war 
were cut off. Such good men as Prentice, Guthrie, and 
Crittenden were soon asking for his release, but this 
meant next to nothing in respect to the merits of the 
case. Social and political influences of a personal char- 
acter were usually the chief factors in such requests. 3 
Morehead was soon removed to Fort Warren. As he 
would not take the oath of allegiance, fearing lest he 
might thereby lose his property within the Confederacy, 
his confinement continued until January 6, 1862, when 
he was given his freedom on pledging that he would not 
enter the state of Kentucky or any state in insurrection, 

1 Morehead to Crittenden, 2 Coleman, 338. 

2 Leslie Coombs, the veteran soldier and politician, who was helping 
organize and arm Union soldiers, wrote to Lincoln pronouncing More- 
head "The most specious, plausible, dangerous of all our Kentucky 
traitors. . . . He scattered the evil seeds of treason broadcast through 
the South by his false statements in public speeches as to the loyalty 
of Kentucky. If he did not advise, he stimulated the invasiou of 
Kentucky by his misrepresentations." — 115 War Records, 818. 

s Prentice urged the discharge of another Kentuckian whom he ad- 
mitted to be a secessionist. — 115 War Records, 807. 

267 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

and that he would hold himself at the disposition of the 
Secretary of State. Not a trace of evidence has been 
found to justify his violent denunciations of Seward. If 
the Secretary had been one-tenth as revengeful as was 
alleged, he would probably have kept this peculiar pa- 
triot in prison throughout the war. 

After Charles J. Faulkner, of Virginia, returned from 
France he was arrested in Washington, in August, 1861, 
on the ground that he was a secessionist. 1 Faulkner 
naturally expected that his case would be promptly in- 
vestigated, but there never was a reasonable doubt about 
his disloyalty. However, before he had been imprison- 
ed a month, Seward offered him his freedom provided 
he swore allegiance to the United States. lie declined 
this proposition, declaring that there was no authority 
for imposing such a condition. Finally, on December 
5th, Seward gave him permission to go to Richmond on 
his promise to return to Fort Warren within thirty days 
unless he should secure the release of Alfred Ely, a 
member of Congress from ISTew York, who had gone 
out to witness the battle of Bull Run and had been 
taken prisoner. This opportunity was accepted, and 
the Richmond authorities accordingly consented to make 
the exchange, which would not have been done if they 
had not regarded Faulkner as good Confederate legal- 
tender. 

George W. Jones was another patriot believing in a 
sacred right to aid and sympathize with public enemies. 
Marshall has made this picturesque soldier of fortune 
the subject of one of his most touching essays in mis- 
representation. 2 Jones continued to be Minister-resident 
at Bogota for several months after Lincoln came into 
office. He was an old friend and correspondent of the 

1 115 War Records, 463 ff. 

2 American Bastile, 375-84. For the official documents in this case, 
see 115 War Records, 1295-1302. 

268 



SEWARD AND THE POLITICAL PRISONERS 

President of the Confederacy, to whom he "wrote in 
May, 1861 : 

" May God Almighty avert civil war ; but if, unhappily, it 
shall come, you may — I think would without doubt — count 
upon me and mine and hosts of other friends standing 
shoulder to shoulder in the ranks with you and our other 
southern friends and relatives whose rights like my own 
have been disregarded by the abolitionists.''' 

By the time Jones reached the United States at least 
one of his sons had joined the Confederate army, and 
the correspondence of different members of his family 
showed sympathies that were thoroughly disloyal. The 
Record-book states that the arrest was made December 
20, 1861, as "a precautionary measure to prevent his 
canning into effect a purpose he had repeatedly pro- 
fessed that he entertained — of going south to join his 
fortunes and his efforts with those of the rebels." On 
February 22, 1862, he was released on solemnly pledg- 
ing not to render any aid to the enemies of his country. 
Subsequently he brought suit against Seward for five 
thousand dollars damages for false imprisonment. But 
there was no possibility of success; for the act of in- 
demnity of March 3, 1863, expressly shielded from pros- 
ecution for search, seizure, arrest, or imprisonment any 
person acting by order or authority of the President, 
or under color of any law of Congress. 

There were some unfortunate and even damaging ex- 
ceptions to the general features already noticed. 

The ex-colonel and an ex -lieutenant of some JSTe\v 
York troops, called the Empire City regiment, made 
affidavits before a United States commissioner that one 
Marcus C. Stanley had been instrumental in breaking 
up that regiment and in other ways had shown sym- 
pathy with the South. 1 The United States marshal in 

1 115 War Records, 766 flf. 
269 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

New York forwarded the affidavits as if they were 
reliable, and Stanley Avas soon in Fort Lafayette. In 
a few days Seward was informed on good authority 
that the prisoner deserved the thanks of the commu- 
nity for what he had done, and that he had in other 
ways helped the cause of the Union ; w r hereas the colo- 
nel was a disreputable character, and the regiment was 
not fit to go forward as it was organized. Seward 
promptly caused an able and independent police officer 
to examine the case. The report left no doubt about 
the injustice of the arrest. Seward ordered Stanley to 
be released on taking the oath of allegiance, but an 
innocent man had already been imprisoned for more 
than a week. Within a fortnight after the Secretary 
telegraphed, " Arrest Marcus C. Stanley . . . and send 
[him] to Fort Lafayette," he received this note from 
the superintendent of police of New York cit}' : " The 
bearer of this is Mr. Marcus Cicero Stanley, late from 
Fort Lafayette. He is capable of imparting informa- 
tion to you that may be useful in regard to that in- 
stitution." However suggestive of a time of revolution 
this incident may seem, it furnishes the strongest evi- 
dence that the persons concerned believed that Seward 
was open to conviction at all times. 

One of the most dangerous yet important features of 
this extra-legal system was that its best service often 
required prompt action on mere rumor or a plausible 
suspicion. In June, 1S61, Seward wrote a friendly letter 
to John E. Ward, who had lately been United States 
Minister to China, giving him a passport and a permit to 
send his baggage to his home in Savannah, Georgia. A 
few months later, when Ward came North on his way to 
Europe, Seward telegraphed to several different points 
ordering his arrest and imprisonment in Fort Lafayette. 1 



1 115 War Records, 10, 85. 
270 



SEWARD AND THE POLITICAL PRISONERS 

The Secretary soon became convinced that he had made 
a mistake. He promptly did all he could to rectify it. 1 

Seward had a correspondence with ex -President 
Pierce that illustrates more than one phase of the ex- 
ercise of arbitrary power. It was as exceptional as it 
was exceptionable ; it has been frequently overlooked. 
Franklin Pierce had been Seward's special aversion and 
political antithesis for many years. Before the begin- 
ning of the war he was such an intense hater of the 
antislavery tendencies of the North that he believed the 
South to be the aggrieved party. In April, 1861, he ad- 
dressed a Union mass -meeting, but he never concealed 
his dislike for the war-policy of the administration. In 
the autumn of 1861 he made some speeches in the "West 
which showed that he was one of the most conservative 
of conservative Democrats. 

In many villages and rural districts of the North the 
narrow-minded enmities between Republicans and Dem- 
ocrats had not yet given way to the generous impulses 
of patriotism and national defence. At North Branch, 

1 The following letter, taken from 115 War Records, 85, is a partial 
explanation : 

"Department of State, Washington, Octobers, 1881. 
"JohnE. Ward, Esq., 

"Care of Messrs. Baring Brothers & Co., London : 
"Sin, — I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated Que- 
bec, 27th ultimo, and now take pleasure in transmitting to you the 
passport in accordance with your request. Owing to the representa- 
tions of persons who, it appears, accompanied you from the South, it 
was deemed proper, with a due regard for the public safety, to obstruct 
you in the progress of your journey; but circumstances have since 
transpired which call for the removal of such restrictions, and the 
accompanying passport is, therefore, forwarded to you. If you deem 
it proper to destroy this communication you are at liberty to do so. 
" I am, your obedient servant, 

"William H. Seward." 

Why he should suggest that Ward might want to destroy this let- 
ter is not known. 

271 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

Michigan, there was a noisy little nest of anti-war Demo- 
crats employing their wits in puzzling and annoying the 
supporters of the administration. One of these tavern- 
brawlers wrote a long letter, crowded with uncertain 
signs and vague references to secret plots, one portion 
of which was as follows : 

" President P , in his passage, has drawn many brave 

and influential men to the league. P y, of the L. C. 

D t, sent a line to Doctor F (by EL, the Mormon 

elder), who as you perhaps know is just across the line 

from Port H . The league is doing nobly in M., I., 

and Wis. He is cautious, but in common with others is 
gradually preparing the minds of the people for a great 
change. He expresses a fear that any attempt to draft 
men will produce a premature outbreak. I think his fear 
is well founded. A member of the league in G-enesee who 
passed through the woods on his way with despatches to 

Doctor F told that any attempt to draft our friends 

there would bring on an open rupture. I think our leaders 
should look to this, as no doubt they will. . . . 
"Yours, in the cause, 

"*]ai!n m 

The letter miscarried and came into the hands of a 
United States marshal. The writer was detected and 
taken to Fort Lafayette to spend a few months. He 
undertook to explain what he had done by saying that 
it was merely an attempt " to ' sell ' the Detroit treason- 
shrieking press " and to get an amusing revenge on the 
Republicans, who had freely denounced many of the 
Democrats as traitors. Of course the United States 
marshal, the acting United States district attorney, and 
the detective employed did not believe that the letter 
was a hoax, but that it referred to the Knights of the 
Golden Circle ; and it was assumed that " President 
P " meant ex-President Pierce. 2 

1 For the whole letter and the documents in the Pierce case, see 
115 War Records, 1244-67. 

2 A Detroit correspondent also reported to Seward a not positively 

272 



SEWARD AND THE POLITICAL PRISONERS 

On the strength of such evidence, Seward sent the 
following note: 

"Department of State, Washington, December 20, 1861. 
Franklin Pierce, Esq., Concord, N. H.: 

"Sir, — I inclose an extract from a letter received at this 
Department, from which it would appear that you are a 
member of a secret league, the object of which is to over- 
throw the government. 

"Any explanation upon the subject which you may offer 
Avould be acceptable. 

"I am, etc., 

"William H. Seward." 

The ex-President's long and solemn answer contained 
these cutting sentences : 

" Surprise, however, only increases as I pass from your 
note to the extract to which you refer as a sufficient basis 
for an official communication. Incoherent and meaning- 
less as this extract from the vagaries of an anonymous cor- 
respondent seems to me to be, it is not a little singular that 
it should have been sent for explanation to one who during 
his whole life has never belonged to any secret league, so- 
ciety, or association. My name does not appear iu the ex- 
tract, and as there is not the slightest ground for any 
reference to me in the connection indicated, I take it for 
granted that 3 r our inference is wholly erroneous and that 
neither I nor anything which I ever said or did was in the 
mind of the writer. 

"Nothing but the gravity of the insinuation, the high 
official source whence it emanates, and the distracted con- 
dition of our recently united, prosperous, and happy coun- 
try could possibly lift this matter above ridicule and con- 
tempt." 

Seward then replied as follows : 

di9lo3 r ;il remark which he had overheard by chance and which came 
from a man supposed to be the ex-President. At the same time he 
inclosed two clippings from Detroit newspapers : The Tribune pro- 
nounced Pierce "a prowling traitor spy," but the charge was plainly 
made on the merest rumors'; the Free Press soberly gave iis reasons 
for thinking- Pierce to be a sincere Unionist. 
ii.— s 273 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

"Department of State, Washington, December 30, 1861. 
"Franklin Pierce: 

" My dear Sir, — An injurious aspersion on your fair 
fame and loyalty came into my hands. Although it was 
in an anonymous letter, the writer was detected and sub- 
sequently avowed the authorship. The document must 
become a part of the history of the times. I desired that 
you might know how your name was made use of by a 
traitor to increase the treason he was encouraging. Un- 
able to prepare a note to you personally, I devolved the 
duty on the chief clerk of this Department. The manner 
in which it was done has given you offence. I regret it and 
apologize for it with the only excuse I can make — namely, 
the necessity of employing another head to do what ought 
to be done, and yet which I had not time to do, personally. 
I place your answer on the files of the Department of State 
as an act of justice to yourself, and I beg you to be assured 
that all the unkindness of that answer does not in the least 
diminish the satisfaction with which I have performed in 
the best way I was able a public duty with a desire to ren- 
der you a service. 

" I am, with great respect, 

"Your obedient servant, 

"William H. Seward. 

"It may be proper to state that adopting the form of ad- 
dress to ex-Presidents of the United States used by the late 
Mr. Webster, I have invariably left off all titles of address 
as being most respectful." 

To say that the writer of the mysterious letter avowed 
its authorship, and then to conceal the fact that he de- 
clared it all a hoax, was an offence that needs no char- 
acterization here. Pierce met the transparent insin- 
cerity of this letter with well - deserved sarcasm in a 
reply of January 7, 1862, 1 and supposed the incident 
closed. 

A little later the newspapers again took up the story 

1 " Concord, N. H., January 7, 1862. 
"Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, Washington : 

" Dear Sir,— I have the honor to acknowledge the reception of 
your letter of the 30th ultimo. It could hardly have surprised you 

274 



SEWARD AND THE POLITICAL PRISONERS 

about the reference to Pierce in the mysterious Michigan 
letter, and stated that the original was on file in the 
Department of State. But they neglected to mention that 
Pierce's answer to it was also there. The ex-President 
knew how to deal with the annoyance. He caused 
Senator Latham, of California, to offer a resolution call- 
ing for the Seward-Pierce correspondence, " and all the 
other papers relating to the same." ' Seward promptly 
replied, saying that he transmitted therewith a copy of 
the correspondence "and of all other papers on file here 
relating to the same." But there was no more reference 
to the sarcastic letter of January 7th than if it had never 
been written. Pierce had prepared for such an outcome; 
so Latham called attention to the omission, and then 

to learn that I failed to discover in your official note a desire to render 
me a service. You will excuse me if I regard even a suggestion from 
a source so eminent that I am 'a member of a secret league, the ob- 
ject of which is to overthrow this Government,' as rather too grave to 
have been sent off with as little consideration as a note of rebuke might 
have been addressed to a delinquent clerk of one of the departments. 
" The writer of the anonymous letter, it seems, 'was detected and 
subsequently avowed the authorship,' and yet I am not advised wheth- 
er he disavows reference to me or whether there was an attempt to 
inculpate me in his disclosure. These were the only facts connected 
with him, his treason, or his confession at all material for me to know. 
I suppose 1 am left to infer the latter, because, although my name does 
not appear in the extract to which my attention was particularly called, 
you still state that an aspersion upon my ' fair fame and loyalty ' came 
into your hands. I think you will upon reflection arrive at the con- 
clusion that the whole ground upon which the allegation is repeated 
should, as a simple act of justice, have been placed before me. It was 
not the manner of your official note, as you seem to suppose, nor any 
form of address which awakened on my part a deep sense of wrong. 
These, whatever they may have been, were not worthy of serious no- 
tice. The substance was what I intended, as courteously as I could, 
but very distinctly, to repel. 

" I am, very respectfully, 

"Your obedient servant, 

"Franklin Pierce." 
' Globe, 1861-C2, 1370-71. 

275 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

read the missing document to the Senate. Retribution 
was not more swift than just. 

Not one of the political prisoners was brought to trial ; 
as a rule they were not even told why they were arrested. 
When the pressure for judicial procedure or a candid 
discussion of the case became too strong to be resisted 
on plausible grounds, the alleged offender was released. 
In the border states conviction would have been ex- 
tremely difficult, and a failure to convict would have 
reacted against the government. It was different in New 
England, and in states like New York and Michigan, 
Avhere the courts were in perfect working order. If 
adherence there to normal methods would have inspired 
less fear in evil-doers, it is certain that it would have 
furnished no basis for criticism, which, at times, was a 
heavy load for the administration. When there was an 
outcry on account of the arrest of the Maryland legis- 
lators, Lincoln said that " no arrest has been made, or 
will be made, not based on substantial and unmistaka- 
ble complicity with those in armed rebellion." ' A very 
important feature of the practice of arbitrary arrests, 
subsequently, was to prevent treason rather than to pun- 
ish it ; and because the aim was precautionary, it was 
assumed that there was no need of further action after 
the precaution had been taken. Of course it would have 
been unsafe to be frank about such a theory. 

Because there was no intention to prosecute, no evi- 
dence was collected after the arrest was ordered. Un- 
less the evidence happened to be very strong, the ex-parte 
pleas, declarations, and complaints in behalf of the pris- 
oner often indicated that Seward had proceeded with- 
out sufficient precaution. The department never made 
up its case, while that of the defendant is often nearly 
complete. How few convictions in the criminal courts 

1 Raymond's Lincoln, 378. 



SEWARD AND THE POLITICAL PRISONERS 

would seem to be just if one knew only the grounds on 
which the grand jury based the indictment, and then, 
at the trial, heard only the witnesses and the lawyers 
for the defence. Yet this is a fair illustration of the 
disproportion shown in the official records. And it is 
on this account that it is so easy to misrepresent the 
whole system. 

For the general policy as practised toward political 
offenders in the border states, there is no more occa- 
sion to apologize than there is for the fact that cannon 
caused destruction. The Confederacy found it necessary 
to adopt a similar system. It is extremely doubtful if 
Maryland could have been saved from secession and 
Washington from consequent seizure if the mayor and 
police commissioners of Baltimore, several members of 
the legislature, and many prominent citizens of both 
Maryland and Virginia had not been deprived of their 
power to do harm. Governor Hicks, who was probably 
the best judge, approved the arrest of the legislators, and 
opposed the liberation of some of them even after their 
successors had been elected. 1 But there were some se- 
rious abuses of this arbitrary power in the far northern 
states. 

The least excusable feature was the treatment of the 
prisoners. Month after month many of them were 
crowded together in gloomy and damp casemates, 
where even the dangerous "pirates" captured on pri- 
vateers, and soldiers taken in battle, ought not to have 
remained long. 2 Many had committed no overt act. 
There were among them editors and political leaders 
of character and honor, but whose freedom would be 
injurious to the prosecution of the war. Fortunately 
for Seward's reputation, their custody belonged to the 

1 114 War Records, 705. 

» 2 Coleman's Crittenden, 334, 341, 342 ; 115 War Records, 470 ; 
American Bastile, 652-80, 687 ff. 

277 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

War Department. It was largely clue to Seward's care, 
recommendations, interference even, that their unneces- 
sary hardships were not greater.' 

It was inevitable that innocent men should be caught 
in the dangerous machinery. It offered rare opportu- 
nities for the gratification of personal enmities and the 
display of power on the part of United States marshals 
and military officers. Seward could not fairly be blamed 
for things concerning which he himself was deceived, for 
he often had no time to take precautions. But he should 
have foreseen that a safety-valve was indispensable in 
the form of some arrangement whereby all cases should 
be promptly and impartially reviewed. It happened more 
than once that men languished in prison for weeks before 
any one at the department even heard their names. 2 At 
the gates of the chief forts there should have been an ex- 
amining board of two or three able men versed in judging 
evidence and familiar with the military and political prob- 
lems in the localities from which the prisoners were taken. 
They would quickly have separated the innocent from the 
guilty, and the harmless from the dangerous. They could 
have decided in a few hours or days as to what restraints 
or punishments were necessary. Instead of making some 
such provision, Seward relied upon occasional examina- 
tions, chiefly by Seth C. Hawley, the chief clerk of the 
[New York police commission ; by Robert Murray, the 
United States marshal at New York, and by Allan 
Pinkerton, the head of the United States secret service. 
This plan was so very inadequate that the prisons be- 
came overcrowded. 8 Although there is nothing to in- 



1 115 War Records, 36, 37, 121, 123. 

2 Department's Record-book, War Records, 290-348, furnishes evi- 
dences of this and of other abuses. 

3 The following sentences are from a report made by a United States 
marshal to Seward, October 28th : 

"Amongst the prisoners we found a number of men who occupy 

278 



SEWARD AND THE POLITICAL PRISONERS 

dicate that Seward was fond of keeping men in con- 
finement — in fact, the contrary seems to have been the 
case — yet his other duties were so engrossing that he 
naturally fell into the habit of waiting for political and 
personal pressure to be exerted before he paid much 
attention to the individual cases. The guilty could 
often command this more readily than the innocent. 1 

Seward's mental and physical traits were such that 
he undoubtedly liked the theory, but was greatly an- 
noyed by the exercise of so much authority in this 
peculiar field. Without doubting his own abilities, he 
probably realized that the resources of the War Depart- 
ment were much better suited than those of the Depart- 
ment of State to deal with every phase of the question 
of arbitrary arrests, whether military or political. Ac- 
cordingly, on February 14, 1862, the whole responsibility 
was given over to Secretary Stanton. 2 Soon a great 
many prisoners were released on parole. In a few days 
John A. Dix and Edwards Pierrepont were appointed 

no social position and who have no standing in the community, and 
whose room would be more beneficial to the government than the 
space they occupy. The main difficulty with regard to the comfort 
of the prisoners in the fort is the want of sufficient room, and b} r dis- 
charging those whom it is of no interest to the government to retain 
this difficulty would be obviated. These men, it would appear to me, 
could not do the government, any mischief, and it is only a matter 
of surprise how they came to be arrested. I would, therefore, advise 
that some competent person or persons should be named by you to 
examine into the charges against these men and report to you for 
your final action in the premises." — 115 War Records, 121. 

1 Morehead told Crittenden that the guilty uniformly got out. 
(2 Coleman, 335.) His own case, Gwin's, and those of several others 
who could then command the services of distinguished Unionists, in- 
dicate that there was truth in the statement. 

2 3 Seward, 72, says that this was done at Seward's suggestion to 
Stanton. "There is nothing whatever [in the official records] show- 
ing that Seward gave up the authority voluntarily or that Stanton 
sought it." — Leslie J. Perry, of the board of publication of the War 
Records, to the author, July 27, 1898. 

279 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM II. SEWARD 

commissioners to examine those still in military custody. 
They quickly caused nearly one hundred more to be 
liberated. In a note to Stanton, April 8, 1862, they said : 
" We have this day examined the cases of several pris- 
oners who have been long in prison and who are detained 
without just cause." l 

There was current a story that Seward boasted to 
Lord Lyons that he could ring a little bell and cause the 
arrest of a citizen of Ohio or order the imprisonment 
of a citizen of ISTew York, and that no one on earth ex- 
cept the President could release the prisoner. If he 
made the remark, it is of no special importance. It was 
a fact that he was almost as free from restraint as a 
dictator or a sultan, and he was charged with acting 
accordingly. But the surprising thing is that in the 
great mass of documents on the subject of political pris- 
oners there are no manifestations of improper motives 
or of extreme prejudice or of personal considerations 
except in the Pierce episode. His mistakes, save in one 
case, were perfectly natural and almost inevitable, con- 
sidering the constant anxiety of the administration about 
military affairs in front of Washington, and the need of 
suppressing words and acts in the North that might in- 
dicate to Great Britain and France that the Federal 
government was declining in strength. But no one 
will deny that Seward sought and was given too much 
responsibility. 

1 115 War Records, 277-79, 282. 



CHAPTER XXXV 

THE QUESTION OF EUROPEAN INTERVENTION, 1863-63 

The outcome of the Trent incident disabused the 
minds of many Englishmen of the belief that Seward 
desired a foreign war, but it did not affect the economic 
influences working toward intervention. Louis Napo- 
leon once remarked to one of the Confederates that " the 
policy of nations is controlled by their interests, and not 
by their sentiments." 1 The actions of France and of 
Great Britain during these years furnished excellent 
illustrations of this rule. It was not difficult to estimate 
approximately the losses that the two countries were 
suffering on account of the blockade ; but the question 
that no one could answer was : What will intervention 
cost if it entails a war with the United States and a 
general disturbance of European politics? The belief 
that the North could not conquer the South, and that 
the attempt would not continue very long, was an addi- 
tional reason for postponing all direct efforts to influence 
affairs in the United States. 

After the beginning of 1862 there was no substan- 
tial reason to doubt the efficiency of the blockade. But 
the Confederacy argued at one time that it was folly to 
respect a blockade through which scores of ships ran 
with impunity ; at another time it maintained that the 
blockade prevented Confederate independence and cut 
off the exchange of cotton and merchandise, without 



1 Bigelow's France and the Confederate Navy, 121. 
281 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

which the distress must continue both in Europe and in 
the South. Plainly there was nothing in international 
law that would warrant foreign interference. So, if it 
came, it must be the outgrowth of selfish interests. But 
some plausible theory or fiction might be regarded as a 
sufficient excuse. However, Great Britain and France 
watched the blockade like birds of prey eager for quarry 
where no risk was involved. 

Near the end of 1861 the United States Navy Depart- 
ment purchased a score or two of old vessels, former- 
ly used as whalers or in the India trade, loaded them 
with stone, and sank them at points in the channels of 
Charleston harbor and of the Savannah river, where it 
w r as expected they would cause accumulations of sand 
and alluvial deposits, and thus stop navigation. The 
New York Times of December 23, 1861, triumphantly 
declared that those vessels were filled with Massachusetts 
rock, and would forever blockade Charleston harbor. 
Although this device was not entirely novel, it was very 
unusual, and it was soon popularly known as a blockade 
by a stone fleet. 

In Europe it aroused great indignation, and many pro- 
nounced it a violation of the laws of war. Even Cobden 
called it a " barbarism." ' If the Times was right as to 
the " forever," the trade of Great Britain and of France 
w T as to be permanently injured; and Thouvenel so under- 
stood the signs. The general depression of manufactur- 
ing and commercial interests in Europe was increasing. 
" This is attributed to the blockade," Weed wrote in 
January, 1862. " Europe asks how long this is to last ? 
And finally, assuming the answer, they say, is it not 
time to recognize the independence of the South?" But 
for recent successes at Port Ro} 7 al, he believed that a 
combination would have been formed against the United 

1 2 Morley's Cobden, 393. 
282 



THE QUESTION OF INTERVENTION, 1862-63 

States. He thought the objections to the "stone fleet" 
were more a pretext than an expression of a real griev- 
ance; yet he was confident that Napoleon had again 
suggested to Great Britain that they interfere jointly in 
the affairs of the United States. 1 On January 18th 
Mann reported to Jefferson Davis that he regarded it as 
certain that the Emperor was to raise the blockade. In 
fact, the representatives of both the great powers grew 
very indignant because they considered that the United 
States had adopted a peculiarly objectionable method 
of evading the conventional duties of maintaining a 
blockade. 2 

Seward explained that the measures were only tempo- 
rary expedients. " No American ever conceived that the 
human hand could place obstructions in a river which 
the same hand could not remove. No loyal American 
citizen has regarded this war as one that can have any 
other than a brief duration, with a termination favorable 
to the Union, casting upon the Federal government the 
responsibilit}' of improving the harbors of all the states." 
Two of the natural channels leading to Charleston harbor 
had been in no way obstructed, he said. 3 As evidence of 
this, he added that a British steamer laden with con- 
traband had just succeeded in getting in. The London 
Spectator of February 1, 1862, called this " a neat reply." 
And the question soon ceased to afford any excuse for 
protests and threatening hints. 

Cobden,in December, 1861, believed that three-fourths 
of the members of the House of Commons would be 
glad to find an excuse for voting for a dismemberment 
of the great Republic. 4 And Weed found the Emper- 
or of the French and all his associates, except Prince 
Napoleon, in sympathy with the Confederacy. Since 

1 3 Seward, 54, 55, 56. 

2 Dip. Cor., 1862, 409, 410, explains Thouvenel's attitude. 

s Dip. Cor., 18G2, 316. * 2 Morley, 390. s 1 Weed, 642. 

283 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

October, 1861, Seward had felt much concern lest the 
French and the British Parliaments on reassembling 
early in 1862 might assume an unfriendly attitude. 
" The next will probably be a direct demonstration in 
Europe for recognition on account of the rigors of the 
blockade," he wrote to Dayton in an unpublished de- 
spatch of January 2,1862. "If the military and naval 
movements now imminent shall be as successful as we 
think, we shall have much confidence in our ability to 
meet with success the last and greatest foreign difficulty 
before us." Then he very prudently added : " At the 
same time, do not lose an opportunity for saying that 
with our past and coming successes we are quite sure 
that the need of the blockade will not continue very long. 
If necessary, speak of it as a thing more and more with- 
in our power to modify, if not to terminate altogether." 
In the same month he said, in a letter to Weed: "But 
I know this, that whatever nation makes war against 
us, or forces itself into a war, will find out that we can 
and will suppress the rebellion and defeat the invaders 
themselves." Then again a few days later: "Your let- 
ters alarm me about the malign intentions on the part 
of Great Britain and France. ... It will be a sad day 
if Europe intervenes. What we can do to prevent it we 
are doing." 1 

Very early in 1862 it was thoroughly announced in Eu- 
rope that the Federal government was about to begin an 
aggressive campaign against the Confederacy. This was 
an admonition against foreign intermeddling just then. 
France was also very much engrossed in the difficult task 
of improving the condition of her finances. 2 In February 
Weed wrote from London: "All is quiet now, in the 
expectation that an immense army and navy will show 
results." 3 The news of the Federal victories, especially 

1 3 Seward, 43, 43. 

5 Slidell to Benjamin, February 11, 1882. a 3 Seward, 62. 

284 



THE QUESTION OF INTERVENTION, 18C2-G3 

at Forts Henry and Donelson, was additional reason for 
procrastination. It put at great disadvantage the Con- 
federate sympathizers who, in the House of Commons 
in March, took part in the debate on the blockade. 

Neither the recent Union victories, nor the prospects 
of still greater successes in the near future, had much 
effect on the impatience of France. On April 9th, II. S. 
Sanford, our Minister to Belgium, had a long talk with 
Thouvenel, who told him that France " must have cot- 
ton " ; that the French people were becoming irritated, 
and some of the communications he had received from 
the chambers of commerce were even menacing in their 
language; and he thought the government of the United 
States had unnecessarily stimulated this feeling by its 
vigorous refusal of communication with the South. " It 
may not be simply a question of policy abroad that Ave 
shall have to deal with, but of public peace at horned l 
During the same month Weed sent to Seward many 
warnings of similar tenor. 2 

About this time Napoleon tried to persuade Great 
Britain to join him in some kind of a demand on the 
United States for the purpose of relieving the difficulties ; 
and he used Lindsay, the Confederate ally and Member 
of the House of Commons, as his spokesman. Russell 
refused to recognize such an undiplomatic medium. But 
Napoleon at least convinced Lindsay and Slidell that his 
efforts had been bona fide, and that he would soon act on 
his own responsibility, unless, in case of the loss of New 
Orleans, which he did not expect, this might be inexpe- 
dient. 3 

It was hazardous to seem to be depriving Europe of 
cotton. To let it through the blockade would be to sur- 
render the very means by which that staple had been 

1 Sanford to Seward, April 10, 1862. Seward MSS. 

2 3 Seward, 85-97. 3 Slidell to Benjamin, April 18, 1862. 

285 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

made worthless to the Confederates. Yet in April Weed 
wrote from Paris that the United States must try to 
get free from the charge of being responsible for the 
cotton famine. " So, if possible, open ports, and let the 
enemy refuse the cotton." 1 Lincoln's administration 
had merely been waiting for a suitable opportunity. 
This was offered by the capture of New Orleans and of 
Beaufort, North Carolina, near the end of April. By 
proclamation of May 12, 1862, these ports and Port 
Royal, in South Carolina, were declared open to com- 
merce. It was expected that this would tend to relieve 
the tension. 

After many weary months of preparation, McClel- 
lan was now engaged in the great campaign that was 
expected to end with the capture of Richmond. That 
won, it was assumed that the Confederacy would soon 
collapse, for its northern line of defence between the 
Alleghenies and the Mississippi had been destroyed and 
the river was practically open everywhere except in 
the neighborhood of Vicksburg. But the magnificent 
Army of the Potomac was soon to be checked in its 
forward march. Near the end of June inferior num- 
bers of the enemy met and repulsed it ; and, after a 
week of hard fighting, McClellan effected a change of 
base from the Chickahominy to the James river. For 
several days McClellan's communications with Washing- 
ton were entirely cut off. Therefore, there was reason 
for greater alarm and panic at the capital than had yet 
been seen. 

Seward was one of McClellan's special friends, and had 
expressed confidence that he would soon conquer the Con- 
federacy. Nevertheless, when the news of McClellan's 
reverses reached Washington, the Secretary of State was 
ready with ideas and plans as to how to meet the crisis.' 

1 3 Seward, 85. ,J See post, p. 352. 

286 



THE QUESTION OF INTERVENTION, 1862-G3 

Lest Europe might draw too damaging inferences, he 
hastened to inform Adams: "The governors of the loyal 
states unanimously demand a speedy close of the war, 
and offer all the forces required at the President's dis- 
cretion. The President promptly calls for three hun- 
dred thousand men. They will be furnished with alac- 
rity." 1 This sufficed for merely a few days. On the 
7th he made an explanation of what had taken place 
in Tennessee, Mississippi, and Virginia. He assumed 
that Ilalleck would capture Chattanooga, that Grant 
would soon be in possession of Vicksburg, and that Far- 
ragut's running past the batteries at the latter place had 
surmounted " the last obstacle of the navigation of the 
Mississippi." But no such good fortune was to attend 
the movements of these armies. As to the state of 
affairs in Virginia, some of Seward's statements were 
thoroughly misleading, and are to be explained only on 
the ground that he thought the government's interests 
demanded a concealment and misrepresentation of the 
facts. He said that the efficiency of the Federal forces 
had been improved, while that of the Confederates had 
been impaired. 

"Everyone of the battles was a repulse of the insurgents, 
and the two last, which closed the series, were decided vic- 
tories. . . . 

"If the representative [respective ?] parties had now to 
choose whether they would have the national army where 
it is and as it is, or back again where it was and as it was, 
it is not to be doubted that the insurgents would prefer 
to it the position and condition on the Pamunkey, and the 
friends of the Union the one now attained on the bank of 
the Juines.'' 3 

Some wit appropriately received similar official an- 
nouncements with the remark: "Undoubtedlv McClel- 



3 Seward, 110. a Dip. Cor., 1862, 125, 12G. 

287 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

Ian has won a great victory, but what the people want 
to know is who is responsible for it." 

Seward's activity was always especially interesting 
whenever he became excited, as he had a right to be 
at this time. Because Lincoln had rejected the proposi- 
tions of April 1, 1861, and the whole incident had been 
kept a profound secret, the Secretary was able to make 
a virtue of our attitude toward Spain and France. On 
July 10, 1862, he wrote to Dayton : 

"We have interfered with the dominion or the ambi- 
tious designs of no nation. We have seen San Domingo 
absorbed by Spain, and been content with a protest. We 
have seen Great Britain strengthen her government in Can- 
ada, and have approved it. We have seen France make 
war against Mexico, and have not allied ourselves with that 
republic. We have heard and redressed every injury of 
which any foreign state has complained, and Ave have re- 
laxed a blockade in favor of foreign commerce that we 
might rightfully have maintained with inflexibility. We 
have only complained because an attitude of neutrality 
encouraging to rebellion among us, adopted hastily and 
unnecessarily, has not been relinquished when the progress 
of the war showed that it was as injurious as it was ill- 
advised. 

"Under these circumstances, if intervention in any form 
shall come, it will find us in the right of the controversy, 
and in the strong attitude of self-defence. ... It will 
here bring out reserved and yet latent forces of resistance 
that can never go to rest until America shall be recon- 
quered and reorganized by Europe, or shall have become 
isolated forever equally from the industrial and govern- 
mental systems of that continent. European statesmen, I 
am sure, before waging war against us, will consider their 
rights, interests, and resources as well as our own." 1 

About a fortnight later Seward learned that in Eng- 
land and France there was again much talk of inter- 
vention. A long despatch of July 28th to Adams, and 
a duplicate to Dayton, explained the aims and difficul- 

1 Dip. Cor., 1862, 372. 
288 



THE QUESTION OF INTERVENTION, 1S62-63 

ties of the war and of foreign relations. It stated that 
the United States continued to rely "upon the prac- 
tice of justice and respect of our sovereignty by foreign 
powers"; but lest this might admit of an erroneous in- 
ference, he added : " It is not necessary for me to say 
that if this reliance fails, this civil war will, without our 
fault, become a war of continents — a war of the world ; 
and whatever else may revive, the cotton trade, built 
upon slave labor in this country, will be irredeema- 
bly wrecked in the abrupt cessation of human bondage 
within the territories of the United States." 1 With just 
enough sarcasm, Seward's spirit and resolution were dis- 
played in these sentences taken from an unpublished 
despatch to Dayton, also of July 28th : 

" France will not conquer both Mexico and the United 
States with one campaign. Certain politicians about the 
courts and the press seem to assume that this nation lies 
at the mercy of any invader or invaders who can muster an 
army of conscripts or fit out a fleet. We have no such 
fears that any European government thinks so. We know 
that in civil war, as well as in others, battles must be lost 
as well as won, and we should not lose our courage or reso- 
lution, even if not merely a battle, but a whole campaign, 
should result against us. We mean to practise justice and 
caution, with as much generosity as possible. We expect 
other powers to do the same, and so we expect to go through 
this, our unhappy civil war, without the complication of 
foreign intervention." 

The Confederates were at a great disadvantage in 
trying to enlist active governmental assistance abroad. 
With their cotton they were, like Archimedes with his 
lever, confident that they could move the world if they 
once got a place to stand on. Neither France nor Great 
Britain would have long delayed recognition or the 
breaking of the blockade if the Confederacy could have 

1 Dip. Cor., 1862, 157. 
ii.— t 289 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

guaranteed to them that their peaceful relations with 
the United States would not also come to an end. But 
it was impossible to give this assurance. Except in mo- 
ments of enthusiasm, or as a result of theorizing, the Con- 
federates never had much faith in obtaining the direct 
aid of the British government. After Napoleon's de- 
signs in Mexico became apparent, early in 1862, the Con- 
federates believed that he would not allow the North 
to succeed. The first instructions to Mason and Slidell 
directed them to try to have cotton excepted from the 
blockade. 1 But they had not been long at their respec- 
tive posts before they saw that the task of entering into 
negotiations of any kind was to be very difficult. 

Benjamin, the successor of Hunter as Secretary of 
State, was a man of quick perception and great enterprise. 
By the spring of 1862 he concluded that if the Confed- 
eracy was to live it must obtain a status among nations, 
and break the blockade b}^ which it was slowly stran- 
gling. On April 12, 1862, he authorized Slidell to nego- 
tiate a treaty with France, permitting free entrance to 
French goods for a period to be specified later, if the 
Emperor should cease to acquiesce in the blockade. It 
was well known that Napoleon felt much hampered by 
the unsatisfactory condition of the national finances. 
To overcome this difficulty, the Confederacy was willing 
to arive " one hundred thousand bales of cotton of five 
hundred pounds each, [which] would represent a grant 
to France of not less than twelve million five hundred 
thousand dollars." Benjamin thought that " such a sum 
would maintain afloat a considerable fleet for a length 
of time quite sufficient to open the Atlantic and Gulf 
ports to the commerce of France." This amount did 
not represent the limit to which Slidell might go ; it 
was suggested that the Confederacy would, perhaps, 

1 Benjamin to Slidell, September 23, 1861. 
290 



THE QUESTION OF INTERVENTION, 1862-63 

double the subsidy, and that the interchange of com- 
modities " might absorb half a million or a million of 
bales." France was expected to send ships for the cot- 
ton — which, of course, they could not get until after they 
bad broken the blockade. The ships could bring mer- 
chandise, and the profit on it might well be expected to 
amount to as much as the profit on the cotton ; so that 
-France would make at least one hundred million francs, 
or twenty million dollars. For the purpose of prepar- 
ing public opinion in France for such a plan, Benjamin 
sent a special press-agent, Edwin de Leon, with a secret- 
service fund of twenty-live thousand dollars. Benjamin 
thought that the carrying out of such an undertaking 
would practically bring the struggle to a successful ter- 
mination. 1 

Slidell had no difficulty in arranging unofficial meet- 
ings with Thouvenel and other members of the Cabi- 
net, all of whom impressed him as favorable to the Con- 
federac} T . On July 16th he had his first interview with 
Napoleon. The commissioner reported the Emperor as 
saying, that although it was the interest of France that 
the United States should be a counter-weight to the 
maritime power of Great Britain, yet his sympathies 
had always been with the South, and his difficult} 7 was 
to find a proper means of giving expression to these 
sentiments. He deeply regretted that France had ever 
respected the blockade and had not recognized the Con- 
federacy after the battle of Bull Kun. But to open the 
ports forcibly now would be a hostile act; mediation 
would probably be rejected in insulting terms by the 
North; a recognition of independence would be of little 
advantage to the Confederacy, and might involve France 
in a war ; it would quicken the Federal enlistments and 
strengthen the administration in the ensuing election. 

1 Text in Bigelow's Fi'ance and the Confederate Navy, 176-79. 
291 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM II. SEWARD 

Slidell susforested that France should declare Charleston, 
Wilmington, and some small cities to be open ports, and 
enforce the decree by arms. He thought it likely " that 
the northern press and government would bully and 
menace, but that experience had fully shown what value 
should be placed on their threats." Then he set forth 
the proposition as Benjamin had directed, and, in addi- 
tion, he expressed the belief that the Confederacy could 
have no objection to making common cause with France 
against the United States and the republican govern- 
ment in Mexico. 

If the very existence of France had depended upon 
success in Mexico, then the proposition would have been 
a fair one. As it was, Napoleon was to get, if he could, 
something like twenty million dollars after involving 
France in a war with the United States. He understood 
how this would satisfy his sentiment, but not his inter- 
ests, although Slidell was magnanimous enough to say: 
"Tour majesty has now an opportunity of securing a 
faithful ally, bound to you not only b} T the ties of grati- 
tude, but by those, more reliable, of a common interest 
and congenial habits." What wonder that, as the Con- 
federate commissioner was advocating recognition, the 
Emperor remarked, " with a very significant smile " : " It 
is very singular that, while you ask absolute recognition, 
Mr. Dayton is calling upon me to retract my qualified 
recognition of you as belligerents." Slidell explained 
this as " but another evidence of the insolence of the 
Washington government." ' Although Slidell saw that 
the Emperor was thoroughly non-committal on the dif- 
ferent points of importance, he nevertheless inferred 
" that if England long preserved [persevered ?] in obsti- 
nate inaction he would take the responsibility of mov- 
ing by himself." 2 

1 Slidell to Benjamin, July 25, 1862. Bigelow's France and the 
Confederate Navy, 116 ff. 2 Bigelow, 125. 

292 



THE QUESTION OF INTERVENTION, 1S62-63 

Mason's path in England was even less smooth. The 
welcome he received did not equal his expectations. On 
June 23, 1862, he reported to Benjamin that the occu- 
pation of the principal southern port by the Federals 
had destroyed almost all chances of interference in re- 
gard to the blockade, and left only the question of rec- 
ognition. ^Nevertheless, two weeks later he addressed 
a long communication to Russell, arguing that the block- 
ade was effective neither in fact nor according to inter- 
national law. 1 But the foreign office merely acknowl- 
edged its receipt without referring to its contents. 

Almost simultaneously, in the latter part of July, 1862, 
Mason and Slidell made formal requests for recognition 
of the Confederacy by Great Britain and France, re- 
spective 1 ^. They expected to gain a diplomatic advan- 
tage abroad from McClellan's disasters in the Penin- 
sula. Mason urged that an existence of eighteen months 
was sufficient evidence of stability, and he claimed that 
his government consisted of thirteen sovereign states, 
with an area of nearly nine hundred thousand square 
miles, and a population of twelve million inhabitants. 
Eussell rebutted these claims by referring to Confederate 
defeats and the general uncertainty of the military status, 
and then he quoted a recent despatch from Seward in 
which it was asserted that the white population in the 
insurrection was under five millions, and that the South- 
ern Confederacy owed its main strength to hope of as- 
sistance from Europe. 2 It would have been difficult to 
make a more offensive reply ; and Mason and Benjamin 
expressed great indignation about it. 

Thouvenel did not take any notice of Slidell's request 
for nearly a month, and then he merely sent word, un- 
officially and oralhy, that he preferred to remain silent 
unless an answer — which would be unmeaning — should 



55 Bri ! ish State Papers, 724-27. ■ 55 State Papers, 733, 784. 

293 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

be insisted upon. Naturally Slidell was chilled, and he 
reported that he was "getting heartily tired of Paris"; 
for, as he wrote, " we are hard and fast aground here, 
and nothing will float us off but a strong and continued 
current of important successes in the field. " ' So the two 
great European powers continued to procrastinate. 

In July, 1S62, Adams feared that intervention in some 
form would be soon attempted, unless affairs should be- 
come more favorable to the North. 2 Although Seward 
expressed himself as unwilling to share Adams's appre- 
hensions, nevertheless, on August 2d, he gave specific in- 
structions as to what course the United States Minister 
to Great Britain should take in certain circumstances. 
After another exposition, showing that Great Britain 
could not possibly improve her condition by interfering, 3 
he said in an unpublished part of the despatch : 

"If the British government shall in any way approach 
yon directly or indirectly with propositions which assume 
or contemplate an appeal to the President on the subject 
of our internal affairs, whether it seem to imply a purpose 
to dictate or to mediate or to advise or even to solicit or 

1 To Benjamin in an official despatch and in a personal letter, each of 
August 20, 1862. 2 Dip. Cor., 1862, 140. 

3 "Is it probable that her intervention would mitigate the war, or 
alleviate the embarrassment she is suffering from it ? The question 
seems to involve a preliminary one — namely, what is to be the charac- 
ter of her intervention? Is it to be merely a moral one, or an act of 
recognition, with a declaration of neutrality, but not respecting our 
blockade, and not refraining and restraining her subjects from violating 
it ? Shall we not, in that case, be justified in withdrawing the relaxa- 
tion of the blockade we have already made, and in closing the ports 
we have opened to her commerce ? If we should do this, would her 
recognition of the insurgents shorten the war, or would it alleviate the 
embarrassment she suffers from it? But it may be answered that she 
would not consent to surrender these concessions, and would resort to 
force to save them. Then Great Britain would violate belligerent 
rights allowed us by the law of nations, and would become an ally of 

294 



THE QUESTION OF INTERVENTION, 1862-63 

persuade, yon will answer that yon are forbidden to debate, 
to hear, or in any way receive, entertain, or transmit any 
communication of the kind. You will make the same an- 
swer whether the proposition come from the British govern- 
ment alone or from that government in combination with 
any other Power. 

"If you are asked an opinion what reception the President 
would give to such a proposition if made here, you will re- 
ply that you are not instructed, but you have no reason for 
supposing that it would be entertained. 

" If, contrary to our expectation, the British government, 
either alone or in combination with any other government, 
should acknowledge the insurgents, while you are remain- 
ing without further instructions from this department con- 
cerning that event, you will immediately suspend the ex- 
ercise of your functions, and give notice of that suspension 
to Earl Russell and to this department. If the British gov- 
ernment make any act or declaration of war against the 
United States, you will desist from your functions, ask a 
passport, and return without delay to this capital. I have 
now, in behalf of the United States and by the authority of 
their chief executive magistrate, performed an important 
duty. Its possible consequences have been weighed, and 
its solemnity is, therefore, felt and freely acknowledged. 
This duty has brought us to meet and confront the danger 
of a war with Great Britain and other states allied with the 
insurgents who are in arms for the overthrow of the Amer- 

our domestic enemies ; and then she would be at war with us, while, 
at least, some other commercial state would be maintaining towards us 
relations of neutrality and peace. Would Great Britain profit by a 
war with us ? Certainly neither nation could profit by the war while 
it should be in actual operation. But it is said she might divide and 
conquer us. What would she gain bj r that ? . . . But what warrant 
have the British government for expecting to conquer the United 
States, and to subjugate and desolate them, or to dictate to them terms 
of peace? A war urged [waged] against \is by Great Britain could 
not fail to reunite our people. Every sacrifice that their independence 
could require would be cheerfully and instantly made, and every force 
and every resource which has hitherto been held in reserve in a civil 
war, because the necessity for immediately using it has not been felt, 
would be brought into requisition. I shall not willingly believe that 
Great Britain deliberately desires such a war, as I am sure that every 
honorable and generous effort will be made by the United Slates to 
avoid it."— Dip. Cor., 1862, 166. 

205 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

ican L'nion. You will perceive that we have approached 
the contemplation of that crisis with the caution which 
great reluctance has inspired. But I trust that 3 t ou will 
also have perceived that the crisis has not appalled us." 

A " current of important successes in the field " set 
in for the Confederates earlier than even Slidell could 
have expected. After McClellan's failure, Pope was put 
in command of the forces in northern Yirginia and prom- 
ised to wage an aggressive campaign. Lee sent Jack- 
son northward to occupy his attention, while he himself 
watched McClellan, who was forced to remain inactive 
by the James river during July, 1862. Early in August 
it was foreseen that the next great battle was to be 
nearer to Washington than to Richmond, and somewhat 
west of a line drawn between the two capitals. Almost 
the entire month was consumed by manoeuvring and 
inarching and occasional engagements. Finally, on the 
29th, the two armies, including Lee's as well as a part 
of McClellan's troops, met on and near the first battle- 
field of Bull Run. Pope's army was routed, and nar- 
rowly escaped destruction before reaching the fortifica- 
tions on the Yirginia side of the Potomac, in front of 
Washington. Instead of pursuing Pope, Lee marched 
northward and crossed the river not far from Harpers 
Ferry. In an offensive campaign he hoped to swing 
Mainland into the Confederacy, menace cities and states 
farther north, pocket the District of Columbia, and 
capture or scatter the Federal officials. Just at this 
time the Confederates in the West were very aggres- 
sive. Bragg and Kirby Smith were making daring and 
skilful marches across Kentucky to the Ohio river. It 
was only a few days later that Price and Yan Dorn 
moved northward from Mississippi to cut off communi- 
cations between Grant and Roseerans, in west Tennes- 
see, and Buell near the central part of the state. 

There was almost a panic in Washington during the 

296 



THE QUESTION OF INTERVENTION, 1862-63 

early part of September. It was feared that Federal 
success was the only impossibility after the miserable 
failure of McClellan's and of Pope's campaigns. What 
wonder that men looked off from the heights of the 
District and almost expected to seethe banners and hear 
the tread of conquering Confederates. The crisis, both 
in military and in diplomatic affairs, seemed to be at 
hand. Seward must have realized the danger, for near 
the middle of July he had said that a Union defeat at 
Richmond or at Washington would probably bring on 
recognition of the Confederacy, "to be either acquiesced 
in or met by war." ' On September 7, 1862, Mercier, 
the French Minister, announced to the Secretary of State 
the opinion that it was time to recognize that the South 
could not be conquered. Was this to be the first step 
toward that intervention on the part of France and Great 
Britain that had been talked of so long? Of course 
much depended on the political status in those countries, 
but more on the aims of Napoleon and the opinions of 
Palmerston and Russell. 

In France there was no deep-seated dislike of the 
United States, although the activit\ T of Confederate 
press-agents had scattered broadcast the impression that 
the success of their cause would be an advantage to 
Frenchmen. But public opinion had hardly any effect 
on the foreign relations of the Second Empire. Na- 
poleon's plans, where definite, were generally the pro- 
duct of somewhat dreamy schemes which were influenced 
at times by unofficial counsellors. His Ministers were 
frequently much in the dark as to his aims. They were 
" little else than upper clerks," wrote Dayton to Seward. 2 
And Slidell, who recognized the fact, quoted one of the 
members of the French Cabinet as saying that he mere- 
's Seward, 115. 

2 These words were left out when the despatch of Octoher 21, 1862, 
was printed. 

297 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

ly played the role of supernumerary. 1 So the Secretary 
of the United States legation was undoubtedly correct 
in his conclusion that the rumors about Napoleon's opin- 
ions were merely what those about him thought that he 
thought. 2 What is historically certain is that the Em- 
peror tried to convince each side that he was especially 
favorable to it, while, in fact, his sole aim was to use 
both without scruple and without risk, if possible. With 
him duplicity was a tool and dishonest}' a habit. He 
wanted France to have cotton less because the manu- 
facturing interests needed it than because the lack of it 
was likely to embarrass his complex plans. He had al- 
read}^ become involved in Mexico. He saw that the 
Confederacy was his natural ally, yet he had neither 
the courage nor the decision of character to enter into 
an alliance with it. 

Mercier was supposed to have much influence with 
Napoleon in regard to American affairs. From the first 
he had been an impatient sympathizer with the Confed- 
eracy, and he was quite devoid of the balance and good 
judgment that characterized Lord Lyons. However, 
Seward appeared to regard his peculiarities and the ru- 
mors of his decided hostility to the United States as 
if they were the harmless and natural results of earlier 
associations with Southerners. 3 In the spring of 1862 

1 Slidell to Benjamin, November 29, 1862. 

2 Schuyler to Seward, October 31, 1861. Seward MSS. 

3 The following sentences from an unpublished despatch of July 
28, 1862, to Dayton show Seward's opinion of Mercier: " As for Mr. 
Mercier, he is not ill-disposed, but the contrary. His early associa- 
tions, however, in this country were with the insurgent leaders, who cer- 
tainly then were very important and powerful personages, for they dic- 
tated policies to the previous administration. They are now traitors, 
every day losing importance and prestige, as all traitors must. But 
Mr. Mercier does not see this. He is, therefore, understood to be a 
doubter, a despondent of our success. It is suspected that it is not 
the result of his constitution. He wants cotton for France, and would 
like it at any cost. But he is not likely, I think, to counsel any inter- 

298 



THE QUESTION OF INTERVENTION, 18G2-63 

Mercier expressed regret that he was not able to go to 
Richmond to judge of affairs in that capital, and to look 
after some commercial interests of France. Quite un- 
necessarily, Seward helped him to make the trip. 1 As 
ought to have been foreseen, Secretary Benjamin util- 
ized the meeting with his old friend to show how resolute 
and hopeful the Confederate leaders were. Mercier's 
sympathies were strengthened into convictions; and, of 
course, the visit gave his conclusions on the American 
question much more weight with the Emperor. 

On September 7, 1802, Seward and Mercier had a 
conversation about the attitude of France toward the 
two belligerents. The account that the Secretary sent 
to Dayton the next day, but which has never been pub- 
lished, is the best explanation of the critical status : 

"He [Mercier] proceeded: 'I think now that the Union 
is no longer possible. We therefore think, my government 
thinks, that what is best is that which will be nearest to 
what has been before, what is most like to what the Union 
has been. So that if there must be two confederacies, then 
they should be confederated confederacies/ Here Mr. 
Mercier stopped, and I took up the word, saying: ' Mr. Mer- 
cier, yon can do this country and your own no greater 
service than by telling your government at once that this 
government neither has the thought, nor can entertain it, by 
whomsoever it may be suggested, that there are or can ever 

ference to get it. I have no reason to think he wishes us anything 
but good, aud certainly he does not wish any evil to his own country 
or her chief. . . . I do not think that Mr. Mercier will immediately 
have leave to go home. If he should I can hardly suppose that he 
would be prepared to advise adversely to us. If he should go home he 
certainly would want to come back. Could he expect to be received 
here if he should do us injury while at Paris? I think he knows the 
line where our forbearance must stop. If European statesmen can- 
not see that iliey have caused us to isolate ourselves enough already, 
I think Mr. Mercier can. He would prefer Washington to Richmond 
as a diplomatic residence — who would not?" Such reasoning was not 
likely to lead to an accurate judgment. 
1 See post, pp. 371, 372. 

299 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM II. SEWARD 

be two confederacies here, or any other government than this 
Union, just as it constitutionally exists and has always boon." 
He interposed to say that I must confess that circumstan- 
ces must control, and that they now look very unfavorable. 
I replied that this government saw nothing in the change 
of circumstances but a new phase in the ever-changing 
panorama, which would probably be followed by anew and 
different phase to-morrow. He said you are expecting a bat- 
tle soon. I replied: ' Yes. We expect a battle and a victory, 
but, however this may be, do not for a moment believe 
i hat either the President, Congress, myself, or any per- 
son connected with this government, will in any case en- 
tertain any projiosition or suggestion of arrangement, or 
accommodation, or adjustment, from within or without, 
upon the basis of a surrender of the Federal Union.' lie 
again replied: •Certainly, but you know we are friendly, 
and Ave are looking to the possibilities of your disappoint- 
ment, and you would then think it necessary to adopt the 
!>est practicable measures for the preservation of thecountry 
and its welfare.' 1 replied: • I must undeceive you entirely 
In that respect. Chaos, even if it must result from our 
efforts to save the Union, could not be worse than the best 
substitution that could be offered or found for it, if it were 
(o be overthrown. And chaos it must be if. indeed, there 
were no alternative but attempts at composition of the 
strife, either on the oiler of the insurgents, or through the 
intervention of any foreign powers, whatever their virtues 
might be. You know what France did to save her integrity 
in 1793. Do not for a moment let France believe that the 
people of the United States will do or suffer less to save 
themselves from the evils of social dissolution.' 1 said: 

• We shall prosecute this war to its end,. We do not distrust 
our strength. We have actually in our army in the held at 
least seven hundred thousand men, and we are perfecting a 
navy which will be equal to any other in the world. Our re- 
sources are asfully equal to the exactions upon them as the 
resources of any power that may assail will be to sustain the 
assault. So far. then, from entertaining any idea of di- 
vision of the country, or of new arrangements, we shall 
maintain it against all who may oppose us. 5 I remarked: 
'This is strong language, but it is the duty of this govern- 
ment to protect the public interests, and vigor of speech, 
as well as of action, is required in emergencies.' lie said: 

• Yes ; but we have our interests also in the matter which 
must be looked to.' I replied: 'Certainly, but the sover- 

300 



THE QUESTION OF INTERVENTION, 1862-63 

eignty of a state is our interest, which in its own councils 
must be held paramount in its importance to any incidental 
or foreign question.' 

'•lie then asked me if you had written me anything 
about Garibaldi and affairs in Italy. 1 replied that you had 
not written a word. ' Have you heard something from Mex- 
ico ? ' I replied: ' Not a word.' These questions gave me an 
opportunity to say: 'Your government can see with what 
moderation and prudence we are conducting our affairs. 
We think France has trouble enough in Mexico, and she is 
likely to have some trouble in Italy. But we have drawn 
baek our bands and sealed our lips in regard to those con- 
cerns. We forbear at all points, with all parties, on all sides. 
We have redressed every complaint that any foreign nation 
lias presented, that was capable of being redressed, and we 
are ready to refer to impartial conventionally that wo are 
unable to redress by our own exclusive authority. We 
mean, if we come into collision with any foreign power, to 
have not only the right on our side, but the position of self- 
defence.'"" 

In England the political conditions were very different 
from those in France. The aristocracy, and the manu- 
facturers and shippers whose interests were affected by 
the war, had grown more outspoken in behalf of the 
South. Most of the Liberals, the antislavery leaders, 
the reformers generally, and the poorer classes, were 
predisposed toward the North ; but as yet hardly any- 
thing had been done to enlist their support. Except 
during the excitement about the Trent affair, probably 
there never was a time when more than one- fourth or 
two -fifths of the population of England would have fa- 
vored any measure designed to help the Confederacy. 
However, the friends of the Richmond government were 
very active in writing, speaking, and planning. Lon- 
don's ponderous " monarch of the press " — " the bad 
Times" as Lincoln jocosely called it, in contrast with 
" the good Times" of New York 1 — almost daily hurled 

1 Russell's Diary, 572. 
301 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

its thunderbolts at the cause of the Union. Likewise, 
for many of the reviews and periodicals hostile pens 
were elaborating prejudices and meagre information 
into sententious dogmatism about the difficulties and 
inconsistencies of trying to maintain the integrity of the 
great republic. 

But the " cotton famine " was the most powerful in- 
fluence in behalf of the Confederates. It had grown 
in intensity during the past year. Excepting the Irish 
famine, the country had seen no such distress for a 
century. Because the mills could not obtain cotton at 
profitable prices, many of them were closed ; and tens 
of thousands of laborers, especially in Lancashire, were 
saved from actual starvation only by means of the most 
energetic and extensive system of charity. 1 This great 
national calamity was known to be due to the war in 
America, and nearly every one believed that the exist- 
ing condition of things could not improve much while 
the conflict continued. Therefore, it worked with pow- 
erful leverage toward intervention; and it was strength- 
ened by the opinion of millions that, as the ultimate 



'"In May of that year [1862], according to the best returns that 
could be obtained, out of three hundred and fifty thousand mill 
hands, sixty thousand were out of work altogether ; one hundred 
thousand continued to be fully employed, and one hundred and 
ninety thousand were working on an average about half-time." The 
same authority said that "from the commencement of the distress up 
to the end of June last [1863], about three million pounds have 
been raised, of which not more than seven hundred and fifty thou- 
sand pounds was procured from the parish rates." — 39 North British 
Review, 235-39. 

The Spectator of May 3, 1862, said that the operatives in Lancashire 
and elsewhere averaged three and one-half days' work per week. " In 
many districts, such as Wigan, Blackburn, and Rochdale, the distress 
is of course much greater than this total would give any conception 
of. In Wigan nearly half of the operatives are totally out of work. . . . 
In Rochdale nearly a third are quite out of work, and more than half 
are working less than three days a week." 

302 



THE QUESTION OF INTERVENTION, 1862-63 

failure of Federal aims was certain, some way ought to 
be found to bring about peace and a restoration of the 
supply of cotton. 

The attitude of the British government is not so clear, 
or at least not so undisputed. Nations never remember, 
when they should, that likes or dislikes are pretty sure 
to be mutual. The North was very eager for the good 
opinion of England, although the people of the United 
States had usually sided with Great Britain's enemies. 
As John Stuart Mill said, the two countries habitually 
judged of each other by their worst specimens. 1 Eng- 
lishmen put the worst construction on Seward's acts 
and expressions, and those of Russell and of Palmerston 
were similarly regarded in the United States. Nothing 
that Russell ever said was so well remembered as his 
remark at Newcastle, in October, 1861, that the North 
was fighting for empire, while the South was fighting 
for independence. Palmerston's harmless and true pleas- 
antry about the wonderfully quick movements of the 
Federals at the battle of Bull Run was enough to con- 
vince most Northerners that he was an inveterate enemy 
to their cause. Gladstone, who was Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, was so confident of the ultimate success of 
the Confederates that he threw his influence in favor 
of the recognition of their independence. But an un- 
biased reading of Russell's official papers compels the 
conclusion not only that he meant to assume an atti- 
tude between the two belligerents that would give no 
unwarranted advantages to the Confederates, but also 
that he was often partial to the other side. His aim and 
duty were to look after British interests in such a way 
as international law permitted. Yet, as a rule, English- 
men were so eager to improve their opportunities to 
profit by the war that the government at times lacked 

1 2 Motley's Correspondence, 115. 
303 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

the courage strictly to regard its obligations as a neu- 
tral. 

As soon as the news of the second battle of Bull Run 
reached England, Palmerston sent a note to Russell in 
which he spoke precisely but unsympathetically of the 
result as "a very complete smashing "of the Federals. 
He also suggested that, in case Baltimore or Washing- 
ton should fall into the hands of the Confederates, it 
would be time for Great Britain and France to address 
the contending parties and recommend an arrangement 
upon the basis of separation. 1 Russell expressed the 
opinion that what was known already would warrant 
" offering mediation to the United States, with a view 
to the recognition of the independence of the Confed- 
erates." He thought that after the Cabinet agreed 
upon the plan, it should be proposed to France, "and 
then, on the part of England and France, to Russia and 
other powers, as a measure decided upon by us." In 
case this should fail, he believed that the independence 
of the Confederacy should be recognized. 2 The Premier 
pronounced these ideas " excellent," and recommended 
that, if France and Russia should agree — "and France, 
we know, is quite ready, and only waiting for our con- 
currence" — it would be best to make the offer before 
the middle of October, then just three weeks off. Mind- 
ful that the two armies had probably fought another 
battle, he concluded that if the Federals had been de- 
feated, they might be "at once ready for mediation, and 
the iron should be struck while it is hot." " If, on the 
other hand," he added, " they should have the best of 
it, we may wait awhile and see what may follow." 3 

During the first days of September, 1862, McClellan 
welded together some of the remnants of his own army 



1 2 Walpole's Russell, 349. a 2 Walpole, 349. 

3 2 Walpole, 350. 

304 



THE QUESTION OF INTERVENTION, 1862-63 

and of that of northern Virginia and hastened up into 
Maryland. He soon met the Confederates, and on Sep- 
tember 17th he defeated them at Antietam. To save 
what was left, Lee quickly withdrew to Virginia. In 
the West, also about this time, Bragg and Van Dorn 
were checked in their bold marches northward and then 
were driven back. 

Napoleon had long been seeking some opportunit} 7 for 
joint interference on the part of two or three powers. 
But just now he was hedged in by peculiar dangers in 
Europe, which made it hazardous to do an} 7 thing likely 
to lessen his strength at home. It was only a few days 
before the full news of the Confederate reverses had been 
received that Thouvenel expressed the opinion to Day- 
ton that there was not a reasonable statesman in Europe 
who thought the Union could be restored, and he ex- 
pected that Great Britain would soon recognize the Con- 
federacy. 1 The Emperor discredited the seriousness of 
the Confederate defeats, for they were highly disappoint- 
ing; and they left him in deeper perplexity because he 
desired to give practical and safe expression to his sym- 
pathy with the South. 

Slidell's account of a second interview with him, on 
October 28, 1862, makes this plain. 2 Napoleon felt com- 
pelled to act with great caution in regard to American 
affairs, fearing lest Great Britain, instead of joining his 
enterprises, might endeavor to embroil him in a war with 
the United States, which would destroy French com- 
merce. This was evidence of the value of Seward's 
warnings. Slidell tried to encourage the Emperor with 
assurances that recognition would bring about peace 
without giving ground for hostilities — which the United 
States would shun ; but if war should come, the Federal 

1 Dayton to Seward, October 2, 1862. MS. archives. 
s Bigelow, 126-32, prints Slidell's account, but erroneously gives 
October 22d, instead of 28th, as the date. 
II.— u 305 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

navy "would be swept from the ocean, and all their prin- 
cipal ports efficiently blockaded b}' a moiety of his pow- 
erful marine," and either the Gloire or the Normandie 
could lay Boston and New York under contribution. He 
was confident that " mad and stupid as the Washington 
government had shown itself to be, it still had sense 
enough not to seek a quarrel with the first power of the 
Avorld." And yet Napoleon hesitated ! " My own pref- 
erence," Napoleon was quoted as saying, " is for a prop- 
osition of an armistice of six months, with the southern 
ports open to the commerce of the world ; this would put 
a stop to the effusion of blood, and hostilities would, prob- 
ably, never be resumed. We can urge it on the high 
grounds of humanity and the interest of the whole civil- 
ized world ; if it be refused by the North, it will afford 
good reason for recognition, and, perhaps, for more active 
intervention." Napoleon's idea was that several of the 
leading European powers should act together. This was 
exactly what Palmerston and Russell had contemplated. 
The two greatest powers had done much coquetting, 
and each had seemed to say to the other : If our inter- 
ests were as great as yours, we should insist on having an 
end put to the bloodshed, or we should at least demand 
cotton. Great Britain had evidently been waiting for a 
state of affairs in the United States favorable to the ac- 
ceptance of foreign propositions for peace. Much as cot- 
ton was needed, the men at the head of the government 
saw that getting involved in a war would increase, not 
lessen, misfortunes. Nor could a great maritime power, 
sure to use blockades as one of her chief resources, afford 
to be very critical of the Federal blockade. Then, too, 
the distinguishing feature of Palmerston's foreign policy 
during these years was distrust of Napoleon. 1 More- 
over, the British Premier had begun, in the summer of 

1 Sanders's Palmerston, 217. 
306 



THE QUESTION OF INTERVENTION, 1862-G3 

1861, to make special efforts to have England supplied 
with cotton from India and other British possessions. 1 
Good results had been realized already. But Napoleon 
had no such opportunities; while his passion for distant 
enterprises, and his wish to show to his people that he 
had great influence with the United States as well as 
with Mexico, were too strong to be resisted. 

Therefore, on October 30, 1862, he instructed the 
French Ambassadors to Great Britain and to Russia to 
invite those powers to join France in requesting the bel- 
ligerents to agree to an armistice of six months, so as 
to consider some plan for bringing the war to an end. 
Drouyn de Lhuys, Thouvenel's successor, informed Day- 
ton 8 that the plan was for the European governments 
to tender their good offices, merely, and not to go far- 
ther unless the belligerents should jointly request it. 
Great Britain promptly and unqualifiedly declined the 
proposition. At first thought this is surprising, for she 
herself had been on the point of making just such a 
proposal. The complete change of mind on the part of 
Palmerston and Russell was probably due to three facts, 
which they had not anticipated: the "smashing" of 
the Federals at Bull Run did not demoralize the Wash- 
ington government or lead to other results that were 
expected ; the Confederates had lost in Maryland the 
prestige they had won in Virginia; and the preliminary 
proclamation of emancipation 3 showed that the war 
was to become positively antislavery. Even if no rumor 
of the character of Adams's instructions of August 2d 
or of Seward's interview with Mercier on September 
7th had reached Russell, he certainly knew Seward too 
well to suppose that he would peaceably accept any sort 

1 Ashley's Palmerston, 210, 211. 

'Dip. Cor., 1862, 405; Dayton to Seward, November 12, 1862. 
MS. archives. 
3 See post, p. 337. 

307 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

of interference when the loyal people were rejoicing over 
what they regarded as a great victory. Russell had re- 
cently told Adams that it was the purpose of the Brit- 
ish government to observe strictly the rule of perfect 
neutrality in the struggle. 1 But this, of course, did not 
mean that the independence of the Confederacy might 
not be recognized in case circumstances should warrant 
it. Russia's reply to Napoleon was also discouraging. 
She was unwilling to adopt the proposed course because 
she believed that it would not lead to peaceful results ; 
yet if France and Great Britain should agree to act to- 
gether on this question, Russia's representative at Wash- 
ington would be instructed to lend to his colleagues, " if 
not his official aid, at least moral support." 2 

" From Europe we hear little that is definite," wrote 
Seward more than a month after the battle of Antietam, 
" but there is manifestly some difficulty there in digest- 
ing disappointments." 3 Yet rumors told of unfriendly 
plans against the United States. So he continued to 
repeat, in different words, his plausible and resolute 
arguments showing the necessity for the United States 
to insist upon absolute sovereignty in every instance. 
Negotiations for a treaty between the United States and 
Great Britain for the suppression of the slave-trade had 
been nearly completed. It was a subject in which British 
public opinion had taken great interest. In an unpub- 
lished despatch of October 25th, he wrote to Adams: 

" If the question how such a recognition would affect 
the action of this government in regard to the convention 
shall officially arise, you will, in that case, state promptly 
and without reserve to Earl Russell that all negotiations 
for treaties of whatever kind between the two governments 
will be discontinued whenever the complete and unbroken 
sovereignty of the American republic shall be denied by 
the government of Great Britain." 

1 Dip. Cor., 1862, 224. 2 1 Dip. Cor., 1863, 3. 

3 3 Seward, 136. 

308 



THE QUESTION OF INTERVENTION, 1862-63 

A few days later he said that the country felt stronger 
and in better condition to encounter the dangers of in- 
tervention than it had at any former time; that if any 
additional motive were necessary to sustain its resolu- 
tion to continue independent and sovereign, that motive 
would be furnished by an attempt at interference on the 
part of any foreign state. 1 

When it became known that France's proposal to 
Great Britain and Russia had been rejected, Seward 
wisely concluded not to treat the incident as an alarm- 
ing one. Napoleon's duplicity was well understood 
throughout the world, and Seward had seen many evi- 
dences of it. It is, therefore, difficult to believe that 
there was not more diplomacy than sincerity in these 
unpublished sentences sent to Daj^ton under date of 
November 30, 1862: "We shall in all cases speak di- 
rectly and explicitly to her [France], and we shall con- 
tinue to understand her exactly in the sense that she 
expresses. We know the French sentiment of chivalry, 
and we do not suppose that France will willingly mislead 
us. In any case it is always more dangerous to mistrust 
a magnanimous nation than it is to correct mistaken ex- 
pectations which are the result of a generous confidence." 
So he decided neither to comment at length on what 
had "already lost its practical character," nor to ask 
explanations. This showed great presence of mind. It 
was in perfect harmony with the rest of the despatch, 
and it was sufficient to add : " The United States have 
constantly said to all Europe that they know that the 
saving of the American Union depends on the American 
people themselves, and not at all on the policies of for- 
eign states, severally or combined." 

When the Confederacy saw that the need of cotton had 
not sufficient strength to compel an alliance, other induce- 

1 Dip. Cor., 1862, 231. 
309 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

ments were held out. What was offered to France in 
the spring and summer of 1862 was to be made much 
more inviting in propositions to both France and Great 
Britain. In a long despatch of December 11, 1862, 
Benjamin instructed Mason and Slidell to urge upon 
these two governments the adoption of certain measures 
promising great returns. "The almost total cessation of 
external commerce for the last two } r ears" had "pro- 
duced complete exhaustion of the supply of all articles 
of foreign growth and manufacture." The Confederate 
Secretary of State estimated that there would be a de- 
mand for three hundred million dollars' worth of im- 
ports within the first six months after a treaty of peace, 
and that the Confederacy had accumulated cotton, to- 
bacco, and naval stores with exchangeable value much 
beyond that sum. The North would reap the great com- 
mercial advantages of returning peace unless England 
or France should make special efforts. He suggested 
that the merchants of neutral nations should purchase 
the Confederate products in advance. The Confederacy 
was ready to promise not to destroy them in any case, 
if the government of the foreign owner would agree to 
protect them from seizure or destruction by the United 
States. The establishment of depots of supplies in the 
West Indies, with improved means of transportation, 
would enable foreigners to take advantage of the open- 
ing of the ports. Of course it was foreseen that, if these 
things should be brought about, every interested mer- 
chant would become an active ally of the Confederacy. 
But the great panacea, in Benjamin's opinion, would be 
a complete armistice on land and sea for six months, for 
it would remove the restrictions to commerce for that 
length of time. 

Undoubtedly Napoleon had had some such dream, ex- 
cept that he expected to gain the lion's share of the 
profits if his lead should be followed. Now he was in 

310 



THE QUESTION OF INTERVENTION, 18C2-63 

a dilemma : if he should give up his plan of telling the 
belligerents how to settle their difficulties, it would be a 
confession to the world that he dared not proceed single- 
handed. If he should undertake to show that his prop- 
osition was practicable, might he not embroil himself in 
just such a war as he had long suspected that Great Brit- 
ain desired to see him engaged in? He had been wise 
in one thing: he had repeatedly told the United States 
that his aims were friendly, and that he did not contem- 
plate doing more than to make recommendations; so he 
had saved his bridges. It was only a few days after he 
received the replies of Great Britain and of Eussia that 
the signs from the United States became more favorable 
to his scheme. The November elections of 1862 indica- 
ted a popular disapproval of Lincoln's administration, and 
many conservative politicians and newspapers advocat- 
ed a policy that pointed toward a peaceful separation. 
Later in .November came the news of Grant's reverses 
in Mississippi, but a much more serious matter was the 
battle of Fredericksburg. Because McClellan had not 
pursued Lee after the victory at Antietam, but had 
halted at Harper's Ferry, and then moved slowly into 
Virginia — all the time displaying an almost contempt- 
uous independence of the administration — he was re- 
moved from command. Burnside superseded him, and 
soon moved the Army of the Potomac from Warren- 
ton to Fredericksburg. After a delay of about a month, 
of which Lee took advantage, Burnside sent his troops 
against the Confederates in such an uneven encounter 
that on December 13, 1862, the Federal soldiers were 
the victims of terrible and useless slaughter to the num- 
ber of thirteen thousand. The North trembled with 
horror, factions increased their wrangling, and many 
patriotic men despaired when they recalled the fatal- 
ities and blunders of the numerous campaigns in Vir- 
ginia. 

311 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

To Napoleon this looked like an opportunity for a 
hearing. His thoughts, as he wished them to be under- 
stood, were expressed in a speech to the French Parlia- 
ment, and in two instructions from Drouyn de Lhuys to 
Mercier, all in January, 1863. ' He told the legislature 
that "the condition of the Empire would be flourishing 
if the war in America had not dried up one of the most 
fruitful sources of our industry," and that he would ask 
for an appropriation to aid those who had suffered from 
the misfortune. Mercier was informed that the Em- 
peror would have been "chilled" by " the little success " 
of his overtures to Great Britain and Russia if he had 
not been guided by friendship for the United States. 
His "sentiments" were " too sincere for indifference to 
find a place " in his thoughts, and he could not be other- 
wise than " painfully affected, whilst the war continues 
to rage"! Aside from repeating his well-known opin- 
ions about the importance of peace, he now urged that 
commissioners from the two belligerent governments 
should meet on neutral ground to devise a means of 
bringing hostilities to an end. 

On February 3, 1863, Mercier presented to Seward 
the instructions ; and three days later the reply of the 
United States was sent to Dayton. 2 As on former occa- 
sions, Seward diplomatically expressed his belief that 
friendly motives had actuated France ; he spoke of " the 
earnestness" of the Emperor's " benevolent desire for the 
restoration of peace," and said that he did not forget 
the traditional friendship between the two countries^ 
which, he assumed, had suggested this counsel. He 
maintained that the cause of the Union had steadily 
advanced ; that there were no " North and South, and 
no southern and northern states," but only "an insurrec- 
tionary party, which is located chiefly upon and adjacent 

1 McPherson's Rebellion, 345 ; 6 Moore's Rebellion Record, Diary, 35. 

2 McPherson's Rebellion, 345*, 346. ' 

312 



THE QUESTION OF INTERVENTION, 1862-63 

to the shore of the Gulf of Mexico," and that the Federal 
resources were yet abundant, and its credit adequate to 
the existing emergency. At best these statements were 
only partially true, but they had their purpose and effect. 

The great strength of the paper was in the directness 
and brevity of a few paragraphs, the gist of which may 
be given in these sentences : Could the French Minister 
of Foreign Affairs fail to see that it would be imprac- 
ticable for the United States government, while engaged 
in an attempt to maintain its constitutional authority, 
to enter into negotiations involving the renunciation 
of that authority? If commissioners should be appoint- 
ed they must come to one of three conclusions : that 
the Union should stand; that it should be dissolved, 
or that the war should go on. There was no possibility 
of the first, for the representatives of the Confederacy 
would surely oppose it, and the hyyal people of the South 
would have no voice in the matter. On the other hand, 
the Federal government had not the least thought of re- 
linquishing its trust or its aims ; " and if it had any such 
thought, it would still have abundant reason to know 
that peace proposed at the cost of dissolution would be 
immediately, unreservedly, and indignantly rejected by 
the American people. It is a great mistake that Euro- 
pean statesmen make, if they suppose this people are de- 
moralized." 

This was rightly called a great despatch. It was an 
impressive suggestion to France to halt. Like the an- 
swer in the Trent case, it was soon published ; it was 
doubtless written with that end in view, for the public 
opinion of the North was a very important consideration. 
Some rather superfluous remarks explanatory of the Con- 
stitution, and the declaration that at least the people of 
the United States were not demoralized, were features 
sure to elicit popular applause. Henry J. Eaymond 
wrote from New York that Seward's reply met with 

313 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

"universal approval" there. 1 And Weed called it the 
ablest paper his friend had ever written. 2 

Early in March both houses of Congress passed res- 
olutions declaring that every proposition of foreign 
interference in the present contest was regarded " as so 
far unreasonable and inadmissible that its only expla- 
nation will be found in a misunderstanding of the true 
state of the question, and of the real character of the 
war in which the republic is engaged "; that because it 
would encourage those in insurrection, Congress would 
be ''obliged to look upon any further attempt in the 
same direction as an unfriendly act." The warning was 
positive, but it was expressed in diplomatic language. 
And the President was requested to have the resolutions 
transmitted to the Ministers of the United States for 
communication to the governments to which they were 
accredited. 3 This not only brought all loyal people to 
a full knowledge of what was to be expected, but it also 
told the world to keep aloof. Yet this was only giving 
wider notice of what Seward had said repeatedly, and 
often in stronger words. 

The strength of the influences for or against inter- 
vention varied from time to time. Until the spring of 
1863, the distress caused by the lack of cotton was the 
most serious of all the European grievances. Although 
Great Britain suffered most, the chance of obtaining 
cotton from new sources — subsequently realized to a 
great extent — made interference seem less imperative. 
The certainty of incurring enormous losses in case of 
a conflict with the United States acted as her chief 
restraint. Mason was entirely right, as all signs indi- 
cated, when, on February 9, 1863, he reported that al- 

' February 17, 1863. Seward MS. 

2 R. M. Blatchford to Seward, March 7, 1863. Seward MSS. 

3 McPherson's Rebellion, 346. 

314 



THE QUESTION OF INTERVENTION, 1862-63 

though both the Ministry and the opposition agreed 
that separation was final, they did not think the time 
for recognition had come ; for both parties had " a fixed 
purpose to run no risk of a broil, even far less a war, 
with the United States." Innumerable and reliable au- 
thorities make this much certain: the British Cabinet 
foresaw that an offer of mediation would be prompt- 
ly rejected ; that merely to recognize the independence 
of the Confederacy would be futile unless it entailed a 
war with the United States, and that that would de- 
prive Great Britain of her gains in shipping and multi- 
ply her misfortunes. Russell was wise in avoiding the 
first step lest he might be pushed forward to the last. 
Napoleon acted from more complex motives. The in- 
terests at home and the possible profits in Mexico seemed 
to order a bold advance ; but the danger, in 1862, of be- 
ing involved in hostilities about Italian affairs, and, in 
1863, of being drawn into the Polish revolution, warned 
him to be cautious and to wait. Seward had said in May, 
1862, that intervention was "sure to come just as soon 
as the American people make up their minds to sub- 
mit to it.'" By almost every form of expression — from 
a simple appeal to moral sentiments down to angry 
threats that barely missed representing a foreign war 
as desired — he made it plain that he would resent in- 
termeddling. The action of Congress showed that he 
would be fully supported. At last no one misunder- 
stood Seward. 

After the early part of 1863, some of the conditions 
changed very rapidly. The pressure for American cotton 
became less, and the development of a strong antisla- 
very policy on the part of Lincoln's administration had 
a marked effect abroad, as is soon to be noticed. Inter- 
vention continued to be talked of, and would probably 

1 3 Seward, 96. 
315 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

have come in some form if the Federal forces had been 
defeated at both Vicksburg and Gettysburg. But after 
July, 1863, as will be seen, the great danger was in con- 
nection with the Confederate warships that had already 
been purchased in England, and others that were ex- 
pected to be built there or in France. 



CHAPTER XXXVI 

SLAVERY AND FOREIGN RELATIONS 

Of all the questions relating to the Civil War, the two 
sections have found it most difficult to agree as to the 
nature of its cause and its purpose. Even the abolition- 
ists with but one idea, who foresaw that secession would 
destroy slavery, did not at first maintain that emancipa- 
tion either was or should be the chief aim. Although the 
Confederates called slavery the corner-stone of their new 
political edifice, they imagined that the object of their 
struggle was to secure greater state rights, more com- 
mercial freedom, and a harmonious, fraternal govern- 
ment. By the general expression of " war for the Union," 
or "war for independence," the respective leaders de- 
scribed the immediate aim without going back to the 
real origin or forward to the probable results of the 
conflict. 

The basis from which Seward argued with foreign 
powers was that, as the sovereignty of the United States 
had not been overthrown, the acts and purposes of the 
Confederates and the question of slavery, were purely 
domestic affairs which could be ignored or brought to 
the front, as public sentiment and military interests de- 
manded. So the first instructions to Adams said : " You 
will not consent to draw into debate before the British 
government any opposing moral principles which may 
be supposed to lie at the foundation of the controversy 
between those states and the Federal Union." And to 
Dayton he expressed these opinions: "The territories 

317 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

will remain in all respects the same, whether the rev- 
olution shall succeed or shall fail. The condition of 
slavery in the several states will remain just the same 
whether it succeed or fail." l 

Consistency was not the most conspicuous of Seward's 
virtues. If he had not been speculating with a partic- 
ular object in view, probably his conclusion would have 
agreed with the one announced in 1850, and frequently 
proclaimed since that time — namely, that a civil war 
would bring on "violent but complete and immediate 
emancipation" 2 In fact, just a week before the date of 
the instructions to Dayton, Seward remarked: "We are 
in a war, and wars work out results not contemplated 
b}^ either side. It is a war for and against the Union, 
but no man can foretell how far it will go, or how far 
it will affect other interests, slavery among the rest." 3 
A very perplexing philosopher, indeed. But our duty 
is to try to understand him. In one case he was un- 
doubtedly considering what could not be done accord- 
ing to the strict letter of the Constitution, and in the 
other what might come as a war-measure, which is often 
merely a modern and evasive euphemism for the ancient 
maxim, Inter arma sile?ii leges. Undoubtedly each opin- 
ion was designed to be serviceable in its time and place. 

The heat of revolutionary passion increased with the 
temperature of the spring and summer of 1861. The 
abolitionists, now rapidly increasing in number, insisted 
that to emancipate the slaves of Confederates would 
quickly end the war. The adoption of such a policy, 
then, would have seemed to justify what the secession- 
ists had said in the past about Republican purposes; it 
would have transformed loyal slave-holders into Con- 
federate allies, and have cost Lincoln's administration 
most of the support it was receiving from the fighting 

1 Dip. Cor., 1861, 76, 198. ! 1 Works, 86. 3 2 Seward, 616. 

318 



SLAVERY AND FOREIGN RELATIONS 

element among- southern Unionists and northern Dem- 
ocrats and conservatives. The routed and frightened 
troops from the first battle of Bull Run had hardly 
reached Washington when Crittenden, whose devotion 
to the Union depended on no if, brought forward a resolu- 
tion declaring that the war was not for conquest or to 
interfere "with the rights or established institutions" 
of the southern states, "but to defend and maintain 
the supremacy of the Constitution and to preserve the 
Union with all the dignity, equality, and rights of the 
several states unimpaired; that as soon as these objects 
are accomplished the war ought to cease." Almost im- 
mediately, and with close approach to unanimity, the 
members of the House and of the Senate pledged them- 
selves to these declarations. This was a Congressional 
approval of Seward's theory — so often mentioned dur- 
ing the preceding eight months — that the Union, not 
slavery, was the paramount issue. 

In the next few weeks was passed the first of the 
measures providing for the confiscation of all property, 
including slaves, used in support of the insurrection. In 
various ways slavery was weakened in all those parts of 
the South to which Federal troops were sent ; and in 
August, 1861, Fremont issued a proclamation in Missouri, 
declaring the confiscation of the property of all per- 
sons that had taken up arms against the United States. 
But Lincoln ordered that slaves should be prohibited 
from entering or following the military camps, and he 
changed the effect of Fremont's proclamation so that 
only property used against the government should be 
confiscated. This opposition to purely antislavery aims 
excited the bitterest criticism among abolitionists ; but 
Lincoln refused to go beyond the course adopted by 
Congress. The immediate purpose was to save Mary- 
land, and to win Kentucky and as much as possible of 
Virgmia and Tennessee. 

319 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

The attitude of the Confederates toward slavery and 
their interpretations of the motives of the Federal gov- 
ernment caused Lincoln's administration much annoy- 
ance. While they indignantly denied that they were 
fighting for the protection and expansion of slavery, they 
disagreed among themselves both as to their ultimate 
aims and as to those of their enemies. The first instruc- 
tions to Yancey, Rost, and Mann authorized these com- 
missioners to offer to assume obligations for all treaties 
in existence between the United States and Great Bri- 
tain except the one for the suppression of the slave-trade. 1 
On May 18, 1861, Toombs wrote to them that it was 
obvious that, " however it may be concealed under the 
guise of patriotism and fidelity to the late Federal com- 
pact, the real motive which actuates Mr. Lincoln and 
those who now sustain his acts, is to accomplish by force 
of arms that which the masses of the northern people 
have long sought to effect, namely, the overthrow of 
our domestic institutions, the devastation and destruc- 
tion of our social interests, and the reduction of the 
southern states to the condition of subject provinces." 

But it was not long before the Confederates saw 
their opportunity. On August 14, 1861, the commission- 
ers adroitly attempted to counteract English prejudice 
against recognizing a slave- holding government b} 7- 
maintaining that the South had not seceded to save 
slavery, and that it was not the aim of the United States 
to free the slave, but " to keep him in subjection to his 
owner, and to control his labor through the legislative 
channels, which the Lincoln government designs to force 
upon the master." This was made very plausible by 
referring to some of the attempts to prevent secession 
— a constitutional amendment, proposed the previous 
winter, against governmental interference with slavery, 

1 Toombs to commissioners, March 16, 1861. 
820 



SLAVERY AND FOREIGN RELATIONS 

and Lincoln's disavowals of an antislavery crusade. 
After such an explanation, they felt confident that 
English sentiment could have no affection for the 
North ; " nay, it would probably become disgusted with 
a canting hypocrisy which would enlist those sympa- 
thies on false pretences." Lest this expose might not 
suit every contingency, or not be sufficiently damag- 
ing, the commissioners w r ere ready to admit that the 
policy might be changed — "a policy based at present 
more upon a wily view of what is to be its effect" in 
the South than upon any honest desire to uphold the 
Constitution. But in case of a change of purpose, they 
prophesied, a system of labor would be destroyed that 
had reared up a vast commerce between America and 
the great states of Europe, " which, it is supposed, now 
gives bread to ten millions of the population of those 
states"; and the result would be " disastrous to the world, 
as well as to the master and slave." ' 

Foreigners generally were unable to understand how 
slavery could either be the real cause of the war or be in 
issue when the avowed purpose of one belligerent was to 
save the Union, while that of the other was to destroy it ; 
and they were so uninformed as to political expediency 
and the constitutional powers of the central government 
that they were often resentful because the administra- 
tion did not announce a policy of emancipation. These 
circumstances were very favorable to the Confederates, 
who could use certain half-truths so as to lead to wholly 
false conclusions. On the other hand, Northerners were 
amazingly dull in expecting Englishmen to comprehend 
without a careful explanation that the South seceded be- 
cause the Eepublican victory of 1860 meant that the in- 
terests of slavery had lost control of the government. 
Motley expressed the common and erroneous expecta- 

1 American Annual Cyclopcedia, 1861, 279. 
ii. -x 321 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

tion of his section, when, in June, 1861, he wrote: "It 
is impossible that so simple and noble a proposition 
as this should fail to awaken the earnest sympathy of 
nine-tenths of the English nation." ' But John Bright 
was almost the only conspicuous political leader abroad 
that fully satisfied this expectation. Even Cobden was 
predisposed toward the Confederacy on account of its 
commercial policy." Many others were right at times, 
but they were often impatient and gave undue weight to 
minor and superficial indications. The nation as a whole 
at first seemed to look on with cynical neutrality, regard- 
ing " the greatest war of principle" as Motley complain- 
ed, as "of no more interest to her, except as it bore on 
the cotton question, than the wretched squabbles of Mex- 
ico or South America." 3 Although Russell was not a de- 
voted friend of the United States, he was certainly much 
less friendly toward their enemies. Most Englishmen 4 
agreed with him in the opinion that the conquest of the 
Confederacy would mean that the United States were 
to continue to be a great slave power, whereas, in case 
of the success of the South there would be one smaller 
slave nation and one new and wholly antisla very nation. 5 
It was a very puzzling task for the government of 
the United States to counteract the erroneous conclu- 
sions of Europeans and yet not to belie the declared 

1 1 Motley's Correspondence, 381. 

8 2 Morley's Cobden (1881), 372, 373. 3 1 Correspondence, 373. 

4 " The Liberals are even more divided than the Conservatives. For 
those who sympathize the most with the position of the free states, as 
favorable to the extension of domestic slavery, are the least inclined 
to favor their policy of war against the slave states. . . . They fear a 
reunion of our states because they think it cannot be effected, except- 
ing at the expense of principle. They favor a separation because it 
would keep the free states consistent and determined enemies of slavery. 
This is one strong form of public sentiment in Great Britain, and the 
force of it accounts for much of the course which has been taken by 
the government." — Adams to Seward, June 21, 1861. MS. archives. 

* See ante, p. 178. 

322 



SLAVERY AND FOREIGN RELATIONS 

policy of fighting merely for the Union. While it was 
not a little absurd to expect a moral purpose to be seen 
where none was avowed, nevertheless the administration 
preferred to run the risk of not winning the antislavery 
sympathy of Great Britain and of France rather than 
to hazard forfeiting the physical support of many in the 
North and still more in the southern border states. The 
rapid growth of Confederate military prestige in the 
summer of 1861 caused the question of slavery to be 
almost forgotten by foreigners, while the unionist policy 
was bringing no victories at home and was permitting 
the development of public opinion abroad that made 
probable the early recognition of the Confederacy. 

In September, 1861, Carl Schurz sent from Spain the 
first impressive warning of this danger. He said that it 
was a foregone conclusion that the anti-democratic gov- 
ernments and political parties, and the commercial and 
manufacturing interests depending upon cotton, were to 
take sides against the North at the first favorable op- 
portunity. The only statesmanlike way to prevent this 
would be to win the hearty sympathy of Europeans of 
liberal instincts and philanthropic impulses. 1 He ex- 
plained how difficult it was to make foreigners under- 
stand why "the free and prosperous North" should in- 
sist upon being associated with u the imperious and 
troublesome slave states," and should resort to the most 
arbitrary measures of war, which seemed to be as in- 
consistent with the avowed spirit of American institu- 
tions as they were unsuccessful in fact. He made it 
clear that many adverse influences were taking our 
cause farther and farther out to sea; that even those 
who were naturally our friends had come to believe that 
" the people of the North had set up pretensions which 

'This is the gist of the first few paragraphs of his long and able 
despatch of September 14, 1861. Most of the remaining part is printed 
in 3 Rhodes, 511-13. 

323 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWAltD 

they had neither the courage nor the power to sustain, 
and the failure of our first military operations was attrib- 
uted by many to a lack of moral force in our cause." In 
only two ways could certain nations be prevented from 
taking unfriendly action: by a "great and decisive mili- 
tary success," or by such governmental measures "as will 
place the war against the rebellious slave states upon 
a higher moral basis, and thereby give us the control 
of public opinion in Europe." Every step taken by the 
government toward the abolition of slavery would, he 
said, be equal to a victory in the field, and if we could 
not win the victory, it was all the more necessary to ob- 
tain its equivalent. He prophesied that if it should be- 
come clear that the war was one for and against slavery, 
public opinion would soon be so strong that no European 
government would dare to side with the Confederacy.' 
Viewed as a problem in foreign affairs merely, the ar- 
gument was thoroughly convincing; but the main-spring 
of the actual policy was the supposed domestic necessity. 
Therefore, Seward replied in generalizations — such as, 
" civil war must be confined always to the existing con- 

1 On October 3, 1861, John Bigelow wrote to Seward : " The seces- 
sionists have found it necessary to proclaim that the Republicans are 
no more advocates of freedom than the rebels, and that the negro has 
no better prospects under Lincoln than Davis. They have succeeded 
in getting the Times and other prominent London and Paris journals 
to take that view. The effect has beeu very prejudicial to our cause 
here. M. Laboulaye puts the case as it should be, and it will do us 
infinite good with the people of France. There is no government in 
Europe that could stand a month in an alliance with the South if the 
people could be made to understand that the issue with us was between 
free and slave labor. Of this I am satisfied. Hence, I regretextremely 
that the good effect produced by the general tenor of Fremont's proc- 
lamation should have been impaired by irregularities or illegalities 
in its mode of issue, of which the government was constrained to take 
notice. If the government can avoid expressing itself at all upon the 
subject we can accomplish all that is necessary here by reference to 
the past history of the Republican party and ' the inflexible logic of 
events.'"— Seward MSS. 

324 



SLAVERY AND FOREIGN RELATIONS 

dition of political forces and to the public sentiment of 
the whole country "; " foreign s} T mpathy, or even foreign 
favor, never did and never can create or maintain an} r 
state"; and there " is no nation on earth whose fortunes; 
immediate or remote, would not be the worse for the dis- 
solution of the American Union," and if that considera- 
tion is not sufficient to save us from unjust intervention, 
then it " must come as a natural incident in our domestic 
strife." He had no fear that we could not "maintain 
ourselves against all who shall combine against us"; and 
there was no one at home who was not more confident 
of the stability of the Union now than when the Minis- 
ter to Spain started on his mission. 1 Evidently the Sec- 
retary did not wish to discuss the question. 

By the time Congress met, in December, 1861, there 

1 "Department op State, Washington, 

" No. 35. October 10, 1861. 

" Carl Sehurz, Esq., etc., etc., etc., 
" Madrid: 

" Sir, — Your despatch of September 14th, No. 18, has been received. 

"I have read carefully the views concerning our domestic policy 
which you have submitted. Of the propriety of your submitting them 
there can be no question, especially when they are presented with ref- 
erence to the public sentiment of Europe aud the possible action of 
the governments of that continent. 

"It would, however, be altogether inconvenient, and it might be in 
some degree hazardous for me to engage in explanations of domestic 
policy in a correspondence which, for all practical purposes, is to be 
regarded as involving only the foreign relations of the country. More- 
over, the policy with which an administration charged with the duty of 
maintaining itself and preserving the Union shall conduct a civil war, 
must be confined always to the existing condition of political forces, 
and to the public sentiment of the whole country. 

" I am not surprised when you inform me that sympathies with the 
United States, regarded as a nation struggling to maintain its integritj' 
against the assaults of faction, are less active in Europe than they 
might or ought to be in view of the benefits which the republic has 
already conferred, and the still greater benefits which it promises to 
confer, on mankind. 

"Nations, like individuals, are too much wrapped up in their own 

325 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

was an increasing number of men eager to attack sla- 
very wherever they found it vulnerable. The President's 
annual message proposed that the government should 
pay for the liberation and colonization of negroes freed 
by the confiscation act and by state action. He was 
anxious that the conflict for " suppressing the insurrec- 
tion" should " not degenerate into a violent and remorse- 
less revolutionary struggle." But there were many 
persons without such scruples. The House refused to 
reaffirm the Crittenden resolution about the purpose 

interests and ambitions to be deeply concerned by accidents or reverses 
which befall otber nations. 

" I can well enough conceive also tbat tbe United States in tbe first 
emergency migbt excite more fervent sympathies abroad by avowing 
a purpose not merely or even chiefly to maintain and preserve their 
existing constitutional organization, but to modify and change it so as 
to extirpate at once an institution which is obnoxious to the enlight- 
ened censure of mankind. 

"But, on the other hand, it is never to be forgotten that although 
the sympathy of other nations is eminently desirable, yet foreign sym- 
pathy, or even foreign favor, never did and never can create or main- 
tain any state, while in every state that has the capacity to live, the 
love of national life is and always must be the most energetic principle 
which can be invoked to preserve it from suicidal indulgence of fear 
of faction as well as from destruction by foreign violence. 

"For my own part, it seems to me very clear that there is no na- 
tion on earth whose fortunes, immediate aud remote, would not be the 
w T orse for the dissolution of the American Union. If that consideration 
shall not be sufficient to save us from unjust intervention by any for- 
eign state or states in our domestic troubles, then that intervention 
must come as a natural incident in our domestic strife, and I entertain 
no fears that we shall not be able to maintain ourselves against all who 
shall combine against us. 

" If it were profitable I might reply to your point that our case 
suffers abroad because we do not win victories so fast as impatient 
friends could wish. But I have no time for such discussions in the 
midst of daily duties and cares. It must suffice to say that rebellion, if 
at all successful, matures fast, acts by surprise, with vehement energy, 
and wins considerable successes in the beginning. Government gathers 
its forces more slowly and may well be content if it maintains itself 
until the revolutionary passion submits to the inevitable law of reac- 
tion. Especially must this be so in a federate republican government 

326 



SLAVERY AND FOREIGN RELATIONS 

of the war. Soon, in one or both houses, propositions 
were brought forward to abolish slavery in the District 
of Columbia, to prohibit it in the territories, to prevent 
the military forces from returning fugitive slaves, and 
to extend the original confiscation act so as to include 
the property and slaves of all " rebels." Other antisla- 
very ideas were advanced, and it was all but certain that 
most of them would be approved. In a special message, 
in March, 1S62, Lincoln advocated governmental payment 
for slaves voluntarily freed by the different states. It 
was one of those statesmanlike half-way measures : in 
recognition of the great straits, it went beyond what was 
strictly constitutional ; but it stopped far short of yield- 
ing to the revolutionary demand to strike at slavery in 
a spirit of impatience and resentment. It was too con- 
servative for the abolitionists and too radical for many 
of the Democrats and southern Unionists. In May, 
1862, General David Hunter, who was in command of 
the Federal troops in South Carolina, Florida, and 
Georgia, declared slavery and martial law to be incom- 
patible ; and, therefore, he pronounced the slaves to be 
forever free. This had the true ring and logic of revo- 
lution, and it pleased the daring radicals now leading 
northern sentiment. But Lincoln promptly revoked the 
order, and tried to keep action within the chosen course. 
This precipitated upon him and Seward — for many of the 
emancipationists regarded Seward as his Mephistopheles 

like our own. While you, who have gone abroad, are hearing appre- 
hensions of the failure of the government on all sides, there is not one 
citizen who has remained at home who is not more confident in the 
stability of this Union now than he was on the day of your departure 
upon your mission. This confidence is not built on enthusiasm, but on 
knowledge of the true state of the conflict, and the exercise of calm 
and dispassionate reflection. 

"I am, Sir, your obedient servant, 

"William H. Seward." 
—MS. 
327 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM II. SEWARD 

— the bitterest, most unreasonable, and most furious 
attacks of the whole war. 1 

Meantime Seward had yielded much less than the 
President to the antislavery demands. On January 11, 
1862, he wrote to Adams: "Every demonstration 
against slavery puts our assured position in Maryland, 
Kentucky, Missouri, and Virginia at hazard, and tends 
to combine the revolting states in mass. With such dem- 
onstrations being made, European states seem to think 
that slavery is to be restored in its ancient strength with 
the establishment of the Union. Time, if we can get it, 
will resolve these questions." 2 This was a truth that 
the abolitionists denied or disregarded. On the other 
hand, on February 17th, he undertook to meet the as- 
sumption that the Federal government was "favorable, 
or at least not unfavorable, to the perpetuation of sla- 
very." He characterized it as " one of the most curious 
and instructive" incidents of the war. However, he 
marked the despatch confidential, and neither repudi- 
ated his unfortunate instructions of the previous April 
nor removed the prohibition against discussing the ques- 
tion of slavery with other nations. But, by explaining 
the antecedents of the Republicans, by showing that 
the army acted as "an emancipating crusade," and bj r 
contrasting the probable effects of a victory of one side 
as opposed to that of the other, he made it plain that, 
although the policy of the administration was not dis- 
tinctly antislavery, the results of that policy were con- 
spicuously so. Moreover, the government was activelv 
preparing for compensated emancipation in the District 
of Columbia, 3 

Probably it was the outbreak of angry criticism on 
account of the revocation of General Hunter's sweeping- 
order that awoke in Seward a consciousness of the mis- 



' See post, pp. 381-64. 2 MS. 3 Dip. Cor., 1862, 37, 

328 



SLAVERY AND FOREIGN RELATIONS 

take of trying to avoid a question that really was very 
important to Federal interests abroad. It was not until 
May 28, 1862, that he removed the restriction against 
discussing the meaning of the war in relation to slavery. 1 
He merely made an ad hominem argument to show that 
it was European encouragement that was prolonging the 
conflict ; that its continuance would disorganize the so- 
cial system of the South and transform slave laborers into 
vagabonds, and ultimately bring on a servile war, which 
would cause great distress in some of the states of Eu- 
rope, and "result in an entirely new system of trade and 
commerce between the United States and all foreign 
nations. 1 ' 5 The suggestion of such possibilities was con- 
ducive to careful thought, and did not interfere with the 
domestic policy. The only mistake was that such ideas 
were not expressed six or eight months earlier. Un- 
doubtedly the reasons were that Seward had felt con- 
fident that the backbone of the Confederacy would be 
broken in the spring or early summer of 1862, and that 
attacking slavery would both interfere with the produc- 
tion of cotton — and thereby increase the temptation for 
foreign intervention — and make more difficult a recon- 
ciliation between the two sections. 

Slavery strewed thorns in the paths of the Confed- 
erate diplomatists. In the summer of 1861 Palmerston 

1 He taxes one's credulity by this explanation for avoiding the ques- 
tion: " It was properly left out of view, so long as it might be reason- 
ably hoped that by the practice of magnanimity this government might 
cover that weakness of the insurgents without encouraging them to per- 
severe in their treasonable conspiracy against the Union. They have 
protracted the war a year, notwithstanding this forbearance of the gov- 
ernment ; and yet they persist in invoking foreign arms to end a do- 
mestic strife, while they have forced slavery into such prominence that 
it cannot be overlooked." — Dip. Cor., 104. 

s Dip. Cor., 1862, 104, 105. This despatch was sent out as a cir- 
cular. 

329 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM II. SEWARD 

summed up the state of both British and French opin- 
ion when he said, " We do not like slaveiy, but we want 
cotton, and we dislike very much your Morrill tariff." 
While the North vastly overestimated the antipathy to 
the South that slavery would cause among Europeans, 
the Confederates vastly underestimated it. It took Sew- 
ard and Palmerston and others more than a year to 
make even an approximately correct calculation of the 
importance of the question of slavery in foreign rela- 
tions. It is not strange that Schurz and Motley and 
Bigelow and Adams got true reckonings much earlier. 
]STor is it surprising that slave-holding diplomatists would 
be mole-eyed in regard to this subject. The Confederacy 
was crumbling into ruins before her Secretary of State 
and her commissioners understood that antislavery senti- 
ment in Europe was anything more than sheer perversity 
and selfishness. 

The first despatch from Yancey and Mann, dated Lon- 
don, May 21, 1861, stated that " the public mind here is 
entirely opposed " to the Confederacy on the question of 
slavery, and " the sincerity and universality of this feel- 
ing embarrass the government in dealing with the ques- 
tion of our recognition." Yet they were confident that 
the leading public men of all parties regarded it [recog- 
nition] as certain, unless the fortunes of war should make 
independence seem hopeless. On June 1st the commis- 
sioners further reported : " The antislavery sentiment is 
weak, and not active in Paris." Slidell mentioned in 
his first despatch from the French capital, February 11, 
1862, that one often heard regret expressed that slavery 
existed in the Confederacy, and a hope for its ultimate 
but gradual extinction ; yet nothing was said offensively, 
and he found it easy to divert the conversation to more 
agreeable topics. He thought the antislavery feeling 
in the abstract quite as general there as in England, 
but there was no considerable class that believed the ex- 

330 



SLAVERY AND FOREIGN RELATIONS 

istence of the institution would affect the action of the 
Emperor and his Cabinet, who were supposed to be quite 
indifferent to the subject. There was a very marked dif- 
ference between this report and the one Weed made to 
Seward about three weeks earlier. 1 Slidell's prejudices 
shut out the light. 

After 1861 there were numerous and wide-spread 
rumors in both England and France that the Confederate 
diplomatists were prepared to make concessions to the 
objections of Europeans to slavery. It was reported 
very soon after Mason and Slidell reached London that 
they had asked for British recognition of their govern- 
ment, and had accompanied the request with a promise 
of ultimate emancipation. 2 The father of this political 
gossip, as Adams explained, 3 was the wish, on the part 
of Confederate sympathizers, that some such plea might 
be urged so as to check the growing antislavery feeling. 
But before 1865 it would have been impossible to make 
emancipation a part of the Confederate programme. 
Nor did more than a very few of the Southerners dream, 
until it was too late, that such a course would be neces- 
sary. Even by November 4, 1862, Mason had not dis- 
covered more than that " when, after recognition," he 
should attempt to negotiate a treaty of amity and com- 
merce, Great Britain would demand, as a sine qua non, 

1 3 Seward, 57. 

'-The Spectator, of January 25, 1862, said: " It is understood, in that 
indirect but accurate way in which great facts first get, abroad, that 
the Confederacy has offered England and France a price for active 
support. It is nothing less than a treaty securing free-trade in its 
broadest sense for fifty years, the complete suppression of the im- 
portation of slaves, and the emancipation of every negro born after 
the date of the signature of the treaty. In return they ask — first, the 
recognition of their independence ; and, secondly, such an investiga- 
tion into the facts of the blockade, as must, in their judgment, lead to 
its disavowal." See also 3 Seward, 58, 62. 

3 Dip. Gor. t 1862, 16. 

331 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

a clause against the African slave-trade. This was less 
than it would have been to exact a pledge for emancipa- 
tion to take effect a century or two in the future, for the 
African slave-trade was prohibited by the Confederate 
Constitution. Yet Mason told his English friends that 
if such a requirement as he mentioned should be de- 
manded, a treaty would be impossible. After consulta- 
tion with Davis, Benjamin gave instructions, January 
15, 1863, that if the provision in the Constitution was 
not sufficient, the negotiations should be transferred to 
Richmond, and if the British representative should still 
persist, " that haughty government will find to its sur- 
prise that it needs a treaty of commerce with us much 
more than we need it with Great Britain." 1 Meantime 
a new and aggressive policy had been adopted by the 
United States. 

After the spring of 1862, Lincoln saw that he must 
yield more to the antislavery men or incur their hostil- 
ity. He believed that state emancipation with compen- 
sation from the central government would be the safest 
and most practicable way to shatter the foundation of 
the Confederacy. Would not a proclamation declaring 
free all the slaves in states and districts in insurrection 
show loyal slave-holders that slavery was doomed? 
Could they still refuse to accept compensation for prop- 
erty that would otherwise be lost? He thought that 
they could not, — forgetting, as Wendell Phillips said, 
that men argue with their prejudices, not with their 
reason. 

On July 13th Lincoln informed Secretaries Seward 
and Welles of his intention to issue a proclamation of 
emancipation. This was his first intimation of a radi- 

1 Both communications are printed in full in an article by John 
Bigelow iu the Century Magazine, May, 1891, pp. 115, 120. 

332 



SLAVERY AND FOREIGN RELATIONS 

cal change from his previous policy. Seward was so 
surprised that he did not feel prepared to express a de- 
cisive opinion on the subject. 1 On the next day Lincoln 
made one more effort to induce Congress to accept his 
plan of compensated emancipation, and he sent a draft 
of a bill that he desired to have passed. Seward im- 
mediately forwarded copies of the message and of the 
bill to all the United States Ministers in Europe, saying 
that " there is no reasonable doubt that the policy in- 
volved cannot be long in winning the favor of the coun- 
try, and in assuring the stability of the Union." 2 

On July 21st and 22d, the President laid before his 
Cabinet different questions concerning a more aggres- 
sive war policy. Among other points, all agreed that it 
would be well to permit the use of negroes as mili- 
tary laborers ; but Lincoln was unwilling that they 
should be enlisted as soldiers, as General Hunter had 
recommended. Lincoln also informed the Cabinet of 
his decision to issue a proclamation announcing his in- 
tention to declare free the slaves of those that were in 
rebellion. 

Seward saw no objection to granting General Hun- 
ter's request. 3 but he had very decided fears and objec- 
tions in relation to a proclamation, at this time, regard- 
ing emancipation. Stanton's memorandum of July 22d 
says: 

" Seward argues : That foreign nations will intervene to 
prevent the abolition of slavery for the sake of cotton. 
Argues in a long speech against its immediate promul- 
gation. Wants to wait for troops. Wants Halleck here. 
Wants drum and fife and public spirit. We break up our 
relations with foreign nations and the production of cotton 
for sixty years." 4 

1 Welles's diary, quoted 6 Nicolay and Hay, 122. 

2 Dip. Cor., 1862, 135. 3 6 Nicolay and Hay, 124. 
4 Quoted 6 Nicolay and Hay, 128. 

333 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM II. SEWARD 

F. B. Carpenter, who painted the famous picture of the 
President and his Cabinet at this time, quotes Lincoln as 
repeating Seward's language as follows: 

"'"It may be viewed as the last measure of an exhausted 
government, a cry for help; the government stretching 
forth her hands to Ethiopia, instead of Ethiopia stretching 
forth her hands to the government." His idea/ said the 
President, ' was that it would be considered our last 
shriek on the retreat.' This was his precise expression. 
'"Now," continued Mr. Seward, "while I approve the 
measure, I suggest, Sir, that you postpone its issue until 
you can give it to the country supported by military suc- 
cess, instead of issuing it, as would be the case now, upon 
the greatest disasters of the war."'" 1 

The aim that was uppermost in Seward's mind at 
this time was to ward off European interference by per- 
suading Great Britain and France that the sufferings 
caused by the lack of cotton would not continue long 
if these powers should cease giving encouragement to 
the Confederacy. More than once he had recently- 
warned them that otherwise a servile insurrection, and a 
consequent cessation in the production of cotton, would 
result from the prolongation of the war. It alarmed 
Seward to think that the course proposed might put an 
end to the extensive slave-labor in the Confederacy, and 
perhaps bring on a negro insurrection — either of which 
could have been used as a plausible excuse for interven- 
tion. As Secretary of State it was natural that he 
should regard the foreign relations of the country — 
then so critical — as of first importance. He was also 
very impatient with what he regarded as an irrational 
clamor for making emancipation, instead of national in- 

1 2 Lincoln's Works, 479. It has too often been assumed that this 
statement was full and precise, although Lincoln made it in February, 
1864. Carpenter's recollections of Lincoln's recollections are interest- 
ing as corroborative evidence, but they should not control as against 
Stanton's memorandum or Seward's opinions expressed at other times. 

334 



SLAVERY AND FOREIGN RELATIONS 

tegrity, the object of the war. Just a week after this 
Cabinet discussion of July 22d, Seward explained in a let- 
ter to his wife how a proclamation of emancipation would 
then do no good, but much harm, and added : " Procla- 
mations are paper, without the support of armies. It is 
mournful to see that a great nation shrinks from a war 
it has accepted, and insists on adopting proclamations, 
when it is asked for force. The Chinese do it without 
success." ' For several weeks, at least, he continued to 
be opposed to the plan decided upon, and felt a linger- 
ing contempt for what must have seemed to him like 
extravagant buncombe. This is shown in his sarcastic 
remark to the Secretary of the Treasury early in Sep- 
tember: "He said," Chase records in his diary, "some 
one had proposed that the President should issue a proc- 
lamation, on the [expected] invasion of Pennsylvania 
[by Lee], freeing all the apprentices of that state, or 
with some similar object." No wonder Chase thought 
"the jest ill-timed." 2 A Washington despatch in the 
New York Times of September 27, 18G2, said: "Secre- 
tary Seward has all along been known to be unfavorable 
to the act [of proclaiming emancipation], though not as 
outspoken in his opposition as Secretary Blair." 

It was another illustration of Seward's readiness that, 
although he was opposed to the general plan, some of 
his ideas should be accepted as very important. Lincoln 
generously gave him full credit for the suggestion that 
the proclamation should be " borne on the bayonets of 
an advancing army, not dragged in the dust behind a 
retreating one." 3 So the draft was laid aside to await 
the first victory, which was always expected soon. 

1 3 Seward, 118. 2 Warden's Chase, 471, 475. 

3 Carpenter, 22; 3 Seward, 118. Lincoln himself, a little later, oddly 
expressed a similar thought: "I do not want to issue a document 
that the whole world will see must necessarily he inoperative, like the 
Pope's bull against the comet."— 6 Nicolay and Hay, 155. 

335 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

Contrary to what has heretofore been believed, Seward 
was so fearful of the effects of the prospective procla- 
mation that he carefully questioned perhaps the best 
authority in Europe, evidently expecting to obtain infor- 
mation with which to reinforce his own objections. In 
a "private" despatch of July 24th he put this searching 
question to Motley : " Are you sure that to-day, under 
the seductions and pressure which could be applied to 
some European populations [powers?], they would not 
rise up and resist our attempt to bestow freedom upon 
the laborers whose capacity to supply cotton and open 
a market for European fabrics depends, or is thought to 
depend, upon their continuance in bondage?" 1 Motley's 
answer, beginning with "a thousand times no," 3 must 
have been a great surprise, for it gave new life and force 
to what the most intelligent representatives of the Unit- 
ed States in Europe had been saying, for nearly a year, 
about an unequivocal antislavery policy. 

At home, too, the tide continued to rise. George Ban- 
croft wrote a private note from Newport, August 27, 
1862, containing these two sentences of warning: "Are 
you at Washington aware how fast and how far public 
opinion has traveled on the subject of emancipation ? 
The people are nearly unanimous now." 3 

The victory at Antietam furnished an opportunity for 
issuing the preliminary proclamation of emancipation. 
When the draft was read to the Cabinet, the President 
said that his mind was made up except as to minor 
points. Again Seward's mental alertness was conspicu- 
ous. He seems to have made the only suggestions that 
were considered important and acceptable. He pro- 
posed that the proclamation be strengthened by a pledge 
to "maintain" the freedom it proclaimed, and that the 

1 MS. archives. 

2 Motley to Seward, August 26, 1862. Seward MSS. 

3 Seward MSS. 

336 



SLAVERY AND FOREIGN RELATIONS 

colonization of negroes should be voluntary on their 
part. 1 The published document, dated September 22, 
1862, announced the President's intention to continue 
to urge compensated abolition and voluntary coloniza- 
tion ; it threatened emancipation in all the states still 
in rebellion on January 1, 1863, and promised to rec- 
ommend to Congress that all persons that had remained 
loyal throughout the rebellion should be paid for losses 
of property and slaves. 

Seward immediately sent a circular despatch, with a 
copy of the proclamation, to all the diplomatic and con- 
sular officers of the United States in foreign countries. 
In his instructions to Adams, September 26th, there was 
a very forcible and statesmanlike summary of the logic 
of what had been, and was to be, done. The emancipa- 
tion of the slaves, he said, 

" could be effected only by executive authority, and on the 
ground of military necessity. Asa preliminary to the exercise 
of that great power, the President must have not only the 
exigency, but the general consent of the loyal people of the 
Union in the border slave states, where the war was raging, 
as well as in the free states which have escaped the scourge, 
which could only be obtained through a clear conviction on 
their part that the military exigency had actually occurred. 
It is thus seen that what has been discussed so earnestly at 
home and abroad as a question of morals, or of humanity, 
has all the while been practically only a military question, 
depending on time and circumstances. The order for eman- 
cipation, to take effect on the first of January, in the states 
then still remaining in rebellion against the Union, was 
issued upon due deliberation and conscientious considera- 
tion of the actual condition of the war, and the state of 
opinion in the whole country. 

" No one who knows how slavery was engrafted upon the 
nation when it was springing up into existence ; how it has 
grown and gained strength as the nation itself has advanced 
in wealth and power; how fearful the people have hitherto 
been of any change which might disturb the parasite, 

1 Warden's Chase, 482. 
ii.— t 337 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

will contend that the order comes too late. It is hoped and 
believed that after the painful experience we have had of 
the danger to which the Federal connection with slavery is 
exposing the republic there will be few indeed who will in- 
sist that the decree which brings the connection to an end 
either could or ought to have been further deferred. 

"The interests of humanity have now become identified 
with the cause of our country, and this has resulted not 
from any infraction of constitutional restraints by the gov- 
ernment, but from persistent unconstitutional and factious 
proceedings of the insurgents, who have opposed them- 
selves to both." 1 

A letter of about the same date, written to his daughter, 
gives this interesting bit of comment on the proclama- 
tion and on himself : 

"It is now evident that the proceeding has not been 
delayed too long. In a short time we shall know whether 
it has come too soon. I hope that this may not prove to be 
the case. I was fearful of prematurely giving to a people 
prone to divide, occasion for organizing parties, in a crisis 
that demands union and harmony, in order to save the 
country from destruction. 

"Having for twenty years warned the people of the com- 
ing of this crisis, and suffered all the punishment they 
could inflict upon me for my foresight and fidelity, I am 
not displeased with the position in which I find myself 
now — of one who has not put forth a violent hand to verify 
my own predictions." 2 

The administration's attitude against slavery gave him 
an opportunity to send to Dayton, October 20, 1862, this 
eloquent and impressive, although oratorical, warning 
against European interference : 

"Are the enlightened and humane nations, Great Britain 
and France, to throw their protection over the insurgents 
now? Are they to enter, directly or indirectly, into this 
conflict, which, besides being exclusively one belonging to 
the friendly people of a distant continent, has also, by force 

1 Dip. Cot., 1883, 202. 2 3 Seward, 135. 

338 



SLAVERY AND FOREIGN RELATIONS 

of circumstances, become a war between freedom and human 
bondage ? Will they interfere to strike down the arm that 
so reluctantly, but so effectually, is raised at last to break 
the fetters of the slave, and seek to rivet anew the chains 
which he has sundered ? Has this purpose, strange and 
untried, entered into the counsels of those who are said to' 
have concluded that it is their duty to recognize the in- 
surgents ? If so, have they considered, further, that rec- 
ognition must fail without intervention ; that intervention 
will be ineffectual unless attended by permanent and per- 
sisting armies, and that they are committing themselves to 
maintain slavery in that manner among a people where 
slaves and masters alike agree in the resolution that it shall 
no longer exist ? Is this to be the climax of the world's 
progress in the nineteenth century ?"' 

Lincoln's letter of August 22, 1862, to Horace Greeley, 
declared : " My paramount object in this struggle is to 
save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy 
slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any- 
slave, I would do it ; and if I could save it by freeing all 
the slaves, I would do it ; and if I could save it by free- 
ing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that." * 
After such a candid statement it would have been very 
shallow hypocrisy for the President to pretend to act like 
an abolitionist. But, of course, the abolitionists both 
in America and in Europe quickly claimed more than 
was true ; while the English friends of the South viewed 
the preliminary proclamation in a very unsentimental 
manner. The London Spectator of October 11, 1862, 
said : " The government liberates the enemy's slaves as 
it would the enemy's cattle, simply to weaken them in 
the coming conflict. . . . The principle is not that a hu- 
man being cannot justly own another, but that he can- 
not own him unless he is loyal to the United States." It 
saw the real reason of the act, and warned Americans not 
to wonder if the imagination of Europeans was not stirred, 

1 Dip. Cor., 1862, 398. 2 2 Lincoln's Works, 227. 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

or if they were not convinced that the system of slavery 
had been brought to an end. The Saturday Review, of 
the same date, in an article entitled " President Lincoln's 
Coup oVEtat" said that the proclamation would have 
been a crime, even if it had been strictly legal. " The 
President has virtually acknowledged his military fail- 
ure, and his desperate efforts to procure military sup- 
port will probably precipitate the ruin of his cause." 

As Seward had foretold, the real danger of an antisla- 
very policy was not in the direct effect upon European 
public opinion, but in the inferences that Europe would 
draw in case the administration should seem to lose 
power at home. It is certain that the Republicans did 
suffer in the elections of 1862 on account of the procla- 
mation; and doubtless Napoleon's actions, already no- 
ticed, were somewhat influenced in consequence. But 
what had been overlooked too long was the fact that all 
Europeans held antislavery convictions, and were sure 
to see, sooner or later, that antislavery acts, although 
prompted solely by military or political considerations, 
were ver} r desirable. 1 On October 10th Bigelow wrote, 
saying: "France is unanimously for emancipation, and 
our cause will now daily grow in grace here as it grows 
in age." 2 Dayton thought the proclamation might have a 
bad effect at first, because of fear lest the production of 
cotton should be interfered with ; but he was confident 
that in the end it would "commend itself to the en- 
lightened conscience of the Christian world." s But the 
most significant report was that from Adams, Novem- 
ber 15th, saying that efforts were making in London to 
organize the antislavery sentiment in our interest. 4 

Before the proclamation of emancipation was issued, 

1 Weed wrote from Paris, January 26, 1862 : "If ours was avowedly 
a war of emancipation, this government would sympathize with us 
and aid us."— 3 Seward, 57. 2 Seward MSS. 

3 Dip. Cor., 1862, 394. 4 Dip. Cor., 1863, 3. 

340 



SLAVERY AND FOREIGN RELATIONS 

January 1, 1863, emancipation societies were forming in 
England ; and by the time it had crossed the Atlantic 
all intelligent Englishmen were beginning to gain cor- 
rect knowledge as to the cause of the war. January 
had not passed before the first waves of the antisla- 
very storm in America were felt. In a few weeks more, 
English public opinion showed a surprising awakening. 
Great public meetings were held in the large cities, 
and famous speakers addressed audiences infused with 
the ardor and courage peculiar to national reform move- 
ments. The mass of laborers in mines and factories rap- 
idly developed a bitter prejudice against the Confed- 
eracy. Impressive antislavery resolutions were passed 
unanimously, and addresses of congratulation were sent 
to the President of the United States. As Cobden wrote 
to Sumner, these remarkable demonstrations of sym- 
pathy for the cause of freedom " closed the mouths of 
those who have been advocating the side of the South." ' 
The friends of the North felt thenceforth that they had 
a cause to plead. 

The response from France was less impressive — for the 
Second Empire was unfavorable to the expression of 
public opinion — but it left the Confederacy no room 
to expect popular sympathy. Before the middle of Feb- 
ruary, 1863, seven hundred and fifty " Protestant pastors 
of France of every denomination" issued an address to 
the pastors and ministers of all evangelical denominations 
in Great Britain, asking them to lead and to "stir up 
altogether a great and peaceful demonstration of sym- 
pathy for the black race" 2 — which meant to give the 
North all possible moral support. "An antislavery Con- 
ference of Ministers of Religion " was held in Manchester 
early in June, 1863. The British reply to the French 
pastors was signed by three thousand nine hundred and 

1 2 Morley, 406. * 1 Dip. Cor., 1863, 646. 

341 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM II. SEWARD 

ninety- seven clergymen. 1 Before the end of June the 
most reliable authority on this question made it clear 
that all France was awake — from the unscrupulous 
Napoleon III. to the most honest peasant. Edwin de 
Leon, the head of the Confederate press -agency in 
France, reported to Benjamin that men " connected with 
the government and enjoying the confidence of the Em- 
peror," had often told him that France could not "take 
the lead in acknowledging the Southern Confederacy, 
without some promise for prospective emancipation.'' 
He called " the old cry of slavery " " the real bete noire 
of the French imagination," and more of a stumbling- 
block to recognition in France than in England. 8 

By the summer of 1863 the utter hopelessness of ob- 
taining recognition from Great Britain had become so 
manifest that on August 4th it was decided to bring 
Mason's mission to an end. From Paris he continued 
to keep up personal relations with some English sympa- 
thizers with the Confederacy. A Southern Independ- 
ence Association was formed by the sanguine, but they 
felt compelled to promise to work for the extinction of 
slavery. The Confederates bewailed this as a fratricidal 
blow. Finally, in January, 1864, Mason concluded that 
there was no human influence that could touch men who 
had gone so far as to allow "the so-called antislavery 
feeling" to become "a 'sentiment' akin to patriotism"; 
who declined to accept his assurances that, after inde- 
pendence, when they came to know " the true condition 
of African servitude with us," " the film would fall from 
their eyes," and that meantime the Confederates ought 
to be regarded as the best judges of their own needs. 3 

Even Secretary Benjamin now realized that the once 
boasted "corner-stone" had become a mill-stone about 



1 Address of the French Protestant Pastors, etc., 30. 

2 Century, May, 1891, 118. 3 Century, May, 1891, 125. 

342 



SLAVERY AND FOREIGN RELATIONS 

the neck of the Confederacy. With apparent amaze- 
ment, he stated that the first political writers of France 
employed abolition sentiments as if they were " philo- 
sophical axioms too self-evident to require comment"; 
they assumed that there was "nothing within the range 
of possibility except the subjugation of the South and 
the emancipation of the whole body of negroes." Na- 
poleon favored recognition and peace, he believed; but 
what could he do "in direct contravention of the settled 
opinion of the people while hampered by the opposition 
of the English government"? 1 

It cannot be said, even as a figure of speech, that sla- 
very was the cause of the death of the Confederacy, as 
it surely was of its birth; but after Lincoln's policy of 
emancipation was understood abroad nothing but great 
victories and positive evidences of increasing strength 
could have established Confederate independence. In 
fact, the new government was a scuttled ship, held back 
by a dragging anchor. 

Probably another reason why Seward was not at first 
in sympathy with the aggressive antislavery movement 
was that he expected very important results from a 
treaty for the suppression of the slave-trade which he 
negotiated with Great Britain. In a long and elaborate 
letter of October IT, 1861, 2 John Jay made many sug- 
gestions to Seward as to the importance of taking im- 
mediate steps to negotiate a treaty with foreign powers 
for the suppression of the slave-trade. Neither England 
nor France could well refuse such an offer, he said; if 
they should accede, they would acknowledge the integ- 
rity of the United States government and make it more 
difficult to recognize the Confederacy on account of any 
temporary success. Such an attempt would show the 

' Century, May, 1891, 122. 2 Seward MSS. 

343 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

true sentiments of the United States and tend to efface 
the unfavorable impression made in Europe by the re- 
turn of fugitive slaves and the repudiation of Fremont's 
proclamation. A treaty of that kind would render nuga- 
tory the southern aim to revive the slave-trade, and it 
might make it impossible for any European power to 
recognize the Confederacy if it did not give its adhesion 
to the treaty itself. And the United States could free 
themselves from the suspicion that they were encourag- 
ing the trade by too strict a refusal to permit visitation 
in time of peace, if they would assent for a limited pe- 
riod to the mutual privilege of visitation within certain 
lines of latitude and longitude. The suggestion was cer- 
tainly a sagacious one, and it just suited the peculiar cir- 
cumstances in which Seward was placed. It gave him 
an antislavery cause of his own to champion. 

The antislave-trade treaty was negotiated by Seward 
and Lord Lyons in April, 1862, and was subsequently 
ratified. It provided that the officers of specially in- 
structed ships of the British and of the United States 
navies might visit such merchant vessels of the two na- 
tions as were under reasonable suspicion of being en- 
gaged in the African slave-trade. The right of search 
was to be exercised by vessels of war, and only within 
the distance of two hundred miles from the coast of 
Africa, and to the southward of 32° north latitude, and 
within thirty leagues of the coast of Cuba; and the of- 
ficer making the search must declare that his sole object 
was to ascertain if the vessel was engaged in the African 
slave-trade. Provision was made for three mixed courts 
— at Sierra Leone, at the Cape of Good Hope, and at JSlew 
York. 

It is said that when Sumner brought to the Depart- 
ment of State the news of the ratification of the treaty 
without dissent, Seward leaped from the lounge on 
which he had been resting, and exclaimed: "Good God! 

344 



SLAVERY AND FOREIGN RELATIONS 

the Democrats have disappeared. This is the greatest 
act of the administration." 1 In letters of this time he 
wrote : " God be praised ! We have got through the 
Senate a treaty that will destroy the slave-trade." " If 
I have done nothing else worthy of self-congratulation, 
I deem this treaty sufficient to have lived for." 2 

LTnforeseen circumstances prevented the treaty from 
assuming any such importance as had been expected. 
When the Secretary of State called upon the Secretary 
of the Navy to carry out the stipulations, he was in- 
formed that it would be impossible during the war 
to detail any vessel with specific instructions, for that 
would be a pro tanto locking -up of a portion of the 
mrvy, when every ship was needed for the blockade 
or for independent cruising. 3 Subsequently it was ar- 
ranged that the special instructions should not derogate 
from the belligerent rights of search. Welles resented 
what Seward had done, yet this statement as to the re- 
sult is deemed to be true : " But, in point of fact, I 
believe not a single capture was made; the African 
slave-trade had ceased, and the cumbrous and expen- 
sive machinery of mixed courts . . . was never put in 
operation." 4 

One of the strangest incidents of the slavery question 
was the conversion of the Republican party to the plan 
of colonizing free negroes in some foreign country. Lin- 
coln's birth in a slave state, and his life-long association 
with settlers from the South, made it natural that he 
should be skeptical about the possibility of the black 
and the white races living together in political equality. 
Therefore he, like Clay and nearly all southern Whigs 
of an earlier time, believed that the deportation of the 



1 4 Pierce's Sum?ier, 68. 2 3 Seward, 88, 85. 

3 Welles's Lincoln and Seward, 134. 4 Welle3, 144. 

345 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

freedmen to some tropical country would be both prac- 
ticable and necessary. Next to compensated emancipa- 
tion, this was one of his favorite ideas. On the other 
hand, Seward's early associations with the abolitionists 
of New York and of New England, who had long since 
pronounced colonization an impossibility, caused him to 
look with disfavor on such a proposition. 1 Nevertheless, 
it was his duty to contribute what he could to the ex- 
periment. 

The preliminary proclamation of emancipation made 
it urgent for the administration to have an answer to 
this question: What is to become of the negroes that by 
the hundred thousand are gaining freedom? Congres- 
sional support of a plan of colonization was already 
assured. Lincoln called for the opinions of the mem- 
bers of the Cabinet. Attorney-General Bates answered 
at length, September 25, 1862, favoring "the propriety 
of seeking to make treaties with the American govern- 
ments within the tropics, and with the European powers 
which have colonies within the tropics, with a view to 
obtaining safe and convenient places of refuge for the 
free colored population of this country " — those already 
free and those that might become so by the operations 
of the war. 1 In a circular despatch of September 30, 
1862, to the United States Ministers at London, Paris, 
The Hague, and Copenhagen, Seward stated the aims 
of the government. The first point was that emigra- 
tion should be voluntary. The other stipulations related 

1 "Seward, to whom the subject was not a new one, had no faith 
in their [the different schemes of colonization] success, and enter- 
tained grave doubts of their wisdom. He did not believe that the 
colored people would be willing to go to distant lands. He thought 
the United States offered a better field for their labor, and quite as 
much probability of contentment and happiness as they would find 
anywhere in the world. ' I am always for bringing men and states 
into the Union,' he said, ' never for taking any out.' " — 3 Seward, 227. 

2 A copy of the memorandum is in the Seward MSS. 

346 



SLAVERY AND FOREIGN RELATIONS 

chiefly to the welfare and the treatment of the emi- 
grants after becoming residents of the new state. Lord 
Russell declined the proposition of the United States as 
to the British West Indies, and no one of the other re- 
plies was satisfactory. On November 18, 1862, Seward 
again wrote to Adams, as follows : 

" While some of them [the projects from foreign conn- 
tries] are thus ascertained to be impracticable, it may be 
hoped, nevertheless, that we are drawing near to the dis- 
covery of a feasible policy which will solve, perhaps, the 
most difficult political problem that has occurred in the 
progress of civilization on the American continent." 

Unfortunately the discovery was never made. The 
projects that seemed least impracticable were to settle 
colonies on lands near the harbor of Chiriqui, in the 
state of Panama, New Granada, and on lie a Vache, be- 
longing to Haiti. A little inquiry caused a doubt as to 
the title to Chiriqui, but left no doubt that the district 
was wholly unsuited to the purpose. By special ar- 
rangement and under the protection of the administra- 
tion, nearly five hundred negroes sailed for lie a Vache, 
in April, 1863. The dream came to a sad end : within 
a few months the colonists were overtaken by hunger 
and sickness, so that a large proportion of them died. 
Within eleven months from the time the hapless ex- 
pedition sailed, the government had to bring back the 
survivors, or they, too, would soon have perished. 1 

Seward's attitude toward slavery was due to his con- 
tinued belief that the chief business of the administra- 
tion was to restore the Union, and that an}' - attempt to 
make emancipation a leading aim — unless a clear major- 
ity of the loyal voters demanded it — would be hazardous 

1 The particulars of the whole question of colonization are given in 
6 Nicolay and Hay, 354-67. 

347 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

and unwise. Being convinced that the election of Lin- 
coln had sounded the death-knell of slavery as a power 
in national politics, and that the war was inevitably 
antislavery in its effects, he was confident that the in- 
stitution would rapidly decline in strength, even with- 
out being made the object of Federal attack. 1 The 
position was true and statesmanlike, although military 
failures, the rapid growth of the power of the radicals, 
and the interests of the United States abroad compelled 
him to yield to the new and rapidly changing conditions. 

1 Carpenter's Six Months in the While House, 72 ; 1 Dicey's Federal 
States, 232-34. 



CHAPTER XXXVII 
SOME MISCELLANEOUS ACTIVITIES AND TRIALS 

Sewakd was an eccentric and many-sided political 
genius. He illustrated Mirabeau's theory that "Jaco- 
bins that are ministers will not be Jacobin ministers." 
Before December, 1860, he had been chief of the radi- 
cals, and his ambition had been primarily personal and 
partisan. Since the summer of 1861 probably no public 
man of the time had been governed by more patriotic 
impulses. Yet he desired as ardently as ever to be mas- 
ter of affairs, and it is doubtful if it ever occurred to 
him that he could not best perform any task falling to 
the President or to any member of the Cabinet. When 
Cyrus W. Field sent him a letter of condolence on his 
defeat at Chicago, he wrote : " If the alternative were 
presented to a wise man, he might well seek rather to 
have his countrymen regret that he had not been Presi- 
dent than to be President." ' Seward aimed to show such 
abilities in saving the Union — notwithstanding popular 
blunders, sectional disloyalty, and the malice of factions 
— that the mistake at Chicago should become apparent 
to all. Although his patriotism was egotistical, it was 
essentially unselfish. Here we have the main-spring of 
his incessant activity. 

From the beginning he was much more than Secretary 
of State. Either with or without formal approval he 
assumed scores of tasks that naturally belonged to other 

1 Judson's Field, 127. 
349 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

departments. To him, and often to Lincoln and to polit- 
ical leaders in the East, this seemed a matter of course. 
He acted as the President's agent in calling the meet- 
ings of the Cabinet and in looking after the perform- 
ance of numerous acts that needed to be done quickly. 
In two sentences, one in a letter written in the spring of 
1861, and the other a year later, he gives an almost per- 
fect description of what he conceived to be his impor- 
tance in the administration : " I am counseling with the 
Cabinet one hour, with the Army officers the next, the 
Navy next, and I visit all the troops as fast as they 
come." " I dare not, because I cannot safely, leave 
this post from which all supplies, all directions, all in- 
quiries must radiate, to armies and navies at home and 
to legations abroad." 1 He was fond of mentioning to 
friends and callers how busy he was, and how many 
irons he had in the fire. His son quotes him as saying, 
occasionally : " I am sure I am the senior of some of 
my colleagues, but they seem to think I am the youngest 
member of the Cabinet. When there is some one to be 
seen, some place to be visited, or some journey to be 
made, they seem to think it easier for me to go than 
for anybody else." 2 It was true ; and Seward was not 
the one to conceal the fact. 

At first no one of Seward's colleagues stood so close 
to him as Simon Cameron. It was not supposed that 
Lincoln's first Secretary of War had any special fitness 
for the duties that were severe enough to employ the 
energies of ten able men. Yet during most of the 
time the cause of the Union depended upon the enter- 
prise, expedition, and spirit of the War Department. 
Seward's subtle influence with Scott, the military head 
of the army for several months after the war began, 
made it easy for him to keep abreast of the leading 

1 2 Seward, 586; 3 Seward, 72. ■ 2 Seward, 622. 

350 



MISCELLANEOUS ACTIVITIES AND TRIALS 

plans in that department. After the call to arms he 
was most ready and resourceful in suggesting how the 
troops and munitions of war, especially from New York, 
should be hurried forward ; in fact, he seems to have 
helped the military organization whenever he had an 
opportunity. The man that had led so many political 
campaigns knew the importance of popular enthusiasm. 
It early became Seward's favorite recreation to drive 
to the neighboring fortifications and camps, in which 
he always found old friends and gave encouragement 
to the soldiers. More than once he visited the armies 
in the field. He was happiest when he appeared with 
the President, either on such occasions or when review- 
ing troops passing through Washington. This occurred 
so often that Seward's enemies began to ask sarcastically 
whether he was head of the army or only general man- 
ager of the whole administration. 

It was one of the best phases of his activity that it 
was never merely meddlesome; he did not bewail the 
mistakes of others ; he let the past go, and was eager 
— too eager, perhaps — to influence the present and the 
future. But he had the virtue to meet every military 
reverse with equanimity, and to be willing to give his 
whole time and energy to help reorganize and strengthen 
the shattered forces. The evidence of an impartial Eng- 
lish traveler 1 is not necessary to convince us that, after 
the fall of Fort Sumter, Seward was among the first 
to recognize that the North was in earnest, and needed 
the most vigorous measures, and that that was why 
Lincoln showed so much confidence in him at critical 
times. 

The numerous battles in different parts of Virginia 
since the beginning of the spring campaign of 1862 had 
sadly depleted the Federal forces. In June, several days 

1 1 Dicey's Federal States, 229. 
351 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

before McClellan's campaign in the Peninsula had ended, 
Seward suggested that new enlistments be called for ere 
the people should realize the extent of the disasters. The 
plan was heartily approved by Lincoln and Edwin M. 
Stanton, who, in January, 1862, had succeeded Cameron. 
Seward first induced several of the ISTew York Kepre- 
sentatives to go home and arouse their constituents; 
then he went to New York city to confer with the 
Union Defence Committees and to communicate by 
telegraph with the governors of the loyal states. It is 
known, moreover, that he caused a great Union meet- 
ing to be called in Springfield, Massachusetts; 1 and it 
is probable that he made many similar suggestions as 
to other localities. 

The President feared to issue a proclamation lest it 
might create a panic; but how, otherwise, could a hun- 
dred thousand new soldiers be obtained? Seward was a 
master of political strategy, and Lincoln was no novice. 
Here is the device; it was chiefly Seward's. 2 Lincoln 
gave Seward a confidential letter to be shown for effect; 
it explained the danger of the situation by saying that the 
Confederates had concentrated so many of their troops 
about Kichmond that it would be easy for them to at- 
tack Washington, unless the Federal army in the East 
should be strengthened. It had been expected that this 
would suffice to induce the governors to send forward 
reinforcements. But Seward found that recruiting had 
ceased and that a direct official appeal to the governors 
would be necessary. So he drafted a circular, incorpo- 
rating the suggestions of the confidential letter and call- 

1 "Upon your suggestion the other day," George Ashmun wrote to 
the Secretary, July 6, 1862, " I set on foot a call for a public meeting 
on the 4th, which was most successfully and happily responded to. 
It was the largest political meeting ever held under a roof in this 
region, and the manifestation was most gratifying." — Seward MSS. 

2 3 Seward, 100-110, gives a full account, with the documents. 

352 



MISCELLANEOUS ACTIVITIES AND TRIALS 

ing for one hundred and fifty thousand men, and tele- 
graphed it to Washington for the President's approval. 
A little later he concluded that it would be better if the 
governors, instead of the President, appeared to take 
the initiative; and immediatety he drew up a petition, to 
be signed by the loyal governors, expressing a " hearty 
desire that the recent successes [!] of the Federal army 
may be followed up by measures which must insure the 
speedy restoration of the Union," and requesting, "if it 
meets your [Lincoln's] entire approval," that the Pres- 
ident should call upon the states for such additional 
numbers of men as might be " necessary to garrison 
and hold all of the numerous cities and military posi- 
tions that have been captured by our armies, and to 
speedily crush the rebellion." This and the prepared re- 
ply, complying Avith the request, were also telegraphed 
to the President, and were promptly approved. By 
Seward's urgent request Stanton agreed to go beyond 
his lawful authority and advance to each recruit one- 
fourth of the one-hundred-dollar bounty, so as to en- 
courage enlistments. In less than a week from the 
time Seward took up the task, he had obtained the sup- 
port of all the governors of the loyal states, with one 
or two exceptions; three hundred thousand men — in- 
stead of half or one-third of that number, as was origi- 
nally intended — had been called for, and the correspond- 
ence was published in the newspapers July 2d, 1 before 
the country knew just what McClellan's fate had been. 
The alarm and anger of the North were great, but the 
prospects of having large reinforcements saved the ad- 
ministration from serious embarrassments. It is doubt- 
ful if any one except Seward could have accomplished 
this remarkable feat so speedily and so successfully. 
In time of war much of the general policy and many 

1 G Nicolay and Hay, 118. 
ii.— z 353 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM PI. SEWARD 

of the special undertakings of the Navy Department 
touch the interests of other nations, and therefore the 
Secretary of State is likely to be called upon to explain 
them or to cause any objectionable features to be changed. 
Gideon Welles and Seward were men of very different 
antecedents, associations, and tendencies. Welles had 
been a Jacksonian Democrat and a journalist — a man 
of little experience in public life outside of Connecti- 
cut and of not much within that state. He belonged to 
the New England school of anti- Seward Republicans, 
most of whom had left the Democracy on account of 
slavery. His integrity and intentions were of the best, 
but his ability was mediocre. He had but slight knowl- 
edge of naval affairs, and even less of international re- 
lations. From the beginning of the administration to 
the end of the war the chiefs of the two departments 
were generally on opposite sides if there was a division 
in the Cabinet. Welles favored closing the ports ; Seward 
preferred a blockade, and had his way. Welles waved 
the Mason-and-Slidell firebrand ; Seward threw it over- 
board, but none too soon. The Secretary of the Navy 
naturally wanted to attack as soon as possible, so as to 
weaken the enemy; the Secretary of State naturalty 
deprecated acts likely to injure the rights or call forth 
the displeasure of foreign governments. As has been 
noticed, Seward often took it for granted that what was 
important and needed to be done quickly must be di- 
rected by himself. Excepting the Fort Sumter and the 
Fort Pickens expeditions, the departmental discour- 
tesies of which Welles complained seem to have had 
some relation to the duties of the Secretary of State, 
and they resulted in nothing very serious; however, 
this may have been due principally to Welles's pro- 
tests and to Lincoln's increased care in examining Sew- 
ard's proposals relating to the Navy Department. The 
ground for just criticism was not Seward's motives but 

354 



MISCELLANEOUS ACTIVITIES AND TRIALS 

his methods. He usually chose the way that would 
most likely be free from obstacles to the accomplish- 
ment of his purposes, and surest to create ill-feeling 
and disorder in administration. His intentions, ex- 
cept possibly in regard to Fort Sumter, were thor- 
oughhy patriotic; but it was too much to expect the 
Secretary of the Navy and his friends to accept that as 
an excuse. 1 

In o-ivino; clearances to vessels and in regard to some 
other functions of the Treasury Department that affected 
foreign relations, Chase appears to have accepted the sug- 
gestions of the Secretary of State. Chase's prominence 
and his militant anti-Seward followers were a warning 
against encroachments. In the Department of Justice 
there was much less danger. The following unpublished 
letter from the Attorney -General to the Secretary of 
State explains itself : 

"Attorney-General's Office, September 23, 1861. 
"Hon. Wm. H. Seivard, Secretary of State: 

"Sin, — I regret to find in the newspapers a document 
bearing date September 21, '61, purporting to be a circular 
letter of instructions from you to the marshals and district 
attorneys of the United States, as to the manner of dis- 
charging their respective duties under recent acts of Con- 
gress. 

"I apprehend that there must be some mistake in this 
matter ; for, if not, there is danger that great inconvenience 
may result both to the officers instructed and to the public 
service. The officers may be embarrassed by discrepant in- 
structions from different sources, and the service may suffer 
from lack of regularity and uniformity in the action of the 
officers. 

"I beg to draw your attention to the act of Congress of 
August 2, 1861, whereby it is declared 'that the Attorney- 
General of the United States be, and he is hereby, charged 
with the general superintendence and direction of the 

1 The relations between the two Secretaries are described in Wellcs's 
Lincoln and Seward, passim. 

355 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM II. SEWARD 

attorneys and the marshals of all the districts in the United 
States and Territories, and as to the manner of discharging 
their respective duties.' 

*'l have the honor to be, with the greatest respect, 
" Your obedient servant, 

"Edwaed Bates." 1 

Seward's manner of filling the offices that came within 
the field of his political influence did not tend to make 
the party more harmonious. Lincoln early advised Weed 
and Seward that fairness to all was to be the rule of his 
administration in distributing the spoils. The President 
himself gave so much time to hearing applicants, espe- 
cially from the West, that several of the eastern leaders 
became very indignant. Lincoln seems to have treated 
Seward with much consideration. 2 To agree upon men 
for numerous positions in New York, Seward invited 
the President and Senators Harris and Preston King to 
a consultation at the Department of State. Lincoln 
brought the Secretary of the Navy. Welles's account 
of the meeting represents Seward as desiring to proceed 
in a very summary manner, and to send to the Senate 
the names of persons that were to be subordinates of 
other Secretaries, without consulting those Secretaries. 
Lincoln vetoed this part of the programme. 3 

1 Seward MSS. No trace of any reply or explanation on Seward's 
part has been found. 

2 2 Lincoln's Works, 24, 43. Mrs. Lincoln wrote to the Secretary. 
March 22, 1861, requesting that the consulship at Honolulu be given 
to a certain person. — Seward MSS. 

3 Welles, 71-73. The following letter from Chase to Seward is very 
much to the point, and probably refers to the conference mentioned 
above : 

"Treasury Department, March 27, 1861. 

"My dear Sir, — The appraisership at New York is vacant. 
Which of the applicants do you prefer? 

"Day before }'esterday you said to me in reference to the marshal- 
ship of the western district of New York, ' Insist on your brother.' I 
replied that the Attorney-General would, as I understood, nominate 

356 



MISCELLANEOUS ACTIVITIES AND TRIALS 

Of course the Post Office Department was the great 
field for the struggle of spoils. Although a conservative 
on many questions, Blair's political interests generally 
caused him to take sides with Chase. He frequently 
complained that Seward had too much to say about ap- 
pointments in his department. 1 

The rivalry between the two Republican factions in 
New York was so bitter and constant that Lincoln 
jested about it. Christopher Adams was a candidate 
for the office of superintending architect of the Treas- 
ury. "Mr. Adams is magnificently recommended," the 
President wrote to Chase ; " but the great point in his 
favor is that Thurlow Weed and Horace Greeley join in 
recommending him. I suppose the like never happened 
before, and never will again ; so it is now or never." 2 

Although Lincoln knew Seward's failings, he had a 
high regard for him both as a man and as a public of- 
ficer. From the day the President-elect offered to the 
great New York Senator the highest office in his ad- 
ministration, until the well-seasoned President came, in 
April, 1865, to tell the Secretary of State of a trip to 
the late capital of the Confederacy, a close association 
and mutual confidence, which did great credit to each, 
existed between them. More than once Seward sub- 

him, and that Senator Harris favored the appointment, as did Rep- 
resentatives Van Horn and Fenton, and that I presumed the other 
Representatives from -western New York would not object, and that I 
supposed therefore that the nomination would certainly be made. 

"To my surprise this morning I learn that another gentleman was 
brought forward by Mr. King in the conference in your department 
last night, 

" I have never favored nor pressed my brother, and never spoke a 
word in his behalf to the Attorney-General, and never mentioned him 
until this morning to the President ; but I cannot abandon him or con- 
sent that the decision of the Attorney-General in his favor shall be 
rescinded." — Seward MSS. 

1 Statement of John A. Kasson, First Assistant Postmaster-General, 
1861-62, to the writer. • 2 Lincoln's Works, 44. 

357 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

mitted patiently to severe reverses in his plans, and con- 
tinued thoroughly loyal toward his official superior, which 
was evidence of good intentions as well as of good judg- 
ment. The President was the only member of the ad- 
ministration whom Seward praised often. And Lincoln 
never felt himself so worthily President as when he in- 
corporated Seward's best thoughts with his own. Al- 
though Seward and Lincoln were men of very dissimilar 
temperaments, intellectual qualities, and methods, they 
were thoroughly congenial. There was no other depart- 
ment-chief at all comparable with Seward as a compan- 
ion; he was full of resources, and always cheerful and 
vivacious, both in council and in society. Because he 
was so energetic, ready, and hopeful, his influence with 
the President was undoubtedly greater than that of any 
other Cabinet officer. 

Lincoln could always understand and generally re- 
strain the inharmonious elements in the administration, 
but it was almost impossible to do either with the war- 
ring factions outside. The old party lines were very 
indistinct in 1861 and 1862. The great question was 
not whether the Union should be saved, but how to save 
it. The radicals, led by such men as Chase, Greeley, 
Sumner, and Thaddeus Stevens, thought that a ruth- 
less and universal emancipation policy would be a pan- 
acea for all the dangers and woes. Their ri^ht wing: 
was composed of abolition zealots, most of whom had 
the brains of Jacobins and the hearts of gentle philan- 
thropists. As they acted upon an interpretation of 
Seward's "higher law" that he himself refrained from 
adopting, they either were ready to ignore the Consti- 
tution or could easily convince themselves of the consti- 
tutionality of any plan they thought important. The 
conservatives that were sincere Unionists in all circum- 
stances looked to Seward as their great exponent. As 
has been noticed, he was confident that the war could 

358 



MISCELLANEOUS ACTIVITIES AND TEIALS 

surely and constitutionally be brought to a successful 
end only by treating slavery as a secondary or incidental 
issue. The left wing of the conservatives was made up 
of men that were as reckless and as illogical as the ab- 
olitionists, and much less respectable. 

The lines of this division became more sharply defined 
as the months passed. The people, as well as the poli- 
ticians, demand a hero for every victory and a scape- 
goat for every defeat. It was especially so during these 
years of revolution, when passion seemed to blaze and 
consume like a conflagration. Lincoln leaned to the con- 
servative side, but he was non-partisan in most of his 
acts. And it is surprising to find how often he was ex- 
cepted from the sweeping denunciations hurled at the 
Cabinet and the military leaders. Of course there were 
always violent orators and furious editors who made no 
distinctions; nor would they, if the archangel Gabriel 
had come, as a Unionist and constitutionalist, to explain 
the mysteries of the conflict and to bring it to the best 
termination. The two factions not only had distinct 
theories and ideas, but they also chose military leaders 
and painted military cowards and military " butchers." 
The radicals cried, " On to Richmond !" when the way 
was almost as unknown as the troops were undrilled; 
and they applauded Fremont's absurd antislavery proc- 
lamation. The conservatives called them crazy aboli- 
tionists, incapable of statesmanlike action. Fremont 
suddenly became a favorite with the radicals, while 
McClellan slowly but surely lost the confidence of all 
except the conservatives. 

Because Seward was so conspicuous and influential, he 
was blamed for many of the failures of 1861 — and there 
were not many Federal successes to be ascribed to any 
one. When the radical press and popular orators asked 
how many years it would take to bring to an end Sew- 
ard's " ninet3^-da.y war," the angry conservatives replied 

359 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

that at the time this opinion was expressed it was as- 
sumed that the other departments would be conducted as 
ably as the Department of State, and not mismanaged by 
zealots. Such was the first froth of revolution. There 
were frequent rumors of changes in the Cabinet. After 
the settlement of the Trent affair Seward's fortunes rose 
Avith amazing suddenness ; and the heavy pendulum of 
vituperation swung to the other side. Nearly every one 
admitted that the credit of averting war belonged chiefly 
to Seward, and his special friends called the radicals to 
mark the result in matters over which he had actual con- 
trol. Behold the difference, they said, between victories 
in diplomacy and defeats in the field. This ought to have 
sufficed, but it did not. They demanded that Seward 
should be given as great influence in the administration 
as the radicals had accused him of exerting, for the con- 
servatives believed that his abilities and the state of 
public affairs warranted it. Even the great and well- 
balanced lawyer, William M. Evarts, wrote to the Sec- 
retary of State, January 2, 18G2 : 

"Your position seemed to me not less difficult than im- 
posing. A chafing people, a Congress filled with malcon- 
tents and empty of leaders, a Cabinet with disturbed plans 
and purposes, and long -accustomed freedom from any 
sharply critical situations in our foreign affairs, were hard 
to handle at home. . . . 

"I hope you will feel strong enough to attempt what I 
am sure your friends feel as important to the complete- 
ness of your fame in the history of the 'Great Rebellion' 
some Clarendon is to write, as to the dearest interests of 
the country — the formation of a public-spirited Cabinet, 
framed to the issues that have come in since the election. 
The whole country is longing for this." 1 

A few weeks later the same friend wrote again: " There 
is a general expectation here that Secretary Welles 

1 Seward MSS. 
360 



MISCELLANEOUS ACTIVITIES AND TRIALS 

will leave the Cabinet, and that his place will be filled 
from New England"; and then he suggested that Rich- 
ard Henry Dana, of Boston, be appointed, for " his gen- 
eral public ability, high character, and intrepid courage 
would make him a most valuable colleague to yourself in 
the Cabinet." ' It was a repetition of a frequent over- 
sight: men forgot that Lincoln, not Seward nor Chase, 
was President. Cameron alone went out, in January, 
1SG2, and that was because he was enveloped in a cloud 
of corruption. 

Seward's aversion to a strictly antislavery policy was 
continually a pretext for attacks. The radicals recalled 
his words in the winter of 1 860-61 ; and when the volume 
of diplomatic correspondence for 1861 was published, 
near the end of that } T ear, they found the despatches to 
Dayton and to Adams saying that no moral principles 
were to be brought into discussion before foreign gov- 
ernments, and that the condition of slavery would re- 
main just the same whether the revolution should suc- 
ceed or fail. 2 From the same store-house they took his 
declaration that " Only an imperial or despotic govern- 
ment could subjugate thoroughly disaffected and insur- 
rectionary members of the state." And all were used 
as cutting weapons. This was the man, they said, whose 
friends asserted that he was the virtual head of the ad- 
ministration; and, they added, if the claim was war- 
ranted it explained why no moral questions had come 
into the conflict, and why there had been so little subju- 
gation of the disaffected. It was a specious but potent 
method of damaging an inconsistent yet zealous patriot. 
Notwithstanding the spring-flood of antislavery activity 
that began in the winter of 1861-62, Lincoln, as has been 
seen, could be induced to go only a little beyond what 

1 February 3, 1862. Seward MSS. 

2 See ante, pp. 162, 357. An editorial article in the New York Tri- 
bune of December 18, 1861, criticised Seward for this. 

361 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

was known to be Seward's opinions at that time. There- 
fore, the emancipationists vented their anger upon the 
Secretary of State, and endeavored to make him shoul- 
der the responsibility for every reverse in the field. 

Seward's offences were much less serious than they 
were represented to be. What he had said about co- 
ercion was written even before the attempt to relieve 
Fort Sumter, which was avowedly not an effort to sub- 
jugate South Carolina, but merely a military declaration 
of a right to supply and hold that particular fort. Al- 
though the prophec} 7 about slavery was made a few days 
later, it was written three months before Congress passed 
the Crittenden resolution, which contained Seward's idea, 
and was an official announcement of the national policy. 
He undoubtedly did believe that the contest itself would 
not immediately destroy slavery, for, like a great many 
others, he fully expected that the next campaign would 
see the beginning of the end of hostilities, if not the 
end itself. If Confederate disintegration had dated from 
the early spring of 1862, it would then, considering all 
the circumstances, have been entirely unnecessary and 
unstatesmanlike, if not positively injurious, to attack sla- 
very directly. 

As soon as McClellan's reverses before Richmond be- 
gan, the severe criticisms on Seward increased in num- 
ber and virulence, and efforts were made " to sow the 
seeds of disunion" in the relations between the Secre- 
tary of State and his colleagues. 1 His services in the 
North in connection with the call for troops did not ap- 
pease his enemies. In July it was said that he was to 
leave the Cabinet. 2 When it was seen that he could not 
be displaced by means of disconnected attacks, his en- 

1 3 Seward, 98. 

5 Robert D. Pine wrote, July 25, 1862: " I sincerely hope that there 
is no foundation for the reported rumor here of your resigning your 
station at the helm."— Seward MSS. 

362 



MISCELLANEOUS ACTIVITIES AND TRIALS 

eraies began to organize. Early in September a com- 
mittee from New York, claiming to represent hostile 
sentiment in that state, and especially the opinions of 
the five New England governors, came to Washington 
to "insist on the resignation of Messrs. S[eward] and 
B[lair?]." In the same paragraph in which Chase re- 
corded this fact he said that he 

" had never known Mr. Seward to object to any action, how- 
ever vigorous, of a military nature, though his influence 
had been cast in favor of harmonizing the various elements 
of support to the administration, by retaining General Mc- 
Clellan in command, and by avoiding action which would 
be likely to alienate the border states. I added that in his 
wishes of harmony I concurred; and that I credited him 
with good motives in the choice of means to ends, though 
I could not always concur with him in judgment as to their 
adaptation." 1 

The presumption and personal motives of the committee 
provoked Lincoln to say : " It is plain enough what you 
want — you want to get Seward out of the Cabinet. 
There is not one of you who would not see the country 
ruined if you could turn out Seward." 2 Bryant wrote to 
a friend, September 15th: " Some of our best and most 
eminent men have visited "Washington to remonstrate 
with him [Lincoln, about his inactivity in military and 
antislavery matters], but with only partial effect. The 
influence of Seward is always at work, and counteracts 
the good impressions made in the interviews with men 
of a different class." 3 It was probably within a few 
weeks of this time that Joseph Medill said in an undated 
letter to Schuyler Colfax : 

"McClellan in the field and Seward in the Cabinet have 
been the evil spirits that have brought our grand cause to 
the very brink of death. Seward must be got out of the 
Cabinet. He is Lincoln's evil genius. He has been Presi- 

1 Warden's Chase, 467. 2 "Warden's Chase, 468. 

3 2 Godwin's Bryant, 178. 

363 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

dent de facto, and lias kept a sponge saturated with chloro- 
form to Uncle Abe's nose all the while, except one or two 
brief spells.". . .' 

So much for the opposition to Seward in the summer 
and autumn of 1862. 

It should not be inferred that the conservatives had no 
reproaches for their enemies. It Avas Seward's misfort- 
une rather than his fault that many Democrats and Demo- 
cratic newspapers that had formerly been counted as pro- 
southern had come to be his stanch allies, and he was too 
often blamed for their opinions. The New York Herald 
belonged to this class, and, of course, violently assailed 
the radicals, just as in former years it had assailed Sew- 
ard himself. On July 9, 1S62, it called for "the re- 
moval of the imbeciles from the Navy and War Depart- 
ments"; and, about this time, it very frequently spoke of 
the " abolition traitors." On November 28th it alleged 
that the movement against Seward was led by Wendell 
Phillips, who had called for a radical change of men and 
measures; that the preliminary proclamation of eman- 
cipation was the beginning of the change in measures; 
and that the dismissal of McClellan was the first step in 
a movement to get rid of Seward, Bates, and Blair. It 
expressed the opinion that Seward was "the only mem- 
ber of the Cabinet who has done his work thoroughly, 
efficiently, and successfully." On December 18th it de- 
clared that the Tribune and the radicals were respon- 
sible for the result at Fredericksburg. The New York 
Times, too, called for a new Cabinet, ready to adopt a 
policy of energy, of stronger, broader, and more perse- 
vering statesmanship, instead of what was regarded as 
unsteady and shifting. 3 Everybody understood this as 
equivalent to a demand that Seward's ideas should be 
given supremacy. 

1 Hollister's Colfax, 200. 2 Times, September 15, 1862. 

364 



MISCELLANEOUS ACTIVITIES AND TRIALS 

The success of the Democrats in the election of 18G2 
and the Federal defeat at Fredericksburg were charged 
against Seward try the radicals ; but there was no ground 
for their accusations. When the Diplomatic Correspond- 
ence for 1862 appeared, near the end of that year, they 
found a despatch that well suited their purposes. It was 
written July 5th, in the midst of the political excitement 
resulting from the disasters of the campaign in the Pen- 
insula. Its principal sentence was : 

"It seems as if the extreme advocates of African slavery 
and its most vehement opponents were acting in concert to- 
gether to precipitate a servile war — the former by mak- 
ing the most desperate attempts to overthrow the Federal 
Union, the hitter by demanding an edict of universal eman- 
cipation as a lawful and necessary, if not, as they say, the 
only legitimate, way of saving the Union." 1 

It was as indiscreet as it was useless to put such a sen- 
tence into the official records, and nothing less than an 
accident would seem to account for its publication. 2 
Charles Sumner, who was chairman of the Senate com- 
mittee on foreign affairs and had been one of Seward's 
severest critics in diplomacy and on the question of 
slavery, learned from the President that the despatch 
had never been submitted to him for approval. There 
was nothing strange about this, for the despatch was 
merely an expression of an opinion in no way design- 
ed to affect foreign relations ; but it was regarded as a 
rare opportunity to create a disagreement between the 
President and the Secretary of State. 

1 Dip. Cor., 18G2, 124. 

' l The biographers of Lincoln and of Sumner (6 Nicolayand Hay, 264; 
4 Pierce, 110) thought it strange that Seward should have such ideas 
so short a time before the President made known his intention about 
emancipation. They overlooked the fact that Seward was speaking 
of universal emancipation, which was no part of Lincoln's programme, 
as was made very evident in his letter of August 22d to Greeley. 

36o 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM IT. SEWARD 

About the middle of December a caucus of Repub- 
lican Senators passed a resolution asking the President 
to dismiss Seward. Later, this was changed into a re- 
quest for a reconstruction of the Cabinet, but it was well 
understood that the Secretary of State was the target. 1 
Nine Senators — Grimes, Sumner, Trumbull, Pomeroy, 
Fessenden, Collamer, Harris, Howard, and Wade — were 
appointed as a committee to wait on Lincoln. Sen- 
ator Preston King alone dissented, 2 and, refusing to be 
bound to secrecy by the caucus, he hurried off to inform 
Seward. Wishing to anticipate the action of the com- 
mittee, and to relieve Lincoln of embarrassment, Seward 
immediately wrote his resignation, and King carried 
it to the White House. The next day the committee 
called on the President and formally attacked Seward. 
Except in relation to slavery, they seem not to have 
questioned his conduct of affairs in the Department of 
State. Lincoln described their criticism in this homely 
figure of speech : " While they seemed to believe in my 
honesty, they also appeared to think that when I had in 
me any good purpose or intention Seward contrived to 
suck it out of me unperceived." 3 Iso conclusion was 
then reached, except that the conference should be con- 
tinued that evening. Lincoln soon talked matters over 
with the Cabinet, showing no signs of yielding to the 
strange demand, and he finally instructed all except 
Seward to meet him that evening. 

When the time arrived for continuing the conferences, 
the committee and the Cabinet were surprised by being 
brought together. Then the President opened the dis- 
cussion by reading the resolution and commenting upon 
some of the points with "gentle severity," as his biog- 
raphers describe it. Of course, the Senators had to take 

1 6 Nicolay and Hay, 264. 

2 Schuckers's Chase, 474 ; Welles, 83. 

3 6 Nicolay and Hay, 265. 

S65 



MISCELLANEOUS ACTIVITIES AND TRIALS 

the aggressive : whereas Lincoln's attitude and the nat- 
ure of the case compelled the Cabinet to act on the 
defensive. No Secretary could properly side with the 
Senators on such an issue ; Stanton's simile explained 
the reason : " This Cabinet, gentlemen, is like yonder 
window. Suppose you allow it to be understood that 
passers-by might knock out one pane of glass — just one 
at a time — how long do you think any panes would be 
left in it?" 1 Chase's position was exceptional, and he 
was greatly embarrassed. He dared not then criticise 
Seward, as it was notorious he had done at other times. 
Yet to defend him would have been a very patent stul- 
tification. It was so evident he was caught in a trap 
that he expressed his regrets that he had not stayed 
away. 2 Before the long meeting broke up Lincoln had 
once more proved his superior shrewdness. All the 
members of the Senate committee had wished to have 
Seward expelled ; but when they were asked : " Do you, 
gentlemen, still think Seward ought to be excused V 
only four of the eight Senators present answered in the 
affirmative. Three were non-committal, and one had 
completely reversed his position. The Senators had met 
with a repulse, but the contest had not ended. 3 

1 3 Seward, 147. 2 6 Nicolay and Hay, 266, 267. 

3 Seward and bis son withdrew from the Department of State on 
the day following the resignation. The New York Times of Decem- 
ber 21st said, in a leading editorial article, that the metropolis had 
been as much startled on the 20th as it was a few days earlier by the 
defeat of Burnside. As yet the Times did not comprehend the sit- 
uation. " Mr. Seward has been the right-hand man of the President 
from the day of his election until now," the same article declared. 
" He has had in a great measure the shaping of the policy of the gov- 
ernment, besides the management of what has been, on several occa- 
sions, its most important and difficult department. . . . Other depart- 
ments are filled with men who have no reputation, no administrative 
ability, no public respect — who are at the same time imbecile and head- 
strong, who have driven the government to the verge of ruin, and who 
would long ago have vacated their posts had they had the least regard 

367 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

On the morning of December 20th, when Lincoln and 
most of the Cabinet met again for further consultation, 
Chase orally offered his resignation, but continued to hold 
the written communication in his hand. " The President 
stepped forward and took it with an alacrity that sur- 
prised, and it must be said disappointed, Mr. Chase." ' 
From that moment the way was clear, for Lincoln had 
the leader of each faction at his mercy. " Yes, Judge," 
said the President to a caller shortly afterward, " I can 
ride on now, I've got a pumpkin in each end of my bag." : 
If either faction should become too bold, it could be 
humbled by accepting the resignation of its chief and 
by refusing to permit that of the other. But Chase was 
recognized as a great Secretary of the Treasury; and 
Lincoln had too keen a sense both of humor and of jus- 
tice to allow an efficient officer to receive very severe 
punishment even for extreme folly. Seward was cer- 
tainly not less efficient. If the President had released 
either Seward or both Seward and Chase, it would also 
have been interpreted to mean that the Senate had the 
right, or at least the power, to get rid of any Secretary 
whom it disliked. This would, indeed, have been very 
hazardous for the administration ; for it would have 
encouraged the discontent shown in the recent elec- 
tions and strengthened by Burnside's failure. More- 
over, France was eager for an excuse to intervene ; and 

for the opinion, the sentiment, or the welfare of the country. If they 
will not resign, they should be expelled before the country is swept 
over the brink of despair on which it is now trembling." 

By the next day the Times had learned the particulars of the crisis, 
and therefore it expressed a very different opinion: "Mr. Seward is 
supposed to have been the leading man in the administration — to have 
suggested policies and caused their adoption, to have held back the 
President from measures which he desired to adopt, and to have forced 
upon him action he did not wish to perform. We believe that all this 
is without the slightest foundation in fact." 

1 6 Nicolay and Play, 268. 2 3 Seward, 148. 

368 



MISCELLANEOUS ACTIVITIES AND TRIALS 

the British government could hardly have resisted the 
popular demand that would have been made for the 
recognition of the Confederacy, if Lincoln's Cabinet had 
gone to pieces under such influences. Fortunately, Lin- 
coln did not forget that the best way to control men 
and events is to keep control of them. "With Chase and 
Seward outside the Cabinet, their respective followers 
were sure to be less friendly to the President. While 
Chase and Seward remained in the Cabinet, neither they 
nor their friends were likely to attack Lincoln, openly 
and directly. So, on the 20th, the President wrote a joint 
note to these Secretaries, saying that "after most anxious 
consideration," his "deliberate judgment" was that the 
public interest would not permit him to accept their resig- 
nations ; and he requested them to resume the duties of 
their departments. 

In a single sentence of fourteen words Seward answered 
the next morning, that he had "cheerfully resumed the 
functions " of Secretary of State. Chase was still serious- 
ly embarrassed. He would have preferred not to re-en- 
ter the Cabinet if Seward had insisted on withdrawing; 
but Seward again at the Department of State, while he 
himself remained out of office, was not a pleasing pros- 
pect. Finally, on the 22d, he wrote to the President ex- 
pressing a willingness " to conform my action to your 
judgment and wishes." ' The New York Herald of the 
23d called Chase the Mephistopheles of the Cabinet, and 
charged that he had " been the prime mover in all the 
radical schemes and an active co-worker with his con- 
federates of the Senate against Mr. Seward." This was 
too severe ; but Chase's actions both before and during 
the Cabinet crisis are unintelligible except on the assump- 
tion that his dislike or jealousy of Seward's influence was 
a very important factor in what took place. 

1 Warden, 509. 
ir.— 2 a 369 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM II. SEWARD 

The real Cabinet crisis ended before Christmas, 1862, 
but the newspapers and the politicians continued to 
wrangle for months. Still smarting from Seward's cut- 
ting but imprudent declaration that "the extreme ad- 
vocates of African slavery and its most vehement op- 
ponents were acting in concert," Greeley affected great 
indignation and charged Seward with sending despatches 
without submitting them to the President for approval. 
The intended implication was that the Secretary was 
too presumptuous and headstrong to be tolerated by 
the administration. Raymond, as usual, replied for his 
friend. The Times declared that not one despatch, "not 
merely and exclusively formal and technical in its char- 
acter," had been sent to any foreign Minister without 
the approval of the President, and that this statement 
was made on the authority and by the permission of 
the President and of the Secretary of State. This was 
a flank attack that Greeley had not anticipated, and it 
showed that he had undertaken a most gratuitous task. 
The Tribune maintained that the exception was so broad 
that it was practically a confession. Greeley was strong 
in a single charge, but his enemies were more resource- 
ful. It came out as Raymond expected when he wrote, 
February 27, 1863: "I think before the matter is ended 
I shall put Mr. Greeley into an awkward position." 1 

For a man that was usually so adroit and circum- 
spect, Seward had a strange faculty for getting himself 
into annoying complications, and the extrications were 
not always satisfactory. Like a lion -tamer or snake- 
charmer, he seemed to think at times that he could safe- 
ly perform what others could do only with the greatest 
risk. His share in the responsibility for the trip that 
Mercier, the French Minister, made to Richmond, in the 

1 Seward MSS. The discussion between the Tribune and the Times 
continued almost daily for two weeks after about February 20, 1863. 

370 



MISCELLANEOUS ACTIVITIES AND TRIALS 

spring of 18G2, illustrated this trait. The particulars of 
the incident did not become known until early in 1S63. 
When Mercier expressed to Seward a regret that he did 
not know more about the condition of affairs in Rich- 
mond, the Secretary obtained the President's permission 
for him to visit that capital, as has been mentioned. Sew- 
ard was sure that the " insurrection " was " shrinking and 
shriveling into very narrow dimensions," and he hoped 
that Mercier might " come back prepared with some plan 
to alleviate the inconveniences of his countrymen in the 
South, who were not acting against this government." ' 
Before Mercier started Seward remarked that he would 
be pleased to iind himself again in the Senate with those 
whom the South might see lit to send thither, and that 
the [North was animated by no sentiment of vengeance. 
Mercier's subsequent account made it plain that Seward 
spoke unofficially, 5 but what the Frenchman said in Rich- 
mond led to very different inferences. To the Confederate 
Secretaiy of State he expressed the belief that the United 
States would in time get possession of all the southern 
ports ; but Benjamin thought he convinced Mercier that 
in any case there was no doubt of the ultimate indepen- 
dence of the Confederacy. Mercier said that it would 
be a matter of infinite gratification to himself and his 
government if his good offices could be interposed in 
any way to restore peace, and he suggested political in- 
dependence combined with commercial union. But, he 
remarked, with regret, one side would not hear a sen- 
tence that did not begin with " independence," while the 
other insisted that not a syllable should be spoken except 
on the basis of "Union." 3 At this time Seward wrote 
to Weed : " Mercier's visit to Richmond was on con- 

'Dip. Cor., 1862, 335. 

2 New York Tribune, Februarys, 1863, printed Mercier's despatch 
describing how the trip originated, etc. 

3 Benjamin to Slidell, July 19, 1862. 

371 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

sulfation with me, and it will produce fruits, I hope." ' 
In a letter of June 25, 1862, to Bigelow, he spoke of 
" our consenting to Mr. Mercier's going to Richmond " 
as being meaningless. 2 

The Tribune, of course, led the attack, and represented 
that Seward was using the French Minister to invite 
Confederates to return to their seats in the Senate. 3 
This led Senator Grimes to introduce a resolution re- 
questing the President to communicate the character of 
the suggestions that the French Minister was authorized 
to make from the government, or from the Secretary of 
State, to the Confederate authorities. 4 Seward replied 
that "since March 4, 1861, no communication, direct or 
indirect, formal or informal, save in relation to prisoners 
of war, has been held by this government, or by the Sec- 
retary of State, with the insurgents, their aiders, or abet- 
tors ; no passport has been granted to any foreign Min- 
ister to pass the military lines, except by the President's 
direction." 5 Of course the sweeping declaration about not 
holding any communication, direct or indirect, with in- 
surgents left out of view what had taken place between 
Seward and Gwin, Hunter, and Campbell in March and 
April, 1861. Seward wrote to Dayton, March 16, 1863: 

"Nothing was ever more preposterous than the idea en- 
gendered here, and sent abroad to perplex Europe, that an 
American Secretary of State would employ a plenipotenti- 
ary of the Emperor of France to negotiate with American 
insurgents, and that a plenipotentiary of such a power would 
accept such a mission." 6 

This was a good reply to the false charges, but it did 
not show that what he had actually done was either 
necessary or wise. 

1 3 Seward, 88. : Bigelow MSS. 

8 New York Tribune, February 4, 1863. * Globe, 1862-63. 817. 

5 6 Moore's Rebellion Record, Diary, p. 45. 6 1 Dip. Cor., 1863, 149. 

372 



MISCELLANEOUS ACTIVITIES AND TRIALS 

Seward had more bitter and active enemies among the 
politicians than any other member of the Cabinet ; yet, 
excepting Welles, he was the only Secretary that served 
throughout the administrations of Lincoln and of John- 
son. There was always a strong element of pugnacity, 
personal hatred, or ambition in the disagreements that 
Chase and Blair, respectively, had with various men and 
factions. Therefore, Lincoln did not find it practicable 
to retain either of them to the end of his first term. 
Seward had a positive dislike for a quarrel of any sort ; 
and, finding himself involved in one, he always tried to 
extricate himself in some diplomatic way. He had his 
failings ; but his great intelligence, his affable manners, 
his earnest desire to serve his country, and the great value 
of the work he did, made it easy to overlook his mistakes 
and to feel that he was indispensable to the administra- 
tion in the crisis. 



CHAPTER XXXVIII 

THE BRINK OF A FOREIGN WAR: BLOCKADE -RUNNING AND 
BUILDING CONFEDERATE WAR-SHIPS 

The Confederates did not expect to prevent a block- 
ade, but they counted on blockade-running as a sufficient 
means of communication with the outside world until 
some foreign nation should come to their assistance. 
They were also confident that by sending out priva- 
teers and improvised cruisers they could destroy the 
commerce of the United States. And if war-ships could 
be obtained abroad, they alone might be able to break 
the blockade. Foreign capital and enterprise were soon 
attracted to the contraband trade with the Confederacy. 
It was not long before the two great powers that were 
complaining of the blockade, but dared not disregard it, 
were building different kinds of war-ships with which 
the Confederates hoped to sweep United States mer- 
chantmen from the seas, and to open southern ports. 
The serious international questions that arose in conse- 
quence brought the United States to the brink of a 
foreign war. 

It was impossible to watch strictly all of the three thou- 
sand miles of Confederate coast-line with its one hundred 
and eighty-five harbor openings. At man}' points there 
were, especially in the beginning, no serious obstacles to 
blockade-running. Wilmington, Charleston, and Savan- 
nah, on the Atlantic, and Galveston and Brownsville on 
the Gulf, were the principal ports. Charleston harbor 
was the one most frequently entered at first, although 

374 



BLOCKADE. RUNNING, ETC. 

care was taken at an early period in the war to block- 
ade it effectively. The numerous inlets to Wilmington 
made it impossible to shut off much of its commerce 
until the third year of the war, when the Federal gov- 
ernment was able to stretch a long line of ships in front 
of the entrances. 1 As many as forty-two vessels entered 
and cleared at Wilmington in the summer of 1861, and 
one hundred and fifty arrived at Charleston in the six 
months prior to December of that year. 3 But the size, 
quantities, and qualities of the cargoes of all blockade- 
runners at different points were not such as either to 
disprove the efficiency of the blockade or to supply the 
needs of the Confederacy. 

As the blockade grew in efficiency the value of ar- 
ticles imported into the Confederacy rose, while that of 
cotton and tobacco rapidly declined. Because the pos- 
sibilities of greater profit, in case of a successful voyage, 
about balanced the increased risks, the contraband trade 
did not become less tempting. At first all sorts of sail- 
ing vessels and steamboats were used ; but when the Fed- 
eral government increased the number of the blockaders, 
some of which could make good speed, only those block- 
ade-runners with steam and of light draft, and built so as 
to attract little attention, were likely to escape capture. 3 

1 1 Wilson's Ironclads in Action, 186. 2 Soley, 89. 

3 " The typical blockade-runner of 1863-64 was a long, low side-wheel 
steamer of from four to six hundred tons, with a slight frame, sharp 
and narrow, its length perhaps nine times its beam. . . . The hull 
rose only a few feet out of the water, and was painted a dull gray or 
lead color, so that it could hardly be seen by daylight at two hundred 
yards." — Soley, 156. They could often steal past the blockaders with- 
out being noticed, and many of them were so swift that it was impos- 
sible to overtake them at sea. The R. E. Lee, which ran the blockade 
twenty-one times in ten months, showed what was possible. But the 
one thousand one hundred and forty-nine prizes, two hundred and ten 
of which were steamers, brought in during the war, and the three hun- 
dred and fifty-five vessels that were burned or destroyed (Soley, 44), 
told a more reliable story. 

375 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

Capital and a venturesome spirit early became pre- 
requisites of success. The Confederates lacked capital, 
but many of them possessed daring and knowledge of the 
coast and of the conditions at home, which made them 
invaluable as captains and pilots. The tastes and re- 
sources of Englishmen could supply the rest ; and the 
proximity of Bermuda and the Bahamas gave them 
special advantages. Large numbers of blockade - run- 
ners were built on the Clyde, and were soon busily 
engaged in this contraband trade. From Bermuda to 
Wilmington is but six hundred and seventy -four 
miles; to Charleston, seven hundred and seventy-two, 
and to Savannah, eight hundred and thirty-four. From 
Nassau the distance to the same cities is five hundred 
and seventy, five hundred and fifteen, and five hundred 
miles respectively. 1 Havana, Cuba, was the port most 
used by the blockade-runners in the Gulf of Mexico. It 
is five hundred and ninety miles from Mobile, and five 
hundred and seventy from New Orleans ; but after the 
first few months of the war the blockade of the Gulf 
ports as far as the mouth of the Mississippi was gener- 
ally very strict. Galveston was accessible most of the 
time, and Matamoras, Mexico, on the Rio Grande, and 
opposite Brownsville, Texas, could not be closed be- 
cause it belonged to a neutral power, although it w r as 
practically a Confederate port. These foreign ports 
suddenly became great emporiums for cotton and for all 
sorts of merchandise intended for the Confederacy. 

To a vessel sailing for a Confederate port the danger 
of capture was, as a general rule, proportionate to the 
distance to be traveled. Bona-fide commerce between 
neutral ports is, of course, not subject to interference. 
Hence merchants and speculators interested in running 
the blockade soon adopted the plan of pretending that 



1 Soley, p. 36, map. 
376 



BLOCKADE-RUNNING, ETC. 

goods that were really for the Confederacy were to be 
shipped merely to Bermuda or Nassau or Matamoras ; 
there they were temporarily unloaded, or were trans- 
ferred to steamers specially built to run the blockade, 
and then what was often practically the same voyage 
was continued. The United States government could not 
afford to be outwitted by this subterfuge. Where there 
was reasonable suspicion of a design ultimately to send 
the cargo to a Confederate port, the ship was captured, 
taken before a prize court, and then, if the evidence 
showed a hostile destination and a guilty knowledge on 
the part of the ship-owner, both the ship and the cargo 
were condemned. 1 This was done on the theory that 
there was but one continuous voyage from the port of 
departure to that of ulterior destination. Transship- 
ment made no difference, for the court held that " the 
ships are planks of the same bridge, all of the same kind, 
and all necessary to the convenient passage of persons 
and property from one end to the other." 3 

The ingenuity of the persons engaged in this com- 
merce was still unexhausted. They sent goods from 
Europe to a United States port, thence to the Bermudas 
or Nassau or Matamoras for the purpose of transship- 
ment. It was believed that the United States would find 
it impracticable to check commerce between their own 
and neutral ports. The presumption was correct for a 
short time. As soon as this peculiar trade developed 
such proportions as to attract attention, Congress passed 
a law empowering the Secretary of the Treasury to re- 
fuse a clearance to any vessel laden with merchandise 
that he had satisfactory reason to believe was intended, 
whatever its ostensible destination, for any insurgent 
port. 3 It also authorized the collector of any port to re- 



1 Bernard, 308 ff. s Quoted Bernard, 310. 

3 Dip. Cor., 1863, 300. 

377 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

quire a bond from the master or owner of any ship that 
the cargo would be delivered at the port for which it 
was cleared. 

The diplomatic correspondence on these questions 
was almost wholly with Great Britain. Of course the 
views of Seward and of Russell disagreed, for each de- 
manded what was most advantageous to his govern- 
ment. 

In regard to the question of broken voyages, the British 
Secretary insisted that the intent to land merchandise at 
neutral ports protected it from seizure until it left that 
port. Seward's line of reasoning is shown in a com- 
munication he sent to Lord Lyons, May 12, 1862, about 
the trade with Matamoras : 

"It is only very recently that this especially enlarged 
Matamoras trade has come to our notice. Suddenly and 
quietly as palaces, cities, states, and empires rise in the tales 
of the Arabian Nights under the waving of a wand or the ut- 
terance of a spell, that trade rose from a petty barter to a 
commerce that engaged the mercantile activity of Liverpool 
and London. Simultaneously roads across the interior of 
Texas were covered with caravans, the cotton of disloyal 
citizens in the insurrectionary region became, all at once, 
the property of the treasonable conspiracy against the 
Union, and it was hypothecated, by its agents, for a foreign 
loan to satisfy obligations contracted by them in the fitting 
out and equipping and clearing from British ports naval 
expeditions to destroy the commerce of the United States. 
The Peterlwff was about the first discovered of the vessels 
engaged in this expanded trade. Unusual arts and devices 
were alleged, with much probability, to have been used by 
her owners to secure for her immunity as a trader bound to 
Matamoras with a lawful cargo, when, in fact, she was de- 
signed not to reach, or even seek, that port at all, but to 
discharge her freight into rebel lighters, at the mouth of 
the Rio Grande, at the order of pretended consignees, who 
were her passengers, to be conveyed at once to the posses- 
sion of the insurgents on American, not Mexican, soil. She* 
was indicated, moreover, as a forerunner of other fraudulent 
craft of the same character, organized with regularity, so 

378 



BLOCKADE-RUNNING, ETC. 

as to constitute a contraband packet-line. She was searched, 
and upon probable grounds was seized and sent into the 
nearest available port for adjudication." 1 

Tli is meant that the United States claimed the right 
to prevent trade between neutral ports whenever that 
trade appeared to be a device for getting goods into a 
blockaded port. The error lay in the fact that Seward 
was ready to assume, from mere probability, what inter- 
national law required should be well substantiated by 
legal evidence. 

The regulations to prevent the shipment of contra- 
band merchandise of various kinds, especially coal, from 
the United States to neutral ports, where it might be 
sold or forwarded to the Confederates, opened a new line 
of discussion. Because these regulations were directed 
against the trade with the Bahamas and affected British 
interests almost solely, Russell alleged that they were 
an anti-British enactment, and were both an unfriendly 
act and a violation of commercial treaties. 

"The false assumptions, "he said, "which seem to pervade 
the views of the United States government with respect to 
Nassau are that it is a violation of neutrality for a British 
colony to carry on any active trade with the so-styled Con- 
federate States during the existence of the blockade, and 
that, in aid of the inefficiency of the blockading force, an 
embargo may lawfully be placed on a particular trade of 
British commerce at New York." 3 

In Seward's formal reply to the British charge d'affaires 
at "Washington he regretted that, although it had been 
claimed that the action was in contravention of inter- 
national law, the particular principles or maxims violated 
had not been named, and he continued: 

" By the law of nations every state is sovereign over its 
own citizens and strangers residing within its limits, its 

1 1 Dip. Cor., 1863, 536. . 2 Dip. Cor., 1862, 305. 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

own productions and fabrics, and its own ports and waters, 
and its highways, and, generally, within all its proper ter- 
ritories. It has a right to maintain that sovereignty against 
sedition and insurrection by civil preventives and penalties 
and armed force, and it has a right to interdict and pro- 
hibit, within its own boundaries, exportation of its produc- 
tions and fabrics and the supplying of traitors, in arms 
against itself, with material and munitions, and any other 
form of aid or comfort. It has a right, within its own 
territories, to employ all the means necessary to make 
these prohibitions effective. ... It [the law of Congress] 
does not confine its prohibitions or its requirements to 
British vessels trading between New York and the Bahamas, 
but applies them to all vessels of all nations, including the 
United States, wherever trading, whether with the Bahamas 
or with any other part of the world. . . . They involve no 
question of neutral rights, because no neutral has or can 
have a right more than any citizen of the United States to 
do an act within their exclusive jurisdiction which is pro- 
hibited by the statutes and laws of the country. The act 
has nothing to do with the blockade of the insurrectionary 
ports, because it confines its prohibitions and requirements 
to transactions occurring and to persons residing or being 
within the ports actually possessed by the United States, 
and under their undisputed protection and control." 1 

The Secretary of State and the American Minister at 
London complained that subjects of Great Britain were 
the principal foreign supporters of the Confederate com- 
merce, and that the British government should try to 
check the blockade-running. 

" Information derived from our consul at Liverpool," 
Seward wrote to Adams, " confirms reports which have 
reached us that insurance companies in England are insur- 
ing vessels engaged in running our blockade, and even 
vessels carrying contraband of war. This is, in effect, a 
combination of British capitalists, under legal authority, to 
levy war against the United States. It is entirely incon- 
sistent with the relations of friendship which we, on our 
part, maintain toward Great Britain ; and we cannot believe 

1 Dip. Cor., 1863, 301, 302. 
380 



BLOCKADE-RUNNING, ETC. 

that her Britannic Majesty's government will regard it as 
compatible with the attitude of neutrality proclaimed by 
that government. . . . 

"Pray bring this subject to the notice of Earl Russell, and 
ask for intervention in some form which will be efficient." 1 

Again, later, he expressed this opinion: 

"The blockade amounts practically to a closing of all 
the insurgent ports except Wilmington, and the contra- 
band trade there is now so exceedingly abridged that it 
seems unaccountable to us that Great Britain should not 
be ready to suppress it altogether, and accept in lieu the 
restoration of a free and prosperous commerce under the 
treaties and laws of the United States." 2 

Russell thought that "two things totally distinct" 
had been confounded : 

"The foreign enlistment act is intended to prevent the 
subjects of the croAvn from going to Avar when the sovereign 
is not at war. Thus private persons are prohibited from 
fitting out a ship-of-war in our ports, or from enlisting in 
the service of a foreign state at war with another state, or in 
the service of insurgents against a foreign sovereign or state. 
In these cases the persous so acting would carry on war, and 
thus might engage the name of their sovereign and of their 
nation in belligerent operations. But owners and masters 
of merchant-ships carrying warlike stores do nothing of 
the kind. If captured for breaking a blockade or carrying- 
contraband of war to the enemy of the captor, they sub- 
mit to capture, are tried, and condemned to lose their 
cargo. This is the penalty which the law of nations has 
affixed to such an offence, and in calling upon her Majesty's 
government to prohibit such adventures you in effect call 
upon her Majesty's government to do that which it belongs 
to the cruisers and the courts of the United States to do 
for themselves. 

" There can be only one plea for asking Great Britain 
thus to interpose. That plea is that the blockade is in 
reality ineffective, and that merchant-ships can enter with 
impunity the blockaded ports. But this is a plea which I 
presume you will not urge."' 

1 Dip. Cor., 1862, 46. " 1 Dip. Cor., 1864, 201. 

3 Dip. Cor., 1862, 93. 

381 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

Russell's reasoning was sound. Seward had claimed as 
a right more than could have been legally granted as a 
favor. 

But no one of these incidents was deemed to be of suf- 
ficient importance to warrant more than a protest, for 
there were already too many serious questions. 

As has been noticed, Jefferson Davis's reply to Lin- 
coln's call for troops was a call for privateers ; but pri- 
vateering did not meet with the success expected, be- 
cause the blockade made it impossible to get the prizes 
before a court for condemnation. 

The first Confederate commerce-destroyer, the Sum- 
ter, was purchased at New Orleans in April, 1861. 
Raphael Semmes was made commander, and his instruc- 
tions from the Secretary of the Navy were to go to sea 
and " do the enemy's commerce the greatest injury in 
the shortest time." ' He ran the blockade at the mouth 
of the Mississippi, and, during the first week of July, 
1861, captured eight merchantmen. Between that time 
and the beginning of the next year the Sumter cruised 
along the coast of South America, back through the 
West Indies, and then eastward to Spain. In all, she 
took seventeen or eighteen prizes, 2 caused much alarm 
and loss, and eluded or ran away from the many vessels 
sent in pursuit of her, until she was finally blockaded at 
Gibraltar, and sold in consequence. 

The early work of the Sumter confirmed the Con- 
federates in their belief in commerce -destroyers, but 
they realized that marked success would depend on the 
ability of their government to procure war-ships abroad, 
for there w T as no opportunity to construct them at home. 
Two naval officers specially qualified for making such 



1 Scharf, The Confederate State* Navy, 7S7. 
2 Soley,176; Scharf, 789. 
382 



BUILDING CONFEDERATE WAR-SHIPS 

purchases were sent to Europe in the winter of 1861-62. 
Captain James D. Bulloch had the chief responsibility 
for this very important enterprise. But could such ships 
be obtained I International law forbids a neutral nation 
to supply vessels of war to belligerents; and Great Brit- 
ain had a neutrality law that was supposed to be very 
stringent. 

The Florida was the first of the ships bought in Eng- 
land. She was constructed in the autumn and winter 
of 1S61-62, and it was pretended that she was for the 
Italian government; but, although it was notorious that 
she belonged to the Confederacy, the protests of the 
United States Minister were regarded as insufficient to 
warrant her detention. In March, 1862, she cleared from 
Liverpool for Palermo and Jamaica, and British subjects, 
as officers and crew, were engaged to take her to sea un- 
armed and to transfer her to a Confederate commander 
at Nassau. The equipments necessary to the destructive 
work planned for her were sent in another vessel. At 
Nassau the United States consul twice tried to have the 
Oreto, as the ship was still called, seized, on the ground 
that she was intended for the Confederacy ; but the 
court released her, on account of a lack of evidence to 
show a violation of the neutrality law. In August she 
received her armament near an uninhabited island sixty 
miles from Nassau, and was regularly commissioned for 
the Confederate service. J. N. Maffitt, soon to be al- 
most as famous as Semmes, became her commander. 
Not finding it practicable to equip and man the ship 
fully in Cuba, Maffitt very boldly ran her into Mobile 
through the blockade. In January, 1863, she steamed out 
past the blockading squadron and began her search for 
merchantmen. During the next fifteen months the Flor- 
ida destroyed thirty-two vessels and bonded four others.' 

1 Beamaa's Alabama Claims, 68. 
383 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

Maffitt thoroughly carried out his instructions, which, he 
said, were brief and to the point, leaving much to discre- 
tion, but more to the torch. 

But it was the Alabama that showed what a single 
ship could do in injuring commerce ; and the alarm 
and anger that it created, first and last, several times 
brought Great Britain and the United States to the 
verge of war. On June 23, 1862, Adams informed Rus- 
sell that a powerful war -steamer for the Confederate 
service was about completed and nearly ready for de- 
parture from Liverpool. The department of the govern- 
ment to which Bussell referred the case reported that 
there was not sufficient ground to warrant the detention 
of the vessel or to interfere with it in any way. Evi- 
dence that the British government itself decided, July 
29th, to be sufficient for these purposes was submitted 
July 22d, 23d, and 25th. 1 But before word was sent to 
Liverpool, the 290, as the cruiser was called at first, had 
gone to sea without a clearance and on the pretence of 
making a trial trip. She stopped at Moelfra Bay, about 
forty miles distant, where she shipped some of her crew 
and materials. In a few days she reached the Azores. 
Here British vessels from British ports brought her ar- 
mament, supplies, and officers. Semmes took command, 
enlisted a crew from the men that had come in the dif- 
ferent ships, and hoisted the Confederate flag. The Ala- 
bama soon became a terror to American merchantmen. 
In a little more than a }'ear and a half she destroyed 
about sixty vessels and property worth several million 
dollars. 2 She w T ent first to the North Atlantic, where 
she captured and burned man}? whalers and grain-ships. 
Later she was in the West Indies and the Gulf of 
Mexico. In 1863 she cruised down the coast of Brazil, 
across to the Cape of Good Hope, through the Indian 



Bernard, 362-70. s Scharf, 815, gives the particulars. 

384 



BUILDING CONFEDERATE WAR-SHIPS 

Ocean and the Bay of Bengal, and proceeded as far east 
as the China Sea. Early in 1864 she returned to the 
Atlantic. Semmes was surprisingly successful : he fre- 
quently found and made ocean-torches of helpless ships 
of commerce, sailing under the United States flag, and 
he had usually departed before his pursuers could reach 
the scene of his latest reported devastations. But, final- 
ly, the Alabama gave battle to the Kearsarge in the 
British Channel, June 19, 1864, and was sunk. 

Several other commerce-destroyers were purchased in 
British ports. The Georgiana got to sea in January, 
1SG3, but was soon wrecked. The Georgia was bought 
in Scotland, and began her career in April, 1863. Her 
armament and crew were forwarded from Liverpool in a 
British ship, and were received in a French port. She 
took many small prizes during her year of cruising. The 
Rappahannock was bought and escaped British deten- 
tion near the end of 1863, but she Avas abandoned before 
being completely fitted out. Next to the Alabama, the 
Sea King, or Shenandoah, was the most successful of the 
Confederate cruisers. But as she did not begin her de- 
structive work until near the end of 1864, her influence 
upon diplomatic relations was not very important. The 
possibility that every cruiser might inflict great dam- 
ages upon the commerce of the United States created 
excitement and aroused protests whenever it was ru- 
mored that a new one was building. 

"When the first extensive reports of the Alabama's 
achievements became known to Seward, he instructed 
Adams to lay the facts of the case before the British gov- 
ernment in the manner best calculated to obtain redress 
for the national and private injuries sustained. 1 It was 
not the intention of the United States, he said, to harass 
Great Britain with impatient demands for immediate rep- 
aration : 

1 Dip. Cor., 1862, 216, 217. 
ii.— 2 b 385 



- THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

" The purpose, first, is prevention of similar injuries here- 
after. It is clear that there will soon be no commerce left 
to the Unixed States if the transaction of the 290 is to be 
repeated and reiterated without check and with impunity. 

" It ought not to be doubted in Great Britain that a peo- 
ple who are only second in commerce to the British nation 
itself cannot quietly consent to a wrongful strangulation of 
their foreign trade." 1 

Adams was given full discretion as to the manner of 
presenting the case. His energy and savoir-faire made 
it certain that he could best contend with the British 
government on questions of international law that re- 
quired close and well - balanced arguments. 2 Seward's 
talent was of a different kind ; and, moreover, he was too 
far away. He quickly saw the political and interna- 
tional meaning of different occurrences, and gave gen- 
eral directions to Adams, who marshaled the facts and 
usually fought the real diplomatic battle about the Con- 
federate war-ships. 

When, in March, 1863, Seward heard of the Florida's 
capture of the Jacob Bell and her cargo, valued at a 
million and a half dollars, he told Adams that many 
merchants regarded this as portending the destruction 
of the navigating interest of the United States, unless 
either the British neutrality law could be enforced or 
the Federal government should send out an adequate 
force, under letters of marque and reprisal, to protect 
the American merchant marine. Just then Seward him- 
self did not hold so extreme a view, for he believed that 

1 1 Dip. Cor., 1863, 14. 

s A despatch of March 7, 1862, from Seward to Adams, contained 
these complimentary sentences : "The President and the Cabinet are 
perfectly unanimous in approving of all your proceedings as the very 
best in every case that could be adopted. I may add that the public 
approbation is equally distinct and earnest. I speak very frankly 
when I say that I do not recollect the case of any representative of 
this country abroad who has won more universal approbation than 
you have." — Dip. Cor., 1862, 44. 

386 



BUILDING CONFEDERATE WAR-SHIPS 

Great Britain was becoming more considerate of our 
rights. 1 Only a few weeks later he learned that the 
Alexandra, another Confederate war -ship, was nearly 
ready to go to sea from Liverpool ; and it was under- 
stood that others were building. Adams was instructed 
to attempt by judicial proceedings to arrest the depart- 
ure of the vessels, and William M. Evarts was sent 
abroad to confer with him in the matter. 2 

The British government decided to detain the Alexan- 
dra and to order a prosecution of the persons concerned 
with what was regarded as a violation of the neutrality 
law, although, as Adams said, the Ministry would have 
to breast a good deal of opposition and subject them- 
selves to heavy responsibilities if they should fail. 3 Con- 
trary to expectation, the verdict was for the defend- 
ants. It was evident that the Alexandra was intended 
for the Confederates, but the decision depended on the 
rules of law. The Chief Baron charged the jury that 
the principal offence of actually equipping for hostile 
purposes could not be completed unless the equipping 
was so completed in British territory that the vessel was 
capable of hostile operations, and consequently that the 
attempt to equip must be with the intent that she 
should be so completed within British territory. 4 All 
efforts were futile to get this decision reversed. The 
construction put upon the neutrality law by the judges 
of the Court of Exchequer indicated that ship-builders 
could safely supply the Confederacy with all the war- 
ships that could be paid for, if they were not fully 
equipped in British ports. This would be ample com- 
pensation for the Confederacy's misfortune in not being 
able to build war-ships at home. 

' 1 Dip. Cot., 1863, 141, 142. 2 1 Dip. Cor., 1863, 210-12. 

3 1 Dip. Cor., 1863, 222. 

4 This is Dana's statement, Dana's Wheaton's International Law, 
568. 

387 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

The Federal victories at Vicksburg and at Gettysburg 
caused a despair in England that was almost as profound 
as the previous confidence of Confederate success. 1 But 
there were still no signs that the government would do 
anything to prevent the building and departure of the 
Confederate vessels. For several months it had been 
known that the Lairds were constructing at Liverpool 
two swift iron -clad, double -turreted steam rams. These 
were " plated with five and a half inches of iron and 
armed with four 9-inch rifled guns." a As usual, there was 
a pretence that they were not for the Confederacy ; but 
Adams presented strong evidence to the contrary. It 
was probable that if these rams should reach the United 
States, they could lay under contribution any of the 
loyal cities on the coast or could break the blockade 
at any point. Here was a possibility of changing the 
whole course of the war. Practically it was of no con- 
sequence that the British government did not wish to 
help the Confederacy in any way ; the important fact 
was, that it did not prevent such Confederate engines of 
destruction to be built in and to depart from British ports. 

" Can the British government suppose for a moment/' 
Seward wrote to Adams, "that such an assault as is thus 
meditated can be made upon us by British-built, armed, 
and manned vessels without at once arousing the whole 
nation and making a retaliatory war inevitable? You have 
only to listen to the political debates in any part of the 
country to learn that the United States would accept an 
unprovoked foreign war now with more unanimity and 
cheerfulness than at any former period." 3 

On the same day, September 5, 1S63, Adams in- 
formed the British government that one of the iron- 
clads was on the point of departure from England, and 
that the refusal to detain these ships would practically 

1 Dip. Cot., 1863, 336. 2 2 Maclay's History of the Kavy, 560. 

3 1 Dip. Cor., 1S63, 365. 



BUILDING CONFEDERATE WAR-SHIPS 

give the Confederates what they believed would bring 
about results worth a hundred victories in the field. 
Then, with directness and candor, he added: "It would 
be superfluous in ine to point out to your lordship that 
this is war." Adams's instructions were such that, if 
he had not been a consummate diplomatist, he would 
probably have said or done something more favorable 
to war than to peace. He desisted from further argu- 
ment, or closing the legation, and referred the whole 
case to Washington for decision. 1 A note, dated Sep- 
tember 8th, from the British Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs reads : " Lord Eussell presents his com- 
pliments to Mr. Adams, and has the honor to inform 
him that instructions have been issued which will pre- 
vent the departure of the two iron-clad vessels from 
Liverpool." 2 

Commercial interest is nearly always the greatest 
factor in the foreign policy of the British government. 
When the Civil War began, the new tariff law was 
most frequently complained of. Then came the prob- 
lem of protecting and benefiting British shipping in- 
terests. The joint action of Great Britain and France 
was to shield the commerce of each, but the advantage 
fell chiefly to Great Britain. A little later the serious 
question was whether the British government should 
break or disregard the blockade on account of the losses 
it was causing to certain industries. But when, during 
the second and third years of the war, it was seen that 
American shipping was rapidly coming under the British 
flag, and that English merchants and manufacturers were 

" 1 Dip. Cor., 1863, 367, 368. 

2 1 Dip. Cor., 1863, 368. Before Adams's note was written Russell 
had ordered measures to be taken to prevent the departure of the 
rams, on any pretext; but it was not until the 8th that the govern- 
ment was officially committed as Adams urged. 4 Rhodes, 377 ff., 
gives a full and interesting account of the incident. 

389 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

profiting immensely by the supplying of ships and muni- 
tions of war, there arose, on this account, a strong senti- 
ment in favor of keeping out of the conflict. 

Seward understood why Great Britain dreaded a war 
with the United States. On April 10, 1863, he had in- 
structed Adams to inform the British government that 
we were at the end of peaceful resources. 1 He frequently 
wrote in a very significant way of the growing strength 
of the Federal navy. 

"We have now a navy, not, indeed, as ample as we pro- 
posed, but yet one which we feel assured is not altogether 
inadequate to the purposes of self-defence, and it is yet 
rapidly increasing in men, material, and engines of war. 
. . . All the world might see, if it would, that the great 
arm of naval defence has not been thus inaugurated for the 
mere purpose of maintaining a blockade or enforcing our 
authority against the insurgents " . . .* 

Sometimes he went too far, perhaps. After the victo- 
ries at Gettysburg and Vicksburg he felt confident of 
the success of the Federal cause in the field ; he threw 
off restraints and instructed Adams — expecting that it 
would be repeated to the British government — that it 
should not cause surprise or complaint if the navy of 
the United States should be directed to pursue the Con- 
federate cruisers into British ports, unless that govern- 
ment changed its course. 3 Adams too well understood 
the dignity and peaceful resources of diplomacy to put 
his country at a disadvantage by repeating this threat. 4 
When the volume of diplomatic correspondence for that 
year was published, and the British government heard 
of what Seward had written, a storm was raised in the 
House of Commons. This was not calmed until Russell 

1 1 Dip. Cor., 1863, 211. 

2 To Adams, October 5, 1863. 1 Dip. Cor., 1863, 393. See also Dip. 
Cor., 1SG2, 189, 216. 

3 1 Dip. Cor., 1863, 310. 4 1 Dip. Cor., 1864, 166. 

390 



BUILDING CONFEDERATE WAR-SHIPS 

explained that as the despatch had never been laid be- 
fore him he had been spared the "difficulty and pain of 
giving an appropriate answer to it." ' 

Still more significant was the frequent suggestion 
that the United States might have to send out hundreds 
of privateers to take revenge on British commerce. 
Seward's eagerness to have all available resources em- 
ployed early brought him into close relations with men 
anxious to see privateers used to augment the strength 
of the Federal navy, although the Confederacy had no 
commerce for them to prey upon. Seward drafted a 
bill authorizing the President to issue letters of marque, 
caused it to be introduced into the Senate, and helped 
forward the project until Congress approved it. The 
statute was sure to be a most impressive warning to 
Great Britain and France, but to use privateers to per- 
form many of the duties of war-ships would be more 
likely to bring on a war than to help avert one. Sew- 
ard's despatches frequently contained significant reports 
as to the progress of the bill and of the new power of the 
President. This much was politic. Adams had written 
to the Secretary that to issue letters of marque would 
be to play into the hands of the Confederates. 2 But 
Seward put such stress on the fact that Great Britain's 
attitude toward the Confederate ships was almost as de- 
structive of American shipping as if the United States 
were at war with her, that he seemed to think more of 
trying to counteract this misfortune than of avoiding 
still greater dangers. Fortunately the influence of Sum- 
ner and Welles kept Lincoln from yielding to so hazard- 
ous and needless an experiment as was proposed. 3 

]STo wonder Seward was not always calm and discreet 
when he saw the record of losses rapidly increasing from 

1 1 Dip. Cor., 1864, 168. 2 1 Dip. Cor., 1863, 158. 

8 4 Pierce's Sumner, 120, 129, 130, 138; Welles, 146 II.; 1 Dip. Cor., 
1863, 141, 644, 662. 

391 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

month to month. 1 Although some of his threats were 
unnecessary and extreme, his custom was to balance 
them, in either the same or a subsequent despatch, with 
soothing sentences that pleaded for the preservation of 
amicable relations. His aim seemed to be to maintain 
the impression abroad that war had no fears for him 
— that he would probably welcome a conflict if Great 
Britain should wish to begin it, but that it was not 
necessary to the realization of his own plans and pref- 
erences. It had long been a habit for him to work out 
such subtle inconsistencies. They were never more ex- 
cusable or valuable than at this time, when he was 
dealing with a government that was controlled by no 
unfriendly feeling toward the United States, but that 
refused, as long as it dared, to put a stop to acts that 
made its neutrality almost worthless. 

In September, 1863, Cobden wrote to Bright: "After 
all, our chief reliance for the maintenance of a non-in- 
tervention policy by France and England is not in the 
merits or justice of that course, but — it is sad to say — in 
the tremendous warlike power manifested by the free 
states of America." 2 To Seward belongs the credit 
of making this " tremendous warlike power " famous 
abroad. In January, 1864, Adams reported that pub- 
lic opinion in England was " essentially changing in 
regard to the obligation of this country to prevent 
the gross violations of neutrality that have been 
heretofore tolerated." 3 This change was hastened by 
the thought now occurring to many that Great Britain 
had been following a policy that would probably be 
used against her commerce with most destructive effects 

1 About three hundred vessels belonging to citizens of the United 
States were destroyed, and nearly eight hundred merchant-ships were 
compelled, for safety, to give up an American for a British registry. — 
Scharf, 814 ff . ; 1 Dip. Cor., 1865, 345. 

5 2 Morley's Cobden, 413. 3 1 Dip. Cor., 1864, 83. 

392 



BUILDING CONFEDERATE WAR-SHIPS 

whenever she became involved in a foreign war. The 
British government bought the ironclad rams from the 
builders, as the best means of solving the difficulty. 
And before the end of May, 1864, Adams expressed 
the opinion that the sentiment had become so strong 
against further countenancing the enterprises of the 
Confederate agents that probably the base of opera- 
tions would be transferred to France. 1 Russell had al- 
ready instructed the British Minister at Washington to 
make a formal protest and remonstrance "against the 
efforts of the authorities of the so-called Confederate 
States to build war -vessels within her Majesty's domin- 
ions to be employed against the government of the 
United States." 

The change in the attitude of the British government 
caused the liveliest indignation on the part of the Con- 
federates. Davis had complained, in his message of 
December, 1863, of unfriendly action on the part of 
Great Britain. And later, when he received Lord Lyons's 
communication inclosing Russell's instructions about the 
so-called Confederate States, he left the reply to his 
private secretary, who characterized the term "so-called" 
as a " studied insult," and said that any future docu- 
ment in which it occurred would be returned unan- 
swered ; and he charged that Great Britain's neutral- 
ity, " while pretending to be impartial," was " but a 
cover for treacherous, malignant hostility." 2 In Septem- 
ber, 1864, Benjamin wrote to Slidell: "The English 
government has scarcely disguised its hostility. From 
the commencement of the struggle it has professed a 
newly invented neutrality which it had frankly defined 
as meaning a course of conduct more favorable to the 
stronger belligerents." 3 

1 2 Dip. Cor., 1864, 29. 

2 8 Moore's Rebellion Record, Docs., 514, 515. 

3 Bigelow, 164. 

393 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

The offence of the British government was that it did 
not use due diligence to prevent the departure of the 
Confederate ships or to detain them when they came 
within colonial ports. The attitude of the French gov- 
ernment was very different. As if fearing lest his ef- 
forts to enlist Great Britain and Eussia in the scheme 
for joint intervention might not succeed, Napoleon sug- 
gested to Slidell, in October, 1862, that the Confederacy 
might build war-ships in France, if " built as for the Ital- 
ian government." ' This was sufficient to convince the 
Confederates that they had taken too seriously the French 
declaration of neutrality. Early in 1863, Bulloch, the Con- 
federate agent, opened negotiations with Arman, a great 
ship-builder at Bordeaux, for "four clipper corvettes of 
about fifteen hundred tons and four hundred horse-power, 
to be armed with twelve or fourteen 6-inch rifled guns." 2 
Arman, who was a member of the Chamber of Deputies 
and a friend of the Emperor, easily obtained an official 
authorization from the Minister of Marine. Two of the 
ships were to be built at Bordeaux and two at Nantes. 
The application said that they were " destined by a for- 
eign shipper to ply the Chinese and Pacific seas, between 
China, Japan, and San Francisco. Their special arma- 
ment contemplates their eventual sale to the govern- 
ments of China and Japan." 3 The fact that these ships 
were of the type of the Alabama, then sweeping the seas, 
warrants the belief that the French authorities well un- 
derstood the hollow pretence. A contract for two iron- 
clad rams of three hundred horse-power, for two million 
francs each, was also made about this time, and their con- 
struction was soon begun. The work was to be pushed 
forward with all possible haste, and it was expected that 
all the ships would be completed early in 1864. 

1 Bigelow, 130. 

2 2 Bulloch's Secret Service of the Confederate States in Europe, 28. 

3 Bigelow, 8. 

394 



BUILDING CONFEDERATE WAR-SHIPS 

Iu September, 1863, a stranger appeared at the United 
States consulate at Paris and offered to sell to John 
Bigelow papers showing that several ships were then 
building at Nantes and Bordeaux for the Confederacy 
under the official authorization of the French govern- 
ment. The papers were bought for twenty thousand 
francs. It was found that they had been stolen from 
one of the leading contractors, and that they contained 
all that had been claimed for them. They disclosed that 
one of the contractors had obtained permission to inspect 
the government factory of arms so as to facilitate his 
task. Dayton promptly presented the case to Drouyn 
de Lhuys, and requested that action should be taken 
to prevent the completion and delivery of the vessels. 1 
The French Minister of Foreign Affairs " expressed 
himself as greatly surprised" at the revelations, and 
soon pronounced the enterprise a breach of neutrality 
which the French government would not tolerate, al- 
though the contractors stoutly insisted on their original 
pretension as to the ships. The authorization of the 
French government was withdrawn in October, 1863. 
Drouyn de Lhuys informed Dayton of this, and called 
attention to " the scrupulous care which the govern- 
ment of the Emperor brings to the observance of the 
rules of a strict neutrality." 2 

Even Dayton did not know of Napoleon's part in en- 
couraging the Confederates; so the promises of the Min- 
ister of Foreign Affairs tended to allay the fears. Sew- 
ard dealt with this question with great moderation and 
circumspection. At first he merely reminded Dayton 
that in a similar case occurring in Great Britain, the 
United States had not hesitated to declare that the 
departure of such an expedition would be deemed a na- 



1 Bigelow, p. 1 ff.; 2 Dip. Cor., 1863, 707, 7( 
* 2 Dip. Cor., 1863, 702, 725, 727. 
395 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

tional aggression justifying resistance likely to disturb 
amicable relations. While it was hoped that it would 
never be necessary for Dayton to say this to France, 
it was important that he should understand that the 
United States were " resolved not to endure the aggres- 
sion of a French navy under a feigned insurgent flag." 1 
However, the work on the ships continued, for it was 
expected that Napoleon would dissemble until he saw 
a good opportunity to let them escape. When, in the 
spring of 1864, Seward came to fear such an outcome, 
he concluded to have Drouyn de Lhuys informed as to 
what the consequences would be. 

"This government thinks that the forbearance it has 
hitherto practised in good faith and friendship toward 
France," he wrote to Dayton, "has entitled it to expect 
that the Emperor will not allow his subjects or strangers 
to wage war aginst us from the ports of France. 

"If this reasonable expectation should be disappointed, 
it would seem necessary to contemplate a change of exist- 
ing relations as a consequence which the government of the 
United States, however much it might be desired, would 
not have the power to prevent. 

"While you are not expected to make a formal represen- 
tation to precisely this effect, you will at the same time so 
express yourself as to leave no doubt in the mind of the 
French government that the President regards the ques- 
tion now to be decided as one upon the solution of which 
the relations between France and the United States for the 
future not improbably depend." 2 

Dayton thought the French government was trying 
to formulate a case against the United States so as to 
appear to be on the defensive and entitled to vindicate 
its honor. But Seward carefully explained the griev- 
ances complained of. Yet, seeing that Drouyn de Lhuys 
had become less positive about preventing the war-ships 
from getting into the possession of the Confederates, he 

1 October 1, 1863. MS. 2 May 21, 1864. MS. 

396 



BUILDING CONFEDERATE WAR-SHIPS 

ordered careful watch to be taken of the alleged sale of 
the rains and the corvettes to foreign governments, and 
then he caused two United States war-ships in European 
waters to be placed under Dayton's orders. 1 

Seward had his reasons for being so cautious. When he 
first heard that the war-ships were building in France, 
the relations with Great Britain were for a similar reason 
in a very critical state. Although the likelihood of a rupt- 
ure with Great Britain diminished during the autumn and 
winter of 1863-64, there was still some danger that new 
and serious complications might be used as an excuse for 
foreign interference. On February 22, 1S64, Seward wrote 
a note to Bigelow that contained these sentences : " Before 
we decide what to do more in France, we wait to be a 
little better assured about our affairs in England. You 
can infer from this what I do not think it perfectly safe 
to write." 2 On the same day he replied to a letter from 
William M. Evarts, written in Paris: "We want to 
know whether, if Ave have a difficulty on one side of the 
Channel, we must expect an enemy also on the other 
— two enemies instead of one. Circumstances favor a 
good understanding with the Cabinet at London. We 
could clear up all difficulties if Great Britain should be 
willing." 3 It was shortly after this time that Congress 
became very excited over the Mexican question, as will 
soon be noticed, and the French government seemed to 
be almost ready for a conflict. Seward saw that we 
were not prepared for a foreign war ; therefore, he made 
a special effort to pitch his despatches in a friendly 
tone. Bigelow, who had not been fully informed as to 
all the perplexities of the case, very frankly told Sew- 

1 3 Dip. Cor., 1864, 115, 117; MS. instructions to Dayton, June 27, 
1864. 

2 Seward MSS. Possibly this letter was never sent, for it is not in 
the Bigelow MSS. The autograph draft is in the Seward MSS. 

3 Seward MSS. 

397 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

ard that his " charming compliments to the French gov- 
ernment," which was " doing all it can [could] to cut our 
throats," discouraged the opposition from attacking the 
Emperor, and he thought that a decisive tone would soon 
be necessary. 1 But in dealing with France the Secretary 
knew the importance of waiting, and replied: 

" I regret that you think my course towards the French 
government is too conciliatory and courteous. If our ar- 
mies succeed, as we hope, we shall have no conflict with 
France, or with any foreign power. So long as our suc- 
cess in suppressing the slavery faction at home is doubt- 
ed abroad, we shall be in danger of war with some one of 
the maritime powers upon some sudden provocation. If 
we have war with one, Ave may expect to have war with 
more than one. If we escape war with all, my courtesy 
to France will have clone no harm. If we shall at last, 
through unavoidable delay here, fall under the calamity 
of a foreign war, it will then have come soon enough ; and 
we shall be none the less able to meet it for all the pru- 
dence we practised in trying to delay and, if possible, to 
avert it." 3 

This was certainly the perfection of logic and of diplo- 
macy. 

Napoleon insisted on the disposal of all the ships to 
foreign nations. Only one, the Sphinx, finally came into 
the possession of the Confederates, but this was brought 
about so late that peace was declared before it could 
reach American waters. 

The disappointment of the Confederate diplomatists 
was intense. They had firmly and correctly believed 
that Napoleon was in sympathy with them. Their mis- 
take was in concluding that he would, therefore, give them 
substantial aid, regardless of his own interests. Benjamin 
devoted a large part of a long despatch that he sent 
Slidell to a formal arraignment, under eight heads, of 



1 Bigelow, 42. » May 21, 1864. Bigelow MSS. 

398 



BUILDING CONFEDERATE WAR-SHIPS 

the Emperor of the French for his unfriendly acts tow- 
ard the Confederacy. 1 He made himself believe that 
Napoleon had promised that the ships might go to sea. 
But Slidell had distinctly stated that the Emperor had 
not committed himself to permit the sailing of the rams 
unless their destination could be concealed. The con- 
sent to the arming and sailing of the corvettes was 
given by the Minister of Marine on the representation 
that they were for commercial purposes, although he 
understood the fact. 2 But when Napoleon found that the 
misrepresentations were no longer a shield, he did not 
feel bound to stand by the Confederates in the altered 
circumstances. Undoubtedly his original expectation 
was that a turn in American affairs favorable to the 
Confederacy would be reached before any international 
question could be raised about the ships. 

With Great Britain Seward had negotiated as with a 
drawn sword. With France he either pleaded for peace 
or made his warnings very mild. The result showed that 
his method in each case was essentially right. Neither 
government failed to see that there was a sword. Sli- 
dell unintentionally gave high praise to Seward when 
he wrote : " The two strongest powers submit to the in- 
solent demands of the Lincoln government that their 
commerce may be safe on the ocean, and Mexico and 
Canada unmolested. And why? Because they have 
formed an exaggerated estimate of its capacity to do 
mischief." 3 Seward had caused them to make that es- 
timate. 

1 Text in Bigelow, 161-65. s Bigelow, 153. 

3 Bigelow, 160. 



CHAPTER XXXIX 

THE END OF THE WAR 

One night in July, 1863, during the rejoicing over 
the victory at Vicksburg, some paraders stopped in front 
of Seward's house, serenaded him, and called for a speech. 
His impromptu response displayed patriotic fervor and 
sentimental egotism, but it also truly represented his 
recent aims and his hopes for the future: 

" When I saw a commotion upheaving in the state, I 
thought it consistent Avith the duty of a patriot and a 
Christian to avert the civil war if it was possible, and I 
tried to do so. If this was a weakness, I found what 
seemed an instruction excusing it in the prayer of our 
Savior that the cup, the full bitterness of which was 
understood by himself alone, might pass. But I found, 
also, an instruction in regard to my duty in his resig- 
nation: ' Nevertheless, not my will but thine be done.' 
When it was clear that without fault on your part or 
mine the civil war was inevitable, I then thought it con- 
sistent with the duty of a patriot and a Christian to take 
care that the war should be begun not by the friends of 
the Union, but by its enemies, so that in maintaining the 
Union we should not only maintain the cause of our coun- 
try, but should be maintaining it in righteous self-de- 
fence." . . . 

"I thought, further, that it was consistent with my 
duty as a patriot and a Christian to do what was in my 
power to render the war as light in its calamities and as 
short in its duration as possible. Therefore, I proposed to 
retain on the side of the loyal states as many of the states 
which were disturbed by elements of sedition as could be 
retained by a course of calm and judicious conduct. I 
would have had, if possible, the insurrection confined to 

400 



THE END OF THE WAR 

the seven original so - called seceding states. "When all 
these conditions had been secured, so far as was possible 
to secure them, I thought still further that it was consist- 
ent with my duty as a patriot and a Christian to combine 
the loyal states and consolidate them into one party for 
the Union, because I knew that disunion had effectually 
combined the people of the disloyal states to overthrow 
the Union.'' . . . 

"Once engaged in the contest, I was prepared to de- 
mand, as I have demanded ever since, that no treasure, no 
amount of human life necessary to save the nation's life, 
should be withheld. I thought that the war might be 
ended in three months — in six months — in a year — and I 
labored to that end. . . . We failed to make that exhibi- 
tion [of zeal, determination, and consistency], and so the 
war has been protracted into its third year." . . . 

" But we have reached, I think, the culminating point 
at last; we have ascertained the amount of sacrifice which 
is necessary to save the Union, and the country is prepared 
to make it." . . . 

..." The Union is to be saved, after all, only by human 
efforts — by the efforts of the people." . . . 

" You must be prepared to do more. ... If the capital 
must fall before it can be saved, which I have always 
thought unnecessary, and which now seems impossible, 
even in that case, let us be buried amid its ruins. For 
myself, this is my resolution. If the people of the United 
States have virtue enough to save the Union, I shall have 
their virtue. If they have not, then it shall be my reward 
that my virtue excelled that of my countrymen." 1 

The administration decided early in July, 1863, to is- 
sue a proclamation calling for a day of thanksgiving for 
the great military successes that had been achieved. Its 
preparation was given to Seward, who sat himself down, 
as he wrote to his wife, "to compose a presidential call 
upon the people for thanksgiving, prayer, and praise to 
our Heavenly Father. I think you must have read in it 
and under it what I think and how I feel." 2 

1 5 Works, 485-88. 

2 3 Seward, 176. He referred to Lincoln's proclamation of July 
17, 1863. 

ir.— 2 c 401 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM II. SEWARD 

Shortly after the battle of Gettysburg it had been de- 
cided to secure a part of the battle-field for a cemetery, 
where the bodies of the fallen combatants might be 
brought together in fraternal burial. In November? 
1863, the cemetery was ready for dedication. Edward 
Everett was the orator of the clay. The President, the 
Secretary of State, and others formed a special party 
from Washington. On the evening of November 18, 
1863, not long after their arrival, they were serenaded, 
and Seward responded to a call for a speech. He was 
upward of sixty years of age, he said, and had been in 
public life practically forty years, and this was the first 
time the people so near the border of Maryland had 
been willing to hear his voice. The reason was, he con- 
tinued, that forty years before he saw that slavery 
was opening a graveyard that was to be filled with 
brothers falling in strife. During all this period he had 
tried to have the cause removed by constitutional means. 
He thanked God that the people were willing to hear 
him at last, and that the strife was to end in the de- 
struction of an evil that should have been removed by 
deliberate councils and peaceful means. He believed 
that thereafter we should 

"be united, be only one country, having only one hope, 
one ambition, and one destiny. 

" To-morrow, at least, we shall feel that we are not ene- 
mies, but that we are friends and brothers, that this Union 
is a reality, and we shall mourn together for the evil wrought 
by this rebellion. We are now near the graves of the mis- 
guided, whom we have consigned to their last resting-place, 
with pity for their errors, and with the same heart full of 
grief with which we mourn over a brother by whose hand, 
raised in defence of his government, that misguided brother 
perished/' 1 

It was on the morrow — after Everett's long and brill- 

1 5 Works, 490. 
402 



THE END OF THE WAR 

iant oration — that Lincoln uttered what is probably the 
briefest and most perfect patriot-speech in any language. 
Its impressiveness was in its impersonality and in the 
modesty that recognized the occasion as one on which 
the living should "be dedicated here to the unfinished 
work which they who fought here have thus far so 
nobly advanced." 

One of the wisest decisions of Seward's life was made 
near the end of 1861. It was to relinquish all aspira- 
tions for the presidency. But it was not so easy for his 
political friends to surrender their hopes. In December, 
1S61, some of them in Philadelphia organized a " Will- 
iam II. Seward Club" for the purpose of making him 
Lincoln's successor. When they informed Seward of 
the fact he pronounced the proceeding " altogether un- 
wise," " a partisan movement, and, worst of all, a parti- 
san movement of a personal character"; and he insisted 
that his name should be dropped " henceforth and for- 
ever." ' No evidence has been found to indicate that 

1 "If, when the present civil war was looming up before us," he 
wrote, " I had cherished an ambition to attain the bigh position you 
have indicated, I should have adopted one of two courses which lay 
open to me — namely, either to withdraw from the public service at 
home to a position of honor without great responsibility abroad, or to 
retire to private life, and, avoiding the caprices of fortune, await the 
chances of public favor. 

"But I deliberately took another course. I renounced all ambition, 
and came into the executive government to aid in saving the Constitu- 
tion and integrity of my country or to perish with them. I knew that 
I must necessarily renounce all expectation of future personal ad- 
vantage, in order that the counsels I might give to the President in 
such a crisis should not only be, but be recognized as being, disinter- 
ested, loyal, and patriotic. 

"Acting on this principle, I shun no danger and shrink from no 
responsibilities. So I neither look for, nor, if it should be offered to me, 
would I ever hereafter accept, any reward." . 

" I could never consent to be a President of a division of the Re- 
public. I cheerfully give up any aspiration for rule in the whole 

403 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

the Secretary ever thought of reconsidering the decision 
here announced and soon made public. 1 In the summer 
of 1863 John Bigelow wrote an article for a Paris news- 
paper, suggesting Seward's candidacy in 1861-. He then 
sent a copy to the Secretary, and at the same time ex- 
pressed a desire to resign. Seward's jocose and unofficial 
answer of July 21, 1803, said : 

" My dear Bigelow, — I have just received your letter 
of the 3d inst., and I am glad that you remain in the 
consulate. I suppose that I can imagine the reason why 
you desire to resign, and, if I do, I am the more convinced 
that you ought to stay at your post. 

"I shall certainly report your violation of your instruc- 
tions, by your article in the Opinion Nationale, to the 
President, though I will mercifully withhold the deserved 
punishment. Some good but impatient friends, as you 
see, are bringing his name forward for re-election. It will 
show you how just and generous he is in that he is able to 
overlook your crime of putting me in his way, and I think 
that he will only be the more decided in his conviction that 
you must stay Avhere you are. As for me, I am bent upon 
leading the way for whosoever may follow in restoring peace 
and Union in our unhappy country, by withdrawing all the 
provocations to anger that are associated with my name." 2 

The military victories of the summer of 1863 were a 
promise of political victories in the autumn. What Sew- 
ard said in a speech in Auburn, just before the elec- 
tion, was the most positive evidence that he cherished 
no ambition beyond his present position as Secretary of 

Republic as a contribution to the efforts necessary to maintain it in 
its integrity. I not only ask but peremptorily require my friends, in 
whose behalf you have written to me, to drop my name, henceforth 
and forever, from among those to whom they look as possible candi- 
dates." — 3 Seward, 50. Welles erroneously asserted that this position 
was not taken until after the Cabinet crisis of December, 1862. — Lin- 
coln and Seward, 84, 85. 

1 New York Herald, March 4, 1862. 

2 Bigelow MSS. 3 Seward, 196, gives a report of a conversation on 
this subject, in 1863, between Lincoln and Seward. 

404 



THE END OF THE WAR 

State : Lincoln must bo de facto President in Georgia 
and in South Carolina, just as he "was in Massachusetts 
and in New York, and there should be no peace and 
quiet until he was President of the whole United States. 1 

The result of the elections showed that the people 
were ready to support the administration even in its vig- 
orous war measures, but on condition that the Fed- 
eral armies should win battles. During the next year 
there was a very close connection between events in 
the field and the political turmoil in the North. Grant 
was made lieutenant-general in March, 1864. He came 
to "Washington and undertook a formidable campaign 
against Eichmond. Sherman was placed at the head of 
the three armies that had done such hard fighting, es- 
pecially in Mississippi and Tennessee. He too began, in 
this spring, his task of cutting the eastern part of the 
Confederacy in two by sweeping through Georgia from 
Chattanooga to Savannah. He advanced with wonder- 
ful regularity and without serious reverses. It was not 
so with Grant. He believed that, with a force almost 
twice as great as Lee's, his forward movement could not 
be resisted. The loss of thirty-six thousand men in the 
Wilderness and about Spottsylvania during a fortnight, 
in May, 1864, made it plain that ultimate success was not 
merely a question of numbers, momentum, and courage. 
Almost every adult in the East counted a friend or 
relative among the dead or the wounded in Virginia. 
Such terrible destruction of human life led to popular dis- 
content, which the politicians undertook to make use of. 

The radical Republicans did not cease their attacks 
upon the administration as its antislavery policy became 
more pronounced, for they kept far ahead, demanding 
extreme measures. Chase had endeavored to make him- 
self the beneficiary of this hypercritical discontent — a 

1 3 Seward, 195. 

405 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

fact that greatly strengthens the circumstantial evidence 
that he had been an important factor in the anti-Seward 
movement in the latter part of 1862; but he succeeded 
merely in getting himself out of the Cabinet. The radi- 
cal faction tried to organize a distinct party at Cleve- 
land, on a platform that favored electing the President 
by popular vote and making him ineligible for a second 
term, the reconstruction of the states under direction of 
Congress rather than of the President, and "the con- 
fiscation of the lands of rebels and their distribution 
among the soldiers and actual settlers." Fremont was 
appropriately chosen as their candidate. 

But there was no room for an anti- administration 
movement outside of the Democratic party. Lincoln 
and Seward stood for the restoration of the Union 
without retracing any steps, and they were willing to 
aid in any new measures beneficial to this main pur- 
pose. The regular Republican convention, which met 
at Baltimore early in June, represented what was best 
and most practical in the character of Northerners. Its 
platform was a sober appeal for help, as well as an ex- 
pression of determination to finish the solemn task that 
had been forced upon the Federal government. Lincoln 
was renominated, and Andrew Johnson was named for 
the second place because the party desired to win the 
support of Democrats and southern Unionists. In a 
public letter written a little later, Seward said every- 
body knew that he himself was "committed in detail 
to all that the convention has now done, long before a 
delegate was chosen, and even long before the conven- 
tion itself was called." And then he added: "For the 
present, let the people send men and supplies to the na- 
tion's armies in the field, and thus enable them ' to fight 
it out on the same line if it takes all summer.' "' 



3 Seward, 226. 
406 



THE END OF THE WAR 

The best element in the Democratic party was sup- 
porting the administration either by service in the field 
or by giving it confidence and cheer at home. The par- 
tisan Democrats of 1S64 were a miscellaneous horde of 
men, whose narrow minds were less influenced by sen- 
timents of reasonable patriotism than by personal griev- 
ances or unworthy ambitions. They agreed among them- 
selves in hardly anything except opposition to existing 
conditions and a desire to profit by every national mis- 
fortune, past, present, and future. So they postponed 
their convention until the end of August. Meantime, 
Sherman drove Johnston before him toward Atlanta; 
but Grant and his soldiers, like faithful oxen drawing 
a too heavy load in the mire, struggled on slowly, dog- 
gedly, painfully. In less than two months from the be- 
ginning of his campaign he had lost more than half of 
all his original troops — about sixty -two thousand out 
of one hundred and twenty- two thousand. By mid- 
summer he had moved around Richmond and begun 
the siege of Petersburg; but the Confederate capital 
seemed to be as inaccessible as ever. Moreover, Wash- 
ington had escaped capture, and probably flames, chiefly 
on account of a misapprehension. Early had rushed out 
of the Shenandoah Valley and down to the ill-manned 
forts on Washington's northern suburbs before proper de- 
fence could be made. But mistaking local recruits for a 
detachment of Grant's army, he delayed his advance 
another day, when the veterans actually appeared and 
blocked the way. AVhen the Democrats met in national 
convention at Chicago, August 29th, they pronounced the 
war a failure and called for a cessation of hostilities with 
a view to an ultimate convention of the states. McClellan 
was chosen as their candidate, but he repudiated the plat- 
form. The Democrats had barely formulated their unpa- 
triotic and impracticable policy when Atlanta fell, Sep- 
tember 2d; it was as unwelcome as an earthquake to them. 

407 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

On the following day Seward took advantage of the 
change in affairs to sound the key-note of the campaign 
in a speech at Auburn. No man not blinded by parti- 
sanship or prejudice could fail to see the force of such 
arguments as these : 

"In voting for a President of the United States, can we 
wisely or safely vote out the identical person whom, with 
force and arms, we are fighting into the presidency ? You 
justly say, No. It would be nothing else than to give up 
the very object of the Avar at the ballot-box. ... By such 
a proceeding we shall have agreed with the enemy, and 
shall have given him the victory. But in that agreement 
the Constitution and the Union will have perished, because, 
when it shall have once been proved that a minority can by 
force or circumvention defeat the fall accession of a consti- 
tutionally chosen President, no President thereafter, though 
elected by ever so large a majority, can hope to exercise the 
executive powers unopposed throughout the whole country. 
... I therefore regard the pending presidential election as 
involving the question whether, hereafter, we shall have 
our Constitution and our country left us. . . . Upon these 
grounds entirely, irrespective of platform and candidate, I 
consider the recommendations of the convention at Chicago 
as tending to subvert the republic. 

"And now," he said, near the end of his speech, "has 
all the treasure that has been spent, and all the precious 
blood that has been poured forth, gone for nothing else 
but to secure an ignominious retreat, and return, at the 
end of four years, to the hopeless imbecility and rapid 
process of national dissolution which existed when Abra- 
ham Lincoln took into his hands the reins of government?" 1 

The only possibility of victory for the Democrats de- 
pended upon continual defeats for the Federal army; but 
there was no hope for them in the face of an energetic 
political campaign in which the Kepublicans were cheered 
on by Sheridan's successes in the Shenandoah valley 
and by Sherman's in Georgia. Lincoln won in all the 
loyal states except New Jersey, Delaware, and Kentucky. 

1 5 Works, 496, 501. 
408 



THE END OF THE WAR 

" It is a truism," Seward wrote in one of his despatches 
early in 1865, "that in times of peace there are always 
instigators of war. So soon as war begins, there are 
citizens who impatiently demand negotiations for peace." 
As the exhaustion of Confederate resources increased, 
Southerners tried harder to accomplish indirectly what 
could not be brought about by force of arms. Many 
Northerners, too, that were opposed to Lincoln's admin- 
istration, believed that a voluntary peace would be the 
surest road to reunion. There was rarely a month, and 
never a season, when some Democratic leader was not 
overflowing with illusory schemes for a cessation of 
hostilities. The great mortality in the Federal army 
in Virginia in the spring and early summer of 1864 
strengthened the anti-war sentiment. Three prominent 
Confederates, who had found their way to Canada, con- 
vinced Horace Greeley that they were authorized to 
carry on negotiations for peace. Greeley appealed to 
Lincoln with so much zeal that the President requested 
him to bring the alleged commissioners to Washington 
in case he should find that they were more than pre- 
tenders. It turned out that Greeley was merely the 
victim of men scheming to embarrass the administra- 
tion and to defeat Lincoln's re-election. 

About the same time a clerical soldier in an Illinois 
regiment, James F. Jaquess, and a journalist and author, 
J. ~R. Gilmore, went on an unofficial mission to Rich- 
mond. Jaquess represented that he had assurances that 
many prominent members of the Methodist Episcopal 
Church of the South were opposed to Confederate aims 
and favored a return to the Union. The President mere- 
ly gave the two dreamers permission to pass the Federal 
lines. They had a long interview with Davis and Ben- 
jamin, but they learned only what Lincoln felt confident 
of alread}' — that Davis insisted upon independence as a 
precedent condition of peace. 

409 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM II. SEWARD 

The result of the election of 1864 proved that Lincoln 
and Grant had the confidence of the North and could 
command its full strength. Before the end of the year 
Sherman had triumphantly reached Savannah. Grant, 
although still in front of Petersburg, was daily becom- 
ing more formidable. It was almost certain that the 
Confederacy could not hold out more than a few months 
longer, for the great bulk of the Federal troops in the 
East were to be concentrated about Kichmond early in 
1865, unless it should fall meantime. What Lincoln's 
administration wanted was peace and reunion, and it 
would have preferred to obtain them by negotiation 
rather than by battles. 

Near the end of December, 1864, Francis P. Blair, Sr., 
elaborated a scheme to overcome the difficulties. The 
gist of it was that the belligerents should enter into a 
military convention to cease hostilities between them- 
selves, for a time at least, and devote their efforts to 
driving the French out of Mexico ; that Jefferson Davis 
should command a union of Confederate, Federal, and 
Mexican forces — be made dictator, if necessary — expel 
" the Bonaparte-Hapsburg dynast}* - ," establish order in 
Mexico, and perhaps round out the possessions of the 
United States to the Isthmus. This would restore the 
balance between the sections and make the South blos- 
som again with prosperity. By that time it would be 
seen that there was really nothing more to fight about, 
for each side had adopted a policy toward slavery that 
would soon bring it to an end. 1 Lincoln neither knew 
Bi air's plans nor assumed any responsibility for them, 
but gave him the necessary pass. 

The Confederate President received Blair as an old 
acquaintance and listened with much interest to the sur- 
prising propositions, for any strategy that offered a pos- 

1 For Blair's full programme, see 10 Nicolay and Hay, 91 ff. 
410 



THE END OF THE WAR 

sibility of escape from the danger threatening the Con- 
federate capital must not be neglected. Davis gave the 
visitor a written statement, to be shown to Lincoln, say- 
ing that he was ready to enter into a conference "with 
a view to secure peace to the two countries." Lincoln 
heard Blair's report of what had taken place, and wrote 
him a note, to be shown to Davis, expressing his willing- 
ness to receive any agent sent informally and authorized 
to consider the question of " peace to the people of our 
one common country." Vice-President Stephens advised 
Davis to meet Lincoln, 1 but the Confederate chief knew 
that in such an enterprise as this there was safety in 
numbers. So he appointed Stephens, R. M. T. Hunter, 
and John A. Campbell, then Assistant Secretary of War. 
The Confederates finally gave up trying to force an 
implied recognition of sovereignty by referring to the 
" two countries." 

On January 31, 1865, Lincoln instructed Seward to 
proceed to Fortress Monroe, Virginia, " to meet and in- 
formally confer with " these three commissioners. The 
instructions were very explicit : 

"You will make known to them that three things are 
indispensable, to wit : First. The restoration of the national 
authority throughout all the states. Second. No receding 
by the Executive of the United States on the slavery ques- 
tion from the position assumed thereon in the late annual 
message to Congress, and in preceding documents. Third. 
No cessation of hostilities short of an end of the war, and 
the disbanding of all forces hostile to the government. You 
will inform them that all propositions of theirs, not incon- 
sistent with the above, will be considered and passed upon 
in a spirit of sincere liberality. You will hear all they may 
choose to sa)'', and report it to me. You will not assume 
to definitely consummate anything/' 3 

After Seward had departed Lincoln was shown a 

1 2 Stephens's War Between fh& States, 593. 
2 10 Nicolay and Hay, 115. 
411 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM II. SEWARD 

despatch from Grant in which a regret was expressed 
that the President Avas not to meet Stephens and Hunter, 
especially, who had impressed Grant as having good in- 
tentions and a sincere desire to restore peace and union. 
This persuaded the President to hurry off to take part in 
the consultation. It would have been a needless risk for 
one man, however reserved in conversation, to carry on 
such a conference with these three Confederates. Per- 
haps, too, Lincoln remembered Seward's unfortunate in- 
terviews with Campbell and Hunter, in 1861, and with 
Mercier a year later. 

What is known as the " Hampton Roads Conference," 
on account of the place where it occurred, was on board 
the Federal ship J2iver Queen, February 3, 1865. It was 
on the Mexican scheme that the Confederates were bas- 
ing their hopes. Stephens soon asked if there w r as not 
some side issue that could be used to divert the attention 
of the two sections until passions might cool — some con- 
tinental question, after the solution of which they would 
be in a more amicable mood for adjusting difficulties 
among themselves. Lincoln understood the meaning of 
this reference, and explained that he w T as not responsible 
for what Blair had said; that he himself adhered to 
the declaration that a restoration of the Union was a 
prerequisite to any agreement whatever. Still, believing 
that the Mexican project was not positively barred, 
Stephens spoke of the hostility of the United States to 
the French invasion and of their desire to enforce the 
Monroe doctrine. He understood this to mean that the 
iSorth would support the right of self-government to 
all peoples on the American continent, against the do- 
minion or control of any European power. Could any 
pledge make a permanent restoration of the Union more 
certain than it would be after this doctrine had been 
asserted in regard to Mexico ? Lincoln repeated what 
he had said about having nothing to do with an annis- 

412 



THE END OF THE WAR 

tice or with any proposition that did not involve the 
restoration of the Federal authority throughout the 
whole country. Campbell then thought it time to intro- 
duce another question, but Seward was so interested in 
Stephens's speculations that he wanted to hear them de- 
veloped further; for, as he said, they had "a philosophi- 
cal basis." ' It was to be expected that the very marked 
resemblance between Stephens's idea as expressed so far 
and the one Seward had advanced April 1, 1861, would 
interest the Secretary. But Seward's aim was to preserve 
the Union, whereas Stephens's plan was primarily to 
establish the principle of local self-government and the 
right of secession. This would have been a vindication 
— in the eyes of all Confederates, at least— of the aims 
of the South, although Stephens hoped that an "ocean- 
bound Federal Republic" would come into existence 
"under the operation of this Continental Regulator — the 
ultimate absolute Sovereignty of each State." 2 Moral 
suasion and self-interest were to be the only cohesive 
forces. Seward easilv exploded the theory by pointing 
out that according to it Louisiana might shut up the 
Mississippi. Stephens had to admit that in case of 
wanton injustice on the part of a state, coercion might 
be used. Still Seward wanted to continue the specu- 
lation about the Mexican question, and he inquired as 
to how the Confederates expected to make their sug- 
gestions practical. This brought out the fact that the 
commissioners had neither the authority nor the wish 
to pledge Confederate military support to the effort to 
overthrow European influence in Mexico. 3 The trap 
was thereby exposed. 

Evidently Seward was desirous of peace, and very 
naturally ; for, if he could have been instrumental in 
bringing it about now, it would be a great compensa- 

1 2 Stephens, 603. ! 2 Stephens, 604. 3 2 Stephens, 608. 

413 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

tion for his disappointment in the spring of 1861. The 
Confederates had not heard that Congress had just 
proposed the XIII. Amendment. Seward at least sug- 
gested that if the states in secession would promptly 
resume their old places, they might defeat the adop- 
tion of the amendment. Both he and Lincoln expressed 
their willingness to favor a plan for compensating the 
South for her slaves. It was thought that the North 
would prefer such an indemnity rather than expend the 
money in prosecuting the war. Lincoln said that some 
Northerners had mentioned as much as four million dol- 
lars for this peaceful purpose. 

Beyond the point of submission to the laws, and stand- 
ing by what had already been done, the President prom- 
ised to act with liberality in all matters that fell within 
his constitutional powers. But again and again he came 
back to his wise declaration that no agreement would 
be entered into until after the Confederates had laid 
down their arms. Hunter undertook to show that there 
was a precedent for such an agreement in the negotia- 
tions between Charles I. and the Roundheads. It was 
then that Lincoln gave the answer, as characteristic of 
himself as it was of his attitude toward Seward: "I do 
not profess to be posted in history. On all such mat- 
ters I turn you over to Seward. All I distinctly recollect 
about the case of Charles I. is that he lost his head in 
the end." 1 After a session of four hours the conferrees 
concluded that there was no possibility of reaching any 
agreement. 

The Confederates returned in sadness and anger to 
their capital, still unwilling to believe that Lincoln had 
never intended to offer some such terms as Blair had 
suggested. Stephens soon withdrew to the quiet of his 
Georgia home, as if to escape being crushed beneath a 

1 2 Stephens, 613. 
414 



THE END OF THE WAR 

structure that he foresaw must soon fall. But Davis, 
who had courage, enterprise, and daring suitable for so 
desperate a cause, made the most of every circumstance. 
Public meetings were held, at which he and other im- 
pressive orators aroused the passions and determination 
of the people until all came to believe that victory was 
still within their reach. 

The North soon learned the chief facts about the con- 
ference. Although it had failed in one sense, it was 
very successful in another: it convinced all sensible men 
that the peace demanded could only be obtained by a 
thorough conquest. 

Already Sherman's vast devastating flood was sweep- 
ing northward from Savannah. Nothing but fear of the 
popular effect of abandoning Richmond had caused the 
government to hold out so desperately against the Fed- 
eral forces, which were working successfully on the plan 
of strangulation. On the night of April 2d, Petersburg 
and Richmond were abandoned, and the army and the 
government officials, with the archives, hurried off south- 
westward, hoping to make a successful stand on reaching 
the Blue Ridge mountains, if not before. But Sheridan 
cut off Lee's retreat. After quickly occupying Peters- 
burg and Richmond, Grant followed up and surrounded 
Lee. The end came at Appomattox Court House April 
9, 1865. What followed was merely gathering up the 
scattered fragments. 

During the two months since the meeting at Hampton 
Roads, Seward had watched the course of events with 
great satisfaction. " Our foreign relations are closing up 
finely," he wrote home, shortly after the conference. 
His pen was not less active than formerly, for he was 
inditing long despatches about the numerous military 
engagements. He could write a smooth, clear story of 
whatever occurred in the field, and the pleasure he found 

415 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

in keeping an open diary on the war led him to give 
much time and labor to it. What afforded him the most 
satisfaction was to mark the growing disorder and des- 
peration in Richmond : 

"The dismay at Richmond rises to distraction. It is 
not doubtful that there has been a conspiracy to force 
Davis to resign." " It is understood that the insurrection- 
ary cabal has at last, under Virginia's dictation, passed a 
bill for arming slaves — leaving to the states the question, 
whether the negroes thus brought into the field shall be 
emancipated." " The so-called Congress, on the eve of an 
intended adjournment, was detained by a message from 
Davis, announcing that Richmond is in imminent danger, 
and demanding extreme measures and virtually dictatorial 
powers, including a suspension of the habeas corpus, un- 
limited control over exemptions, and authority to seize gold 
for the uses of the rebel authorities. The so-called legis- 
lature listened and adjourned, as is understood, without re- 
viewing the policy of which Davis complained, and without 
conceding the most, much less all, of the extraordinary 
powers demanded." 1 

On a bright spring afternoon, April 5, 18G5, Seward 
went for a drive with his daughter, one of her friends, 
and his son Frederick. The horses became frightened, 
and the Secretary, in attempting to get out of the 
carriage, was thrown to the ground with great force. He 
was picked up unconscious; his jaw was broken in two 
places ; his right shoulder was badly dislocated, and 
nearly his whole body was bruised and strained. The 
jaw was set in an iron frame, and in every way he re- 
ceived the best scientific care. Nevertheless, he remained 
unconscious for several hours and then was delirious for 
many more. Fever set in, and there were serious doubts 
as to his recovery. But in a few days favorable signs 
appeared. 

Lincoln was absent on a visit to Grant's array when 

1 3 Seward, 266, 267, 208. 
416 



THE END OF THE WAR 

the accident occurred. On his return he went to see 
Seward. Sitting on the bed by the invalid, he quietly 
described what he had seen in and about the late capital 
of the Confederacy. Seward could not even whisper 
without great pain. So the monologue was continued 
in soft tones for an hour or so, until Seward fell asleep; 
then the President quietly slipped away. They never 
saw each other again. 

About ten o'clock in the evening of April 14th, when 
Seward's sick-room had been put in order for the night, 
an unknown man rang the door- bell and told the ser- 
vant that he brought a message from the physician. 
As there was nothing suspicious about him, he was al- 
lowed to pass up-stairs; but at Seward's door he was 
refused admission by Frederick W. Seward. The stranger 
tried in vain to fire his revolver, and then savagely beat 
the Assistant Secretary over the head with it, until the 
weapon broke. Then bursting open the door, he rushed 
at the Secretary, striking furious blows at his head and 
throat with a bowie-knife, until Seward rolled from the 
other side of the bed to the floor. The male nurse, who 
tried to protect the Secretary, received some bad cuts, 
and so did Augustus Seward, who undertook to expel the 
assassin. As the assailant was leaving he wounded a 
fifth man, and then rode off on the horse he had left 
near the front door. Seward's throat had been " cut on 
both sides, his right cheek nearly severed from his face." 
Probably it was the iron frame on his jaw that turned 
a blow that might have caused instant death. As it was, 
the chances seemed to be that either the w T ounds or the 
terrible shock would be fatal. 1 The life of the Assistant 
Secretary was despaired of, for his skull was badly fract- 
ured in two places. At nearly the precise moment of 

1 For a fall account of Seward's accident and attempted assassina- 
tion, and of the fate of Powell, alias Payne, see 3 Seward, 270 ff., and 
10 Nicolay and Hay, 303 ff. 

ii.— 2d 417 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

the assault upon Seward, Lincoln was shot while at 
Ford's theatre, and he died early the following morn- 
ing. 

As far back as June, 1862, John Bigelow had written to 
Seward from Paris about a rumored plot to assassinate the 
President and some of his Cabinet. In a letter of July 
15, 1862, Seward replied as follows : 

"There is no doubt that from a period anterior to the 
breaking out of the insurrection, plots and conspiracies for 
purposes of assassination have been frequently formed and 
organized. And it is not unlikely that such an one as has 
been reported to yon is now in agitation among the insur- 
gents. If it be so it need furnish no ground for anxiety. 
Assassination is not an American practice or habit, and one 
so vicious and desperate cannot be engrafted into our po- 
litical system. 

."This conviction of mine has steadily gained strength 
since the Civil War began. Every clay's experience con- 
firms it. The President, during the heated season, occupies 
a country-house near the Soldiers' Home, two or three 
miles from the city. He goes to and comes from that 
place on horseback, night and morning, unguarded. I go 
there unattended at all hours, by daylight and by moonlight, 
by starlight and without any light." 1 

Seward had a philosophical theory for everything he 
wished to believe. But, alas! the unexpected happened. 
Fortunately, the five men wounded at his house re- 
covered. 

1 Bigelow MSS. 



CHAPTER XL 

SEWARD'S ATTITUDE TOWARD FRENCH INTERVENTION IN 

MEXICO 

Sewakd's treatment of Napoleon's attempt to over- 
throw a republican form of government in Mexico and 
to place in its stead an imperial throne with an Austrian 
prince was his most perfect achievement in diplomacy. 
No other question in his department was for a long 
time so puzzling, so changing, so dangerous, or so mis- 
judged by the people and the public men of the United 
States. No mere accident, no circumstance, no fortune, 
good or ill, could have given Seward success; one or all 
of these might have helped, but a genius for diplomacy 
was necessary. 

Ever since the Spanish yoke had been thrown off, in 
1821, Mexico had been subject to revolution and counter- 
revolution, generally led by some chief of either the Lib- 
eral or the Clerical party. In forty years there had been 
nearly forty revolutions and over seventy different su- 
preme executives. Government was hardly more than 
a name. Assaults and murders were frequent in the 
capital, guerilla warfare was common in the provinces, 
and banditti infested the highways. Even the British 
legation had been robbed of about six hundred thousand 
dollars in coin. So insufferable had become the outrages 
upon foreigners that the French and the English Ministers 
loudly protested ; and President Buchanan, in his last 
annual message, recommended intervention on the part 
of the United States to obtain indemnity. In 1S61 the 

419 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

constitutional President was Benito Juarez. He was a 
full-blooded Indian, but a man of character, energy, and 
extraordinary attainments. Although Miramon, the 
leader of the Church party, had been completely defeated 
and had fled from Mexico, leaving the party without 
organization, yet plotting did not cease. Juarez and 
the Liberals about him had some honest and statesman- 
like purposes, but they had not the power to restore 
order or to correct abuses. England, France, Spain, and 
the United States had claims against Mexico amounting 
to more than eighty million dollars, but Mexican finan- 
ces were in a chaotic state. The annual governmental 
expenses alone exceeded the revenue by nearly a million 
dollars. In July, 1861, the Mexican Congress sought 
temporary relief by passing an act suspending for two 
years the payment of all foreign debts. This brought 
matters to a crisis. 

The question as to how to compel Mexico to respect 
her obligations had often been discussed. England, 
France, and Spain now decided to take matters into 
their own hands. Aside from the grievances com- 
plained of by these powers, each had its notion of the 
probable results of intervention. Spain had not yet 
become fully reconciled to the loss of her American 
colonies, and she thought of a throne for a Bourbon 
prince. England very reasonably believed that no inter- 
vention should go beyond the point of seeking redress 
for actual injuries. 1 France had several aims which will 
soon be noticed. On the 31st of October, 1861, these three 
powers signed a convention in London, by which they 
agreed to demand jointly from Mexico " more efficacious 
protection for the persons and properties of their subjects, 
as well as a fulfilment of the obligations contracted tow- 
ard their Majesties." Article second of the convention 
read : 

1 2 Earl Russell's Speeches and Despatches, 484. 
420 



FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 

"The high, contracting parties engage not to seek for 
themselves, in the employment of the coercive measures 
contemplated by the present convention, any acquisition of 
territory nor any special advantage, and not to exercise in 
the internal affairs of Mexico any influences of a nature to 
prejudice the right of the Mexican nation to choose and to 
constitute freely the form of its government." 1 



Toward the end of 1861 naval ships of Spain, France, 
and England sailed for Vera Cruz with the avowed in- 
tention of taking possession of the custom-houses of two 
or three of the Mexican ports, for the purpose of satisfy- 
ing the claims of their respective governments. 

Within a few weeks after the arrival of these ships, 
and before the allies had done much more than seize Vera 
Cruz, the English and the Spanish leaders became dis- 
satisfied with the actions, and suspicious of the inten- 
tions, of the French. The English and the Spanish forces 
withdrew in April, 1862, after an agreement had been 
reached with Mexico as to the claims of their govern- 
ments. The triple alliance was dissolved, and the 
French were left with a free hand. 

The three European powers had not only agreed among 
themselves not to prejudice " the right of the Mexican 
nation to choose and constitute freely the form of its 
government," but they had invited the United States to 
join them in compelling Mexico to respect her obliga- 
tions. It was in the midst of the excitement over the 
Trent affair that the United States had to deal with this 
problem. To protest against the action of the powers 
would have made it easy for Great Britain to obtain the 
sympathy, and perhaps the support, of France and Spain 
in case of a w r ar on account of that incident. More- 
over, the precise significance of the Mexican expedition 
was not yet known. So Seward indicated that the 



1 H. R. Exec. Doc. No. 100, 37th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 136, 137. 

421 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

United States would stand aloof. They declined to 
become a party to the London convention, chiefly for 
two excellent reasons: they preferred to adhere to the 
traditional policy, which forbade alliances with foreign 
nations ; and, secondly, they did not feel inclined to 
resort to forcible remedies for claims at that time, when 
Mexico was deeply disturbed by factions within and by 
war with foreign nations. 1 In the same communication 
in which these reasons were set forth, Seward volun- 
teered the statement that 

"the President does not feel himself at liberty to question, 
and he does not question, that the sovereigns represented 
have [the] undoubted right to decide for themselves the 
fact whether they have sustained grievances, and to resort 
to war with Mexico for the redress thereof, and have the 
right also to levy Avar severally or jointly." 

From beginning to end the Mexican expedition was the 
strangest scheme of the Second Empire. Like many of 
the enterprises of Napoleon III., if not too grand for for- 
mulation before execution, it was, at least, too absurd for 
explanation subsequently. His political aims really took 
precedence to what were known as French " grievances." 
The Italian war had left him many perplexing questions. 
Austria bore him much ill-will. The Pope had not for- 
gotten how Napoleon III. had injured his temporal 
power. The French Republicans threatened to interfere 
with the so-called grande politique irrvperiale. Leaving 
out of consideration the promptings of Napoleon's ill- 
balanced ambition, the Mexican revolution seemed to 
present just the opportunity to appease Austria, to induce 
the Holy Father to smile benignty, and to reduce the 
Republicans at home to a patriotic hush or to an odious 
opposition. Nor was commercial France forgotten. As 
the United States were occupied in a great civil war, 

1 Doc. 100, p. 189. 
422 



FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 

Napoleon thought he saw a chance to prevent their 
preponderance in trade in the western hemisphere, by 
laying in Mexico the foundations of French supremacy, 
so as to turn the tide of race predominance in the Amer- 
icas in favor of the Latins, as he said. 

After the English and the Spanish retired from Vera 
Cruz the French soon showed that they had never in- 
tended to be bound by the London convention. In the 
most summary manner France presented her ultimatum 
to Mexico in the shape of a claim for twenty-seven million 
dollars: twelve millions were demanded as an indemnity 
for injuries that French subjects claimed to have suffered, 
but France would not deign to itemize the claims ; and 
the remaining fifteen millions were for government bonds 
which the revolutionary Clerical government of Miramon 
had given to Jecker, a Swiss banker, for seven hundred 
and fifty thousand dollars in cash, by the aid of which 
it had been hoped that the constitutional government of 
Juarez might be overthrown. Payment being an im- 
possibility, as the French well knew long before, they 
began a forced march toward the City of Mexico. On 
approaching Puebla the vanguard lost two thousand men. 
At the town itself they met with a most humiliating re- 
pulse. Thereupon large reinforcements were called for, 
and in a few months the French army amounted to about 
thirty-five thousand men. In May, 1863, Puebla finally 
fell into the hands of the French, and early in June they 
triumphantly entered the Mexican capital. 

It was plain that Napoleon intended to overthrow the 
Mexican republic. The commander of the expedition, 
General Forey, and the French Minister, Saligny, took 
matters into their own hands. They selected a junta, or 
provisional government, composed of thirty -five mem- 
bers, who chose three Regents as an executive head, and 
later named an Assembly of Notables of two hundred and 
fifteen persons. With hardly an exception, the members 

423 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

of this improvised government were enemies of the con- 
stitutional President, Juarez. In accordance with the 
programme, the Assembly met in July, 1863, and without 
debate, and with only two voices in the negative, voted 
that an empire should be established; that the throne 
should be offered to the Archduke Maximilian of Austria, 
brother of Francis Joseph ; and that if he should decline 
it, the Emperor of the French should be asked to fill the 
vacancy. Maximilian expressed his willingness to ac- 
cept the offer if a Mexican plebiscite should result in 
his favor, and if he could obtain from other sources 
guaranties of the protection of Mexico. During the 
next year the imperial array, composed mainly of French 
soldiers, forced many of the smaller cities and villages 
of Mexico to surrender to the new government. By the 
spring of 1864 all doubt had been settled in the mind 
of Maximilian, and his scruples in favor of a national 
plebiscite were satisfied without an actual vote. On the 
day Maximilian finally accepted the crown, April 10, 
1864, a convention was entered into between France 
and the new imperial government, by which Mexico 
agreed to pay the French claims and the past and fut- 
ure cost of the intervention, under certain conditions; 
and France practically guaranteed to Maximilian her 
military protection. 1 In June, 1864, Maximilian I. made 
a brilliant entry into the City of Mexico. His pious 
and sentimental mind was filled with generous thoughts, 
for he really hoped to regenerate his adopted country. 
But his throne rested on the shoulders of the French 
troops. 

It was late in March, 1862, when the Department of 
State received its first definite information of the aims of 
the French. This was about the time McClellan com- 



'ZDip. Cor., 1864, 74, 75. 
424 



FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 

menced his Peninsular campaign. If Seward had then 
taken a firm and defiant attitude toward France, Napoleon 
would have foreseen that his own expedition and the cause 
of the Union could not both succeed. He might have 
turned the scales either way, and we know what his de- 
cision would have been. However, had Seward preserved 
silence, it would have been very difficult for him to object 
later. See how diplomatically he chose a middle course : 

" You will intimate to Mr. Thouvenel that rumors of this 
kind [that France is a party to the scheme to 'subvert the 
republican American system in Mexico'] have reached the 
President and awakened some anxiety on his part. You 
will say that yon are not authorized to ask explanations, 
but you are sure that if auy can be made, which will be 
calculated to relieve that anxiety, they will be very welcome, 
insomuch as the United States desire nothing so much as 
to maintain a good understanding and the most cordial re- 
lations with the government and the people of France. 

"It will hardly be necessary to do more in assigning 
your reasons for this proceeding on your part than to say 
that we have more than once, and with perfect distinctness 
and candor, informed all the parties to the alliance that we 
cannot look with indifference upon any armed European 
intervention for political ends in a country situated so near 
and connected with us so closely as Mexico." 1 

Thurlow Weed understood both the requirements and 
Seward's aims, and wrote from Paris, in April, 1862 : 
" Your despatch on Mexican matters breaks no eggs. It 
makes a record, and there, I hope, you are at rest." 3 
The immediate danger was avoided without closing the 
question. Subsequently Seward made it plain why he 
desired to defer the discussion : " Nations no more than 
individuals can wisely divide their attention upon many 
subjects at one time." 5 While France was frequently 
interrogated, and was permitted to infer that Seward 



1 Instructions to Dayton, March 31, 1862. Doc. 100, p. 218. 

2 3 Seward, 85. s Dip. Cor., 1862, 471. 

425 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

thought her avowals and actions not altogether consis- 
tent, he never seemed to question her sincerity. Not 
knowing what the United States could afford to risk for 
Mexico, he discreetly awaited events. 

Plowever, the aims of the conquering French army 
were notorious. Because Seward knew that the Mexicans 
would not choose Maximilian, he must have seen that 
the French were intending to violate the Monroe doc- 
trine. In April, 1863, Dayton reported that Drouyn de 
Lhuys had informed him that the French troops expect- 
ed to take the capital, establish order there, repay them- 
selves for debts, expenses, etc.; that sources of Mexican 
wealth, such as mines, if properly worked, would meet 
all claims. Dayton thought that this showed the intend- 
ed policy, and he was right ; that if France kept both 
sides of the account it would require long possession be- 
fore the profits of the adventure would fully settle the 
balance. 1 A little later he was assured that there was 
no intention to colonize Mexico or to occupy Sonora 
or any other section permanently. Dayton then told 
Drouyn de Lhuys that the government of the United 
States would not interfere in any wa}*" with the war 
between France and Mexico. 2 Seward approved what 
Dayton had said, and pronounced it "as truthful as it 
was considerate and proper." 3 A private and unpub- 
lished letter of September 9, 1863, to John Bigelow, 
said: 

" We are too intent on putting down our own insurrection., 
and avoiding complications which might embarrass us, to 
seek for occasion of dispute with any foreign power. I do 
not know, bnt I think it reasonable to presume, that the 
Emperor finds the difficulty of his administration sufficient 
to employ him, without inviting any unnecessary difficulty 
with the United States. I may be wrong in the latter view. 

1 1 Dip. Cor., 1863, 656. s 1 Dip. Cor., 1863, 66. 

3 Dip. Cor., 1863,665. 

426 



FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 

But, if I am, there is likely to be time enough for us to 
change our course after discovering the error." 1 

The great advantage of Seward's attitude was mani- 
fested by the result of an interview between Dayton 
and Drouyn de Lhuys in September, 1863. The report 
had been widely circulated in France that the United 
States only awaited the termination of their domestic 
troubles to drive the French out of Mexico. " The French 
naturally conclude that if they are to have trouble with 
us, it would be safest to choose their own time," Dayton 
wrote. 2 With this idea in view, the Emperor had inquired 
.of his Minister of Foreign Affairs if the United States 
had made a formal protest against the action of France 
in Mexico. But as no such protest had been made, and as 
the United States had not assumed a position that was 
positively hostile, Napoleon saw no need of changing his 
policy. 

Toward the end of the year 1863 Drouyn de Lhuys 
intimated that if the United States would early recog- 
nize the proposed empire such action would be agreeable 
to France and would hasten the withdrawal of her 
troops. Seward's answer must have been as unsatis- 
factory as it was adroit. He said that the United States 
were determined to err, if at all, on the side of strict 
neutrality in the war between France and Mexico; that 
they were still of the opinion that the permanent estab- 
lishment of a foreign or monarchical government in 
Mexico would be found neither easy nor desirable ; and 
that the United States could not do otherwise than leave 
the destinies of Mexico in the keeping of her own peo- 
ple, and recognize their sovereignty and independence in 
whatever form they themselves should choose. 3 

: Bigelow MSS. This designation will be used for citations from 
many unpublished letters that Seward wrote to John Bigelow, who gen- 
erously gave the author access to them. 

3 2 Dip. Cor. , 1863, 699. 3 2 Dtp. Cor., 1863, 726. 

427 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

These statements were doubtless intended to convey 
the impression that the United States would not invoke 
the Monroe doctrine, which had already been violated. 
The most Seward did at this time was to point out that 
if France should adopt a course in Mexico adverse to 
American opinions and sentiments, it " would probably 
scatter seeds which would be fruitful of jealousies, which 
might ultimately ripen into collision between France 
and the United States and other American republics." ' 

Congress and the newspapers could not understand 
the wisdom of employing all the resources of the na- 
tion against the almost invincible Confederacy before 
seeking formidable enemies abroad. They had great 
contempt for what they styled Seward's cowardice. In 
January, 1864, McDougal, of California, introduced in 
the Senate a series of resolutions declaring it to be the 
duty of the government of the United States to require 
France to remove her armed forces from Mexico; and 
the resolutions further called for the negotiation of a 
treaty by which the government should engage to pre- 
vent the possible interposition of any of the European 
powers in Mexican affairs.' In a confidential, unpublished 
despatch of February 8, 186-i, Seward foretold that there 
would 

"be a legislative demonstration against the establishment 
of a foreign government and a monarchy in Mexico. Only 
the influence of executive moderation holds the popular 
action under restraint now. The President thinks you 
should know these facts. But you are left the free exercise 
of your discretion, how and when to use them." 

Fortunately some prudent men in the Senate caused 
these resolutions to be laid on the table. But in April 
the House declared unanimously that it would not ac- 

1 2 Dip. Cor., 1863, 711. See ibid., 713, for a positive denial of 
meditating a future war against France. 

s McPnerson's History of the Rebellion, 348, 349. 

428 



FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 

cord with the policy of the United States to acknowl- 
edge a monarchical government erected on the ruins of 
a republican government in America under the auspices 
of any European power. 1 Dayton reported that the Eu- 
ropean press inferred from this that either France or the 
United States would soon have to make a change of pol- 
icy. 4 When he called on Drouyn de Lhuys, shortly after 
the report of these resolutions reached Paris, the first 
words of the French Minister were : " Do you bring us 
peace, or bring us war ?" ' 

Seward had already taken the precaution to inform 
Dayton that the extravagant opinions entertained at the 
Capitol were " not in harmony with the policy of neu- 
trality, forbearance, and consideration which the President 
has so faithfully pursued." 4 After the passage of the 
House resolution, Seward caused the French government 
to be reminded that the question of the attitude toward 
Mexico was an executive one, unless two-thirds of both 



1 McPherson, 349. * April 22, 1864. MS. 

3 3 Dip. Cor., 1864, 76. 

4 January 12, 1864. MS. In an unpublished confidential letter of 
May 5, 1864, to Bigelow, lie wrote: 

"The war of the French against Mexico is, of course, a source of 
continued irritation. The House of Representatives responds prompt- 
ly to a popular impulse, which is as strong as it is universal. Never- 
theless, it will he seen in this case, as it was in the affair of the Trent, 
that the nation can act with all the circumspection and deliberation 
which a regard to it3 condition of distraction, civil war, and social 
revolution requires. 

"I might say to you confidentially, if it were entirely wise to say 
anything unnecessary, that those who are most impatient for the 
defeat of European and monarchical designs in Mexico might well be 
content to abide the effects which must result from the ever-increasing 
expansion of the American people westward and southward. Five 
years, ten years, twenty years hence, Mexico will be opening herself as 
cheerfully to American immigration as Montana and Idaho are now. 
What European power can then maintain an army in Mexico capable 
of resisting the martial and moral influences of emigration ?" — Bigelow 
MSS. 

429 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

houses should formulate a different policy ; that the Presi- 
dent did not then contemplate a departure from the course 
hitherto pursued ; and that in any case France would be 
seasonably apprised of any change. 1 But for such dec- 
larations as these — in opposition to the prevalent opinion 
of the people of the United States — it is practically cer- 
tain that Napoleon would have felt compelled to strike 
at the Federal government while it was weak, and Avhile 
he was still master of affairs at home and in Mexico. 

Seward's purpose during the years 1863 and 1864 was 
to avoid the active disfavor of France, but still to keep 
her informed that her intervention in the affairs of Mex- 
ico was not approved. The only heed he gave to the 
popular clamor against Napoleon was to make special 
efforts to prevent it from disturbing his plans, while he 
held firmly to his belief that the destinies of the Amer- 
ican continent were not to be permanently controlled by 
political arrangements made in the capitals of Europe. 
John Bigelow, knowing the possible opposition to the 
Emperor that might be encouraged in France, but un- 
able, at so great a distance, to see all the complications 
elsewhere, had urged Seward to be more outspoken in 
regard to both Mexico and the ships. In an unpublished 
letter marked " private, unofficial, and confidential," part 
of which has already been quoted, 3 the Secretary replied, 
May 21, 1864: 

" I think, with deference to your opinion, which I al- 
ways hold in great respect, that, with our land and naval 
forces in Louisiana retreating before the rebels instead of 
marching toward Mexico, this is not the most suitable 
time we could choose for offering idle menaces to the Em- 
peror of France. We have compromised nothing, surren- 
dered nothing, and I do not propose to surrender any- 
thing. But why should we gasconade about Mexico when 
we are in a struggle for our own life ? You tell me of help 

1 3 Dip. Cor., 1865, 356, 357. 3 See ante, p. 398. 

430 



FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 

in the legislative chambers of France, and support in the 
press of Paris. I appreciate and am grateful for both, but 
what would they avail us if we should give the French 
government a ground to appeal, in the midst of our civil 
war, to French and English jealousy against the United 
States? It would avail us just as much as German re- 
publicanism avails now in Prussia to hold in check the 
King and Count Bismarck. On the other hand, do you 
suppose the American people are in a temper to forgive 
an administration that should suffer the country to fall 
into a foreign war upon a contingent and merely specula- 
tive issue like that of the future of Mexico ?" 

" Party politicians," he wrote again, June 6, 18G4, " think 
that the Mexican question affords them a fulcrum, and 
they seem willing to work their lever reckless of dangers 
to the country. Can anybody mistake the isolated and 
painful condition of England ? Can anybody doubt that 
it results from making foreign questions the basis of parti- 
san action ? So far we have escaped only this complication 
in our great trial. I hope we shall continue to steer clear 
of it." 1 

After the summer of 1864 the fortunes of Napoleon 
and of poor Maximilian did not brighten. The Liberal 
party in Mexico had confiscated most of the enormous 
possessions of the Catholic Church. It was the Cleri- 
cal party that had brought about foreign intervention, 
with the confident expectation that thereby the lost 
riches of the church could be regained. Probably Na- 
poleon had given assurances encouraging this expecta- 
tion ; but the French found that much of this property 
had fallen into the hands of their fellow-citizens. Max- 
imilian was pre-eminently a Catholic prince ; and, it was 
assumed, he would champion the cause of his church. 
But he sincerely sought to conciliate all parties. As a 
result he received the full support of none. Many of 
the Clericals were soon denouncing Napoleon and Max- 
imilian as bitterly as were any of the Liberals, and the 

1 Both letters are in the Bigelow MSS. 
431 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

Liberals would never yield to an emperor. Moreover, 
neither Maximilian nor any of his trusted friends pos- 
sessed executive ability. Able men would have organ- 
ized a new financial system, but Maximilian had to 
depend upon the French budget as much as upon the 
French troops. Despite all these and other threatening 
signs, Napoleon was not free to abandon Maximilian. 
In an unpublished part of a despatch of March IT, 1865, 
to Bigelow, Seward said : " I remain, however, of the 
opinion I have often expressed, that even this vexatious 
Mexican question in the end will find its solution with- 
out producing a conflict between the United States and 
France. The future of Mexico is neither an immediate 
nor even a vital question for either the United States 
or France. For both of them it is a foreign affair, and 
therefore time and reason may be allowed their full in- 
fluence in its settlement." 

The conclusion of the Civil War removed the greatest 
elements of danger for the United States. If Seward's 
declarations had been merely a matter of prudence, he 
would have changed his attitude with the return of peace. 
For four years he had been very successfully practising 
the art of diplomacy with France. During most of that 
time he kept her so perfectly balanced between her hopes 
and her fears in regard to the United States that she let 
many a good opportunity slip; and by philosophizing 
about "the traditional friendship" between the two 
countries he helped to prevent Great Britain and France 
from forming closer relations. This was much, but he 
knew that the criterion of his powers as a diplomatist 
would be to get the French out of Mexico peaceably. 
It was known that Napoleon was pledged to support 
Maximilian for a much longer time than had as yet 
elapsed. To desert his puppet now would be not only 
faithless and expensive, but it would also give the French 

432 



FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 

Republicans a chance to heap ridicule and contempt upon 
the Emperor. 1 It was clear to Seward that threats, or 
summary proceedings along the Rio Grande, might easily 
be represented to the French people as an insult to them- 
selves, and then the whole nation would rise in its anger, 
and Napoleon would cover the failure of his original 
schemes and make himself popular in a patriotic war. 

So, on June 3, 1865, Seward wrote to John Bigelow, 
who had become Dayton's successor : 

"The policy of the administration of the late President, 
in respect to France and Mexico, is well known to Mr. 
Dronyn de Lhuys. It was fully and frankly made known 
by communications from this department. You are au- 
thorized to inform Mr. Dronyn de Lhuys, that that policy 
has undergone no change by the change of administration, 
but will be continued as heretofore." '" 

This was a very important announcement. For more 
than a } r ear there had been a growing sentiment in favor 
of turning the veterans of the Civil War against the 
French troops in Mexico. The idea appealed to a sense 
of resentment against Europeans, which was common 
among both politicians and military men. Already some 
United States soldiers, after their release from service, 
had crossed into Mexico and joined Juarez's republican 
forces; but Seward believed that in no event could the 
enlistments amount to a sufficient number of men to 
give ground for the least uneasiness to either France or 
Mexico." ! Apparently he expected to pursue his course 
without serious opposition, but he had not yet reckoned 
w 7 ith Lieutenant-General Grant. 

Grant, as he himself wrote in his Memoirs, had looked 
upon the European invasion of Mexico "as a direct 
act of war against the United States by the powers 

1 3 Dip. Cb?\,1864, 74, 75, quotes the convention between Napoleon 
and Maximilian. * Bigelow MSS. 3 Ibid. 

ii.— 2 E 433 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

engaged, and supposed, as a matter of course, that the 
United States would treat it as such when their hands 
were free to strike." ' He considered this task so much 
a part of his duties as practical head of the army 
that it never occurred to him to get distinct and full 
instructions in regard to it any more than on his other 
important plans. Sheridan was sent to southwestern 
Texas to subdue the Confederates still holding out 
under Kirby Smith, and to menace the imperial forces 
in Mexico by distributing United States soldiers and 
munitions of war along the Rio Grande. 2 Stranger still 
were Grant's instructions of July 25, 1865, to Sheridan 
about the part to be played by General Schofield. 3 Scho- 
field was given a leave of absence for twelve months, in 
order, as he himself said, " to organize in Mexican terri- 
tory an army corps under commissions from the govern- 
ment of Mexico, the officers and soldiers to be taken from 
the Union and Confederate forces, who were reported to 
be eager to enlist in such an enterprise." 4 The plan 
was that veterans of the Civil War, when mustered out, 
should cross the Rio Grande with their arms and equip- 
ments as well as with the ordnance and ordnance stores 
along that river, and join Scbofield's standard for the 
purpose of expelling the French. Schofield believed that 
all the members of the government expected that force 
would be necessary to settle the question with France. 

1 2 Grant's Memoirs, 545. Sumner's account of Grant's ideas and 
plans is given in 4 Pierce, 255. 

2 2 Grant's Memoirs, 546. "General Grant was not content with 
the frequent and earnest expression of his opinion in regard to what 
the action of his government should he ; he ordered troops to the 
frontier, not only for readiness to march into Mexico in case war 
should be declared, but apparently to provoke hostilities, and thus 
make war between the two countries unavoidable." — McCulloch's 
Men and Measures of Half a Century, 387. 

3 Text in Scbofield's Forty-six Years in the Army, 380-82. 

4 Schofield, 380. 

434 



FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 

It is all but certain that this expectation would have 
been realized within a few months, perhaps within a 
few weeks, if Seward had not cleverly disorganized the 
whole undertaking by flattering its chief into believ- 
ing that his services were needed at once in the field of 
diplomacy. Schofield was requested to meet Seward at 
Cape May. There the soldier, after four years of the 
hard fare of war, could look out upon the ocean and 
dream of important interviews and banquets at the 
Tuileries. The perfection of the strategy is shown by 
the fact that Schofield did not think it remarkable that 
such shrewd diplomatists as Seward and Bigelow needed 
his aid. And Seward was supposed to be perfectly seri- 
ous when he said: " I want you to get your legs under 
Napoleon's mahogany and tell him he must get out of 
Mexico." ' Schofield was kept waiting for more than 
two months and then sent off to Paris, where he was 
allowed to remain and do some feasting in the outer cir- 
cle of court and military society until May, 1866, when, 
as he unsuspectingly and solemnly says: "The condition 
of the Franco-Mexican question at the time of my return 
from Europe gave no further occasion for my offices in 
either of the ways which had been contemplated in be- 
half of Mexico." 2 The soldier had done no harm in diplo- 
macy, where he had no important authority ; Seward 
and Bigelow had been laughing in their sleeves. 3 

! Schofield, 385. 2 Schofield, 393. 

3 For Sheridan's views as to how Seward lost a "golden oppor- 
tunity " for war, and as to "the slow and poky methods of our State 
Department," see his 2 Personal Memoirs, 214-17. 

Parts of some of Seward's unpublished private letters to Bigelow 
show not only how little assistance the two diplomatists needed, but 
also how careful Seward had been to keep the question within the do- 
main of negotiation: 

June 17, 1865: "Circumstances indicate a growing disposition in 
some quarters of the country to find or make a casus belli with a view 
to the political situation in Mexico. I think it would be well for you 

435 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

Seward had meantime become more peremptory with 
France. In a long despatch of September 6, 1865, he 
said, in substance: For many years there has been a 
traditional friendship between France and the United 
States that has been cherished quite regardless of politi- 
cal conditions in either country. The United States 
favor republican institutions on the American continent. 
French intervention in Mexico has been antagonistic to 
this position and has tended to prevent the republican 
sovereignty of Mexico from asserting itself. France and 
the United States have armies confronting each other on 
the Mexican border ; and although the two forces have 

in an informal and confidential manner to let the French government 
understand the great importance, as we think, of the practice on their 
part, of the most just and friendly disposition towards the United 
States by the French authorities in Mexico, as well as in the shaping 
of French policy towards that country. 

"Prompt and punctual attention to this subject will be of essential 
importance." 

July 1, 1865: " Parties are organizing here for ulterior political 
action. It is unmistakable that immediate enforcement of negro 
suffrage upon the states which rebelled, by the conquering loyal states, 
is to be the platform of one, and decided and initiatory action toward 
France in regard to Mexico another." 

July 14, 1865 : " I need hardly point out the movements made here 
indicative of a defiant spirit about Mexican affairs. I may, however, 
properly tell you that they find much favor in the army, and you are 
well aware how popular the army deservedly is at this moment. Con- 
gress will soon be in session and then we may expect debates and 
party organizations. 

" Fully informed you will act wisely and discreetly." 

July 24, 1865: "There are unmistakable signs that the Mexican 
embroglio is to be made a subject for excitement and party conten- 
tions. Nothing will satisfy the nervous but vehemence on the part 
of this government. The complications grow more formidable every 
day." 

August 7, 1865: "I hope that you clearly foresee what is certain 
to be the temper of Congress and of political conventions in this 
country in regard to Mexico, and that you do not in any way with- 
hold the information from Mr. Drouyn de Lhuys." 

436 



FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 

heretofore practised prudence, " a time seems to have 
come when both nations may well consider whether the 
permanent interests of international peace and friendship 
do not require the exercise of a thoughtful and serious 
attention to the political questions to which I have thus 
adverted." 1 

On November 6th another step in advance was taken. 
Seward declared that Maximilian's government was in 
direct antagonism to the fundamental policy and prin- 
ciple of that of the United States. Therefore, he said, 
they were not prepared to recognize it then, or to prom- 
ise to recognize any similar government later. 3 It is not 
strange that the French Minister of Foreign Affairs re- 
marked, after Bigelow had finished reading the despatch, 
that its contents gave him neither pleasure nor satis- 
faction. 5 Still Napoleon could not accept this as final 
and withdraw, for the stronger the language of the 
United States the stronger the moral demand upon 
the Emperor of the French to support his puppet. 

Before the end of 1865 practically everybody in the 
United States agreed that French intervention must 
soon end, and a despatch of December 16th announced : 

" It has been the President's purpose that France should 
be respectfully informed upon two points, namely : 

First. That the United States earnestly desire to con- 
tinue to cultivate sincere friendship with France. 

Second. That this policy would be brought into imminent 
jeopardy unless France could deem it consistent with her 
interest and honor to desist from the prosecution of armed 
intervention in Mexico, to overthrow the domestic republi- 
can government existing there, and to establish upon its 
ruins the foreign monarchy which has been attempted to 
be inaugurated in the capital of the country." 4 

This was as plain as if he had written: 'Withdraw or 



1 3 Dip. Cor., 1865, 413-414. 2 3 Dip. Cor., 1865, 422. 

3 3 Dip. Cor. , 1865, 427. 4 3 Dip. Cor. , 1885, 490. 

437 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

fight; yet it was not said in a way to precipitate a con- 
flict. 

There was great excitement in France early in 1866 
owing to the Mexican question. Some likened the 
commotion to that that preceded the revolution of 1789. 1 
Drouyn de Lhuys reviewed with circumspection the 
course that France had pursued ; and, as a condition of 
the withdrawal of French troops, he once more tried to 
get the United States to recognize Maximilian. 2 On 
February 12th Seward replied, with great care, making 
what Bigelow privately described as a very happy com- 
bination of the suaviter in modo with the fortiter in re; 
he held his ground firmly but diplomatically. 3 

After considering the matter for several weeks, Na- 
poleon concluded that he could not afford to risk a war 
with the United States. On April 5, 1866, Le Moniteur, 
his official organ, announced that the French troops 
would evacuate Mexico in three detachments — namely, 
in November, 1866, and in March and November, 1867. 4 
Thus the question of French intervention in Mexico 
seemed to be settled. 

When the time came for the departure of the first 
third of the French army, Seward was informed by the 
American Minister in Paris that Napoleon had decided 
to postpone the withdrawal of all his troops until the 

1 3 Dip. Cor., 1865, 807. 2 3 Dip. Cor., 1865, 805 ff. 

3 3 Dip. Cor., 1865, 813 ff. In a private letter of February 14, 1866, 
about this despatch, Seward said : 

"What I write is approved by the President. The Congress of 
the United States is sufficiently imbued with a conviction of the ne- 
cessity of governmental action on the subject of the French interven- 
tion. 

" What has recently been written by me on that subject to Mr. 
Drouyn de Lhuys is marked by a degree of decision which Congress 
will approve, while I trust it is expressed in a manner that ought to 
be deemed conciliatory and respectful. I shall look with much 
solicitude to the reply which may now be expected from France." 
—Bigelow MSS. 4 3 Dip. Cor., 1865, 827. 

438 



FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 

spring of 1S67. 1 Seward replied by cable, under date of 
November 23, 1866 : 

" We cannot acquiesce — 

" First. Because the term ' next spring/ as appointed for 
the entire evacuation, is indefinite and vague. 

" Second. Because we have no authority for stating to 
Congress and to the American people that we have now a 
better guarantee for the withdrawal of the whole expedi- 
tionary force in the spring than we have heretofore had for 
a withdrawal of a part in November." 

And third, in substance, because such delay would seri- 
ously conflict with the plans of the United States. 2 

Napoleon intended to withdraw his troops, but he 
wished to postpone their departure as long as possible, 
in the interest of French securities and to ward off the 
disgrace of his own unscrupulous scheme to use Maxi- 
milian and the Mexicans. In the hope of gaining time, at 
least, he proposed that a Mexican provisional govern- 
ment be formed to the exclusion of both Maximilian 
and Juarez. But Seward had repeatedly declined to 
sever the friendly relations of the United States with 
Juarez's government, although it had long been a fugi- 
tive. During the early part of 1806 Sheridan had sup- 
plied the Mexican Liberals with as many as thirty thou- 
sand muskets, and Juarez had won back most of the 
northeastern, part of Mexico. 3 Seward now knew that 
he could safely refuse to carry on further negotiations 
for delay ; and the avoidance of war he wisely thought 
more important than a display of enthusiasm and power. 
So, on January 18, 1867, he positively declined Napo- 
leon's proposition. 4 Napoleon then gave up hope. In 
February, 1867, the French evacuated the City of Mex- 
ico, and intervention quickly came to an end. 



1 Dip. Cor., 1866, 364. 2 Ibid., 366, 367. 

■ 2 Sheridan's Memoirs, 224. 4 1 Dip. Cor., 1867, 218. 

439 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

In a few weeks Maximilian's forces were routed. The 
Emperor and two of the most prominent of his Mexican 
supporters were soon tried by court-martial, and on June 
19, 1867, they were shot. Seward endeavored to obtain 
clemency for Maximilian, but the passions of the army 
seem to have prevented Juarez from commuting the sen- 
tence. 1 

Meantime, in March, 1866, Seward learned that Aus- 
tria was about to permit four thousand volunteers to be 
enlisted for the army of Maximilian. John Lothrop 
Motley, United States Minister at Vienna, was there- 
upon requested to make known to Austria that such 
permission would be viewed with displeasure by the 
government of the United States. 3 On April 6th, after 
having received fuller information, Seward instructed 
Motley that 

"in the event of hostilities being carried on hereafter in 
Mexico by Austrian subjects, under the command or with 
the sanction of the government of Vienna, the United States 
will feel themselves at liberty to regard those hostilities as 
constituting a state of war by Austria against the Eepublic 
of Mexico ; and in regard to such war . . . the United 
States could not engage to remain as silent or neutral spec- 
tators." 3 

On the 16th, and after it was understood that only 
about two thousand were to be sent, he notified Motley 
that "the despatch of any troops from Austria for 
Mexico" "while the subject remains under considera- 
tion " would be regarded " as a matter of serious con- 
cern" by this government. 4 When, a few days later, 
Motley showed that he misapprehended Seward's posi- 
tion, or halted in view of the contrast between the dif- 
ferent instructions, Seward informed him that that was 

1 2 Dip. Cor., 1867, 411-20. 3 3 Dip. Cor., 1865, 831, 832. 

3 3 Dip. Cor., 1865, 833. J 3 Dip. Cor., 1S65, 837. 

440 



FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO 

a question not to be discussed, and that if the Austrian 
government should persist in its course, he would be 
expected to retire from Vienna. 1 On May 20, 1866, but 
two months after Seward first took up the problem of 
Austria's giving aid to intervention in Mexico, Motley 
was informed by the Austrian government that, "in 
consideration of all the . . . circumstances, the necessary 
measures have been taken to prevent the departure of 
the volunteers lately enlisted for Mexico." 2 Here was 
summary diplomacy; and the circumstances fully war- 
ranted it. 

One of the striking facts connected with the ne- 
gotiations about intervention in Mexico is that the 
Monroe doctrine, though constantly appealed to at the 
time by the sensational newspapers and the politicians, 
seems not once to have been mentioned in any official 
despatch from the United States government. France 
violated the doctrine continuously for five years. But 
Seward knew that it was no part of international law ; 
that it had no authority of its own, and no claim even 
to consideration except where it was used as a general 
term to express a protest against European interfer- 
ence that endangered substantial and vital interests 
of the United States. Foreign nations would yield to 
it only in proportion as it was rational and as they 
feared the military strength ready to support it. Sew- 
ard was not as wise as we think if he did not see 
that all the reason of the Monroe doctrine would be 
equally strong and even more impressive if stated 
ad hoc in his own words, and without reference to 
the very different circumstances of the previous half- 
century. 

This much is certain : to Seward belongs the chief 



1 3 Dip. Cor., 1865, 838. 2 Ibid., 845. 

441 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

credit for expelling those who were violating the Mon- 
roe doctrine, for restoring republicanism in Mexico, and 
for averting a war with France that might have been 
no less terrible than the Civil War, and might even have 
led to a renewal of that terrible conflict. 



CHAPTER XLI 
SEWARD'S PART IN RECONSTRUCTION, 1865-69 

It is hardly conceivable that any leader except Lincoln 
could have conquered the difficulties of the period of 
reconstruction. And it is possible that all the prestige 
and confidence he had earned by his tact, philanthropy, 
and perseverance might not have enabled him to direct 
a system of thorough reconciliation. The relations be- 
tween those that had been enemies in battle, and even 
between the ex-master and the ex-slave, were to be less 
difficult to adjust than the antagonisms between radicals 
and conservatives, between scheming, unscrupulous pol- 
iticians and sullen, brutal men that lived to obstruct 
progress and satisfy old prejudices. Lincoln consistent- 
ly maintained that no state had withdrawn from the 
Union, although most of the inhabitants in some of the 
states were in organized insurrection against the Federal 
government. 1 The state governments of Louisiana and 
Arkansas had been reorganized under the President's 
authorization that the work might begin as soon as one- 
tenth of the number of their voting population in 1860 
became loyal; but Congress had withheld its approval 
by failing to admit delegations from those states. At 
the Hampton Roads conference Lincoln expressed the 
opinion that as soon as the rebellion ceased the states 
ought to be allowed to exercise their normal powers, 2 

1 Dunning's Essays on the Civil War and Reconstruction, 65 ff. 

2 10 Nicolay and Hay, 122, 123. 

443 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

and he promised to act with great liberality toward the 
Confederates. A few days after the surrender at Ap- 
pomattox the administration decided that reconstruction 
should begin by the extension of the functions of the 
different departments to the states lately in revolt. Lin- 
coln expected that the citizens of the respective states 
would soon conduct the state governments, although 
they might at first do it badly. 1 

Seward's wishes were not less generous. Seven 
months before the end of the war he said that he looked 
for propositions for a restoration of the Union to come 
from citizens and states not under Confederate control, 
and he added : 

" All the world knows that so far as I am concerned, and, 
I believe, so far as the President is concerned, all such 
applications will receive just such an answer as it be- 
comes a great, magnanimous, and humane people to grant 
to brethren who have come back from their wanderings to 
seek a shelter in the common ark of our national security 
and happiness.'*' 3 

In his opinion slavery was " the only element of dis- 
cord among the American people," and that being once 
removed, he was sure it would not be the fault of the 
administration if a period of peace and harmony did 
not prevail. 3 Some remarks at Hampton Koads showed 
that he expected the South would be treated with kind- 
ness, and he objected to the inference that the United 
States demanded unconditional submission. 4 



1 3 Seward, 275, 283. 2 5 Works, 504. 

3 Speech at Auburn, November 7, 1864, 5 Works, 514. 

4 Campbell's MS. account of the conference says that in summing up 
the conclusions Hunter had inferred that there was nothing left for 
the Confederate States but unconditional submission. "Mr. Seward 
remarked that they [the President and himself] bad not used tbe 
word submission or any word tbat implied humiliation to the States, 
and betrged that it should not be noted." 

444 



SEWARD'S PART IN RECONSTRUCTION 

But it fell to Andrew Johnson to say the decisive 
word as to reconstruction. Johnson was a crude and 
sinewy specimen of a self-made man. Born a "poor 
white," he owed much of his advancement in politics to 
the favor with which the common people regarded his 
inherited prejudices against the highest class in the 
South. He felt, as another Southerner said, that the 
Confederate leaders had inaugurated " a rich man's war 
but a poor man's fight." He remained in the United 
States Senate after his state passed an ordinance of seces- 
sion; and subsequentl}'', as military governor of Tennes- 
see, he reorganized a loyal state government in harmony 
with Lincoln's aims. His valuable services as a south- 
ern unionist and a Democrat led to his nomination for 
the vice-presidency. The whole Republican party was 
committed to the theory that the states were still in the 
Union; for, otherwise, how could they have favored 
Johnson, whose state was officially a part of the Con- 
federacy % His courage and pugnacity were well known ; 
but it was not yet fully realized that he was wholly lack- 
ing in the qualities that made Lincoln great. Johnson's 
intentions were good, but it was his acts that were to be 
influential. It was very unfortunate, even if accidental, 
that his inauguration as Yice-President was marked by 
inebriation and a meandering, egotistical harangue. 
Within a few clays after he became President his public 
remarks showed that thoughts of his rise from a hum- 
ble origin and of the necessity of punishing traitors 
were uppermost in his mind. The North blushed for 
his dull egotism and the South feared that he might be 
very revengeful. 

Long before the iron frame was removed or the splints 
and bandages could be taken oif, Seward was eager to 
return to his work. Nearly a month elasped before he 
was able to attend a Cabinet-meeting, even when it took 
place in his own house; and then "his immovable arm 

445 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

and stiffened jaw rendered him almost incapable of tak- 
ing part in the examination of papers or the discussion of 
questions." 1 He seems to have had no thought of retiring 
from the Department of State. The diplomatist's work 
is likely to be hardest before and after war. Seward's 
undertakings were necessarily far from complete. The 
two most important questions of long standing — French 
intervention in Mexico and Great Britain's alleged vio- 
lations of neutrality — were still unsettled, and they were 
only a small part of the difficulties and projects in for- 
eign relations that he was anxious to bring 1 to a suc- 
cessful conclusion. 3 He rightly believed, also, that his 
services were never more needed in the department. 
As a matter of course, he dreaded to think of the time 
when he should have no responsibility and but little in- 
fluence in politics. 

The opinions Johnson had expressed about treason 
and negro suffrage 3 caused many persons to expect that 
his policy would differ radically from that of his prede- 
cessor. But a presidential order of May 9th — the day 
the Cabinet met at Seward's house — designed to re-es- 
tablish the authority of the United" States in Virginia, 
applied the policy that Lincoln's administration had 
lately decided on. 4 Likewise the amnesty proclamation 
of May 29, 1865, closely followed Lincoln's of earlier 
date. It was almost a matter of course, owing to 
changing circumstances, that the oath prescribed by 
Johnson should make the recognition of emancipation 
more positive, and that the exceptions from this general 
pardon should be more numerous. Each proclamation 
excluded all persons that had violated their oaths of alle- 

1 3 Seward, 281, 282. 

2 4 Pierce, 253, 254, quotes Seward's remarks to Sumner. 

3 4 Pierce, 242, 243, 245. 

4 McPherson's Reconstruction, 8; McCulloch's Men and Measures of 
Half a Century, 378. 

446 



SEWARD'S PART IN RECONSTRUCTION 

giance to the United States or had been conspicuous in 
the civil, the military, or the diplomatic service of the 
Confederacy. One feature peculiar to Johnson's policy 
was to preclude from amnesty all voluntary participants 
in the rebellion who possessed property estimated at the 
taxable value of over twenty thousand dollars. 1 Even 
the men in the excepted classes were promised that, on 
special application, clemency would be " liberally ex- 
tended " to them as far as might be " consistent with 
the facts of the case and the peace and dignity of the 
United States." On the same day the President ap- 
pointed a provisional governor for North Carolina and 
authorized him to arrange for a convention of loyal 
citizens chosen by persons that had been rehabilitated 
and were voters according to the constitution and laws 
in force in the state just previous to the passage of the 
ordinance of secession. The questions of suffrage and 
of eligibility to hold office were to be left to the con- 
vention or to the legislature, for the proclamation de- 

1 2 Blaine's Twenty Years of Congress, 66 ff., 108, makes some very 
entertaining statements about Seward's influeuce in causing Johnson 
to change his idea of reconstruction. The only fault to be found with 
them is that they are chiefly assumption and imagination and tend to 
conceal the facts. No one has ever produced evidence showing that 
Johnson needed to be convinced that the work of reconstruction 
could be best directed by the executive department of the government. 
And before Seward was able to talk without great pain Johnson had 
begun to follow the course Lincoln had laid out for himself. So the 
President must either have changed his plans after merely a few 
words with Seward or have surrendered in advance, having heard of 
what Blaine called Seward's " faculty, in personal intercourse with 
one man or with a small number of men, of enforcing his own views 
and taking captive his hearers." Assuming that Johnson felt this 
magic in the beginning, one is left to wonder why that same magic 
was unable to prevent him from showing his prejudice against the 
wealthy class (2 Blaine, 74), or from making so sorry an exhibition 
of himself before the public, or from letting southern men " fasten 
their hold upon Mr. Johnson even to the exclusion of Mr. Seward." 
(2 Blaine, 109.) 

447 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

clared that that was a power the people of the several 
states had rightfully exercised from the foundation of 
the government. Before the middle of July all the 
other unorganized states were treated in the same way. 
Johnson was advancing by long strides, but his course 
was essentially the same as the one Lincoln had in pros- 
pect. 1 

The amnesty proclamation directed that the Secretary 
of State should have general supervision of the s} 7 stem 
of political pardons. Many men in the excepted classes 
made oral applications either at the department or at 
Seward's house. " They come to me," he wrote in Au- 
gust, 1S65, "as if I were more inclined to tenderness 
than others, because I have been calm and cool under 
political excitement." 2 Many years later, William 
Henry Trescot described 3 how Seward, with mock se- 
verity of voice and facial expression, answered his re- 
quests for the return of confiscated lands by playfully 
declaring that the ex-Confederate leaders must hum- 
ble themselves before obtaining forgiveness. Then the 
Secretary entered into a pleasant conversation, and did 
all he could to aid the applicant. R. M. T. Hunter was 
a man toward whom one would not expect Seward to 
show any friendship. After Hunter was released as a 
prisoner of war, he visited Washington. Seward greeted 
him as if they had been life-long friends, and invited 
him to dinner. The Virginian found under his plate a 
pardon duly signed and sealed. It was typical of Sew- 
ard's disposition to make friends of enemies, of his good- 
fellowship, and of his easy-going ways about matters 
that he regarded as of secondary importance. 

During the New York campaign in the autumn of 
1865 Weed and Raymond decided that Seward — al- 
though he had not yet recovered from his wounds — 

1 Dunning, 79 IT. 2 3 Seward, 293. 

3 In conversation with the author. 

448 



SEWARD'S PART IN RECONSTRUCTION 

ought to address the public in defence of the Presi- 
dent's policy, which was not gaining in popularity at 
the North. So it was arranged that while he was on 
a visit to Auburn a company of friends and neighbors 
should call, and that in reply to some remarks from 
a local clergyman, Doctor Ilawley, the Secretary of 
State should express his opinions on the political sit- 
uation. The speeches to be delivered were dictated in 
advance to the same stenographer. The programme 
was carried out, and Seward spoke from his own door- 
step. ' 

Of the method of reconstruction he said : " It is the 
plan which abruptly, yet distinctly, offered itself to the 
last administration . . . when the work of restoration 
was to begin; ... it is the only possible plan which 
then or ever afterward could be adopted. ... In the 
mean time, the executive and legislative authorities of 
Congress can do no more than discharge their proper 
functions of protecting the recently insurgent states 
from anarchy during the intervening period while the 
plan is being carried into execution." a 

Many Republicans were beginning to doubt if the 
work of rehabilitation was not proceeding too rapidly to 
be safe and sincere. Seward's reply was : 

" Certainly you must accept this proposed reconciliation, 
or you must propose to delay and wait until you can pro- 
cure a better one. . . . Are you sure that you can procure 
a better reconciliation after prolonged anarchy, without 
employing force ? Who will advocate the employment of 
force merely to hinder and delay, through prolonged an- 
archy, a reconciliation which is feasible and perfectly con- 
sistent with the Constitution? In what part of the Con- 

1 These statements are made on the authority of George R. Bishop. 
Mr. Bishop went to Auburn at the request of Henry J. Raymond and 
acted as Seward's stenographer for a few days.— Letter of March 10, 
1896, to the author. 2 5 Works, 519. 

ii.— 2 p 449 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

stitution is written the power to continue civil war against 
succumbing states, for ultimate political triumph ? What 
would this be but, in fact, to institute a new civil war, af- 
ter one had ended with the complete attainment of the law- 
ful objects for which it was waged ? . . . Congress and the 
President have a right to accept or even make war against 
any part of the people of the United States only under 
their limited power to suppress sedition and insurrec- 
tion, and for that purpose only. What then ? Must we 
give up the hope of further elevation of classes in the 
several states without any new guarantees for individual 
liberty and progress ? By no means. Marching in this 
path of progress and elevation of masses is what we have 
been doing still more effectually in the prosecution of the 
war." 1 

He was also sure that the plan already inaugurated 
" must and would be adopted," although turbulent or 
factious persons in one section, or manifestations of dis- 
trust or defiance in the other, might cause delay. The 
way to hasten the work was for the sections to trust each 
other. 3 

At first thought one wonders how Seward could have 
supposed that Johnson was capable of succeeding in so 
difficult an undertaking as reconstruction was even then 
known to be. Seward judged Johnson according to the 
good work he had done during the four years previous 
to 1865, whereas it is the bad work of the four years 
subsequent to 1865 that has given Johnson his place 
in history. However, Seward's estimate of the Presi- 
dent was higher than ought to have been made by any 
one that had been intimately associated with him. 3 
Seward soon perceived that a storm was gathering. 

1 5 Works, 521. 2 5 Works, 522. 

3 "Except those of you who have been maimed or bereaved, have 
any of you suffered more of wrong, insult, and violence at the 
hands of those leaders than he [the President] has? Can we not 
forget where he can forgive? Are you aware that his terms of 
amnesty are far more rigorous than those which were offered by 
Abraham Lincoln? . . . And yon ask: May not the President yet 

450 



SEWARD'S PART IN RECONSTRUCTION 

"The approach of Congress prognosticates trials of 
many sorts, from the ill-assortment of tempers and the 
absence of a spirit of conciliation, when conciliation is 
the interest and duty of all," he wrote, November 18, 
1865. A week later he heard "the rumbling of con- 
gressional ambitions." "How to steer clear of the 
partisan and personal contentions of Congress" was 
his "chief responsibility." As Congress was assem- 
bling he wrote again : " Every wild thought and incon- 
ceivable jealousy is afloat. Interests of cupidity and 
ambition, mingled with passion and prejudice. The 
President is suspected of everything, and guilty of 
nothing." ' 

Meantime the work of reconstruction had advanced 
so rapidly that its friends supposed it was almost com- 
plete. The conventions in the different states had re- 
pealed the ordinances of secession, abolished slavery, and 
repudiated war debts. Loyal legislatures had come into 
existence, and Senators and Representatives from the 
states of the late Confederacy were in Washington ex- 
prove unfaithful to us? For myself, I laid aside partisanship, if 
I had any, in 1861, when the salvation of the country demanded 
tliat sacrifice. . . . Andrew Johuson laid aside, I am sure, what- 
ever of partisanship he had at the same time. That noble act did 
not allow — but, on the other hand, it forbade — collusion by the 
friends of the Union with opponents of the policies of the war and 
of reconciliation which the government has found it necessary to 
pursue. . . . Patriotism and loyalty equally, however, require that 
fidelity in this case should be mutual. Be ye faithful, therefore, on 
your part, and, although the security I offer is unnecessary and 
superfluous, yet I will guarantee fidelity on his part. . . . Perhaps 
you fear the integrity of the man. I confess, with a full sense of my 
accountability, that among all the public men whom I have met or 
with whom I have been associated or concerned, in this or any other 
country, no one has seemed to me to be more wholly free from per- 
sonal caprice and selfish ambition than Andrew Johnson; none to be 
more purely and exclusively moved in public action by love of coun- 
try and good-will to mankind." — 5 Works, 523. 

1 3 Seward, 301, 302. 

451 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

pecting to see the doors of Congress open before them. 
On December 18th the Secretary of State issued a proc- 
lamation announcing that the XIII. Amendment had 
become a part of the Constitution. Eight of the states 
lately in rebellion were among those that ratified it.' 
Florida and Texas were unorganized, but it was ex- 
pected that they would not long remain so. Recon- 
struction would then be complete, if Congress should 
admit all the delegations from the South. 

Unfortunately the evidences of success were mere- 
ly superficial. Beneath the surface nearly everything 
had progressed unsatisfactorily to the Republicans at 
the Capitol. The conventions had not referred their 
actions to the people for approval, as many Northerners 
thought should have been done. Since there were no 
longer any slaves, the number of members in the House 
of Representatives must be proportionate to the free 
population. But the suffrage had nowhere been extend- 
ed to the freedmen. Therefore, the white voters in the 
South would have a much larger representation than the 
same number in the North. Then it was sarcastically 
asked: Do unionism and success owe this advantage and 
an immediate voice in legislation to treason and defeat? 
Several of the reconstructed legislatures soon enacted 
special laws to regulate the actions and status of the 
negroes. An extensive system of peonage, likely to 
affect a large portion of the ex-slaves, would have been 
the result if these so - called " black codes " had been 
tolerated. Although emancipation was not the purpose 
of the war, it had come as one of the results; and most 
of the Republican leaders considered that their party 
was nominally bound to give the negroes the same civil 
rights as white persons, while some of the radicals were 
already insisting on an equality of political rights. So 

1 Dunning, 82. 
452 



SEWARD'S PART IN RECONSTRUCTION 

large a majority in Congress had become thoroughly 
dissatisfied that, about the middle of December, 1865, a 
joint committee was appointed to inquire into the whole 
question of reconstruction. 

Early in 1866 the President vetoed a bill to continue 
and enlarge the functions of the Freedmen's Bureau, 
which was designed especially to aid and protect ex- 
slaves. The veto message needlessly expressed the 
opinion that most of the states lately in rebellion were 
''entitled to enjoy their constitutional rights as mem- 
bers of the Union." 1 The Republicans were unable to 
pass the bill over the veto, but in a concurrent resolution 
they informed the President and the country that no 
Senator or Representative should be admitted from any 
state held to have been insurrectionary, until Congress 
should declare such state entitled to representation. In 
a public speech, on February 22, 1866, Johnson charged 
that there was an attempt on the part of Congress to 
consolidate the Republic and that that was as objec- 
tionable as its dissolution. He denounced Charles Sum- 
ner and Thaddeus Stevens personally, and spoke as if 
his own assassination had been suggested by his oppo- 
nents. His words and acts excited the South with the 
vain belief that Congress must yield because it had no 
right to tax the states to which it refused a voice 
in legislation. Had his aim been to appear unwise and 
undignified, the speech would have been a perfect suc- 
cess. 

On the same day Seward addressed a political meet- 
ing in New York city on the "Restoration of Union." 2 
It was announced that many of his prominent political 
friends — such as Thurlow Weed, William M. Evarts, 
Hamilton Fish, E. D. Morgan, R. M. Blatchford, and 
Moses II. Grinnell — were in sympathy with him. This 

1 Mcpherson's Reconstruction, 72. * 5 Works, 529-40. 

453 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

indicated that a serious effort was to be made to build 
up a new party or faction to support the administra- 
tion. Unlike Johnson, Seward knew that personalities 
are always unprofitable. He now — as in December, 
1860 — declared that there was nothing- very serious 
about the political situation. The Union had been 
saved. According to his metaphor, the ship had passed 
from tempest and billows to within the verge of a safe 
harbor, and had yet to pass merely some small reefs ; and 
the dispute was only a difference of opinion between 
pilots. He was confident that " there never was and 
never can be any successful process for the restoration of 
the Union and harmony among the states, except the 
one with which the President has avowed himself satis- 
fied." " Say what you will or what you may, the states 
are already organized, in perfect harmony with our 
amended national Constitution, and are in earnest co- 
operation with the Federal government. It would re- 
quire an imperial will, an imperial person, and imperial 
powers greater than the Emperor of France possesses, 
to reduce any one of these states with the consent of 
all the other states, to what you term a territorial con- 
dition." Therefore, he pronounced the concurrent reso- 
lution to be " not a plan for reconstruction, but a plan 
for indefinite postponement and delay." He thought it 
impracticable, vicious, and sure to fail. With confident 
optimism he saw nothing alarming about the condi- 
tion of the freedmen. In ninety } r ears there had been a 
change from slavery everywhere to freedom everywhere. 
Because the country was wiser than it was ninety years 
earlier, he had no fear that it would " lack the wisdom 
or the virtue to go right on and continue the work of 
melioration and progress, and perfect in due time the de- 
liverance of labor from restrictions, and the annihilation 
of caste and class." So, in regard to the veto of the 
Freedmen's Bureau bill, he asked if the President ought 

454 



SEWARD'S PART IN RECONSTRUCTION 

to be denounced " for refusing, in the absence of any 
necessity, to occupy or retain, and to exercise powers 
greater than those which are exercised by any imperial 
magistrate in the world." 

In March, 1866, the Civil Eights bill was sent to the 
President. It was designed to establish absolute equality 
of civil rights among all citizens of the United States. 1 
The President returned the bill with a veto so strong 
and lucid that there was a suspicion that it had not 
come from the pen of the man whose speeches were gen- 
erally meandering and dull in expression. But Congress 
was no more open to conviction than the President; it 
promptly passed the bill over the veto. 

As yet relatively few Republicans were in favor of de- 
manding full negro suffrage. 2 They proposed the XIV. 
Amendment for the purpose of equalizing representa- 

1 Dunning, 91 ff., discusses the bill in a clear and scholarly manner. 

2 In April, 1866, Professor Charles Eliot Norton and E. L. Godkin 
had a long interviewwith Seward. A careful report — written out im- 
mediately after the conversation — quotes Seward as saying : 

" There ought to be no question about the readmission of the South. 
Those states are loyal, devoted, earnest, patriotic, humiliated, and 
repeutant, eager to come back. Congress has no right to refuse them. 
It shows its distrust of the Constitution by its refusal. Every neces- 
sary preliminary has been complied with ; the South has accepted 
every needful condition ; there is nothing more to ask of it. It has as 
good a right to be represented in Congress as the North has, but Con- 
gress chooses to keep it out of the Union." 

"The North has nothing to do with the negroes. I have no 
more concern for them than I have for the Hottentots. They are 
God's poor; they always have been and always will be so everywhere. 
They are not of our race. They will fiud their place. They must 
take their level. The laws of political economy will determine their 
position and the relations of the two races. Congress cannot con- 
travene those. I am ready to leave the interests of the most intel- 
ligent white man to the guardianship of his state, and where I leave 
the interests of the white I am willing to trust the civil rights of the 
black. The South must take care of its own negroes as the North 
did and does. I was born a slave-holder; my state took away my 

455 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

tion in the House, to prevent ex -Confederate leaders 
from assuming control of political affairs in the South 
so as to interfere with congressional reconstruction, to 
guarantee the Federal debt incurred in the war, and to 
repudiate all Confederate obligations on the part of states 
or the nation. The Republicans were determined to make 
the acceptance of this amendment a precedent condi- 
tion of admitting Senators and Representatives from the 
states of the late Confederacy. 
On May 22, 1866, Seward spoke in Auburn on " The 

slaves, and it did right, but I had to support them, and, indeed, have 
to support some of them up to this time. 

"The North must get over this notion of interference with the 
affairs of the South. Some people talk about being afraid of the 
South if the southern members of Congress are allowed to take their 
seats. But what harm can they do? I am not afraid of them; I never 
was afraid of the South in my life, not even when it had power and 
wealth and united interests and patronage." . . . 

..." I cannot imagine a base motive in politics any more than 
some men a base motive in domestic life. The states form one family. 
The South comes knocking at the door of the old home, and wants to 
be taken in, and will not the father hasten to open the door and wel- 
come his repentant child?" 

. . . " The South longs to come home now, sir. Those who refuse 
to take them into the family again are in my opinion guilty of a great 
crime. It may be a sublimated consideration, but I confess it has 
great weight with me, that if I could not forgive the enemies of my 
country as I forgive my own enemies, I could not have the hope that 
I might enter kingdom come. There is a want of charity in this re- 
fusal to forgive which is worse than the sins against which it is mani- 
fested. At this time the North is showing the most evil disposition, 
and I would rather go South, where they are behaving well, than to 
Massachusetts, where they are behaving ill, and showing so bad and 
unforgiving a temper. 

" But all this trouble is going to pass over. Things will come out 
all right. The people will not consent to follow the lead of Congress, 
for they love the Union, and mean to have it whole again." 

..." I have every confidence. I never held an opinion that was 
popular, and I have never failed to see the country come up to my 
opinions in time. This doctrine is not Massachusetts doctrine, but it 

456 



SEWARD'S PART IN RECONSTRUCTION 

Question of Reconciliation." l He argued that what the 
country needed was not reconstruction, but reconcilia- 
tion, which would come as soon as the acting members 
of Congress admitted from the ex -Confederate states 
the members-elect that were loyal and qualified. The 
other leading contention was, that it could not be true, 
as charged, that the President was unfaithful to the party 
and its cardinal principles of public policy ; for his dis- 
agreements w T ith Congress on the Freedmen's Bureau 
bill, the Civil Rights bill, and one or two other subjects 
were " purely extraneous incidents, and have no neces- 
sary or real bearing upon the question of reconciliation." 
He maintained that the President had " neither sought, 
nor made, nor accepted any occasion for disagreeing 
from Congress, and that, so far as the purely incidental 
legislation to which I have referred is concerned, he is 
as loyal to the principles of the Union party and to the 
national cause as Congress or any of the members can 
claim to be." The speech was excellent in temper, but 
light and unconvincing in argument. It lacked the vi- 
rility and enthusiasm of his senatorial days. In a single 
sentence he tried to answer the demand of the North 
that the negro should be given equal rights: "There is 
no soundness at all in our political system, if the per- 
sonal or civil rights of each member of the state, white 
or black, free born or emancipated, native born or nat- 
uralized, are not more secure under the administration 
of [a] state government, than they could be under the 
administration of the national government." Such 
sentiments called out the severe criticism of men that 
had once regarded him as a champion of liberty and 
equality, who was to use Plymouth rock as "the ful- 

is going to be the Massachusetts doctrine before long." — Published in 
the New York Evening Post, March 24, 1888. 

1 The speech was not printed in his Works, but was published in 
pamphlet form. 

457 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

crum by whose aid I may move the world — the moral 
world." 1 

After June, 1866, there was no hope of reconciliation 
between Congress and the President. Johnson was out 
of harmony with the Republican party, and his support- 
ers must expect to find themselves allied with Demo- 
crats. It was not a pleasing prospect for a Republican 
Cabinet. William Dennison, the Postmaster - General, 
James Speed, the Attorney-General, and James Harlan, 
the Secretary of the Interior, withdrew in July. 

Seward stood firmly and confidently by the policy that 
he had done much to shape. This was to be expected 
in view of all the circumstances. From the winter of 
1860-61 he had almost continually counted on seeing 
the secessionists return speedily and in full repentance. 
He always cherished the amiable vanity of counting 
himself the most magnanimous of men ; it was a part of 
his philosophy of practical politics, for the politician is 
concerned with the present and the future, not the past. 
Had he been ten years younger and in good physical 
condition, he would undoubtedly have been as energetic 
in the reconstruction movement as he had been in regard 
to military or diplomatic questions. But most of his old 
party friends were in sympathy with Congress ; his per- 
sonal misfortunes were many; he was crippled and 
scarred, and his vigor and ambition were not what they 
had been; and it was evident that his political career 
must end with his service in the Department of State. 
He was usually very charitable, and acted as if he had 
adopted for himself these immortal phrases of Lincoln's 
second inaugural address : " With malice toward none. 

1 The New York Independent of May 31, 1866, heaped ridicule upon 
him, and said: "Mr. Seward once earned honor by remembering the 
negro at a time when others forgot him ; he now earns dishonor by 
forgetting the negro when the nation demands that the negro should 
be remembered." 

458 



SEWARD'S PART IN RECONSTRUCTION 

with charity for all ; with firmness in the right, as God 
gives us to see the right, let us strive to finish the work 
we are in ; to bind up the nation's wounds." He showed 
no rancor, even in the forced contest with Congress, al- 
though he considered it " agitated and stormy," and its 
'debates "troubled, and its entire action convulsive." 1 

In July, Tennessee, after ratifying the proposed XIV. 
Amendment, obtained admission to Congress for her 
delegation. Seward promptly assumed the role of the 
forgiving father and prepared a feast, which he described 
as follows : 

"We had all the Tennesseean Representatives last night 
to dinner ; and they seemed to appreciate the attention. I 
had a calf served up in many ways, and they accepted it as 
'returned prodigals.' The feast went off to the strains of 
martial airs from the band ; and the two green-backed birds 
from the snnny South, added, by clamorous loquacity, to 
the hilarity of the occasion." 3 

The Republican majority in Congress was so large 
that there was no hope for the President's policy unless 
a strong conservative movement could be organized. 
The support of the Democrats could be counted on, 
because they would be benefited by it. The convention 
that met in Philadelphia in the middle of August was 
the result of an attempt to unite, for the purpose of an 
early restoration of the Union, about the same class of 
men to whom Seward and Weed had appealed in the 
winter of 1860-61 to prevent the dissolution of the 
Union. Henry J. Raymond, who wrote the address, first 
heard of the convention from Weed. Seward, Weed, 
and Raymond were at least its strongest supporters. 
The intention was not to found a new party to put the 
Democrats in power, but merely to develop sentiment in 
favor of admitting 1 the ten states without further con- 



1 3 Seward, 331. 2 3 Seward, 332. 

459 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

ditions ; that is, to settle the difficulties between the sec- 
tions as soon as possible. There was something noble 
in the faith, hope, and charity of the conception ; but its 
utter lack of practical statesmanship was pitiable. The 
attempt to make a picturesque illustration of fraternity 
and forgiveness, by having delegates from Massachu- 
setts and South Carolina enter the " Wigwam " arm in 
arm, was easily ridiculed. The North was not ready to 
trust the South ; and it is strange that Seward and 
Weed did not know it, especially as the best interests of 
the country were opposed to such hasty forgiveness. 

Near the end of August the President began the ill- 
fated campaign of stump-speaking that has gone into 
history as his famous " swinging-around-the-circle " trip, 
which Lowell humorously described as an " advertising 
tour of a policy in want of a party." 2 Seward had in 
advance some misgivings about the " excitements and 
fatigues" that it was likely to create. "But it is a duty 
to the President and to the country, though so many 
think it otherwise, and I shall go on with right good 
heart," he wrote. 2 The sight of a party consisting of 
the President of the United States, General Grant, Ad- 
miral Farragut, Seward, and others, ought to have im- 
pressed the multitudes that gathered in public places. 
In Philadelphia, New York city, and elsewhere in the 
East the crowds were not especially disrespectful, but in 
some of the western cities the President was railed 
at as if he were a mere brawling street - orator. At 
Cleveland he answered the hooting rabble in the man- 
ner of a man both mad and drunk, and he said, as he 
had often shown, that he cared nothing for dignity. 
This was a public disgrace. His ablest champion, the 
New York Times, 3 criticised him for it, and reproved him 

1 Political Essays, 296. 2 3 Seward, 339. 

3 September 7, 1866. 

460 



SEWARD'S PART IN RECONSTRUCTION 

for assuming that his opponents were enemies of the 
Union." 

The role of the Secretary of State in this episode was 
pathetic. One of the wits of the time spoke of Seward's 
" new office of bear-leader." 1 Unfortunately he was very 
unsuccessful even in this task, for he could do little more 
than apologize for Johnson, and in a few commonplace 
sentences call upon the audiences to support the Presi- 
dent in opposition to Congress. In New York he said : 
"I know you will give a certificate at the polls that the 
Union of the United States consists not of twenty-five 
states but of thirty-six." 2 At Niagara he told the crowd 
that Lincoln had been traduced when alive, but after 
his assassination all hearts inclined to the deepest sor- 
row; and it would be the same if Johnson should be 
taken off. 3 To the citizens of Buffalo he stated the is- 
sue as follows : 

"The question is between the President and the Con- 
gress. Of all that has been done, tell me what the Congress- 
men of the United States have done ? Of all that has been 
done to bring us so near the consummation [of reconstruc- 
tion], you see that nothing has been done that was not 
done through the direction, agency, activity, perseverance, 
and patriotism of Andrew Johnson, President of the United 
States. Will you stand by Congress ? or will you stand by 
the President ?" 4 

At the unveiling of the Douglas monument in Chicago, 
he told his hearers that it was one of the proudest po- 
litical recollections of his life that, although he and 
Douglas had been what the world called enemies for all 
but six months of their acquaintance, Douglas's widow 
and children and friends had invited him to be the orator 
on this occasion. 

1 Lowell's Political Essays, 290. 

2 New York Times, August 30, 1866. 

3 Times, September 2. 1866. " Times, September 4, 1866. 

461 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

" It proved tins, namely : That Stephen A. Douglas was 
a great and generous man. Had he not been he could not 
have gone through ten years of opposition to me without 
leaving in my heart a pang or wound. It proved that I 
knew all the while that he was a patriot, and that he thought 
me to be one also. ... I think that Stephen A. Douglas with 
Abraham Lincoln will live in the memory and homage of 
mankind with the Washiugtons and Hamiltons of the Rev- 
olutionary age." 1 

Until the summer of 1866 many of Seward's old friends 
believed that he had remained in Johnson's Cabinet 
mainly for the purpose of restraining the President; but 
after the absurd trip to the West — to eulogize Douglas 
and to exhibit Johnson — he became the object of the 
most cutting reproaches. The whole controversy about 
reconstruction had become an intensely bitter one be- 
tween Johnson and the Kepublican leaders. Not a few 
of Seward's most ardent champions in earlier years depre- 
ciated both his acts and his character, and recalled cer- 
tain doubtful incidents in his career to prove that his 
impulses and aims were now personal and resentful. One 
spoke of " the decline of his abilities and that dry-rot 
of the mind's nobler temper." " People are disgusted. 
Seward seems to have lost his wits as well as his prin- 
ciples," wrote another. Still another concluded an arti- 
cle thus: "Distrusted by his old friends, he will never 
be taken to the bosom of his old enemies. His trouble 
is not that the party to which he once belonged is with- 
out a leader, but that he wanders about, like a ghost — a 
leader without a party." 2 These were the severe judg- 
ments of opponents. Seward had not lost his princi- 
ples, nor radically changed his opinions; but he was, 
indeed, the victim of strange circumstances: to adhere 
to the patriotic duty as well as ambition to keep control 

1 Times, September 7, 1866. 

2 3 Nation, 234. Lowell's Political Essays, 292 ft., and 4 Pierce, 
299, 308, give further illustrations of harsh criticism. 

462 



SEWARD'S PART IN RECONSTRUCTION 

of international difficulties, he had to stand at the Presi- 
dent's right hand and to help defend a policy that was 
his own not less than the President's. Although this 
defence was often so calm and impersonal as to lack 
vigor and seem half-hearted, Seward was blamed for 
Johnson's follies and credited with much of the ability 
that was displayed in the President's communications 
to Congress. Seward's worst enemies could not have 
wished to see him humiliate himself as he did in the 
"swinging-around-the-circle" trip. It was a sad fact 
that Seward's popularity had gone and was never to 
return, to any considerable extent, while he remained 
in public life. The Quixotic expedition to the West was 
too much for Seward's frail condition; he became dan- 
gerously ill in Kentucky, and returned to Washington 
in advance of the other members of the presidential 
party. Subsequently his activity in reconstruction was 
much less conspicuous. 

The President's appeal to the country was a complete 
fiasco; for, as Nasby suggested, the people were too 
dull to see " the danger of concentrating power in the 
hands of Congress instead of diffusing it through one 
man." It resulted in increasing Johnson's unpopular- 
ity; it encouraged the unorganized states to reject the 
XIV. Amendment and to decline the terms offered by 
Congress; it gave the Republican leaders a surer fol- 
lowing, and convinced them that more summary meth- 
ods should be applied to reconstruction. But the Presi- 
dent was not discouraged. His annual message of 1866 
reargued the question, and bill after bill, which in differ- 
ent ways touched the principles involved in his policy, 
was met with a pugnacious veto, which the majorities in 
Congress promptly rendered futile. 

The reconstruction act of March 2, 1867, was a for- 
mal expression of the determination of the Republicans 
to begin anew the work of reorganizing the ten states. 

463 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

These states were divided into five military districts; 
the military officer in command in each district was to 
provide for the holding of constitutional conventions, 
the members of which should be chosen by citizens of 
the state, regardless of color, who had attained the age 
of twenty-one years; but all classes of persons described 
in the proposed XIV. Amendment as conspicuous in the 
Confederate movement were to be disqualified from vot- 
ing or holding office, and the amendment itself must be 
approved by the convention. These acts subordinated 
the existing state organizations to the military author- 
ity ; they soon tore down the ten structures built accord- 
ing to the President's plan ; they gave the ballot to all 
men not political offenders ; they inaugurated the broad- 
est democracy, where a very large majority of the popu- 
lation was not only ignorant, but also without the moral 
standard that is the prerequisite of decent government. 
To bring about a different result, it would have been 
necessary for the President to be less precipitate and 
bigoted ; for the South to be less prejudiced against the 
negro and to place less confidence in Johnson ; and for 
the Republicans to be less ambitious to secure a long 
lease of political power for themselves, while they gave 
the freedman the protection he needed. 

Johnson's expectation of winning the support of many 
Republicans had caused him to resist the demands of the 
Democrats for office. When Congress decided upon its 
new plan of reconstruction, it was feared that the Presi- 
dent might remove many civil officers, either as a means 
of opposing Congress or of punishing men for not sup- 
porting him. To prevent this, Congress passed a bill 
providing that civil officers appointed with the advice 
and consent of the Senate, and not holding their posi- 
tions during a period fixed by law, should not be re- 
moved without the Senate's consent ; that a like consent 
should be obtained for the removal of any member of 

464 



SEWARD'S PART IN RECONSTRUCTION 

the Cabinet during the term of the President by whom 
he was appointed ; but that the President might sus- 
pend any official, when Congress was not in session, 
pending action by the Senate. Any violation of this 
act was pronounced " a high misdemeanor," punishable 
by fine and imprisonment. An amendment to the army 
appropriation bill sought to deprive the President of the 
command of the army by providing that orders should 
issue through the general of the army, who should not 
be removed without the consent of the Senate. These 
were direct and unwarrantable attacks upon the con- 
stitutional prerogatives of the executive branch of the 
government. 

The tenure-of -office bill was returned with another in- 
effectual veto, which argued the constitutional as well 
as the practical political question with great force and 
clearness. James G. Blaine believed that Seward's 
" hand was evident in every paragraph." l Any one fa- 
miliar with Seward's speeches and writings will surely 
see that the temper, several of the ideas, and many of 
the phrases and words of this paper very distinctly sug- 
gest the style peculiar to the Secretary of State. No 
wholly conclusive evidence has been found to show that 
he wrote either this or any other veto message ; but the 
fact that William M. Evarts, Seward's intimate friend 
and Johnson's counsel in the impeachment trial, offered 
to prove in that trial, but was not permitted to do so, 
that the preparation of this veto was given over to Sew- 
ard and Stanton, 8 leaves very little room for doubt. 

The impeachment of Johnson had been discussed al- 
most continually since the autumn of 1866. Improba- 
bility of success had been the greatest obstacle to at- 
tempting it. One of the virtues that the tenure-of-office 

1 2 Blaine's Twenty Tears of Congress, 273. 

2 Evarts's language is quoted 2 Blaine, 369. 
ii.~ 2 G 465 



THE^LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

act was expected to possess was that any violation of it 
would make impeachment easy. Stanton was the only 
Cabinet-officer that was entirely out of sympathy with 
Johnson's aims. In August, 1867, the President sus- 
pended him and appointed General Grant Secretary of 
War ad interim. After Congress met and the Senate 
refused to approve the President's act, Stanton resumed 
possession of his office. In February, 1868, he was 
again removed, and General Lorenzo Thomas was ap- 
pointed Secretary ad interim. Thereupon preparations 
for impeachment proceedings were begun. After a trial 
lasting more than three months Johnson was acquitted. 
If one of the several Republican Senators that voted 
with the Democrats had cast a partisan vote, Benjamin 
F. Wade would have succeeded Johnson. Seward looked 
upon this attempt to get rid of the President as a meas- 
ure that was likely to endanger constitutional govern- 
ment. 1 Within a few years the opinion became gen- 
eral that Johnson's acquittal was very fortunate. 

When the presidential campaign of 1868 opened most 
of the ten states had recovered their former status in 
the Union, and the Republican platform pronounced the 
success of the congressional plan to be assured. " The 
guaranty by Congress of equal suffrage to all loyal men 
at the South was demanded by every consideration of 
public safety, of gratitude, and of justice, and must be 
maintained; while the question of suffrage in all the loy- 
al states properly belongs to the people of those states," 
said the same authority. General Grant was chosen 
as the party candidate for the presidency, and Schuyler 
Colfax, one of the leaders at the Capitol, was given the 
second place on the ticket. On the other hand, the 
Democratic platform called interference with suffrage 
in the states " a flagrant usurpation of power," and it 

1 3 Seward, 376. 
466 



SEWARD'S PART IN RECONSTRUCTION 

regarded "the reconstruction acts (so-called) of Con- 
gress, as such, as usurpations and unconstitutional, revo- 
lutionary, and void." While one platform charged John- 
son with treachery, usurpations, and abuses, the other 
said that he was "entitled to the gratitude of the whole 
American people." The Democratic candidates were 
Horatio Seymour, who had not been an enthusiastic sup- 
porter of the late war, and Frank P. Blair, a brave Fed- 
eral soldier, who had recently said in a letter that there 
was " but one way to restore the government and the 
Constitution," and that was for the President-elect to 
declare the acts of reconstruction " null and void, com- 
pel the army to undo its usurpations at the South, dis- 
perse the carpet-bag state governments, allow the white 
people to reorganize their own governments, and elect 
Senators and Representatives." ' 

These circumstances were somewhat embarrassing for 
Seward, who approved Johnson's policy ; but he had no 
more sympathy with the revolutionary tendencies of the 
Democrats than with the recent revolutionary acts of 
the Republicans. In a political speech to his friends 
and neighbors in Auburn, on the eve of the election, he 
explained his position in the present and in the past. 
As to reconstruction he said : 

"I simply say that as I stood firmly by the wise and 
magnanimous policy of President Lincoln in his life, so I 
have adhered to the same policy since his mortal remains 
were committed to an untimely grave, and I have adhered 
with equal fidelity to his constitutional successor. 

"When the civil war came to an end, no wise man sup- 
posed that the transition could be abruptly made from a 
state of civil war to a condition of tranquillity and peace 
without occasional disturbance to be produced by incon- 
siderate individuals, and even by unlawful combinations 
of disappointed and excited men. ... I have habitually 
thought that all needful political wisdom in regard to that 

1 McPherson, 381. 

467 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

crisis was contained in the Scriptural injunction, ' agree 
with your adversary quickly/ and that this injunction, 
which is true in regard to all adversaries, is especially 
true when your adversaries are estranged brethren." ' 

He now preferred to support the Republicans, al- 
though they had committed some grievous mistakes. 
" Nevertheless, the Republican party neither rests un- 
der any suspicion of its devotion to human freedom, 
nor can it fall under any such suspicion." 2 The Demo- 
cratic party had "not so conducted itself in its corpo- 
rate and responsible action as to secure the entire confi- 
dence of a loyal and exacting people in its unconditional 
and uncompromising adherence to the Union, or in its 
acceptance and approval of the effective abolition of 
slavery." He appreciated the patriotism and heroism 
of many of the Democrats, but the party as a whole 
had not freed itself from the errors and shortcomings 
of its leaders during the war, and therefore it was not 
yet prepared "to assume the responsibilities of a res- 
cued and regenerated nation." 3 

The overwhelming Republican victory, which gave 
Grant two hundred and fourteen electoral votes as 
against eighty for Seymour, put an end to all hope of 
undoing what had been accomplished by the congres- 
sional plan. 

Considering that Seward had no special l^esponsibility 
in regard to President Johnson's acts, he has been too 
severely judged for his part in reconstruction. If Lin- 
coln had lived he and Seward would probably have de- 
veloped their plans gradually and tentatively. As in the 
contest with the abolitionists about a proclamation of 
emancipation, it is likely that Lincoln w T ould have found 
a way to yield some of his preferences while he kept 

1 5 Works, 550. s 5 Works, 553. 3 5 Works, 553, 554. 

468 



SEWARD'S PART IN RECONSTRUCTION 

general control. But Johnson's pugnacity, prejudices, 
and violent language alienated sober-minded men. Con- 
trary to what is frequently supposed, there was not so 
close a mutual sympathy between Johnson and Seward 
as there had been between Lincoln and Seward. They 
had common interests, and felt a common antipathy to 
most of the aims of Sumner and Thaddeus Stevens ; but 
while Johnson despised these radical leaders, Seward 
usually got on pleasantly with them, and even enlisted 
them in the championship of one or more of his enter- 
prises. The presidential policy in its origin and first 
steps was largely due to Seward, but as prosecuted and 
quarreled about, it was almost wholly Johnson's. At 
times Seward's support was merely perfunctory. He 
philosophized mildly, and continued loyal to his chief ; 
but he did not study or try to master the conflicting 
forces as he had done in 1860-61. His conduct proved, 
as he said in 1844, that he loved peace and harmony 
with his fellow -men. As will soon be seen, his ambi- 
tion, strength, and best thoughts were devoted to sev- 
eral questions in foreign relations. 



CHAPTER XLII 

ASPIRATIONS FOR TERRITORIAL EXPANSION : THE PURCHASE 
OF ALASKA j ATTEMPTS TO ANNEX ST. THOMAS, ST. JOHN, 
SANTO DOMINGO, AND HAWAII 

Seward was a very conspicuous prophet of territo- 
rial expansion. His lively imagination and enthusiasm, 
which were easily stirred by mere magnitude, his belief 
in vast national enterprises, his fondness for optimistic 
speculation, and his understanding of certain currents 
and traits of civilization in this hemisphere — all tended 
to lead him into predictions of the future influence and 
extent of the United States. Public sentiment at the 
North, as has been noticed, forbade him to favor any 
acquisition that would relatively increase the political 
power of the South. But he felt confident that the 
United States were to exercise the paramount influence 
on this continent and in and beyond the Pacific, not 
only by example, but also by actual governmental con- 
trol and incorporation. 

In a political letter written in 1846, he said : " Our 
population is destined to roll its resistless waves to the 
icy barriers of the North, and to encounter oriental civili- 
zation on the shores of the Pacific." ' During the debate 
about the compromise of 1850, he spoke of " the strifes 
yet to come over ice-bound regions beyond the St. Law- 
rence and sun-burnt plains beneath the tropics." 2 In a 
eulogy of Henry Clay, in 1852, he expressed this opinion: 

1 3 Works, 409. 5 1 Works, 109. 

470 



TERRITORIAL EXPANSION 

" Expansion seems to be regulated, not by any difficul- 
ties of resistance, but by the moderation which results 
from our own internal constitution. No one knows how 
rapidly that restraint may give way. . . . Even prudence 
will soon be required to decide whether distant regions, 
east and west, shall come under our own protection, or 
be left to aggrandize a rapidly spreading and hostile 
domain of despotism." ' At St. Paul, in 1860, he had 
this vision : 

" Standing here and looking far off into the northwest. I 
see the Russian as he busily occupies himself in establish- 
ing seaports and towns and fortifications, on the verge of 
this continent, as the outposts of St. Petersburg, and I can 
say, ' Go on and build up your outposts all along the coast, 
up even to the Arctic Ocean — they will yet become the 
outposts of my own country — monuments of the civilization 
of the United States in the northwest.' So I look off on 
Prince Rupert's Land and Canada, and see there an in- 
genious, enterprising, and ambitious people occupied with 
bridging rivers and constructing canals, railroads, and tele- 
graphs to organize and preserve great British provinces 
north of the great lakes, the St. Lawrence, and around the 
shores of Hudson bay, and I am able to say, 'It is very 
well ; you are building excellent states to be hereafter ad- 
mitted into the American Union.' I can look southwest 
and see amid all the convulsions that are breaking the 
Spanish-American republics, and in their rapid decay and 
dissolution, the preparatory stage for their reorganization 
in free, equal, and self-governing members of the United 
States of America." 8 

At the same time he remarked that in casting about " for 
the future the ultimate central seat of power of the 
North American people," he had concluded, after look- 
ing at Quebec, New Orleans, Washington, San Francisco, 
Cincinnati, and St. Louis, that it " would yet be found in 
the valley of Mexico ; that the glories of the Aztec capi- 
tal would be renewed, and that city would become ulti- 

1 3 Works, 109. 2 4 Works, 333. 

471 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

mately the capital of the United States of America." 1 
Persons not in sympathy with his prophecies had main- 
tained that he was in favor of adding at least a part of 
China to the national domain. That this did him no in- 
justice he himself made evident, in 1861, when he wrote 
to Cassius M. Clay: "Russia and the United States may 
remain good friends until, each having made a circuit of 
half the globe in opposite directions, they shall meet and 
greet each other in regions where civilization first be- 
gan, and where, after so many ages, it has become now 
lethargic and helpless." 2 

Probably to suit some temporary purpose, he also 
prophesied that Canada would not be annexed. After 
he returned from Labrador, in 1857, he wrote a letter, 
which was printed in the Evening Journal, saying that 
his previous opinion about the future of Canada was 
dropped " as a national conceit." 

" I find them jealous of the United States and of Great 
Britain, as they ought to be ; and, therefore, when I look 
at their resources and extent, I know that they will be 
neither conquered by the former nor permanently held by 
the latter. They will be independent as they are already 
self -maintaining. Having happily escaped the curse of 
slavery, they will never submit themselves to the dominion 
of slave-holders, which prevails in, and determines the 
character of, the United States." . . . "All southern politi- 
cal stars must set, though many times they rise again with 
diminished splendor. But those which illumine the pole 
remain forever shining, forever increasing in splendor." 

On several occasions, both before and after this time, he 
expressed confidence that the United States were to be 
the only power on this continent. Naturally, therefore, 

1 4 Works, 331, 332. This was one of bis favorite political dreams, 
and he often spoke of it in private. In 1868 he thought it would come 
about in thirty years.— 4 Pierce's Sumner, 328. 

2 Dip. Cor., 1861, 293. For other opinions favorable to expansion, 
etc., see ante, p. 151, and 4 Works, 311, 312, 399. 

472 



TERRITORIAL EXPANSION 

this counter-prophecy of 1857 was soon forgotten — for- 
gotten even by its author, until during the Trent excite- 
ment it Avas brought to mind and used to refute the 
charges that Seward had shown an aggressive spirit 
against Great Britain by advocating the annexation of 
Canada. 1 

In all Seward's dreams of territorial expansion was 
the expectation that they were to be realized by peace- 
ful means, such as the quiet spread of population and 
the growth of commerce. 2 Although his opinion may 
have been affected by political considerations in relation 
to the Mexican War, then impending, he wrote, in 1846 : 
"I want no war. I want no enlargement of territory, 
sooner than it would come if we were content with ' a 
masterly inactivity.' I abhor war, as I detest slavery. 
I would not give one human life for all the continent 
that remains to be annexed^* Nor would he hasten 
the annexation of Mexico. Fear of the increased influ- 
ence of slavery resulting from incorporating tropical 
states led him to study out strong objections. As the 
inhabitants of Mexico could not govern themselves, he 
asked if they were to be governed by pro-consular pow- 
er or by being admitted as equals. Pro-consuls must 
always be supported by armies, he said ; and if the Mex- 
ican provinces became states of the Union, there was 
a serious question whether they would govern or be 
governed. 4 

The "Thoughts" of April 1, 1861, seem not to have 
been affected by any purpose to extend the boundaries 

1 Neither the long letter (reprinted in the Philadelphia Press of 
January 8, 1862) nor the despatch of the same date to Adams, quoting 
and explaining it, is published or referred to in Seward's Works, or the 
Diplomatic Correspondence, or Baker's, F. W. Seward's, or Lothrop's 
biography. 

"■ See ante, p. 68. 3 3 Works, 409. 

4 8 Works, 655. Somewhat similar expressions are used in the eu- 
logy on John Quincy Adams, 3 Works, 75, 76. 

473 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

of the United States. But if the vast war contemplated 
had destroyed monarchical influences on this continent, 
the United States would probably have been left at the 
head of a great confederation. That Seward was ready 
to give a practical expression to his aspirations for terri- 
torial expansion is proved by his instructions of June 3, 
1861, to Corwin, saying that the United States would 
purchase Lower California rather than let any part of 
it fall, either by purchase or conquest, into the hands of 
the Confederates. But as the Mexican government, like 
that of the United States, was barely able to sustain it- 
self, there was no time to think about voluntarily con- 
tracting boundary lines. 

The purchase of Alaska has often been called Seward's 
greatest service to his countr}'. A vast territory which 
Russia acquired by right of discovery and held for con- 
siderably more than a century, was sold to the United 
States before hardly a dozen Americans knew that such 
a proposition was even under consideration. There is a 
tradition that during Polk's administration something 
Avas said to Russia about parting with her possessions 
in North America. It is certain that as early as 1859 
Senator Gwin and the Assistant Secretary of State dis- 
cussed the question with Stoeckl, the Russian Minister 
at Washington, and that as much as five million dollars 
was offered. 1 The official answer was that this sum was 
not regarded as adequate, but that Russia would be 
ready to carry on negotiations as soon as the Minister 
of Finance could look into the question. There was no 
occasion for haste; Buchanan soon went out of office; 
and the subject, which was never known to many per- 
sons, seems to have been entirely forgotten for several 
years. 

1 Charles Sumner's speech on The Cession of Russian America, 8. 

474 



THE PURCHASE OF ALASKA 

The interests of a few citizens on the Pacific slope 
were the main-spring of the little that had been done. 
For more than a decade San Francisco had annually 
received a large amount of ice from Russian America, 1 
and United States fishermen had been profitably en- 
gaged in different parts of the far northern Pacific. 
Those interests had rapidly increased from year to year. 
At the beginning of 1866 the legislature of Washing- 
ton territory sent a petition to President Johnson, 
saying that an abundance of codfish, halibut, and sal- 
mon had been found along the shores of Russian 
America, and requesting him to obtain from the Rus- 
sian government such concessions as would enable 
American fishing vessels to visit the ports and harbors 
of that region for the purpose of obtaining fuel, water, 
and provisions. 2 Sumner says that this was referred to 
the Secretary of State, who suggested to Stoeckl that 
some comprehensive arrangement should be made to 
prevent any difficulties arising between the United States 
and Russia on account of the fisheries. About this time 
several Californians wished to obtain a franchise to carry 
on the fur-trade in Russian America. Senator Cole, of 
California, urged both Seward and Stoeckl to support the 
request. Seward instructed Cassius M. Clay, the United 
States Minister at St. Petersburg, to consult the Russian 
government on the subject. Clay reported in February, 
1867, that there was a prospect of success. In fact, 
the time happened to be peculiarly opportune for nego- 
tiation. 

Russian America had never been brought under the 
regular rule of the imperial government. Since the be- 
ginning of the century its few thousand civilized inhab- 
itants had been governed by a great monopoly called 

1 H. H. Bancroft's Alaska, 587. 
s Memorial quoted by Sumner, 9. 
475 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

the Russian- American Company. Its charter had ex- 
pired with the year 1861, and had not been renewed ; 
yet a renewal was expected. This monopoly was so 
unprofitable that it had sought and obtained special 
privileges, such as the free importation of tea into Rus- 
sia. It had even sublet some of its privileges to the 
Hudson Bay Company. This sublease to Englishmen 
was to expire in June, 1867. By the usual means of 
communication Russian America was from Russia one 
of the most distant regions on earth. To organize it 
as a colony would involve great expense and contin- 
uous financial loss. To defend it in time of war with 
Great Britain or the United States would be an im- 
possibilit}^. When the Crimean war broke out common 
interest led the Russian-American and the Hudson Bay 
companies to induce their respective governments to 
neutralize the Russian and the British possessions on 
the northwest coast of America. 1 Otherwise Great 
Britain might easily have seized the Russian territory. 
To the imperial government at the beginning of 1867 
the problem resolved itself into these three questions : 
Shall the charter of the monopoly, with its privileges 
and unsatisfactory treatment of the inhabitants, be re- 
newed? Shall an expensive colonial system be organ- 
ized ? Shall we sell at a fair price territory that will 
surely be lost, if it ever becomes populated and valua- 
ble ? It was foreseen that unless sold to the most con- 
stant and grateful of Russia's friends, it was likely to 
be taken by her strongest and most inveterate enemy. 
Stoeckl was spending part of the winter of 1866-67 in 
St. Petersburg, and the different questions were talked 
over with him, for he had long been Minister to the 
United States. In February, 1867, as he was about to 
return to Washington, " the Archduke Constantine, the 

1 Bancroft's Alaska, 570. 
476 



THE PURCHASE OF ALASKA 

brother and chief adviser of the Emperor, handed him a 
map with the lines in our treaty marked upon it, and 
told him he might treat for this cession." ' 

The following month Stoeckl and Seward began ne- 
gotiations. One named ten million dollars as a reason- 
able price; the other offered five millions. Then they 
took the middle ground — namely, seven million five 
hundred thousand — as a basis. Seward urg-ed and 
Stoeckl agreed that the half million should be dropped. 
The Russian-American Company still claimed privileges 
and held interests that could not be ignored. Seward 
saw the objections to assuming any responsibility for 
matters of this kind ; so he offered to add two hundred 
thousand dollars to the seven millions if Russia would 
give a title free from all liabilities. On the evening of 
March 29, 1867, the Russian Minister called at Seward's 
house and informed him of the receipt of a cablegram 
reporting the Emperor's consent to the proposition, 
and then he added that he would be ready to take up 
the final work the next day, for haste was desirable. 
With a smile of satisfaction at the news, Seward pushed 
aside the table where he had been enjoying his usual 
evening game of whist, and said: "Why wait till to- 
morrow, Mr. Stoeckl ? Let us make the treaty to-night." 
The needed clerks were summoned ; the Assistant Sec- 
retary went after Sumner, the chairman of the Senate 
committee on foreign affairs ; the Russian Minister 
sent for his assistants ; and at midnight all met at the 
Department of State. By four o'clock in the morning 
the task was completed. In a few hours the President 
sent the treaty to the Senate. As only Sumner knew 
of what had taken place, it was supposed that the mes- 
sage announced was a veto of some recent bill. 2 

1 Sumner, 9. 

2 Most of the statements in this paragraph are based on 3 Seward, 
347-49. 

477 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

On questions of foreign policy Sumner had great in- 
fluence in the Senate at this time. He made a thorough 
study of the resources of Alaska, and championed the 
treaty with persistency and a very impressive array of 
facts; yet he was no enthusiast for expansion. 1 As the 
proposition of cession came from Russia, and at a time 
when the United States were in financial difficulties on 
account of the expenditures of the Civil War, it was 
made the object of much ridicule. Many persons as- 
sumed that the territory was a frozen region where there 
was but little animal or vegetable life, and that its in- 
habitants, excepting a few Russians, were Esquimaux, 
and its chief products polar-bears and glaciers. It was 
often spoken of as Walrussia. The area of the cession 
is five hundred and seventy-seven thousand three hun- 
dred and ninety square miles. Even if valueless except 
for furs and fisheries, there could be no great loss at 
the price agreed on. As the population, aside from the 
aborigines, numbered only about ten thousand, 2 and as 
no foreign complications were to be feared, there were 
no grounds for weighty political objections. However, 
there would have been no likelihood of ratifying the 
treaty if only the supposed desirability of the terri- 
tory had been involved. The important fact was that 
Russia wished to sell. Both the government and the 
people of the United States still entertained feelings of 
gratitude toward her. She refused Napoleon's propo- 
sition of intervention in 1862, and about a year later 

1 "But there is one other point on which I file my caveat. This 
treaty must not be a precedent for a system of indiscriminate and 
costly annexation. . . . But I cannot disguise my anxiety that every 
stage in our predestined future shall be by natural processes without 
war, and I would add even without purchase. There is no territorial 
aggrandizement which is worth the price of blood. . . . Our triumph 
should be by growth and organic expansion in obedience to ' pre-estab- 
lished harmony,' recoguizing always the will of those who are to be- 
come our fellow-citizens."— Sumner, 16. 2 Sumner, 24. 

478 



THE PURCHASE OF ALASKA 

she sent her fleet to New York and Washington, where 
there were great demonstrations of friendship between 
the two governments. It was widely believed — though 
without the slightest authority — that this fleet was to 
help the United States in case of war with France or 
Great Britain. Only two Senators voted against the 
treaty. Katifications were exchanged and the treaty 
was proclaimed June 20, 1S6T. Doubtless to make it 
practically impossible for the House to refuse to ap- 
propriate the money, commissioners were appointed by 
each government within a few weeks, and the actual 
transfer occurred October 11, 1867, accompanied by mili- 
tary salutes between the Russian and the United States 
troops. At this time the name Alaska — which Sew- 
ard had chosen from the many that had been suggested 
— came officially into use. 1 "When the House took up 
the question of voting the appropriation, much ill-feel- 
ing was expressed on account of the speed and secrecy 
with which the treaty had been negotiated. Jealousy 
of the power of the Senate and hatred of the admin- 
istration were also influential. But the desire not to 
exhibit any lack of appreciation of Russia's friendship 
prevailed with many members, and the bill was passed 
by a vote of one hundred and thirteen to forty-three. 2 

During the Civil War most of the inhabitants of the 
British, the Spanish, and the French West Indies sym- 
pathized with the Confederacy. Confederate cruisers 
usually received a welcome in those islands, and the 
local governors connived at almost everything that did 
not convict them of a flagrant violation of neutrality. 
On the other hand, Federal warships were treated with 
cold formality, watched, and denied coal and repairs 
whenever a plausible excuse could be found. In the 



3 Seward, 369. 2 Globe, 1867-68, 4055. 

479 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

Danish West Indies just the reverse was the case. The 
governor of the island of St. Thomas was so friendly 
that United States men-of-war could openly or secretly 
obtain special favors. 1 However, Lincoln's administra- 
tion continually felt the inconvenience of not having 
in the West Indies a ship-yard and a fortified harbor, 
where prizes could be passed on, so as to save long and 
expensive journeys. 

Not only was Denmark the power most likely to con- 
sent to part with one or more of her West Indian pos- 
sessions, but her island of St. Thomas was regarded as 
especially well suited to the purposes in view. It is 
about twelve miles long and three miles wide, and at 
that time contained a population of thirteen thou- 
sand inhabitants, most of whom spoke English. 2 The 

1 James Parton. The Danish Islands, 6. 

2 Subsequently, Vice- Admiral David D. Porter gave this opinion : 
" St. Thomas lies right in the track of all the vessels from Europe, 
Brazil, East Indies, and the Pacific Ocean bound to the West India 
islands or to the United States. ... It is a central point from which 
any or all of the West India islands can be assailed, while it is imper- 
vious to attack from landing parties, and can be fortified to any ex- 
tent. ... St. Thomas is a small Gibraltar of itself, and could only be 
attacked by a naval force." — Parton, 63. Ex- Assistant Secretary of 
the Navy Fox pronounced the harbor " one of the best in the West 
Indies, admirable for naval purposes, and fully equal to all the require- 
ments of the commerce of those seas." — Parton, 71. The correctness 
of these opinions was disputed later. 

Parton wrote a good account of the attempt to acquire two of 
the Danish islands. He was emplo} T ed by the Danish representative 
at Washington, who supplied him with confidential documents (4 
Pierce's Sumner, 619), and with memoranda of interviews with Sew- 
ard at different times. His inferences and pleas are sometimes ex 
parte, but his statements and use of the records were commended even 
by opponents. The sketch by Miss Olive Risley Seward (2 Scribner's 
Magazine, new series, 585 ff.), the reply by Sumner's biographer (4 
Pierce, 615 ff.), and the letters by "Dixon" (reprinted from the Boston 
Advertiser of several dates in January, 1869), and by Robert J. Walker 
(reprinted from the Washington Chronicle of January 28, 1868), are 
much less complete and valuable than Parton's pamphlet. 

480 



ATTEMPT TO ANNEX ST. THOMAS, ETC. 

island of St. John, much less desirable, has about 
the same area, but a very small population. Santa 
Cruz, the other important island of that group, has 
a population and an area of about twice those of St. 
Thomas. 

In January, 1865, Seward first suggested to the 
Danish Minister at Washington, General Raasloff, that 
the United States wished to purchase these islands. 
The proposition was not received with favor by the 
Danish government, mainly for the reason that the 
Prussian amputation of Schles wig- Holstein had weak- 
ened and humiliated the Danes so that they were eager 
to avoid any further appearance of a decline of national 
prestige. So the question was laid aside until near the 
end of 1865. Meantime a new Danish Ministry had 
come into power, and it concluded that a large sum of 
money might be more beneficial to the interests of the 
nation than the possession of the islands. 

When this was reported to Seward he was about to 
leave in a United States man-of-war, the De Soto, for a 
month's cruise in the West Indies. The party con- 
sisted of the Secretary, the Assistant Secretary, Mrs. F. 
W. Seward, and her sister. Avowedly the purpose of 
the trip was to benefit the health of Seward and his 
son, neither of whom had recovered from the effects of 
the murderous assault in the previous April. Notwith- 
standing the question of health, and Seward's earnest 
desire not to let the public or foreign nations know 
of his communications with Denmark, it was widely 
believed that he was thinking of acquisitions in the 
tropics. Doubtless the use of a government ship for a 
family outing strengthened this belief. The De Soto 
made straight for the harbor of St. Thomas. Seward 
passed three busy days there, meeting everybody and 
seeing everything of interest. Then a short time was 
spent on the island of Santa Cruz. In returning the 
ii.— 2 h 481 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

travelers stopped at Santo Domingo city. Seward held 
a conference with the swarthy members of the revolu- 
tionary government, which was anxious to be recog- 
nized by the United States. The vessel next touched 
at Port-au-Prince, where the President and Cabinet of 
a still blacker republic received Seward with a display 
and formality that bore no resemblance to "republican 
simplicity." From Hayti the De Soto proceeded to Ha- 
vana. The party were generously entertained by the 
Captain-General of Cuba. Notwithstanding Seward's 
physical condition, he was constantly active as a sight- 
seer and as a recipient of hospitalities. In fact, at all 
the ports visited he was treated very much like a state 
guest. Before the end of January, 1866, he was again 
in Washington. 1 

The day following Seward's return home he had an 
interview with the Danish Minister about the proposed 
cession, and the question was frequently spoken of dur- 
ing the next six months. Neither one wished to suggest 
a price. At length Raasloff expressed his personal opin- 
ion that twenty-five million dollars would be a reasona- 
ble sum, and " twenty millions would be the absolutely 
minimum price. 3 This was certainly complimentary to 
the supposed munificence, if not to the judgment, of the 
United States. On July 17, 1866, as KaaslofF was about 
to return to Denmark for the summer, Seward handed 
him a written offer of five million dollars for the three 
islands. 3 Nothing but great eagerness to bring about 
an agreement as soon as possible would have induced 
Seward to transfer the negotiations to Copenhagen. Yet 
no progress was made during the next ten months, al- 
though Seward repeatedly urged haste, caused Senator 
Doolittle to visit the Danish capital, and later to try to 

1 3 Seward, 302-19, and Oodey's Magazine, April-November, 1894, 
give particulars of this journey. * Parton, 13. 

3 Parton, 15, quotes the letter. 

482 



ATTEMPT TO ANNEX ST. THOMAS, ETC. 

enlist the aid of the Russian Chancellor, Prince Gortcha- 
koff. 1 In a note of March 17, 1S67, Seward also besought 
the Russian Minister at Washington to ask his govern^ 
ment to use its influence to persuade Denmark to consent 
to part with her West Indian islands. This was shortly 
after Russia had announced her desire to sell Alaska. 
Not until May 17, 18G7, would the Danish Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Count Frijs, give a definite answer to 
Seward's offer, which he declined. He was willing, how- 
ever, to sell the three islands for fifteen millions, or St. 
Thomas and St. John for ten millions. And in any case 
there should be no sale without the free and formal 
consent of the people of the islands concerned. Seward 
promptly offered seven and a half millions in gold for the 
three islands, but he objected to consulting the islanders; 
he was afraid that some influence might induce them to 
vote adversely. This proposition was also declined by 
Count Frijs. Then the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs 
said that the United States might have two of the islands 
for seven and a half millions, and the third for three 
and three-quarter millions, but the popular vote must 
be a precedent condition, because right in itself, and an 
established custom of Europe. 3 Thereupon the United 
States Minister broke off negotiations. In July, 1867, 
Seward telegraphed ordering the acceptance of Den- 
mark's offer for St. Thomas and St. John. Still Den- 
mark held fast to the demand for a popular vote. Sew- 
ard persisted in his objection until October, and then, 
finding that he must either yield or give up his hopes 
of acquisition, consented to the condition. A monarch 
would not sell his sovereignty over even distant subjects 
without their consent; Seward, avowedly a life-long 
democrat, endeavored to ignore their wishes. The 
treaty was signed in Copenhagen, October 21, 18G7. 

1 2 Scribtwr's Magazine, new series, 592. 2 Parton, 23, 26, 27. 

483 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

Next came the question of taking the vote of the inhab- 
itants of St. Thomas and of St. John. Seward appoint- 
ed the Reverend Doctor Hawley, of Auburn, to act as 
United States commissioner to help secure a favorable 
decision. St. Thomas had long been a free port, and its 
merchants supposed that this was the fountain of their 
prosperity. They asked that the United States tariff 
should not, for a considerable time at least, be extend- 
ed to their harbor. Then, in November, 1867, came a 
most destructive earthquake, followed by a huge wave, 
and, later, by a hurricane. Each caused much damage 
and alarm. The vote was postponed, and the commis- 
sioners hastened to Washington, hoping to obtain some 
assurance that the freedom of the port would not be 
disturbed. No such arrangement was practicable. The 
best that could be done was to impress the islanders 
with the advantages of becoming citizens of the Ameri- 
can Union, and to arouse their fears by saying that the 
United States were determined to have a military and 
naval station in the West Indies, and if not at St. Thomas, 
then at some place that would injure the prosperity of 
their port. So the Danish commissioner returned and 
made these representations.' 

The vote was taken early in January, 1S68. The 
voters formed in procession behind the United States 
flag and a band playing "Hail Columbia." In St. 
Thomas one thousand and thirty-nine ballots were cast 
in favor of annexation and only twenty-two against it. 
In St. John two hundred and five voted for the cession, 
and no one against it. 2 

1 Parton, 38. 

2 Parton, 39. Parton quotes one of the newspapers as saying : 
"The success of the blue [annexation] ticket relieves both con- 
tracting parties from an embarrassing position, since it would have 
been hard to tell how the treaty could have been finally ratified on 
either side in the absence of a successful plebiscitum — the only mod- 

484 



ATTEMPT TO ANNEX ST. THOMAS, ETC. 

The Danish Kigsdag ratified and the King signed the 
treaty at the end of January, 186S. But ratification by 
the United States Senate was never to be obtained. 
When Seward's aims first became known there was no 
appreciable opposition, for after a long period of disa- 
greeable domestic questions the country always relishes 
a change to foreign affairs. The purchase of Alaska 
both satisfied this impulse and brought out a free ex- 
pression of opinion on the part of the opponents of ex- 
pansion. On November 25, 1867, Washburn, of Wiscon- 
sin, introduced in the House a resolution declaring that 
" in the present financial condition of the country any 
further purchases of territory are inexpedient, and this 
House will hold itself under no obligation to vote money 
to pay for any such purchase." . . . After he explained 
that there was no intention to have this apply to Alaska, 1 
the resolution was adopted. Even if the preparation of 
impeachment proceedings against the President had not 
been uppermost in the minds of Congressmen, there 
would have been no likelihood of the completion of the 
bargain by the United States. The earthquake and the 
hurricane enabled the opposition to cover the enterprise 

crn method by which one people may now be incorporated with 
another, and at the same time exempt the contractors from the odi- 
um of having handed over their citizens or subjects as simply ma- 
terials for purchase and sale." 

1 "Mit, Speaker : I do not intend that resolution to apply to Wal- 
russia. . . . But it is rumored in the papers — whether it is true or 
not I cannot say — that the Secretary of State has been making an- 
other purchase without consulting any one, in the absence of any pub- 
lic sentiment requiring it, or of any demand from any quarter. I intend 
that that action shall be covered by the resolution. I intend to serve 
notice upon the kingdom of Denmark that this House will not pay for 
that purchase ; and I mean to serve notice upon the world that we will 
pay for no purchases that the Secretary of State, on Ills own motion, 
may see proper to make — that no purchase will be sanctioned that is 
not demanded by the public sentiment and the best interests of the 
country."— Cong. Globe, 1867, 793. 

485 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

with ridicule. The treaty had no champion among the 
members of the Senate committee on foreign affairs. 1 
It was due to Seward's skill and persistency that it even 
approached success, for there never was any considera- 
ble public sentiment in favor of the project. The Senate 
decided to lay the treaty on the table ; which, in this 
case, was regarded as equivalent to rejection, but as the 
method least likely to embarrass Raasloff, who had many 
friends among the Senators. 2 Johnson's term expired, 
and Hamilton Fish became Secretaiy of State before all 
hope for the treaty was abandoned. President Grant 
pronounced the undertaking "a scheme of Seward's," 
and would have nothing to do with it. 3 In 1870 the com- 
mittee on foreign affairs reported unanimously against 
ratification, and the Senate seems to have given a unan- 
imous acquiescence in that opinion. 4 

Seward would have been glad to perform as Secretary 
what he had prophesied as Senator. He often remarked 
that he wished to extend the Union up to the north pole 
and down to the tropics. 6 Unexpectedly Russia opened 
the way to the Arctic. Mindful of the law of proba- 
bilities, Seward was unwilling to limit to one or two 
enterprises his chances to make acquisitions of territory. 
In the winter of 1866-67 — that is, while reluctant Den- 
mark was still reflecting — a special appropriation for the 
secret service of the Department of State was obtain- 
ed, and the Assistant Secretary of State and Admiral 
Porter went to Santo Domingo authorized to inspect 
and make a treaty for the purchase of the gulf and 
peninsula of Saraana. At that time the Dominican gov- 
ernment was not ready for positive negotiations. 6 Near 
the end of 1S67 a favorable decision was reached and 



1 4 Pierce, 623. s 4 Pierce, 329. 3 .4 Pierce, 622. 

4 4 Pierce, 329, C24. 6 3 Seward, 372. ' 3 Seward, 344, 345. 

4S6 



ATTEMPT TO ANNEX SANTO DOMINGO, ETC. 

a commissioner was sent to "Washington to conclude the 
desired treaty. But no considerable progress was made 
with the project. 

Before Johnson's annual message of 1868 was sent 
to Congress, Seward undoubtedly saw that the attempt 
to acquire the Danish islands would fail. As annual 
messages are often largely made up from parts supplied 
by the different departments, and as Johnson was almost 
wholly engrossed in opposing and denouncing congres- 
sional reconstruction, whereas Seward was anxious to 
give prominence to foreign relations, some opinions 
about expansion expressed in Johnson's last annual mes- 
sage are particularly important. This message said 
that the President had been obliged to ask explana- 
tion and satisfaction for national injuries committed 
by the President of Hayti, and that the political and 
social conditions of the republics of Hayti and Santo 
Domingo were " very unsatisfactory and painful." 

" Comprehensive national policy would seem to sanction 
the acquisition and incorporation into our Federal Union 
of the several adjacent continental and insular communi- 
ties as speedily as it can be done peacefully, lawfully, and 
without any violation of national justice, faith, or honor. 
. . . Each one of them, when firmly established as an 
independent republic, or when incorporated into the United 
States, would be a new source of strength and power.". . . 
... "I am satisfied that the time has arrived when 
even so direct a proceeding as a proposition for an annex- 
ation of the two republics of the island of St. Domingo 
would not only receive the consent of the people interested, 
but would also give satisfaction to all other foreign nations." 

In reply to the objection that the political system of 
the United States could not be successfully applied be- 
yond this continent, the opinion was expressed that " with 
the increased facilities for intercommunication between 
all portions of the earth, the principles of free govern- 
ment, as embraced in our Constitution, if faithfully main- 

487 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

tained and carried out, would prove of sufficient strength 
and breadth to comprehend within their sphere and in- 
fluence the civilized nations of the world." 1 

During the autumn and winter of 1868-69 Santo 
Domingo indulged in another little civil war. On Jan- 
uary 29, 1869, Seward wrote to General Banks, chairman 
of the House committee on foreign affairs: "Within 
the present week, however, a reliable and confidential 
proposition comes from the Dominican republic, which 
proposes immediate annexation, waives all preliminary 
stipulations, and addresses itself simply to the discre- 
tion and friendship of the United States. An agent from 
Santo Domingo awaits the directions of the govern- 
ment." 2 In the hope of rushing this measure through, 
Orth, of Indiana, a vigorous leader, being undoubtedly 
inspired by Seward, introduced a joint resolution pro- 
viding for the admission of the territory of Santo Do- 
mingo, on the application of the people and government 
of that republic, into the Union as a territory of the 
United States, with a view to the ultimate establish- 
ment of a state government. 3 The resolution was not 
accompanied by a report setting forth the facts. The 
sole explanation in behalf of the proposition was made 
by Orth in these words : " Without wishing to debate 
this resolution, I desire to state that it has the approba- 

1 It was at least odd that such sentiments should closely follow 
this sentence: "It is, indeed, a question of grave consideration 
whether our recent and present example is not calculated to check 
the growth and expansion of free principles, and make those [West 
Indian] communities distrust, if not dread, a government which at 
will consigns to military domination states that are integral parts of 
our Federal Union, and, while ready to resist any attempts hy other 
nations to extend to this hemisphere the monarchical institutions of 
Europe, assumes to establish over a large portion of the people a rule 
more absolute, harsh, and tyrannical than any known to civilized 
powers." This was evidently from Johnson's pen. The sentences 
quoted above must have been inspired, and probably drafted, by 
Seward. a 3 Seward, 393. 3 Globe, 1868-69, 769. 

488 



ATTEMPT TO ANNEX SANTO DOMINGO, ETC. 

tion of a large majority of the committee on foreign 
affairs. I call for the previous question." This was a 
demand for an immediate vote on the measure. One 
member asked if the House was "to go it blind"; an- 
other said: "I would inquire if it is proposed to gag the 
House on so important a proposition as this ?" Orth 
insisted, and would allow neither substitute nor debate. 
But Holinan, of Indiana, moved to lay the resolution on 
the table. He was supported by a yea and nay vote of 
one hundred and ten to sixty-three, which brought the 
amazing scheme to a speedy end, as far as Johnson's 
administration was concerned. 

In 1867, when the reciprocity treaty with Hawaii 
was under consideration, Seward instructed the repre- 
sentative of the United States that if reciprocity and 
annexation should come into conflict with each other, 
" annexation is in every case to be preferred." ' By the 
summer of 1S68 he realized that there was then hardly 
any possibility of making those islands a part of the 
United States, for " public attention sensibly continues 
to be fastened upon the domestic questions which have 
grown out of our late civil war. The public mind 
refuses to dismiss these questions, even so far as to 
entertain the higher, but more remote, questions of 
national extension." 2 It was enough to try the soul of 
an optimist to think that a nation, after four years of 
destructive and costly civil war, should let such subjects 
as reconstruction, " economy and retrenchment," be 
" the prevailing considerations." 

Even before this time Seward's keen insight had 
marked the unwisdom of the great majority in Con- 
gress and among the people, and he described it in these 
words : " In short, we have already come to value dol- 

1 3 Seward, 373. J 3 Seward, 333. 

489 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

lars more and dominion less/' ' Nothing short of thirty 
years of humdrum tranquillity, prosperity, and intellec- 
tual growth would be adequate punishment for a republic 
so lacking in appreciation of things " higher but more re- 
mote " as to think that the incorporation of " the several 
adjacent continental and insular communities" was of 
less importance than close attention to the obligations 
incurred in saving the Union and to reorganizing what 
the war had left. 

The annexation of territory, the inhabitants of which 
have come into close relations and sympathy with the 
United States, cannot be very dangerous if effected in 
compliance with a sober public opinion. But Seward's 
practice bore no resemblance to such a course. He be- 
gan, in January, 1865, by searching for a harbor in the 
West Indies, but he was extremely anxious to keep the 
subject a secret. He did not wish to consult either his 
countrymen or the persons whose nationality he strove 
to change ; and when the treaty had to go before the 
Senate its advocates declared that the thing was done, 
and that it would be a wrong to the other power con- 
cerned to fail to ratify what had already been solemnly 
agreed to. But the sentiments expressed in the annual 
message of 1868 and the efforts to acquire Santo Do- 
mingo — which also meant the early annexation of 
Hayti by purchase, conquest, or intrigue — showed that 
he was an expansionist for the sake of expansion, and 
believed in rushing through the necessary legislation, 
while the messenger of a disordered and ignorant little 
nation waited for a definite answer. 4 Many indignantly 

1 3 Seward, 369. 

2 In some instructions on another subject he said that "this govern- 
ment must, nevertheless, conduct its proceedings in all negotiations 
with proper deference and respect to the state of opinion which pre- 
vails in the Senate, in Congress, and among the people of the United 
States."— 1 Dip. Cor., 1868. 355. 

490 



ATTEMPT TO ANNEX SANTO DOMINGO, ETC. 

protested against both Seward's aims and his methods. 
They said that he was constantly trying to do what there 
was no public demand for; that it was extremely un- 
pleasant to think that any morning the country might 
find that during the night the Secretary of State had 
bought several million persons to be fellow -citizens 
and provided work for forty or fifty thousand soldiers. 
Seward's zeal for making acquisitions was doubtless in- 
creased by a desire to be involved as little as possible in 
the disagreeable features of the problem of reconstruc- 
tion, and to have aims that should be known as distinctly 
his own. Although he met with only partial success, he 
deserves, indeed, to be regarded as the greatest prophet 
and leader among expansionists. 



CHAPTER XLIII 

I. NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT THE ALABAMA CLAIMS. — II. SOME 
TRAITS AS SECRETARY OF STATE 

I. NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT THE ALABAMA CLAIMS 

Claims against Great Britain for the destruction of 
American merchantmen by the Alabama and other cruis- 
ers were duly presented by the United States Minister as 
they arose. 1 This was very unpleasant to Earl Eussell. 
In September, 1863, he insisted that because the Alaba- 
ma had not been actually fitted out in a British port as 
a war-vessel, there was nothing to warrant such claims. 
"I have only, in conclusion, to express my hope that you 
may not be instructed again to put forward claims which 
her Majesty's government cannot admit to be founded 
on any grounds of law or justice." 2 To this Seward 
responded that "the United States do insist, and must 
continue to insist, that the British government is justly 
responsible for the damages which the peaceful, law- 
abiding citizens of the United States sustain by the dep- 
redations of the Alabama." Still, he said, there was no 
intention "to act dogmatically or in a litigious spirit"; 
and he admitted that the time was not favorable for 
a candid examination of either the facts or the prin- 
ciples involved. If the British government should 
decline to receive the evidence on which the claims 



1 See ante, 385, 383. 9 1 Dip. Cor., 1863, 380. 

492 



NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT ALABAMA CLAIMS 

were based, then a record should be kept for future 
use. 1 

"When war ended, the " Alabama claims," resulting 
from actual losses amounting to many millions of dol- 
lars, were still unrecognized. Adams reported, Septem- 
ber 7, 1S65, that Russell then seemed less fearful of 
being suspected of good-will toward the United States; 
and the British Secretary himself soon suggested the ap- 
pointment of a joint commission to which should be 
referred "all claims arising during the late civil war, 
which the two powers shall agree to refer." But he 
expressly said that there could be no arbitration of the 
question whether his government had honestly adhered 
to its neutrality proclamation, or whether the law offi- 
cers had properly understood the foreign enlistment 
act, or whether there should be reparation "for the 
captures made by the Alabama." 3 As this was hardly 
as much as a short first- step in the right direction, it 
was promptly declined by Seward. 3 He was determined 
to obtain more. Early in 186G he informed Adams that 
both the Cabinet and the people of the United States 
expected Great Britain to redress the wrongs of which 
these claims were a result. A little later he said : " I 
see now no reason for apprehending that we shall at 
any time or under any circumstances be willing to ne- 
gotiate for future contingencies without having first due 
regard paid to past injuries and damages."* As the 
Secretary informed the British Minister at Washington 
of this opinion, it was a very important indication of 
strained relations between the two powers. In July, 
1866, the Plouse of Representatives unanimously passed 
a bill designed to remove the prohibition against selling 
ships and munitions of war to foreign citizens or govern- 



1 1 Dip. Cor., 1863, 395, 396. s 1 Dip. Cor., 1865, 545. 

3 1 Dip. Cor., 1865, 630. 4 1 Dip. Cor., 1866, 66, 74. 

493 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

merits at peace with the United States, and thus to en- 
able American citizens to take a profitable revenge 
for the devastations of the Alabama the first time Great 
Britain should become involved in hostilities. 

The Fenian movement, which was an attempt to es- 
tablish an independent republic in Ireland, tried to in- 
crease and use for its own ends the resentment Amer- 
icans felt against the British government. For several 
years a large number of Irish -Americans had taken a 
zealous interest in this cause. Conventions had been 
held in several American cities, and in the autumn of 
1865 a general convention in New York elected a so- 
called president of the would-be republic, and he ap- 
pointed heads of departments of war, navy, and finance. 
From the United States these " Irish patriots " sent 
emissaries to England and Ireland to give active sup- 
port to the revolution. After a few thousand Fenians 
had invaded Canada, in June, 1866, the arms and muni- 
tions of war that the brotherhood had collected and left 
behind were seized, the United States garrisons on the 
frontier were strengthened, and President Johnson is- 
sued a proclamation against the enterprise. Many Irish- 
Americans were arrested in Ireland, on suspicion that 
they were stirring up sedition and perhaps inciting oth- 
ers to commit treasonable acts. They were treated as if 
they were subjects of Great Britain and not as American 
citizens, for Great Britain had never recognized the right 
of expatriation. As the writ of habeas corpus had been 
suspended in Ireland, Adams was soon very busy mak- 
ing representations in behalf of his indiscreet and unfort- 
unate fellow-citizens. 

In August, 1SGG, Seward sent to Adams a long list 
of Alabama claims. He said that it was the Presi- 
dent's desire that the attention of Lord Stanley, Earl 
Russell's successor, should be called to them " in a re- 
spectful but earnest manner," and that he should be in- 

494 



NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT ALABAMA CLAIMS 

formed of the President's opinion that a settlement of 
them had " become urgently necessary to a re-estab- 
lishment of entirely friendly relations" between the 
two governments.' If Great Britain had claims against 
the United States this government would be disposed 
to take them into consideration so as to remove by one 
comprehensive arrangement ail existing causes of mis- 
understanding. Then he again referred to the precipi- 
tancy and unfriendliness of Great Britain's recognition 
of the Confederates as belligerents, and charged that 
" the misconduct of the aggressors [against United 
States commerce, etc.] was a direct and legitimate fruit 
of the premature and injurious proclamation of bellig- 
erenc}', against which we had protested, and that the 
failure of her Majesty's government to prevent or coun- 
teract the aggressions of British subjects was equally 
traceable to the same unfortunate cause." In lanffuajre 
almost threatening, he said that when one state showed 
a disregard of international obligations so injurious to 
the citizens of another state as to awaken a general 
spirit of discontent and dissatisfaction, they were likely 
" to conform their own principles and policy, in con- 
ducting their intercourse with the offending state, to 
that of the party from whom the injury proceeds." 2 
And he added, emphatically : " Thus we have seen rui- 
nous British warlike expeditions against the United 
States practically allowed and tolerated by her Maj- 
esty's government, notwithstanding remonstrance ; and 
we have seen similar unlawful attempts in this country 
against Great Britain disallowed and defeated by the 
direct and unprompted action of the government of the 
United States." 

Lord Stanley's reply showed that Seward's state- 
ments were too sweeping. In defence of what Seward 

1 1 Dip Cor., 1866, 173. * 1 Dip. Cor., 1S66, 179. 

405 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

regarded as the original fountain of the evil — Great 
Britain's proclamation of neutrality — Stanley said that 
the Supreme Court of the United States and the Court 
of the District of Columbia held that a state of war 
existed prior to that proclamation. While his govern- 
ment could not consent to arbitrate the question as to 
whether the Confederates were prematurely recognized 
as belligerents, there would probably be no objection to 
arbitrating the other questions at issue between the two 
governments in reference to the war. 1 

On January 12, 1867, Seward made a long rejoinder, 
which was very ambitious and ardent, but inconclusive 
in respect to his main contention about the recognition 
of belligerency. With characteristic persistency, he said 
that in case of arbitration the United States would ex- 
pect this question to be considered along with the claims, 
although there was no disposition to require that any 
question of national pride or honor should be ruled and 
determined as such. 

Another year passed without progress in regard to 
the claims. Meantime it had become apparent in Eng- 
land that other differences were increasing the ill-will 
of the United States. At the beginning of 18G8 Seward 
called Adams's attention to several questions of great 
importance: a divided occupation of the island of San 
Juan, in the Pacific; Great Britain's treatment of Irish- 
Americans ; the extradition of criminals ; and the fish- 
eries in the North Atlantic waters. 

" Any one of these questions may at any moment be- 
come a subject of exciting controversy. The naturaliza- 
tion question is already working in that way. 

" It was in view of all these existing sources of contro- 
versy that the thought occurred to me that her Majesty's 
government, if desirous to lay a broad foundation for 

1 IJDip. Cor., 1867, 184-88. 
496 



NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT ALABAMA CLAIMS 

friendly and satisfactory relations, might possibly think it 
expedient to suggest a conference, in which all the matters 
referred to might be considered together, and so a compre- 
hensive settlement might be attempted without exciting 
the sensibilities which are understood to have caused that 
government to insist upon a limited arbitration in the case 
of the Alabama claims." ' 



Before anything important was accomplished in the 
line of Seward's suggestions, Adams's resignation took 
effect, in May, 1S68. 3 Throughout seven 3'ears he had 
maintained with great zeal and efficiency the most diffi- 
cult and responsible foreign position under the govern- 
ment. His long notes to Russell were thorough and for- 
cible. They contained no bombast, no phrase written 
for display. His sterling character was reflected in his 
straightforward, fearless, and well-balanced arguments, 
and his correspondence left "no deficiency to be sup- 
plied," as Seward said. 8 He also perfectly understood 
his antagonist, Earl Russell, knowing when to make a 
sharp reply, when an elaborate statement, and when to 
yield to his opponent's temper. Of course he had an 
advantage over both Russell and Seward, for he could 
and did give his entire time and energy to a few ques- 
tions; and he treated them in so masterly a way that 
there has never been any difference of opinion as to the 
greatness of his talents or his service. 

Reverdy Johnson, a distinguished lawyer and ex- 
Senator from Maryland, became Adams's successor. 

1 1 Dip. Cor., 1868, 142. 

2 He had asked permission to resign in 1864, but the administration 
would not assent to it. In a personal note of November 27, 1867, to 
Seward, he requested a reconsideration of the question, for private mat- 
ters demanded his attention, and his time had been occupied by re- 
claiming Irishmen from punishment, which most of them seemed to 
him richly to deserve, and entering into discussion about the clothes 
he must wear at Court. — Seward MSS. 

3 1 Dip. Cor., 1866, 177. 
n.— 2 1 497 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

Seward instructed 1 him to obtain from Great Britain 
a recognition of the same rights for naturalized as for 
native-born citizens of the United States ; to say to Lord 
Stanley that until this difficulty should be overcome it 
would be useless to try to settle any others; and that 
the United States were willing to refer to arbitration 
the question of national dominion and ownership over 
the island of San Juan. After providing for the solution 
of these problems, he should " advert to the subject of 
mutual claims of citizens and subjects of the two coun- 
tries against the government of each other respectively." 
He thought that an arrangement might be made with- 
out reviewing the former discussions, and he suggested 
a commission, on the model of the joint commission of 
February 8, 1853, for the adjustment of all claims of the 
citizens of either country against the government of 
the other. After Johnson and Lord Stanley had signed 
protocols touching the questions of naturalization and 
of the San Juan boundary, they agreed to a claims con- 
vention. This was unsatisfactory to Seward, and, under 
his close instructions, Johnson then concluded with Lord 
Clarendon, Stanley's successor, what is known as the 
Johnson-Clarendon convention of January 14, 1869. 

It provided for the settlement of all claims arising 
since July 20, 1S53. The President and the Queen were 
each to name two commissioners, and these in turn were 
to select an arbiter to whom should be referred for final 
judgment any claim that the commissioners might not 
be able to decide. If they could not agree on an arbiter, 
then each side should designate a person, and the arbiter 
should be chosen by lot from these two. If any 'two or 
more of the commissioners should desire a sovereign or 
the head of a f riendly state to act as final umpire in any 
case, then the two governments should agree on one 

1 1 Dip. Cor., 1863, 328-331. 
498 



NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT ALABAMA CLAIMS 

within six months. It was thought that an award from 
such an umpire might be more readily accepted by the 
people and have more weight as precedent in questions 
referring to neutral rights. All the official correspond- 
ence in regard to any claim was to be laid before the com- 
missioners, and other documents and statements were 
to be admissible. By this means the old arguments about 
the recognition of belligerency would come up in review. 
The question of the ratification of this convention by 
the United States was almost wholly political or per- 
sonal. The Fenian movement had increased the strong 
public sentiment in favor of either waiting for an oppor- 
tunity to retaliate in the kind of "neutrality" Great 
Britain had practised or making that government pay 
smart- money. The feeling against the President had 
reached the point of spite against the administration, and 
Seward was the object of bitter antagonism, because it 
was believed that but for his influence, and that of his 
political friends, the impeachment trial might have suc- 
ceeded. When Reverdy Johnson went abroad the public 
knew nothing of his instructions or of the improved dis- 
position of the British government. Therefore, when he 
made very friendly speeches in England, he was sup- 
posed to have fallen under the influence of former sym- 
pathizers with the Confederacy. This caused much in- 
dignation ; and, as Seward wrote, party spirit raged, and 
the Republicans expected and hoped that the new Min- 
ister would both fail in his negotiations and suffer hu- 
miliation for having lowered the national' standard, as 
was alleged. 1 Now that Grant was President-elect, the 
Republicans were not disposed to put the seal of success 
upon negotiations that had been carried on by Johnson's 
well-hated administration. Perhaps the most effective 



1 Seward to Reverdy Johnson, October 26, 1868, quoted in Moore's 
International Arbitrations, 500. 

499 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM II. SEWARD 

complaint was the one that said the convention over- 
looked the moral wrong, did not even refer to the Ala- 
bama claims by name, and made the whole question a 
matter of mere dollars and cents. But any objection 
was good enough if it helped to defeat the convention. 
This was accomplished by a vote of forty -four to one. 

It was a hard blow to Seward. Although he fore- 
saw that Reverdy Johnson's negotiations would encoun- 
ter much hostile criticism, he predicted success. The 
possibility of having to choose an arbiter by lot in 
case of disagreement was likely to bring about deci- 
sions inconsistent with one another, for the American 
appointee would decide some questions and the British 
appointee others. Probably he chose the convention 
of 1853 as a model because he hoped that, as it had 
already been approved, it would be less open to ob- 
jections than any new plan. After having warded off 
direct European intervention, it was a worthy ambition 
to desire to settle the claims resulting from what was 
popularly known as Great Britain's indirect interven- 
tion. Although he failed, and although the terms of the 
treaty of Washington, concluded under other auspices a 
few years later, were better adapted to solve the differ- 
ent problems, he did much toward bringing about a more 
friendly feeling between the two countries, and accom- 
plished all that was possible, considering the adverse in- 
fluences he had to contend with. 



H. SOME TRAITS AS SECRETARY OF STATE 

Seward's personal appearance had undergone slight 
change since he entered the Senate, save for the injuries 
he received in April, 1865. His face Avas a little thin- 
ner, and this made more conspicuous his noticeable 
features — a strong aquiline nose, a wide and shapely 
mouth, and large, thin ears. His shock of hair was now 

500 



SOME TRAITS AS SECRETARY OF STATE 

"silvery and fine" — "snow-white" it seemed to some 
— but it never quite lost its auburn tinge. The head, 
with its beetling brows, appeared too heavy for the 
slender neck and slight bod} 7 , and projected over the 
chest in an argumentative sort of way, as if the keen 
eyes — " lively with humor of some kind twinkling about 
them" — were seeking an adversary. Professor Dicey 
saw him early in 1S62 sitting in his office " dressed in 
black, with his waistcoat half unbuttoned, one leg over 
the side of his arm-chair, and a cigar between his lips," 
looking like "a shrewd, well-to-do attorney, waiting to 
learn a new client's story." Seward's frankness and 
bonhomie at once put the Englishman at his ease. 1 In 
Seward's face and manner there was slight indication of 
his intellectual power and activity: he was almost as 
plain and homely as Lincoln, but lacked the President's 
impressive height. 

Seward cannot be defended from the charge of Syd- 
ney Smith against Lord Melbourne : " I accuse our 
Minister of honesty and diligence." During the entire 
period of the war he kept long office -hours, and fre- 
quently devoted Sunday to the important and exacting 
work of drafting despatches. Foreign mails often came 
at the end of the week, and required immediate answers. 
Saturday was consumed in reading the reports from 
United States Ministers. On Sunday he could meditate 
in quiet on the dangers abroad, and prepare further in- 
structions, which on Monday were laid before the Presi- 
dent. After the carriage accident, Seward's right arm 
remained so stiff that it was very difficult for him to 
write and for the reader to decipher what was written. 
Thus dictation became necessary, though at first it was 
hard for him to express his thoughts satisfactorily by 
this method. While dictating he often walked to and 



1 1 Dicey's Federal States, 230. 
501 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

fro, puffing his inevitable cigar, his hands behind his 
back, and his eyes fixed on the floor. He progressed 
slowly, making many changes as he proceeded. The 
first draft was read to him by the stenographer, and 
improved as much as possible, or discarded and redic- 
tated. The first copy was made on alternate lines, and 
subjected to a careful criticism as to words, phrases, 
ideas, and general style, just as a painstaking author 
would labor over an ambitious description. 

In the following comments on Seward's diplomatic 
papers there is no intention to modif}^ opinions already 
expressed, but only to notice some minor qualities that 
gave the color of the politician to much that he wrote. 

Seward was so enthusiastic, and his skill in expression 
so great, that his despatches were spirited, fresh, and 
popular. The style was more often that of a political 
pamphlet or a public speech than that of a diplomatic 
document. This was due not to lack of familiarity 
with the usages of diplomacy, but rather to his habit- 
ual desire to influence the popular audience, which he 
as a leader had ever in mind. Many of his despatches 
were promptly given to the press, and all of them, ex- 
cept those containing important secrets or objectionable 
comment, were printed annually in the Diplomatic Cor- 
respondence, the publication of which Seward began in 
1861. "When he wrote to such men as Adams and Day- 
ton and Bigelow about the mission of the United States 
in the world's progress, and informed them that this or 
that occurrence was natural and inevitable in times of 
civil war and popular excitement, he was addressing the 
reading public at home. It is inconsistent with Sew- 
ard's intelligence that he expected to impress Russell or 
Thouvenel by didactic magniloquence. " But," says Jus- 
tin McCarthy, in writing of the Trent affair, "Mr. Sew- 
ard always was a terribly eloquent despatch-writer, and 

502 



SOME TRAITS AS SECRETARY OF STATE 

he could not, we may suppose, forego the opportunity 
of issuing a dissertation." 1 Undoubtedly Seward did 
too much thinking in ink; and a "spendthrift verbosity" 

1 Here is part of a passage taken from a despatcli to Adams : 
" For what was this continent brought up, as it were, from the 
depths of what before had been known as ' the dark and stormy 
ocean' ? Did the European states which found and occupied it, al- 
most without effort, then understand its real destiny and purposes ? 
Have they ever yet fully understood and accepted them? Has any- 
thing but disappointment upon disappointment, and disaster upon 
disaster, resulted from their misapprehensions? After near four 
hundred years of such disappointments and disasters is the way of 
Providence in regard to America still so mysterious that it cannot be 
understood and confessed? Columbus, it was said, had given a new 
world to the kingdoms of Castile and Leon. What has become of the 
sovereignty of Spain in America? Richelieu occupied and fortified a 
large portion of the continent, extending from the Gulf of Mexico to 
the Straits of Belleisle. Does France yet retain that important ap- 
pendage to the crown of her sovereign ? Great Britain acquired a 
dominion here surpassing, by an hundred-fold in length and breadth, 
the native realm. Has not a large portion of it been already formal- 
ly resigned ? To whom have these vast dominions, with those found- 
ed by the Portuguese, the Dutch, and the Swedes, been resigned but 
to American nations, the growth of European colonists, and exiles 
who have come hither bringing with them the arls, the civilization, 
and the virtues of Europe? Has not the change been beneficial to so- 
ciety on this continent? Has it not been more beneficial even to 
Europe itself than continued European domination, if it had been pos- 
sible, could have been ? The American nations which have grown up 
here have been free and self-governing." — Dip. Cor., 1862, 167. 

His first instructions to Reverdy Johnson — a profound lawyer and 
a man of learning and ideas— began as follows : 

"Sir, — It is a truism that commercial and industrial interests con- 
tinually exert a powerful influence in favor of peace and friendship 
between the government and people of the United States and Great 
Britain. Intimate consanguinity, together with a nearly entire com- 
munity of language and a very considerable community of political 
and religious principles, ideas, aud sentiments, work in the same di- 
rection. On all occasions when the moral sentiment of mankind is 
moved in favor of national regeneration or other political reform in 
any part of the world, a very cordial sympathy and regard to such ad- 
vances in civilization is found to exist between the two countries. 
This mutual, friendly disposition between the two nations manifests 

503 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

called "the nightmare of foreign ministeries " ' was 
sometimes the result. 

Yet Seward's democratic method of carrying on for- 
eign relations from the public square had its advantages. 
The English custom by which a Cabinet-Minister can 
address the country in a political speech to his con- 
stituents or from the floor of Parliament was not open 
to Seward. His influence upon his generation was 
due to the fact that he never failed to consider the 
probable popular effect of what he said or wrote. If 
his aim had been merely to please the people and to gain 
their favor, it would have been demagogical ; but when 
he, like Gladstone, sometimes wheedled them, or played 
to the gallery, it was either as a means of retaining 
power or of gaining the support necessary to enable him 

itself more strongly now than at any former period." — 1 Dip. Cor., 
1868, 328. For other examples, see Dip. Cor., 1861, 183, 196-201; Dip. 
Car., 1862, 352-53 ; 1 Dip. Cor., 1863, 325-28. 

1 Lowell's Political Essays, 293. "More than any Minister with 
whose official correspondence we are acquainted, he carried the prin- 
ciple of paper money into diplomacy, and bewildered Earl Russell 
and M. Drouyn de Lhuys with a horrible doubt as to the real value 
of the verbal curreucy they were obliged to receive." — Ibid. 

James E. Harvey reported that he had attended the ceremony of 
laying the corner-stone of a monument to Camoens, "the great poet 
of Portugal." It was no more worth noticing, beyond the formal ac- 
knowledgment of its receipt, than the "bright and benignant sky" 
of that day. Seward replied : 

" Sir, — Your despatch of June 29 [1862] has been received. 

" The erection of a monument in Lisbon to the memory of the im- 
mortal poet of Portugal was not merely an act of national justice and 
a proper manifestation of national pride. It illustrates the eclec- 
tic, conservative faculty of nations, by which they rescue and save 
whatever is great, good, useful, and humane from the wrecks of 
time, leaving what is worthless, vicious, or pernicious to pass into 
oblivion. 

"The incident seems doubtless the more pleasing to us because 
it occurs at this conjuncture, when we are engaged in combating, in 
its full development, a gigantic error which Portugal, in the age of 
Camoens, brought into this continent."— Dip. Cor., 1862, 584. 

504 



SOME TRAITS AS SECRETARY OF STATE 

to accomplish a worthy object : he could stoop to con- 
quer, but the conquest was usually such a one as only a 
superior leader would aspire to. There was in Seward's 
nature so much that was emotional and sentimental aside 
from what was subtle, and it was so common for him to 
seek to accomplish his purpose by indirect means, that 
it is often impossible to distinguish impulse from calcu- 
lation. The "Thoughts" of April 1st were a combi- 
nation of the two qualities. The draft of instructions 
of May 21, 1861, to Adams was mainly the product of 
excitement. Adams could be relied on not to repeat or 
read to Russell anything that seemed indiscreet ; and 
Seward's knowledge of this, after the first few months, 
gave him great latitude. "When the despatches to Adams 
were printed, they impressed the American people as if 
they were addressed to the British government. But 
Russell could take no exception to anything not com- 
municated to him or to the British Minister at Washing- 
ton. The general effect was beneficial ; it indicated to the 
Ministry that Seward was a very daring character, and 
would attempt to use any mistake they might make ; 
yet he had neither said nor done anything directly that 
they could properly resent. Seward's success in this 
regard was extremely irritating to the Confederate 
diplomatists. 1 

Confidence and a strong inclination to prophesy, or 
to explain at once whatever happened, were very con- 
spicuous with Seward during the war period ; and they 

1 " The most surprising infatuation of modern times is the thorough 
conviction entertained by the British Ministry that the United States 
are ready to declare war against England, and it is impossible not to 
admire the sagacity with which Mr. Seward penetrated into the secret 
feelings of the British Cabinet, and the success of his policy of intim- 
idation, which the world at large supposed would be met with prompt 
resentment, but which he, with deeper insight into the real policy of 
that Cabinet, foresaw would be followed by submissive acquiescence 
in his demands." — Benjamin to Slidell, June 22, 1863. 

505 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

caused many to doubt his sincerity. His opinions repre- 
sented hope rather than belief or sober judgment. As 
he often employed them for special purposes, he was not 
always particular about accuracy.' This was how it 
happened that he prophesied a war that he did not fore- 
see, as was said, and foretold many things that he did 
not expect to come to pass, such as the end of secession 
and of the war in sixty or ninety days. 2 Without firm 
belief that the Confederac}* - would soon be conquered, 
the foreign service could not be thoroughly efficient. 
But how were United States representatives abroad to 
be inspired with confidence unless the Secretary of State 
gave them the needed encouragement? As Hosea Big- 
low says : 

"So Mister Seward sticks a three-months' pin 
Where the wur'd oughto eeud, then tries agin." 

Seward's declarations that Johnson's plan of recon- 
struction must necessarily succeed illustrated the bold- 
ness of his prophecies ; and the strength of his optimism 
was shown in the way he bore his afflictions. Mrs. Sew- 
ard, who never recovered from the terrible shock caused 
by the murderous assault upon her husband and her sons 
Frederick and Augustus, died in June, 1865. And in 

1 In a despatch of May 28, 1862, to Adams, is the declaration that, 
although disloyalty had divided Maryland, and provoked conflict 
there, "The Union is now as strong in that state as in auy one of the 
always loyal states."— Dip. Cor., 1862, 103. 

2 "Great Britain has but to wait a few months and all her present 
inconveniences will cease with all our own troubles." — Seward, May 
21, 1861. Dip. Cor., 1861, 90. " You spoke the simple fact when you 
told him that the life of this insurrection is sustained by its hopes of 
recognition in Great Britain and in France. It would perish in ninety 
days if those hopes should cease."— Seward to Adams, November 30, 
1861. "I thought that the war might be ended in three months— in 
six months — in a year — and I labored to that end." — 5 Works, 486. 
"If Great Britain should revoke her decree conceding belligerent 
rights to the insurgents to-day, this civil strife, which is the cause of 

506 



SOME TRAITS AS SECRETARY OF STATE 

October, 1866, the Secretary's sorrow was greatly in- 
creased by the loss of his only daughter, to whom he 
had shown a touching devotion in his daily letters. His 
mental activity and the character of his work to his 
last day prove the power of his will and his cheerful 
serenity against the flood of personal misfortune and 
political isolation. 

Seward's habit of adapting his arguments to a pre- 
conceived conclusion, and his great tenacity of purpose 
in holding to his declarations, led to some very arbitrary 
reasoning in his diplomatic correspondence. It is often 
puzzling to decide whether he was conscious of it when 
he disregarded elementary principles of international 
law, or whether he supposed that by argument and in- 
sistency he could do away with principles and hoodwink 
his opponents. This trait was shown in the despatches 
about the declaration of Paris, the Trent affair, and sev- 
eral other questions, and it was conspicuous throughout 
his entire secretaryship in discussions concerning the 
warships and the belligerency of the Confederacy. He 
wrote officially on April 27, 1861, to Schurz, that an 
insurrection had developed itself, and had "assumed 
the organization and attitude of a separate political 
power"; that it had "instituted civil war"; that it had 
"an army of invasion directed against this capital, and 
a force of privateers incited to prey upon the national 
commerce, and ultimately, no doubt, upon the commerce 
of the world." ' And although the entire coast of the 



all the derangement of those relations [between the United States and 
Great Britain], and the onl\ r cause of all apprehended dangers of that 
kind, would end to-morrow."— Seward to Adams, March 6, 1862. Dip. 
Cor., 1862, 43. • For the evidence of some of his contemporaries in re- 
gard to such prophecies, see 4 Pierce's Sumner, 17; Welles's Lincoln 
and Seward, 41; 2 Coleman's Crittenden, 338; W. H. Russell's Diary, 71. 
1 Dip. Cor., 1861, 257. On May 4, 1861, he wrote to Dayton : "The 
United States have accepted this civil war as an inevitable necessity." 

507 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

Confederacy was declared to be blockaded, and the Fed- 
eral government was preparing to exercise the belliger- 
ent right of search, Seward complained bitterly when, 
a few weeks later, Great Britain recognized that a state 
of war existed. The United States treated the Confed- 
erates as belligerents, but Seward continued until he 
went out of office to call the sailors pirates or "gueril- 
las of the seas," ' and the soldiers insurgents or traitors. 
In July, 1861, he wrote to Dayton: "We do not ad- 
mit, and we never shall admit, even the fundamental 
statement you assume — namely, that Great Britain and 
France have recognized the insurgents as a belligerent 
party." a For some reason Seward thought that if 
McClellan had captured Richmond in the summer of 
18G2 the two great powers would have withdrawn the 
recognition of belligerency.* But subsequent events 
make it all but certain that this expectation would 
have been disappointed ,• for that recognition was not 
revoked until after Appomattox, and after the receipt 
of satisfactory evidence that the war-ships of the Uni- 
ted States would not continue the belligerent right of 
search. Likewise his efforts to link with the Alabama 
claims the question of recognizing the belligerency of 
the Confederacy was, of course, a total failure. Not- 
withstanding these facts, he wrote to Adams, on Jan- 
uary 12, 1867 : " Before the Queen's proclamation of neu- 
trality the disturbance in the United States was mere- 
ly a local insurrection. It wanted the name of war to 
enable it to be a civil war and to live, endowed as such 
with maritime and other belligerent rights. Without 

1 2 Dip. Cor., 1864, 227. 

■ See ante, p. 184. Not many months later, -when he began to urge 
both of these powers to withdraw that recognition, Dayton ingenu- 
ously inquired: " Besides, did you not refuse to take official notice of 
the fact that such concession ever was made ?" — Dip. Car., 1862, 334. 

* Dip. Cor., 1862, 181; 3 Seward, 88. 

508 



SOME TRAITS AS SECRETARY OF STATE 

that authorized name it might die, and was expected 
not to live and be a flagrant civil war, but to perish a 
mere insurrection." Seward never seemed to be much 
bothered by his own inconsistencies. 1 

A few weeks after becoming Secretary, Seward moved 
into a large house on the east side of Lafayette Square, 
on a site now occupied by a theatre. It was within two 
minutes' walk of the White House and of the old Depart- 
ment of State. The generous hospitality of Seward's 
senatorial years quickly expanded to suit his new position 
— in official society the most important one after that of 
the President. He soon gave a series of informal recep- 
tions, so that the members of the new regime, civil and 
military, might become acquainted with one another. He 
usually invited to dinner those of his callers during the 
day with whom he wished to have longer conversations 
than the busy office-hours would permit. He lived in 
excellent taste, spending money freely, but not extrav- 
agantly, considering the custom of his office. At times 
serious military disasters cast a gloom over life at the 
capital ; but Seward early saw that there was no bet- 
ter way to show his confidence of Federal success, and 
to inspire others with it, than to encourage social gay- 
eties. The rich "old families" were not in sympathy 
with the new administration, and as yet the city had not 
become a highly fashionable winter resort for wealthy 
Northerners and Westerners. So there were few enter- 

1 The fact that he had championed the Irish "patriots" in 1852 
(see Vol. I., 323 ff.) did not prevent him from seeing the impertinence 
of public men in Eugland when they suggested what punishment 
should be visited upon Jefferson Davis and the other Confederate 
chiefs. — 1 Dip. Car., 1865, 413. To Bigelow he wrote sarcastically, 
July 3, 1805 : "European politicians will take time to forget their in- 
terest in Jefferson Davis while they digest the proceedings of the gov- 
ernment against the assassins of Mr. Lincoln. Europe is impatient 
with us, but she must wait our time."— Bigelow MSS. 

509 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

tainments during the first two years of the war, except 
at the White House and at the residence of the Secre- 
tary of State. Beginning with the winter of 1863-6-i 
Washington became gayer than ever before. The regular 
state occasions at the Seward house were the formal 
dinners to the members of the Cabinet, to the Diplo- 
matic Corps, and to the Supreme Court. 1 Distinguished 
foreign visitors were sure to receive from the Secretary 
of State attentions that showed a happy combination of 
formality and cordiality. Prince Jerome Napoleon, the 
Prince de Joinville, the Comte de Paris, and the Due de 
Chartres, the officers of the Russian fleet, the Queen of 
Hawaii, a commission from Japan, some special envoys 
from China, and other famous personages, were given 
formal dinners or receptions, or both. Most men worthy 
to be Secretary of State would have been worried or bored 
by such obligations ; but Seward saw their sunny side, and 
found something enjoyable in them. Yet he was most 
happy and vivacious when he had about a dozen guests, 
sufficiently well acquainted and congenial to allow a 
general conversation. One Thursday in the summer of 
1863 Archbishop Hughes called on him, and was invited 
to dinner on the next evening. His Grace suggested 
that the day would not be a good one for banqueting. 
The Secretary answered, " Never mind ; I shall see that 
you will be provided for." Secretaries, generals, and 
others were present to meet the clerical guest, but there 
was not a particle of meat on the table. The Arch- 
bishop considered it the most delicate compliment he 
had ever received. 

As a talker Seward had very uncommon and attractive 
qualities. Whether with one, a few, or man}^ persons, 
he was persuasive, interesting, vivacious, or merry, ac- 
cording to his purpose. His talk was much oftener 

1 A contemporary account of one of these dinners says that there 
were seventeen courses and Ave kinds of wine. 

510 



SOME TRAITS AS SECRETARY OF STATE 

scintillating and surprising than solemn or profound ; 
for to hiui conversation was perhaps the greatest of his 
pleasures. The London Times correspondent described 
him as u a subtle, quick man, rejoicing in power, given 
to perorate and to oracular utterances, fond of badi- 
nage, bursting with the importance of state mysteries." 
Richard Henry Dana, Jr., after spending an evening 
alone with Seward, in April, 1S64, wrote: "His con- 
versation always interests me, although it is strange and 
not always dignified; still it is natural and peculiar.' 1 
Seward's public utterances were studiously discreet ; in 
private he frequently spoke with reckless freedom — 
sometimes in earnest, but often — oftener than his 
hearers imagined — in playful extravagance. Charles A. 
Dana once described 1 a dinner given by the Secretary to 
Goldwin Smith, who did the cause of the Union great 
service by his articles and speeches in England. At 
this dinner Seward advanced and maintained, with a 
solemn face, the proposition that a republican form of 
government was a failure. Some guests, taking Seward 
seriously, attacked his position with great vigor, and the 
debate continued until about eleven o'clock. Those un- 
acquainted with the Secretary's fondness for a paradox, 
or his love of an artificial encounter of this kind, were 
much surprised by the unrepublican opinions expressed 
by their host. 3 Ex-Senator John B. Henderson, who has 
probably seen more than any other man of the best 
side of politico -social life in "Washington during the 

1 In conversation with the author, August 19, 1894. 

3 Under date of December 7, 1894, Professor Smith wrote to the 
author : " Thirty year3 have now elapsed since I had the honor and 
pleasure of being Mr. Seward's guest. I do not recollect his intro- 
ducing the proposition that republican government was a failure. If 
he did, it must have been for the purpose of starting a debate, or in the 
way of playful paradox, an exercise of wit to which he was given. He 
would sometimes give utterance to a playful paradox or a startling 
proposition with an air of seriousness which might lead his hearers to 

511 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

past thirty-five years, said 1 that he never knew any 
one that could surpass Seward in ability to entertain 
a whole company of ladies and gentlemen at dinner; 
that, although Seward often monopolized the talk, he 
held his monopoly artfully, not tyrannically or pom- 
pously, like Benton or Conkling. The preserved bits of 
Seward's table-talk s during six months near the end of 
his life, although not brilliant, indicate that he kept 
his mind occupied with cheerful, interesting, and philo- 
sophical thoughts. He had also a keen sense of humor, 
which was increased by his close and almost daily asso- 
ciation with Lincoln. He told a story well, and join- 
ed heartily in the laughter that his narrative created. 
His wit was exceedingly bright at times, but his fond- 
ness for eccentric remarks was likely to misdirect it, and 
cause him to be entirely misunderstood, as has been no- 
ticed. Perhaps his best and most characteristic witti- 
cism was the reply to a lady who, noticing his silence 
during a discussion as to the probable purpose of a se- 
cret movement of troops, had asked : " Governor Sew- 
ard, what do you think about it? Which way is the 
army going?" "Madam, if I did not know, I would 
tell you," he answered, with a smile. 

Seward's rare social qualities were a distinct element 
in his success as Secretary. His ability to create and 
retain pleasant and even intimate relations with political 
and diplomatic opponents was of great value at many a 
critical moment. His good-humor and tact in all per- 

think that he was in earnest." [Professor Smith illustrates this point 
by recounting the Seward-Newcastle incident.] "In his social hours 
Seward spoke with great freedom on all subjects, and sometimes said 
what, had it been maliciously repeated, might have done harm. Fort- 
unately for him, in those days the rule of social confidence still pre- 
vailed, and a man could not have betrayed the hospitable board with- 
out forfeiting his position as a man of honor." 
1 In conversation with the author. 2 3 Seward, 470-504. 

512 



SOME TRAITS AS SECRETARY OF STATE 

sonal matters during his entire career were unfailing. 1 
The true Seward was vividly described by Dicey: 

" In our English phrase, Mr. Seward is good company. 
A good cigar, a good glass of wine, and a good story, even 
if it is taut soit peu risque, are pleasures which he obviously 
enjoys keenly. Still, a glance at that spare, hard -knit 
frame, and that clear, bright eye, shows you that no pleas- 
ure, however keenly appreciated, has been indulged in to 
excess throughout his long, laborious career ; and more 
than that, no one who has had the pleasure of seeing him 
amongst his own family can doubt about the kindliness of 
his disposition. It is equally impossible to talk much 
with him without perceiving that he is a man of remark- 
able ability ; he has read much, especially of modern liter- 
ature, travelled much, and seen much of the world of men, 
as well as of books." 2 

1 Charles A. Dana related to the author the following incident, 
which occurred some time after Seward retired from public life. 
Dana and Seward, in the accustomed room at the Astor House, were 
enjoying their reminiscences over a bottle of brandy when the card of 
Archbishop Hughes was brought up. Seward checked the conversa- 
tion, ordered the servant to remove the brandy and place a pitcher of 
ice-water in its stead ; then to his guest he said, "Dana, good-bye," 
and to the servant, " Let his Grace enter." 

2 1 Federal States, 230. 



CHAPTER XLIV 

TRAVELS AND SUNSET, 1869-72.— SOME CONCLUSIONS 

Seward resolved to employ in extensive travel the 
better part of the strength and time that were likely to 
be his after retirement, March 5, 1869. His friends were 
surprised, and politely hinted that he could not endure the 
fatigue of a long journey. Although physically a broken- 
down old man, who could not get on without a valet, he 
seemed to be as unwilling as ever to recognize that any- 
thing was impossible for him. Formerly, his trips had 
generally been undertaken to indulge a fancy or to sat- 
isfy a taste while escaping from the routine of politics 
or law. Kow, he wished to observe natural phenomena, 
to study questions, to see places and nations that had 
long been of great interest to him. Of course Alaska 
attracted his attention. Then, too, the Pacific Kailroad, 
an enterprise to the advancement of which he had given 
much time and thought, had just been completed. It 
passed through states and territories that he had never 
seen, although he was long their antislavery champion. 
To the south lay Mexico, barely recovered from the 
disorders wrought by European soldiers and the dreamy, 
unfortunate Maximilian. She had already invited Sew- 
ard to pay her a visit as the guest of the nation, for she 
knew who had done most to save her both from mur- 
derous assailants and from friends that would have come 
as allies, but might have remained as conquerors. Be- 
yond the Pacific were many peoples and civilizations 

514 



TRAVELS AND SUNSET, 1869-72 

and industries that had often occupied his thoughts and 
excited his curiosity. China and Japan regarded the 
government of the United States as very friendly ; and 
all but the most ignorant persons, even there, had heard 
of the civil war in the United States and of the Secre- 
tary of State that had so narrowly escaped death when 
Lincoln was assassinated. As was the case with Li 
Hung Chang, the attempt upon Seward's life had in- 
creased his fame abroad as perhaps nothing else could 
have done. 

Here were attractions enough to induce him to leave 
the quiet and comfort of home, and to risk all climates 
and to endure at times the roughest and most primitive 
means of travel. But probably there were other con- 
siderations. Notwithstanding his many successes and 
cheerful disposition, Seward was a very -much -disap- 
pointed man, although not a sad one. The years with 
Johnson were a period of great anxiety and dissatis- 
faction. Even most of the popularity won in Lincoln's 
administration had disappeared since 1865. It were 
strange if he had not often been reminded that a prophet 
is not without honor, save in his own country. The at- 
tentions that foreigners would surely bestow upon him 
would be pleasing evidence of his real fame and suc- 
cess in the world; and those attentions might help to 
bring his own countrymen to a fairer appreciation of 
his services. 1 Long absence from home and politics 
would at least give him new thoughts and pleasant ex- 
periences. 

The fountain of his optimism continued to flow. 

1 One of his earliest letters, written after returning to Auburn in 
March, 1869, said, significantly : " It is marvellous to see how popular 
it makes a man to retire from public life." Then a little later : " Sev- 
eral newspapers begin to relent and relax on foreign affairs, and signs 
of toleration of our own policy are becoming more frequent." — 3 Sew- 
ard, 401, 402. 

515 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

The furniture, books, and miscellanies collected in Wash- 
ington during twenty years' residence were transferred 
to the spacious and comfortable house in Auburn, and 
were soon arranged. " Mr. Lincoln's bust has gone to a 
place of honor in my library. We are well, and the 
robins are musically singing their greetings of the sea- 
son." So the spring slipped by. His mind was full of 
pleasant expectations instead of sad broodings over the 
past. 

The first long journey began in June, 1869. The 
party was composed of Seward and his negro valet, Mr. 
and Mrs. Frederick W. Seward, and Abijah Fitch, of 
Auburn. Beyond the Missouri river almost everything 
was new and strange. While enjoying all the comforts 
and luxuries of railway travel, they hastened across the 
plains, catching sight of many evidences of savage life 
— Indian camps, buffaloes and buffalo bones, antelopes, 
prairie-dogs, and jack- rabbits. Every phase of life 
seemed to please Seward. Salt Lake City was especially 
hospitable, and Brigham Young, who had once been a 
journeyman carpenter in Auburn, showed the travelers 
much attention and answered their inquiries with ap- 
parent frankness. After a halt of a few days at Sa- 
cramento, where they were entertained by the state 
officials, they proceeded to San Francisco. California 
regarded Seward as a great benefactor as well as a great 
man ; therefore, the citizens of San Francisco welcomed 
him Avith more cordiality and gratitude than they had 
ever before shown to any visitor. 

Hearing that Seward thought of going to Alaska, 
Ben Holliday put at his service a ship fully equipped 
for the trip. Some California friends were invited to 
join the original party, and the Active started about the 
middle of July to visit "Seward's Arctic Province." 
They stopped at Victoria, on Vancouver's Island, and 
then made a side-trip up Puget Sound to visit settle- 

516 



TRAVELS AND SUNSET, 1869-72 

merits in Washington territory. The voyage to Alaska 
was by the inland passage " through an archipelago of 
islands, straits, and sounds." By the end of July the 
Active reached Sitka, where a few days were spent in 
the study of the strange life of a Russian and Indian 
provincial settlement. 

Jefferson C. Davis was in command of the United 
States troops in Alaska. The Chilcat Indians, who 
lived a few days' journey by water farther north, had 
given these troops much trouble, but now desired peace. 
So it was decided that General Davis and staff should 
go with the travelers on the Active to visit these 
Indians. The strange notions of the savages afforded 
great amusement. 1 A scientific party from the United 
States was near by, prepared to observe the total 
eclipse of the sun. The tourists and many of the Ind- 
ians gathered about the scientists at the important hour. 
When the shadow began to pass over the sun the Ind- 
ians thought that it was caused by the instruments 
used by "the Boston men," as the astronomers were 
called. Some of the Chilcats became greatly alarmed by 
the darkness and fell on their knees and prayed. When 
the shadow passed off they were relieved and thought 
that " the Boston men " were more wonderful than ever. 
A little later the visitors were invited to meet the prin- 
cipal men of the Chilcat tribe. The Indians supposed 
that Seward was their " Great Tyee " (supreme ruler), 
and they appealed to him to decree that nine Sitka 
Indians should be killed to avenge the murder of three 
Chilcats of the chiefs family. When Seward learned 
that the Chilcats had been slain before Alaska was pur- 
chased, he thought it would suffice to tell the council 
that they ought to have appealed to the Emperor of 
Russia. They replied that they had done so in vain. 



1 3 Seward, 426 ff. 
517 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

Finally, they agreed to be satisfied if the Great Tyee 
should cause thirty-six blankets to be sent to them — 
reckoning four blankets as equivalent to each of the 
nine Sitka Indians demanded as a peace-offering. The 
blankets could easily be given from the United States 
supplies at Sitka. So General Davis authorized compli- 
ance with the request. To make the very practical joke 
thoroughly effective, the Indians were instructed to ap- 
point commissioners to proceed to Sitka to receive the 
blankets and to exchange tokens of friendship with their 
late enemies. The outcome pleased the savages as much 
as it amused the Americans. And the successful neffo- 
tiations were celebrated on board the Active by a ban- 
quet attended by the tourists, " the Boston men," and 
the Chilcats dressed in their gayest attire. 

When Seward returned to Sitka he was called upon 
to make a public address expressing his impressions 
of Alaska. 1 He was, of course, enthusiastic. " In the 
early mornings and in the late evenings peculiar to the 
season I have lost myself," he said, " in admiration of 
skies adorned with sapphire and gold as richly as those 
which are reflected by the Mediterranean." " The ther- 
mometer tells the whole case when it reports that the 
summer is colder and the winter is warmer in Alaska 
than in New York and Washington." He thought it 
would be impossible to exaggerate the marine treasures 
of the territory. He regarded the forests as hardly less 
wonderful and useful. " The elk and the deer are so 
plent} 7 as to be undervalued for food or skins, by natives 
as well as strangers. The bear of many families — 
black, grizzly, and cinnamon ; the mountain-sheep, ines- 
timable for his fleece ; the wolf, the fox, the beaver, the 
otter, the mink, the raccoon, the marten, the ermine ; 
the squirrel — gray, black, brown, and flying, are among 

1 5 Works, 559-69. 
518 



TRAVELS AND SUNSET, 1869-72 

the fur-bearing animals." He claimed that the explo- 
rations had already shown that Alaska possessed treas- 
ures in the baser ores equal to any other region of the 
continent. The scenery passed in his voyage seemed 
" like a varied and magnificent panorama," bordered 
with coast-range mountains rising to an exalted height 
and clothed with eternal snows and crystalline glaciers. 
Because other nations were exhausting their mines and 
forests, he believed that Alaska, British Columbia, Ore- 
gon, and "Washington were "destined to become a ship- 
yard for the supply of all nations." After all the ridi- 
cule of " Seward's polar regions," it was a ludicrous fact, 
which he did not fail to notice, that a California com- 
panj'- had found the climate about Sitka too mild to 
produce ice of sufficient thickness. This speech and 
later ones showed that he traveled with a keen eye and 
an inquiring mind. 1 

After returning to San Francisco the party took a 
steamer to the southern extremity of California. Mexi- 
co had renewed her invitation, and Seward decided to 
accept it. So he entered that country at Manzanillo, on 
the Gulf of California, early in October, 1869 ; and the 
party sailed from Vera Cruz, on the Gulf of Mexico, 
three months later. During this time Seward was the 
guest of the nation, and he received honors such as the 
Mexicans had never before bestowed upon any foreign- 
er — or perhaps, indeed, upon any person whatsoever. 
The demonstrations of popular enthusiasm and gratitude 
were not less than those for Lafayette when he returned 
to the United States in 1824. In fact, there were many 
points of similarity between the two incidents. Lafa- 
yette's services to the United States had been more 
picturesque, but Seward's to Mexico were more critical 

1 He spoke at Victoria of "The North Pacific Coast," and at Salem, 
Oregon, of " Our North Pacific States."— 5 Works, 569, 572. 

519 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

and decisive. During the visit Seward was constantly- 
accompanied by a special escort on behalf of the national 
government, and this was often increased by commit- 
tees from different state and local governments. Large 
numbers of cavalry attended him for long distances in 
his overland journey. The hamlets and cities through 
which he passed were decorated with flags and mot- 
toes, and the inhabitants thronged the streets and wel- 
comed him with shouts of praise and benediction. 1 
Wherever the party stopped for a day or more a fully 
equipped house was generally put at their disposition. 
His coming made a fete-day; and public receptions, 
banquets, balls, bull-fights, serenades, and parades were 
given in the spirit of Spanish hospitality and festivity. 
The National Academy of Sciences made him an hon- 
orary member, with the title of "Defender of the Liberty 
of the Americas," and he was presented with an original 
proclamation issued by Charles II. in 1676. Naturally 
the climax of display occurred in the City of Mexico, 
where President Juarez and the officials of the national 
government entertained him as lavishly as kings do their 
royal guests. 

Seward seems to have keenly enjoyed these many 
demonstrations of respect and affection. He had no 
special message to communicate, but at different times 
he expressed the hope that the United States and the 
Spanish-American republics might come into a closer 
moral reliance, " to the end that all external aggression 

1 As he passed through the little Indian village of Tecbaluta, where 
the people, being too poor to buy decorations for their houses, used 
such wearing apparel as bright-colored blankets and shawls and scarfs 
and ribbons. They greeted him, in Spanish, with "God bless you !" 
"Heaven protect you !" "A thousand thanks, sir !" and presented a 
scroll of paper addressed " To the great statesman of the great Re- 
public of the North — Techaluta is poor, but she is not ungrateful." — 
3 Seward , 446. 

520 



TRAVELS AND SUNSET, 1869-72 

may be prevented, and that internal peace, law and or- 
der, and progress may be secured throughout the whole 
continent." 

Early in 1870 he took passage from Mexico to Havana, 
and spent about a month in Cuba. When he reached 
Baltimore, late in February, many friends from Wash- 
ington, Philadelphia, and New York were there to greet 
him. During two weeks spent in New York city he 
found that much of his old-time popularity had revived. 
Deputations from different organizations called to ex- 
press their admiration and to congratulate him on his 
prosperous journey. 

The spring and most of the summer of 1870 were 
quietly passed in Auburn. Before June had elapsed he 
wrote of having " concerted a plan of travel, of a year 
or more, in Asiatic countries, not forgetting my favorite 
scheme of visiting South America." The South Amer- 
ican part was never to be realized, but the trip around 
the world began in August, 1870. Physically he was 
weaker than in the previous year, but to friends express- 
ing misgivings about his setting out again he replied, 
" Travel improves health instead of exhausting it." He 
was accompanied by his adopted daughter, Miss Olive 
Eisley Seward, her sister, Miss Risley, and two or three 
servants. 1 

Seward was the first famous American politician to 
make what might be called a public voyage around the 
world. Almost everywhere in the Orient he was treated 
with royal distinction, and he was looked upon by the 
rulers and the people as the greatest of living Americans. 
In Japan the Mikado showed him what was intended to 
be a great honor : he received Seward in a private lodge, 
instead of a public court, and for the first time com- 



1 William H. Seward's Travels Around the World, edited by Olive 
Risley Seward, gives the particulars of this trip. 

521 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

pletely unveiled himself to a visitor. In China, Seward 
was given interviews with Prince Kung, the regent who 
exercised political sovereignty,' and with the Chinese 
Cabinet. The manner in which he had treated both 
Japan and China caused him to be regarded as a special 
friend. Perhaps it was merely Oriental politeness, but 
the United States legation was informed that the Chi- 
nese Ministers of State had never before given a stranger 
so unrestrained a welcome. In a speech made at the 
American consulate at Hong-Kong, Seward expressed 
the belief that the regeneration of China was to be 
brought about by means of commerce, which would 
come across the American continent and the Pacific 
ocean. " The United States must send her steam- 
engines and agricultural implements, and bring away her 
coolies." ' 

The travelers went as far south as the island of Java. 
There they were the guests of the Governor-General, 
and were taken on a long excursion by stage into the 
interior, where they saw many strange phenomena both 
of nature and of civilization. At Calcutta the East 
India Railway Company furnished them with a special 
car for their use in that country. They made a long 
trip to the north of India, up to within sight of the Him- 
alayas. Perhaps the most weird and interesting expe- 
rience of their whole journey was at Putteeala, where 
the native prince of the province made a holiday display 
■which could hardly have been surpassed if his guest had 
been Queen Victoria. Seward entered the city in a state 
coach drawn by six white horses. The other members 
of his party mounted upon the backs of elephants, 
" richly caparisoned in cloth of gold and scarlet, all or- 
namented with gilt earrings and necklaces." A train 
of about sixty elephants and five hundred horsemen 

1 Travels, 278, 282. 
522 



TRAVELS AND SUNSET, 1869-72 

followed. Ten thousand troops were passed in review. 
The visitors were given a palace for their use, and on 
the following day they were entertained by Indian dis- 
plays and attentions of various kinds. About ten weeks 
were spent in India. 

The party sailed from Bombay to Suez, where the 
Khedive furnished them with a special train to Cairo. 
Later they were entertained by the Khedive at his 
palace and furnished with a steamer for a long excur- 
sion up the Nile. In Turkey they were everywhere 
treated as the guests of the Empire, and the Sultan 
received Seward. In Austria Count von Beust gave a 
public dinner in honor of the ex -Secretary of State. 
In Rome the Pope granted Seward an audience such as 
had formerly been accorded only to sovereigns and 
princes. 1 

The party found Paris in disorder and almost in ruins, 
as a result of the Franco-German war and of the more 
destructive work of the Commune. The public men of 
the new government were remarkably attentive to 
Seward, considering the time. Thiers, on the first day 
of his presidency of the French Republic, entertained 
the traveler. Drouyn de Lhuys, who had learned to fear 
Seward as an opponent in diplomacy, now met him with 
frankness and cordiality. Seward expressed regret that 
it was physically impossible for him to grasp and shake 
the hand held out to him. The Frenchman recalled the 
fact that in the days of their antagonism Seward had 
sent him some excellent cigars. 2 

Returning to the United States by way of Germany 
and England, Seward was again in Auburn the second 
week in October, 1871, after an absence of fourteen 
months. Once more a crowd of friends greeted him at 

1 Travels, 733. 

2 Godey's Magazine, March, 1894, pp. 262, 263. 

523 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

the station. In one paragraph of his brief speech to 
them he said : 

" My friends, we are met together, I trust, not to part 
again. I have had a long journey, which, in its inception, 
seemed to many to be eccentric, but I trust that all my 
neighbors and friends are now satisfied that it was reason- 
able. ... I found that at my age, and in my condition of 
health, 'rest was rust'; and nothing remained, to prevent 
rust, but to keep in motion. I selected the way that would 
do the least harm, give the least offence, enable me to ac- 
quire the most knowledge, and increase the power, if any 
remained, to do good." ' 

About this time it was apparent that Seward's day 
was near its close, and that the twilight would not be 
long. Paralysis had attacked his arms, so that they 
were, or soon became, quite useless. He could still 
walk, but even this power was to be lost in the near 
future. Hardly any decline in his intellectual faculties 
was perceptible. He continued to be cheerful and 
genial, and ambitious to accomplish something more. 
He received many invitations to make public addresses 
in different places, but compliance was impossible. The 
only activity he could endure was mental, and this must 
in the nature of the case be chiefly reminiscent. So he 
began an autobiography in October, 1871. The prog- 
ress made in the next eight or ten weeks, and the style 
and accuracy of what he dictated, show that his mind 
was still clear and vigorous. After covering the first 
thirty-three years of his life, he decided to lay aside the 
autobiography and to write an account of the trip around 
the world while his impressions were still vivid. Notes 
of the journey had been made from day to day by the 
aid of his adopted daughter ; and during the first eight 
months of 1872 the octavo volume of nearly eight hun- 



1 Travels, 778. 
524 



TRAVELS AND SUNSET, 1869-72 

clred pages was prepared for the press. It appeared the 
following year, and had so large a sale that it brought 
his estate over fifty thousand dollars. 1 

For the first time in half a century a presidential 
contest had but little interest for hirn. In that of 1372, 
one party was led by his old personal enemy, Greeley, 
and the other by President Grant, whose reconstruc- 
tion policy he had never approved of, although he had 
voted for Grant in 1S68 as a choice between two evils. 
If the plan to make Charles Francis Adams the presi- 
dential candidate of both the Liberal Kepublicans and 
of the Democrats had not miscarried, probably Seward 
would have favored his election. In the spring of 1872 
Seward said : " I have ceased to be a partisan ; and have 
no desire to surrender my independence, or impartial- 
it} 7 , to the dictates of any party that I now see around 
me." 2 Undoubtedly he would have preferred Grant to 
Greeley, but he had already voted for the last time. 

The summer of 1S72 was spent with his son and 
namesake, in the attractive cottage, " "Woodside," by 
Owasco lake, a few miles from Auburn. He daily 
found pleasure in an afternoon drive in sight of one 
of his " silvery lakes," where the setting sun sometimes 
gives hills and clouds and water the richest colors seen 
in Italy. His fondness for a rubber of whist in the 
evening continued long after he was able to handle the 
cards. He still welcomed old friends and had many a 
long and interesting conversation. 3 One who saw him 
about this time wrote : " His head and heart were un- 
changed, but the poor limbs were all stricken. . . . He 
could not take our hands, nor even nod his head ; but 

1 Derby's Fifty Tears Among Authors, Books, and Publishers, 84. 

2 3 Seward, 479. 

3 Charles K. Tuckerman gives an account of a visit made in July, 
1872, -when they sat on the veranda and talked and smoked until af teT 
midnight. — 1 Tuckerman's Memoirs, 122. 

525 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

when we turned for one more good-bye look, be was still 
smiling, and so I ever picture him." ' 

In the morning of October 10, 1872, he and his adopt- 
ed daughter were occupied as usual in literary work. 
Later, as he lay resting upon the lounge, breathing be- 
came very difficult, at first supposed to be due to a slight 
cold. When his physician told him that the end was at 
hand, he received it with a placid smile such as he had 
often given in years past, whether the news was good 
or ill. At four o'clock that afternoon he died peace- 
fully, surrounded by his family. 

The excellence and success of Seward's career were 
mainly due to his superior ideals and his skill in prac- 
tical politics. Both his natural radicalism and his polit- 
ical insight made him progressive; he knew that no one 
could prove mistakes about theories and plans for the 
future. This characteristic was the source of much of 
his popularity as well as the main-spring of some of his 
greatest miscalculations ; it led him to appeal to the na- 
tional treasury instead of solving the difficulties of state 
finances ; to seek relief in foreign wars rather than to 
deal directly with secession; to urge the consideration 
of questions of national expansion in place of trying to 
remedy social and political disorganization in the southern 
states. As chief of the opposition he was both adroit 
and daring; he made few mistakes, and usually brought 
about better results than probably any other contem- 
porary could have done. This was because he knew 
when to drop the theoretical for the practical ; he was 
master of all the usual weapons, and had no equal as a 
popular expounder of politico-antislavery doctrines. He 
had greater fertility than depth of thought, although he 
was often truly profound. He was pre-eminently a man 

1 63 Atlantic Monthly, 397. 
53G 



SOME CONCLUSIONS 

of theories and expedients, but he also had settled con- 
victions and sound judgment. The foremost aim of his 
life was to be supremely great both in his generation 
and in history. It is now agreed that he was strongly 
individual, very influential, fascinating, able, and re- 
sourceful ; but it was Lincoln that was thoroughly great. 

Personally Seward was most amiable. Devoted and 
tender in all domestic relations, he was an appreciative 
and faithful friend, generous and interesting as a host, 
affable to strangers, considerate with inferiors and even 
with political bores — across hundreds of whose letters 
he wrote, for the direction of his secretary, " Acknowl- 
edge kindly," or something similar. As Lincoln said, 
he was " a man without gall." With but two or three 
exceptions, the public and private records of his half- 
century of political activity contain no trace of malice 
toward contemporaries ; it was his life-long custom to 
avoid recording or even saying anything disparaging 
of either colleagues or opponents. How superior, in 
this respect, he was to Jefferson, Sumner, Chase, Stan- 
ton, and many others ! Hence it is not strange that he 
often had warm friends among his political enemies. 
Although he joined the Episcopal Church at the age of 
thirty-six, he was not what would be called a religious 
man ; he can best be described as a moral man of the 
world. The amusing story that Lincoln guessed a new 
acquaintance was an Episcopalian because he swore like 
Seward, is entirely plausible; yet Seward was not coarse, 
but quite the contrary. By education, association, and 
in the quality of his thoughts he was as conspicuously 
a gentleman as he was a man of brains. Although very 
calculating, he was also very human. 

The reason Seward has not been fully appreciated is 
found in the fact that the average person more easily 
grasps and retains what is simple and direct : brilliancy 
and power may stir admiration, but not affection ; an 



THE LIFE OF WILLIAM H. SEWARD 

intricate nature makes less appeal because less under- 
stood. Cromwell, Washington, Calhoun, and Grant 
hold their distinct places in popular regard ; Voltaire, 
Napoleon, and Gladstone, on account of the complexi- 
ties of their characters and their activities, have created 
much less than an adequate impression. Seward was an 
agitator, a politician, and a statesman, all in one. His 
irresistible impulse to pose and explain and appear all- 
wise and all-important earned for him a reputation for 
insincerity and egotism. A perfectly fair-minded con- 
temporary gave this answer to a question : " I did not 
regard Seward as exactly insincere ; we generally knew 
at what hole he would go in, but we never felt quite sure 
as to where he would come out." It is a paradox that 
precisely explains the paradoxical Seward. The variety 
of his resources weakened the impression and quality of 
his moral and intellectual strength. 

Notwithstanding his limitations, Seward stands in the 
front rank of political leaders, both on account of the 
talents he displayed and the services he rendered to 
his country. And he holds the first place among all 
our Secretaries of State. Sumner had a more thorough 
knowledge of international law ; Adams was by birth 
and education equipped for diplomacy ; Chase had a 
genius for managing national finances in a critical time. 
Stanton was the broad and tireless organizer of the phys- 
ical forces that saved the nation. Seward had dash, a 
knowledge of political conditions, and a versatility such 
as none of these men possessed, while his perfect tact 
and vigor of intellect, his enthusiasm and inspiring hope, 
made him the almost perfect supplement to Lincoln. The 
Secretary grew in diplomacy as the President grew in 
statesmanship. Although large numbers of Seward's 
earlier admirers deserted him, and criticism succeeded 
adulation when his ambition ceased to be partisan and 
personal, his conduct of the work of his office was rarely 

528 



SOME CONCLUSIONS 

assailed, and never successfully. With few exceptions, 
the bitter attacks so frequently made during his secre- 
taryship related to matters outside the sphere of the 
Department of State, and were largely inspired by re- 
sentment at his supposed influence over Lincoln or John- 
son. While Secretary he negotiated more than forty 
treaties or conventions ; and if the Johnson-Clarendon 
convention had been approved — and it was not his fault 
that it failed — he could have said that for eight years he 
had safely piloted the government past every great for- 
eign danger, and had left the United States in a much 
better condition in regard to all other nations than when 
he came into office. 



APPENDIX 



Garrison to Ross 

"Boston, August 25, 1875. 

" Dear Sir, — Your letter, in reply to mine, has just been 
received. 

" I beg to be understood. In recording in your book what 
John Brown is said to have uttered concerning the Northern 
abolitionists, I did not suppose that you endorsed his senti- 
ments, but published them rather to show how intensely con- 
centrated was his mind upon his own method of operations. 
Still, their absurdity and injustice are none the less obvious, 
and quite derogatory to his moral discernment; and as, out of 
regard to his memory, it would have been a friendly act not to 
have printed them, so it will be none the less friendly and judi- 
cious on your part to suppress them in the new edition of your 
work, as you intend doing. He will be better appreciated by 
the omission. 

"The truth is, John Brown was exactly fitted for the enter- 
prise he undertook to achieve. He believed in the method of 
Joshua rather than that of Jesus — in the sword of Gideon rath- 
er than the sword of the Spirit — in powder and ball rather than 
any moral instrumentalities; and he acted accordingly, being as 
willing to be led to the stake or the gallows as any martyr or 
patriot of other days ; acting all the while under the deepest relig- 
ious convictions. While in prison, awaiting his execution, he evi- 
dently had his spiritual vision somewhat purged ; for, writing to 
a Quaker lady in Rhode Island, he said : ' You know that Christ 

531 



APPENDIX 

once armed Peter [a mistake, for the occasion referred to incul- 
cates a very different lesson] ; so also I think in my case He put 
a sword into my hand, and there continued it as long as He 
saw best, and then kindly took it from me [a marked para- 
dox] ; I mean when I first went to Kansas. I wish you could 
know with what cheerfulness I am now wielding " the sword of 
the Spirit " on the right hand and on the left. I bless God that 
it proves " mighty to the pulling down of strongholds." ' Yes, 
his power over men's hearts, on both sides of the Atlantic, em- 
anated from his prison through the spirit he displayed and the 
grand words he wrote in his numerous letters. Had he been 
killed outright, with a musket in his hand, at Harper's Ferry, 
the world would have regarded him as simply or little better 
than insane. At the time, I said in the Liberator : ' By the 
logic of Concord, Lexington, and Bunker Hill, and by the prin- 
ciples enunciated by this nation in its Declaration of Indepen- 
dence, Captain Brown was a hero, to be justified in all that he 
aimed to achieve, however lacking in sound discretion.' I al- 
ways endeavored to deal tenderly and generously with him, 
though not in accord with his martial policy. 
" Very truly yours, 

" Wm. Lloyd Garrison. 
" Dr. A. M. Ross." —MS. 



B 

Moses H. Grinnell to Seward 

"New York, January 28, 1861. 
"My dear Gov., — The committee of twenty-five go on this 
morn'g. They take with them a very large petition having many 
thousand names appended. 

"There is a very deep and anxious feeling growing up here in 
regard to the border states, the sentiment is strong that if the 
border states withdraw, the Union is gone, and therefore if con- 
cessions are to be made, it must be done to save them. Unless 
the Northern people are satisfied that proper offers have been 
made to the border states (in case they should go out) there 
cannot be any unanimity in support of the gov't in the event of 
a civil war. It cannot be denied that there is a want of unity 

532 



APPENDIX 

amongst our people, and I am free to confess, that many of our 
Republican friends have strong sympathies with those who are 
ready to yield to either the Crittenden or border state propositions. 

" I begin to despair of an amicable settlement, things have 
gone too far, the Cotton States it is true are too mad to negoti- 
ate with, and the border states sympathize so strongly with them 
that I see but little chance. 

" To my mind it is clear that the new Administration is to 
have a hard time of it, and unless the border states are with us 
we might as well make up our minds to separate, for there is a 
very powerful opposition to coercion, especially if the whole 
South were united. We were more united in this quarter three 
weeks ago than now." — Seward MSS. 



W. D. Moss to Seward 

" Mocndsville, Va., February 6, 1861. 

" My dear Sir, — As I wrote you some days ago, we have 
scarcely left a vestige of secession in Western Virginia, and 
very little indeed in any part of the state. The success of the 
friends of the Union, has really astonished us all. The vote has 
been overwhelming against secession under any circumstances. 
This was the issue made here, and our candidate received nearly 
six to one. Not a single secessionist, or ' conditional Union ' 
man, has been returned in Virginia west of the Blue Ridcre. 
The Gulf Confederacy can count Virginia out of their little fam- 
ily arrangement — she will never join them. The election of 
Monday, cannot be regarded in any other light than an effectual 
check upon secession. The example of Virginia, will be potent 
with her sister border states, and without these six important 
states the squad of traitors in the extreme South cannot exist. 

"There will be a desperate effort with counties, to throw Vir- 
ginia prospectively [?] out, but even this will be defeated. The 
matter will have to be referred to the people for action, and the 
popular vote indicates a heavy majority against secession, to-day, 
tomorrow, and forever ! A majority of the delegates elected 
will, I think, be found to be against secession without contin- 

533 



APPENDIX 

gency or mental reservation. This, I know, will be the case in 
the northwest. The result in Harper's Ferry district [?], (Jeffer- 
son County), if correctly reported, is remarkable. Hunter who 
is after the late Judge Davis' place, avowed himself uncondi- 
tionally for secession. His defeat is a just rebuke. 

" We will endeavor to secure a Western man, Stuart, Summers, 
or some other equally good Union man as President of Conven- 
tion."— Seward MSS. 



John Pendleton to Seward 

" Redwood, February 8, 1861. 

" I dropped you a hasty note a few days ago, ... I told 
you how we would carry the state in the convention election. 
The result is that there will not be twenty immediate and un- 
qualified secessionists and disunionists, in the body of one 
hundred and fifty. And it is equally certain, there will not be 
one man in it, who is not for a final separation of the states, in 
double quick time — unless there is reason to hope for a perfectly 
full, final and unqualified surrender of the slavery question to 
those whom it concerns. 

" Had we received a little more decisive encouragement from 
our Northern friends there is not a county in Virginia that 
would have elected a secessionist. I would like to know from 
you your opinion of the present promise of things. And I 
would write you very fully, but I know you have no time to read 
my letter. Our whole batch of old Demagogues will be swept 
from the field, if this matter is settled. Millson and probably 
Hunter may survive." — Seward MSS. 



E 

James Barbour to Seward 

"Culpeper, February 8, 1861. 
"The very kind manner in which you received my sugges- 
tions when in Washington and the patriotic purpose expressed 
by you encouraged me to address this letter to you. 

534 



APPENDIX 

" It's important that you should understand the true condi- 
tion of political affairs in this state. There is a shrewd, ener- 
getic, intellectual body of gentlemen in this state who belong 
to the So. Carolina school of politics. By force of talent and 
industry they generally control the Democratic party organ- 
ization except when boldly and shrewdly opposed. Recent 
occurrences have placed these gentlemen in full sympathy with 
the masses of the people in Eastern Va. and in all the central 
and southern portions of Western Va. Unquestionably they 
would have carried the recent election if we had not been able 
to hold out tolerable evidences that there was a hope of obtain- 
ing by radical appeals to the Northern people constitutional 
guaranties of our slave property rights. We had to place 
our men in the recent contest upon that ground, and concede 
that secession ought to follow the extinction of the hope of 
constitutional amendments. I for one assumed that ground 
not only as expedient for the canvass but as right in itself as 
did many others. Upon that ground most of those called Union 
men prevailed. Men like Mr. Botts who took the unconditional 
Union ground went down generally. The most potent campaign 
paper in this part of the state was the statement of Messrs. 
Douglas and Crittenden that an adjustment was to be expected. 
If these representations are disappointed our men (called Union 
men in the election returns) will become determined uncondi- 
tional secessionists. They are men in earnest — devoted to the 
Union and would mourn over its loss as a private grief. But 
they are resolute to shiver the bond if their effort to get guaran- 
ties fails. It is a noble and gallant body of gentlemen. The 
people of the Northern states have the political fortunes of these 
gentlemen as well as the destinies of this Union in their hands. 
If you meet our efforts in the spirit in which we made them 
everything is safe. If you stand back and leave us unsupport- 
ed in this great contest the secession of Va. is as inevitable 
as fate. I tell you this as no menace but as a fact upon the 
knowledge of which you ought to direct your actions and that 
of your friends. Come forward promptly with liberal conces- 
sions — make the Va. power and influence the potent instru- 
ment of saving the Union. So arrange it as to secure the credit 
in fact at least to the conservative influences of this state and 
you at once clothe those influences with the power to recall the 

535 



APPENDIX 

departing states. You may lose a portion of your own party 
North. But you place yourself and the new administration at 
the head of a national conservative party which will domineer 
over all other party organizations North and South yet many 
years to come. You above all men have it in your power to 
bring the really conservative elements North and South into an 
organization the most useful and the most peaceful yet seen in 
this country. But to be done at all this must be done promptly. 
You can make a shield of the peace commission at Washington. 
Make them lay down a basis of safety to our property owners 
upon which we can rally all the conservative influences North 
and South. Let them construct the platform upon which the 
shrewd partisan and the wise patriot can zealously unite. You 
can render a vast service to the country and to your own repu- 
tation. If at any moment I can be made instrumental in accom- 
plishing this great purpose by going to Washington my friend 
Hon. John T. Harris of Va. will call me there," — Seward MSS. 



Sherrard Clemens to 



" Spotswood House, Richmond, February 18, 1861. 

" It is about as much as I can do to get to and from the con- 
vention in consequence of my leg which has again broken out. 
I am therefore disqualified from taking any active measures in 
regard to the matter you mention. 

" If the Republicans in Congress and in the Peace Conference 
do not promptly and at once abandon the positions they have 
taken, there will be no Union party left in Virginia. We are 
struggling here against every obstacle, and Mr. Lincoln, by his 
speech in the North, has done us vast harm. If he will not be 
guided by Mr. Seward but puts himself in the hands of Mr. 
Chase and the ultra Republicans, nothing can save the cause of 
the Union in the South. Instead of circulating documents, it 
will be far better, to take care of your own friends, who are 
stabbing us every hour. Bingham of Ohio, and his force bill 
has done us more injury than an invading army. Show this 
letter to him and other wild men who conceive that their policy 

536 



APPENDIX 

and their principle, if enforced by the government will save us 
from danger. If they knew how the secessionists chuckled 
over them, as honest fools, they would awaken from the deep 
dream, which has sealed up their faculties. Let them see them- 
selves as others see them. 

"Many Republicans know me. They know the force of my 
character and words. If they choose to commit suicide let 
them blame themselves alone." — Seward MSS. 



G 

Thomas Fitnan to Seward 

" Washington, February 19, 1861. 
..." Need I therefore repeat to you what I have already 
reported to you of them [the opinion of people irrespective of 
parties], that they looked to you for the prompt settlement of 
existing national troubles and the more so now since they dis- 
approve of Mr. Lincoln's recent railroad speeches. As his Sec- 
retary of State, on you will devolve the main responsibility of 
national affairs. Once in that position you can defy your per- 
sonal foes, and mould all measures necessary to promote the per- 
man[en]cy of the Union to suit the hopes and expectations of the 
country. All old party platforms are now either breaking down 
or [are] being swallowed up in the universal desire of the people 
to save the republic from dissolution, and a new one, constructed 
upon Union principles per se will inevitably spring up after the 
4th of next March. It is for you to take the lead or not in the 
movement. If you decide in the affirmative, the extreme men of 
the North and South will have to be thrown off and made sub- 
ordinate to the centre, or conservative Union party. I do not 
hesitate to say, that no public man in this or any other country, 
has ever been placed in a better position than you are now, either 
for weal or woe of the human race. It is for you to say what 
shall be done. You, all know, are competent to decide; no 
man is more so, and I am sure you will solve and determine the 
difficulty in the right way, be the sacrifices of by-gone party 
principles what they may." . . . — Seward MSS. 

537 



APPENDIX 

H 

Alfred M. Barbour to Seward 

" Private and confidential. 

" Spotswood House, Richmond, Virginia, February 21, 1861. 
" Dear Sir, — The messenger you spoke of to my brother 
James did not come. Write us soon. Let us hear from you. 
The matter you mentioned about a raid upon the capitol from 
Va. is a humbug. I have inquired specially. Nothing is thought 
of [it] in Virginia. This convention is a body of great personal 
worth and character — too high toned to do anything which 
looks like a disgrace. Don't let anybody excite your friends 
with such stuff. You gentlemen of the Republican party ought 
to suppress excitement against us. Force bills can do your 
people no good, and yet paralyze the Union men here. It is 
very cruel to crush us. In telegraphing you we (my brother 
James and myself) will call [use ?] the name of our mutual 
friend M. M. Dent who is entirely reliable and a member. In 
corresponding you would do well to use some mutual friend's 

frank such as [illegible] or John T. Harris, Millson or Bote- 

ler or any not publicly prominent member of your party. You 
understand this. Or just stamp your letters. You appreciate 
the necessity of our not appearing to be in conference with 
Mr. Lincoln's cabinet. Don't take this in any sense than that 
of policy."— Seward MSS. 



Joseph Segar to Seward 

"Washington, Feb. 21, 1861. 
" I am, as, I suppose, you [are] aware, a member of the House 
of Delegates of Va., as well charged with the sentiment of the 
Legislature and the Convention now sitting in Richmond, and 
with the general sentiment of my state as, perhaps, any one 
individual within her limits; and charged with the sentiment, I, 
an ardent friend of the Union, desire to say to you, another 
friend of the Union, that the passage now of what is termed 

538 



APPENDIX 

the 'force bill' will have, in Virginia, a most unhappy effect. 
We are now conservative. We have demonstrated, by our acts, 
our ardent desire to preserve the Union of the states, as it came 
to us from our fathers. The passage of this force bill will take 
from us the strong foothold that we have. It will cause the dis- 
unionists in Virginia, in Congress and out of it, to clap their 
hands with joy at the passage of this measure. There is a 
strong states-right vein running through the sentiment of our 
people, and a most determined opposition to coercion. The suc- 
cess of this measure will be regarded as looking to coercion 
and will wound the sensibilities of our people. 

" For God's sake, and for the country's sake do nothing, and 
let nothing be done, to weaken the position of the conservatives 
the Union men of Virginia. Strengthen us — give us ground to 
stand on. Above all things prevent the passage of this bill, and 
all will yet be well. Give ' no aid and comfort ' to our enemy. 

" I had designed to see you in person, but I am compelled to 
return to Richmond to-night, and so drop you this hasty line to 
be used as you see fit." — Seward MSS. 



F. W. Lander to Seward 

"Friday Night, 12 m. Richmond, Va., Feb. 22J. [1861.] 
" I shall be back on Saturday. It was out of place for me to 
leave while anything was to be heard or gained. I have to say 
that the old Whig element is here strongly in the preponderance. 
It is divided into two classes. The older and more prominent 
men, whom it is urged here are seeking office as the result of 
their patriotic efforts, are in a measure opposed by a younger 
set of talented and rising individuals who still do not affiliate 
with the secessionists. It is the latter class who may yet follow 
the excesses of the extreme Southern movement and aid in the 
passage of secession resolutions. But the last-named conserva- 
tives will be guided much by public events. The passage of a 
Force bill by Congress would probably drive them into the ranks 
of the extremists. There is an evident disposition of these con- 
servatives to hear the inaugural of the President elect. If that 

539 



APPENDIX 

is openly conservative, and an extra session of Congress is called 
by him, no extreme measures can pass here. Moderate men urge 
that this convention is composed of the most conservative men 
of the state, and that thus its conclusions, pro or con, will be 
ratified by the people. 

" The extreme radicals greatly fear some conservative course by 
the President elect. They have lost much ground by his silence 
(of late) on existing public affairs. A prominent Whig editor of 
an influential paper, although conservative, told me to-day that 
he should vote for the resolution against coercion. This resolu- 
tion is now being fought through the committee on Federal rela- 
tions. It will be reported to-morrow and adopted by a large vote. 

" I have read letters from prominent Southern secessionists. 
Their projects cannot culminate to success without the aid of 
the border states. They have in view that New Mexico shall 
apply for admission as a state. Being refused from want of 
the quota of population necessary for a state, she will join the 
Southern Confederacy. Arizona will be accepted by the South- 
ern seceding states. Utah will then be recognized, and thus 
it will be believed that the North will be shut out in its passage 
to California. California, in its southern portions, it is believed, 
will thus be practically revolutionized. When the recognition 
of the Southern Confederacy is made by England and France, 
Sonora and Mexico will be invaded. England and France are to 
be propitiated by their claim for a passage to the East Indies 
across the isthmus. The South rallies troops to take the isth- 
muses. It is urged that a movement is now progressing in 
southern California to perfect these movements. Thus they 
maintain the idea of a separate California confederacy which 
will eventually join the South. You must regard these argu- 
ments of no force. California will remain with that section 
which will build her overland railways. The magnitude of this 
programme has no weight against sound and reliable argument. 
But it is clear that Lincoln must extend his comprehension 
beyond the trifling question of the hour. He must secure the 
border slave-holding states to the present Union. It is abso- 
lutely necessary for him to pursue an extreme reactionary yet 
statesman-like course. He has passed through politics to gov- 
ernship [sic]. Should he take the simple ground that until the 
will of the self -governed reacts he will not molest the people; 

540 



APPENDIX 

should be even order Anderson and other officers out of the 
Southern forts, and, disclaiming the policy of practical surren- 
dership of the XL S. property by receiving payment for it, leave 
the seceding states to the extremity of their own folly during the 
first of bis administration; should he further recommend no 
action against the claims of the South as to territories, I believe 
that secession would be disarmed. 

" On the other hand, if he proposes to fight the South as a 
foreign nation, holding the peninsula of Florida and the mouths 
of the Mississippi, and thereby aggressing on the South — here 
the old argument of the acquisition of Cuba to guard the Gulf 
being pertinent — if he proposes this — still he must have the 
support of the border states. 

" And why ? Why ? Because the extreme radicals, the left 
hand of the Republican party, are not strong enough to sustain 
him. It is no longer party which demands action of him, but a 
country, a nation requesting from him a stern, unrelaxing grasp 
of the reins of government. It is expected here that Lincoln 
will call an extra session of Congress and afterwards advise a 
convention of the people. It is said that civil war can only 
grow out of his persistance in the idea that he is elected by a 
majority. This, it is avowed, he continues to dilate upon, for- 
getting that facts are stronger than arguments, mere declamation 
having no power against the figures that L. was 900,000 votes 
short of a majority, and that not one electoral vote was cast for 
him in the states whose peculiar interests are now at stake. 
It appears to me that the madness which creates revolutions 
refuses itself in this city to comprehend realities. Men say that 
it is in vain to declaim that the incoming President intends 
no wrong to Southern institutions, while the strength of his 
assertions on the construction of doubtful clauses of the Consti- 
tution are hardly dry on the manuscript which reports them. 

" Whatever may be the course of Mr. L. it is necessary that 
he should keep silent until inaugurated. No good can issue 
from his declamations ; much harm may come. Excuse the 
apparent rudeness of the remark." — Seward MSS. 

"Washington, D. C, Sunday Morning, February 24, 1861. 
. . . " I arrived this morning. If you wish to see me to-day 
will come up by your apprising me. The committee on federal 

541 



APPENDIX 

relations on the coercion resolutions failed to report Saturday 
as anticipated. They will report, it is said, on Tuesday, when 
a sharp debate will arise. Mr. Davidson a particular friend of 
Gov. Letcher is in town having come on with some half dozen 
gentlemen some of them delegates to the convention to pass 
the Sabbath. He can afford information, and requested me to 
introduce him to such public prominent men as I know here. 
He is regarded [as the] right hand man of Letcher, and is a 
strong friend of H. H. Stuart. 

"A few young men came down with us 'who talked fight' but 
I am able to assure [you] so far as Virginia is concerned there 
is not the slightest danger of a collision. Even if coercion is de- 
cided on Va. will act with dignity and caution. But I have not 
heard one man say, not the most conservative man that Virginia 
will fail to follow the cotton states should she not receive great 
concessions. This is now said by men who declare that the issue 
is clearly a false one, unnecessary and forced on Va., but that 
now being made she can take no less. The time for argument 
is passed when to endeavor to reason away the facts accom- 
plished by secession by saying it was and is unnecessary can 
have any weight in Virginia. 

" The incoming President holds the whole matter in his hand. 
He can shape public opinion at the convention either way, for 
every one is disposed to await his inaugural." — Seward MSS. 



K 

Samuel Ward to Seward 

[No date.] 
" Private. 
" Hon. Wm. H. Seward: 

"My dear Sir: The following extract from a letter I have 
this moment received from New York may interest you. 

" ' I wish I could think that there would be no fight at Pick- 
ens, but I am skeptical as to the possibility of preventing it. 
Benjamin writes Barlow (reed ys a. m.) [received yesterday 
morning] in the most emphatic manner as to the dissatisfaction 

543 



APPENDIX 

of the Govt at Montgomery with things at Washington and their 
intention not to await events.' 

" With great respect 

" Your obedient servt, 

(Signed) " Saml. Ward." 

—Seward MSS. 

[The following memoranda in Ward's handwriting were evi- 
dently written on the evening of March 4, 1861:] 

[No. 1.] 

" I visited Dr. G. [Gwin] this p.m. and found Senator Hunter 
in his study. Neither had read the inaugural and my ac of it 
confirmed the impression they had derived from Mr. Bright and 
another Senator whose name has escaped me. Whilst we were 
discussing the probable action of Va., which Dr. G. maintained 
nfd not go out ; Constitution Browne came in from ye p.m. train 
— fresh from Montgomery. I purpose intruding upon you with 
the rough sketch of the salient facts and speculations of the dia- 
logue which ensued. 

"1. Mr. Davis had shown Browne a letter ree'd from Dr. G. 
some days since foreshadowing peaceful policy on the part of 
the incoming Admn. This announcement has given Dr. G. great 
satisfaction. He, too, was in favor of moderate measures and of 
eliminating angry words threats and bluster from 'the situation.' 

" 2. There is perfect unanimity in the Southern Congress — 
no jar; all is harmony. Tom Cobb a cleverer man than his 
brother is the leader of debate. 

" 3. Toombs is the master spirit of the new Government. 

" 4. Cabinet ministers are bound to keep their seats in Con- 
gress to defend their measures. 

"5. No appropriation can be made by Congress without a 
recommendation from the Secy of the Treasury. 

" 6. The export duty on cotton is accepted with great cheer- 
fulness. It is £ $ = 45 cts. a bale. 

" 7. The Commissioners to France will be Yancey, Judge 
Rost of ye Louisiana Supme Court and Dudley Mann. The 
latter doubtful because on bad terms with Slidell. 

" 8. In Alabama the appointment of Clemens to the army has 
drawn off a great deal of opposition. 

543 



APPENDIX 

" 9. In Tennessee Browne did not see a man woman or child 
who was not a submissionist. (Here he groaned in spirit.) 
In Virginia he found people shockingly submissionistic save at 
the University (Charlottesville I believe) and in Richmond. 

No. 2. 

" Mr. Crawford the commissioner is here alone. He has full 
powers without his two adjuncts or colleagues. 

" He will instantly apply for a reception. If he goes back 
unacknowledged as commr Prest Davis cannot hold the people 
from attacking the forts. 

" Dr. Gwin and Hunter think the question had best be re- 
ferred to the Senate. They say it is a risk that you must take. 

"You can rely upon 22 Democratic votes. You will have 
Baker, Simmons, Anthony, Foster Harris probably the two new 
Penna successors of Bigler and Cameron unless the country 
should be inflicted with Wilmot in place of one of them. This 
risk is, after all, an affair . . . [illegible]. You can doubtless 
count upon Douglas. 

" Hunter observed that it was to be regretted that you could 
not leave your mantle upon the shoulders of a man of nerve to 
sustain your measures in the Senate. Baker was ready and will- 
ing but lacked position. He seemed to think Fessenden would 
be a great card to win to your hand and Dr. Gwin fancied, from 
some remarks of F's this morning, that, although you and F. 
were not exactly cordial and sympathetic he might be gained. 

No. 3. 

" Mr. Hunter remarked that Mr. Simmons's tariff would give 
the new Admn no money and produce a feeling of jealousy and 
perhaps war at the North as the Tariff of 1857 wd. bring mdse 
to Southern ports. 

No. 4. 

" Dr. G-. desires to see you and begs you will be kind enough 
to send me word as early as you please to-morrow at what hour 
it will be convenient for you to meet him at 258. 

« p. S. — The chief reason for recg [receiving?] ye Commission- 
ers would be to gain time, allay irritation at the South, when her 

544 



APPENDIX 

people would await patiently the result of negotiations, — being 
fully aware of the limited and finite powers of our Govt, for un- 
foreseen cases." 



John A. Gilmer to Seward 

" Confidential. 

"Greensboiio, N. C, March 7, 1861. 

" I was hurried from Washington by the extreme and dan- 
gerous illness of a member of my family. This preveuted me 
from having some conversation with you that I much desired. 

" I am here in the very midst of the South, and I beg you to 
weigh well the suggestions which I make to you. 

" The seceders in the border states and throughout the south 
ardently desire some collision of arms in attempts to collect the 
revenue or in some way about the fortifications. 

" The very best thing that the administration can do will be 
to frame some excuse to withdraw the troops from all the south- 
ern fortifications in the seceding states — such as that Congress 
failed to give the necessary legislation to do this successfully, 
and that they must wait such provisioning as Congress may 
hereafter provide &c. 

" There must be no fighting or the conservative Union men 
in the border slave states of N. C, Tenn., Mo., Ky., Va., Md. and 
Del. who are at this time largely in the majority, will be swept 
away in a torrent of madness. 

" For the time being every effort should be made to strength- 
en the hands of the Union men in these border states, and even 
in Arkansas. Let this crisis pass. Let the Union seem quietly 
to settle down with the free states and the border slave states. 
Let these border slave states pass out of the hands of the seces- 
sionists, Governors, legislators &c. into the hands of the Union 
Conservative men and then if coercion be deemed wise it can 
be attempted without harm to the border states, that are now 
mostly in the hands of ultra-extreme rulers. These states by 
wise management on the part of the administration can be got 
into the hands of Union men, before the lapse of sufficient time 
to be construed into acquiescence in secession. That secured 
ii.— 2 m 545 



APPENDIX 

which I have indicated the more [the] treachery and plundering 
and lawless conduct on the part of the seceding states in the 
mean[tirae], will only make the Union men in the border states 
be more inclined to unite cordially with the free states, to bring 
the seceding states to their senses. 

" If collision can be avoided — and the most vigilant care must 
be practiced to this end — Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi and 
Louisiana and even Texas will . . . [six words illegible] for return- 
ing to the Union. S. C. will not remain in harmony long in any 
confederacy. You have a mighty storm to control. If your 
advice prevails I believe it can pass without further harm. 

" If Virginia secedes, then all the other slave states will fol- 
low her even Maryland and Delaware. I am certain of this. 
If we can only get clear of the Virginia convention, we will 
have passed the most dangerous point immediately ahead of us. 

" North Carolina has elected a very large proportion of Union 
and conservative delegates to the convention. The vote on the 
convention is so very close that the official returns can only de- 
termine the result. Perhaps it may prove best that a convention 
shall have been called with such delegates as the people have 
selected in order to give a good turn to Virginia and the other 
border states." 

" Confidential. 

" Greensboro, N. C, March 8th. 

"Since the defeat of the secessionists on the 28th in this 
state they have become furious. Our Governor went down to 
"Wilmington on last Saturday among his fellow disunionists, was 
called, and made a speech to a large crowd of disunionists. He 
was bold, and defiant. He said that circumstances would soon 
occur, which would induce N. C. to retrace her steps, and that 
she would be out of the Union soon. 

" The only hope of the secessionists now is that some sort of 
collision will be brought about between federal and state forces 
in one of the seceding states. I have full confidence that you 
in some way wiser and better than I can devise or suggest can 
prevent this. 

" If you can do this, I believe I can say that Virginia can be 
kept from secession. You can do much to quiet Virginia. If 
the Virginia convention can adjourn without harm to the peace 

546 



APPENDIX 

of the country, a great point will be gained. If the border 
states can be retained, Mississippi, Louisiana and Texas will 
soon be back. If the others never come back, there will be no 
great loss. But I believe Georgia and Alabama will also soon 
want to return. 

" If for any decent excuse the Govt, could withdraw the 
troops from all the southern fortifications, the moment this is 
known N. C, Va., Md., Del., Ky., Tenn., Md. and I believe 
Arkansas are certainly retained. The only thing now that gives 
the secessionists the advantage of the conservatives is the cry of 
coercion — that the whipping of a slave state, is the whipping of 
slavery. 

" When these states come back as many of them will they 
will come with the fortifications. If they do not find it to 
their interest to return let them keep their plunder — or if any 
whipping is to be done let it be after the other slave states have 
certainly determined to remain. 

" The present excitement should be allowed to pass away as 
soon as possible without fighting." 

" Confidential. 

"Greknsboro, North Carolina, March 12, '61. 

" You must attribute my annoyance to the great anxiety I 
have about the threatening aspect of things in the south. The 
seceders would give a kingdom for a fight in some of the seceded 
states. 

" If the administration could yield the forts &c. under some 
suitable terms avoiding the right of secession, and that ques- 
tion be left open for the decision of Congress, it would be a 
grand movement. 

" Under a proclamation, reciting the conduct of the late 
Cabinet and Executive, laying the whole blame on them, and 
this could be done with great propriety and would do great good. 
If the seceding states come back as they certainly will if let go 
out into the cold a while they will come back with all the forts 
Public property &c. 

" In less than two years in these states in their state elections 
for members to their state legislatures it will become a question 
whether the candidates are for reversing the order of things, 
are for calling conventions, and for retroceding. This will be 

547 



APPENDIX 

certain to happen. Louisiana will be the first to move, and 
then all but South Carolina will follow, and I pray that she may 
never come back. 

" The great point is to avoid a collision. 

" When the border states are once quiet in the Union, they 
will co-operate with the free states against the seceding. You 
have the mind to draw up a proclamation, which will withdraw 
the troops, avoid threatening, and acquiescence in the right of 
secession. 

" You can do it with a proper protestation. 

" If this is done, the country will become quiet at once, and 
the next step will be the gradual return of the erring states. 
The citizens will quit thinking about war and begin to consider 
the ways and means of a return. 

" The cabinet and administration from and after the time 
they say [saw ?] their party was to be defeated, have been 
engaged in nothing but a conspiracy most felonious against the 
Government. They have said to these disunionists — make haste, 
get out of the way during our time, make hay whilst the sun 
shines. On their heads let the great crime rest. 

" In fact they have let things run until it is out of the power 
of the present administration with the means and force at com- 
mand now to correct the evils or put down the rebellion. It is 
due to the country that all this should be proclaimed and the 
administration is perfectly justified in waiting for the voice of 
the remaining states, expressed through the next Congress." 

"Greensboro, N. G, April 11, 1861. 

" When I was assured in your brief reply that in your opin- 
ions my suggestions were 'judicious' hope revived within me. 
I have consoled myself, and duly look for a proclamation in 
which I should recognize clearly your ability and wisdom. 

" I am so deeply distressed that my heart seems to melt 
within me. I cannot but still believe that the course I sug- 
gested would have been wise, and the results had it been pur- 
sued most beneficial. . . . 

" If what I hear is true that we are to have fighting at Sum- 
ter or Pickens, it is what the disunionists have most courted, 
and I seriously apprehend that it will instantly drive the whole 
South into secession, and that before the end of another 60 

548 



APPENDIX 

days at Washington City, there will be a contest that makes me 
shudder to contemplate. 

" Truly indeed may it be said that ' madness rules the hour.' " 

u Confidential. 

"Grkknsboro, N. C, April 21, 1861. 

"I have been from home, attending my courts up the coun- 
try, ever since I wrote you some ten days ago. I addressed 
crowds of Union men. Enthusiastic demonstrations for the 
Union were given. I was out of the reach of the mails and 
telegraph. I felt sure that we should overcome the disunionists 
in N. C. and all the border states. All this in the face of the 
fight at Charleston. This had done us no harm. But yesterday 
evening on my return I saw for the first time this Proclama- 
tion. Soon thereafter I heard that a volunteer company in my 
own town, among whom was my only son, had been called for 
by the Governor, and that they had gone to Fort Macon, Beau- 
fort Harbor. I came home with a sad heart. I found my own 
friends greatly excited. I was too full to address them. I could 
not rest last night. 

"If I had supposed that the administration, would not pur- 
sue the policy, (or something like it) which I had urged on you, 
I would have returned to Washington, and have gone daily on 
my knees to it in behalf of my policy and to avert that shed- 
ding of human blood which now seems inevitable. Few if any 
members will be elected from any slave state to the next Con- 
gress. All hope is now extinguished. The administration, but 
doubtless inadvertently, has done the very thing which the dis- 
unionists most desired. I cannot learn whether the secession 
ordinance in Virginia is to be submitted to the people." . . . 



INDEX 



Adams, Charles Francis, i., 160; 
appointed Minister to Great 
Britain, ii., 153; on Trent affair, 
230 ; July, 1862, fears immediate 
intervention, 294; effect in Lou- 
don of preliminary proclamation 
of emancipation, 340 ; given 
full discretion as to Alabama 
claims, 386; complimented by 
Seward, 386 «.; waruing as to 
rams, 388, 389 ; does not repeat 
Seward's threat, 390 ; opposes 
issuing letters of marque, 391 ; 
resignation and estimate of, 497, 
528. 

Adams, John Quincy, i., 16; influ- 
ence of, over Seward, 200, 201. 

Alabama, its record, ii., 384, 385. 

Alabama claims, ii., 385; urged by 
Adams, Seward, and Keverdy 
Johuson, 492 if.; character and 
rejection of the Johnson-Claren- 
don convention, 498-500. 

Alaska, purchase of, ii., 474-479. 

Albany in 1830, i., 36. 

Albany Regency, i., 15 ; causes re- 
moval of De Witt Clinton, 16. 

Alexandra, the, ii., 387. 

Amendment, XIII., proclaimed by 
Seward, ii., 452. 

Amendment, XIV., ii., 455, 456. 

Anderson, Robert, ii., 93, 107. 

Anti-masonic party, i., 25 ff. ; end 
of, 47, 50. 

Autislavery, constitutional victory 
of, in California, i., 217 ; convic- 



tions of, held by all Europeans, 

ii., 340. 
Antislavery Society, National, i., 

68. 
" Appeal of the Independent Dem- 
ocrats," i., 339. 
Arctic and Pacific oceans, survey 

of, ii., 66. 
Argus, Albany, i., 37 ; charges 

Seward with abuse of pardon- 

iug power, 120, 121. 

Badger, George E., i., 211, 351. 

Bagby, of Alabama, on Oregon and 
tlie Wilmot proviso, i., 207. 

Bancroft, George, ii., 336. 

Banks, Nathaniel P., ii., 256. 

Barbour, Alfred M., letter to Sew- 
ard, ii., Appendix H. 

Barbour, James, ii., 31, 39 ; letter 
to Seward, Appendix E. 

" Barnburners," i., 135. 

Barnwell, Edward W., exequatur 
revoked, ii., 203. 

Bates, Edward, chosen for At- 
torney-General, ii., 41 ; opinion 
regarding Fort Sn niter, 105, 106; 
supports Seward's views on 
Trent affair, 235, 236 ; opinion 
on colonization of free negroes, 
346 ; protests against Seward's 
interference, 355, 356. 

Bay Islands, Colony of, i., 482, 484, 
486, 487. 

Beecher, Henry Ward, i., 77, 4C2 ; 
" Beecher's Bibles," i., 408. 



551 



INDEX 



Bell, John, L, 211. 

Bell-Everett party, ii., 4, 5. 

Belligerency, question of Confed- 
erate, ii., 177 ; Seward's incon- 
sistencies in regard to, 507-509. 

Belligerent rights, ii., 179. 

Benbani, Calhoun, arrest, trial, 
and liberation of, ii., 264, 265, 
and n. 

Benjamin, Judah P., i., 334; seeks 
recognition and a raising of the 
blockade, ii., 290 ; visit from 
Mercier,299; instructs Mason and 
Slidell to oiler further induce- 
ments, 310 ; unwilling to agree 
to prohibit the slave-trade, 332 ; 
on French antislavery opinions, 
342 ; on hostility of British gov- 
ernment, 393 ; formal arraign- 
ment of Napoleou, 398, 399 ; on 
Seward's success in intimidat- 
ing the British Cabinet, 505 n. 

Benton, N. S., i., 37. 

Benton, Thomas H., i., 365. 

Berdau, David, eulogy on, i., 24. 

Berrieu, John M., i., 211. 

Bigelow, John, on Seward and 
his political rivals, i., 527-530 
n. ; consul at Paris, ii., 154 ; on 
Trent affair, Scott letter, 231 ; 
French sentiment on emancipa- 
tion, 340 ; buys documents show- 
ing that Confederate ships were 
building in France, 395 ; sug- 
gests Seward's candidacy for 
presidency in 1864, 404 ; urges 
Seward to be more outspoken, 
430. 

Birney, James G., i., 139 ; presi- 
dential nominee of Liberty par- 
ty, 145. 

Black, Jeremiah S., circular letter 
of instructions to United States 
Ministers abroad, ii., 156. 

Black Warrior, the, i., 470. 

Blaine, James G., criticism of Sew- 
ard's argument in Trent affair, 
ii., 252 ; on Seward's influence 
over President Johnson, 447 ». ; 
thought Seward helped pre- 



pare veto of teuure-of-office bill, 
465. 

Blair, Francis P., Sr., scheme for 
joint expedition against Mexi- 
co, ii., 410. 

Blair, Frank P., Democratic vice- 
presidential candidate, 1868, ii., 
467. 

Blair, Montgomery, ii., 41 ; opinion 
regarding Fort Sumter, 105, 106; 
denounces Scott, 123; accuses 
Seward, 144 ; takes correct view 
of Trent aft'air, 232 ; some traits, 
373. 

Blatchford, Samuel, i., 182. 

Blockade, proclamation of, ii., 163 ; 
rumors of, reach London, 168 ; 
instructions to Adams concern- 
ing, 170 ; discussed by President 
and Cabinet, 174, 175; inter- 
national law governing, 175 ; 
as a means to conquer the Con- 
federacy, 204, 205 ; proclama- 
tions of April 19th and 27th, 
205 ; Seward's expectation as to, 
206 ; rapid extension southward, 
207; question of continuance, 
207, 208 and ».; Mercier's rec- 
ommendation as to the raising 
of, 209 ; action postponed by 
Great Britain and France, 209; 
statements concerning, to Rus- 
sell, 210; efficiency of, beyond 
doubt, 281, 282 ; by stone fleet, 
arouses indignation in Europe, 
282 ; expectations of its being 
raised, 283; explained by Sew- 
ard, 283; raised at three ports, 
286 ; at different ports, 374-378 ; 
UnitedStatesregulationsagainst 
export of contraband merchan- 
dise, 379. 

Blockade-run uers, ii., 208, 209. 

Blockade-running, ii., 374-382. 

Bouck, William C, i., 83. 

Bradish, Luther, i., 66; declares 
himself an abolitionist, 71. 

Bragg, Braxton, ii., 296, 305. 

Brent, J. L., arrest, trial, and lib- 
eration of, ii., 264, 265. 



552 



INDEX 



Bright, John, ii., 322. 

Broderick, David C, i., 510, 511 ; 
eulogized by Seward, 511. 

Brooks, Preston S., attack on Sum- 
ner, i., 411; resigns, embraced by 
southern women as be leaves tbe 
House, 412 n. ; re-elected, 412 n. 

Brown, Albeit G., i., 222. 

Brown, Jobn, midnigbt raid at 
Pottawatomie, i., 409 ; raid at 
Harper's Ferry, 495-498; cbarges 
brougbt against Republican 
party on account of, 499. 

Bryant, William Cullen, urges 
Chase for Secretary of State, ii., 
41 ; letter about Seward, 363. 

Buchanan, James, i., 422, 423; in- 
augural address of, 436, 437 ; 
special message urging admis- 
sion of Kansas, 444, 445 ; asks 
authority from Congress to make 
war upon Mexico and several 
Central American states, 490, 
491 ; opposed by Seward, 491, 
492; annual message of 1860, ii., 
3; rare opportunity of, 5; truce 
as to Forts Sumter and Pickens, 
92,93; recommends intervention 
in Mexico, 419. 

Bulloch, James D., ii., 383, 394. 

Bunch, Robert, to act in strict 
concert with French represent- 
ative, ii., 197; describes priva- 
teering, 198; his relations with 
Confederacy discovered by Sew- 
ard, 199 ; his recall requested, 
200 ; actions defended by Rus- 
sell, 200 ; Seward insists on his 
recall and revokes his exequatur, 
201-203. 

Burnside, Ambrose E., supersedes 
McClellau, ii., 311. 

Cadwaladeu, George, refuses 
obedience to writ of habeas 
corpus, ii., 256, 257. 

Calhoun, John C, i., 16, 211 ; speech 
on compromise of 1850, 233-236; 
listens to Seward's " higher- 
law " speech, 251, 252. 



Cameron, Simon, ii., 41; opinion 
regarding Fort Sumter, 105 ; as 
Secretary of War, 350; leaves 
the Cabinet, 361. 

Campbell, John A., relations with 
Seward and Confederate com- 
missioners, ii., 113-117, 128, 130, 
131, 140, 141 and n. ; at Hamp- 
ton Roads conference, 411, 413. 

Cass, Lewis, i., 211; compared 
with Seward, ii., 90; on Trent 
affair, 229. 

Cavour, ii., 76. 

Central America, British in, i., 
482, 483. 

Chamberlain, Frank, estimate of 
Seward as a lawyer, i., 183 n. 

Chase, Salmon P., i., 160 ; grounds 
of opposition to slavery, 265 ; 
speech ou the compromise, 265, 
266; appeal of the Independent 
Democrats, 338, 339 ; replies to 
Douglas's Kansas and Nebraska 
speech, 342 ; as a possible Re- 
publican nominee, i., 526, ii., 41 ; 
compared with Seward,90 ; opin- 
ion regarding Fort Sumter, 105, 
106 ; letter to Seward relative 
to his brother, 356 n. ; as a 
leader of the radicals, 358 ; 
never know Seward to object to 
any military action, 363; rela- 
tion with attempt to remove 
Seward, 367-369 ; some traits, 
373 ; tries to use popular dis- 
content, 405, 406. 

Chilcat Indians, Seward's experi- 
ence with, ii., 517. 

Civil rights bill, ii., 455. 

Civil War, opinion in Europe on, 
ii., 166; English opinion on, 
167, 168 ; question of its cause 
and its purpose, 318. 

Clark, Myron H., i., 367, 371. 

Clay, Cassius M., i., 149, 150 ; ii., 
153, 394, 475. 

Clay, Henry, i., 16; National Re- 
publican presidential nominee, 
48; Whig candidate for presi- 
dency, 145 ; " Alabama letters," 



553 



INDEX 



145 ; no relation between sla- 
very and Texas question, 148 ; 
Lexington speech, 138 ; compro- 
mise of 1850, 227 ff. ; urges gov- 
ernment to purchase MS. of 
Washington's Farewell Address, 
228 ; chairman of committee of 
thirteen, 269; increased influ- 
ence of, 279, 280 ; final speech 
on the compromise, 280. 

Clayton -Bulwer treaty, alleged 
violation of, i., 482; Seward on, 
482-488. 

Clayton, John M., i., 153, 207. 

Clemens, Jeremiah, i., 211. 

Clemens, Sherrard, letter of, Ap- 
pendix F. 

Clinton, De Witt, i., 6 ; withdraws 
from active politics, 15 ; candi- 
date for governor, 16 ; elected, 
19. 

Cohden, Kichard, on blockade by 
stone fleet, ii., 282 ; ou dismem- 
berment, 283; influenced by 
Confederate commercial policy, 
322; writes of demonstrations 
for the cause of freedom, 341 ; 
on warlike power of United 
States, 392. 

Cole, Cornelius, of California, ii., 
475. 

Colfax, Schuyler, Kepublican vice- 
presidential candidate, 1868, ii., 
466. 

Collins, Edward K., ii., 62. 

Colonization Society, i., 68. 

Colonizing free negroes, ii., 345- 
347. 

Commerce in the Pacific, ii., 66-68. 

Compromise of 1850, i., 228 ff. ; Jef- 
ferson Davis on, 232, 233 ; Cal- 
houn on, 234-236 ; Webster on, 
237-242; Seward on, 243-251; 
Chase on, 265, 266 ; referred to 
committee of thirteen, 268; 
Yulee ou, 270 ; Hale on, 270 ; 
Clay ou, 285, 286; passage of, 
285,286; Julian on, 287. 

Confederacy, peculiar position of, 
ii., 91 ; attitude toward certain 



fortifications, 92, 93 ; activity of 
diplomatic agents of, 165 ; theo- 
ries of, 204 ; means used to con- 
quer, 204, 205 ; nothing to offer 
in exchange for assistance, 289, 
290; little faith in British in- 
tervention, 290 ; believes Na- 
poleon would not let the North 
succeed, 290; army of, opera- 
tions, 296 ; attitude toward 
slavery, 320. 

Coufederate commissioners to 
Washington, efforts to obtain 
recognition of Confederacy, ii., 
107-117 ; communications with 
United States government ter- 
minated, 140-142. 

Confederate commissioners to 
Europe, appointed, ii., 165 ; 
instructed, 165; reach London, 
166 ; disagree on question of 
recognition, 210 ; statements 
concerning cotton aud hlock- 
ade, 210 ; on aim of the United 
States, 320, 321 ; on European 
opinion of slavery, 330. 

Confederate intermediaries— Gwin, 
ii., 108-111; Hunter, 111, 112; 
Campbell, 114-117. 

Congress, altercations in, i., 504 
and n., 506 ; resolutions on prop- 
ositions of foreign interference, 
ii., 314. 

Congress in 1849, i., 211-213. 

Constantino, Archduke, ii., 476, 
477. 

Constitutional Unionists, i., 521, 
522 ; nominate Bell and Ever- 
ett, 522. 

Coombs, Leslie, opinion of More- 
head, ii., 267 n. 

Corvettes, specifications, etc., ii., 
394. 

Corwin, Thomas, ii., 154. 

Cotton, views of the Confederacy 
on, ii., 204, 208 ; Merciei J s rec- 
ommendation as to, 209 ; state- 
ment concerning crop of 1861, 
210 ; England's supply of, 211 ; 
scarcity of, in France, 213, 214 ; 



554 



INDEX 



Tkouvenel's plans for obtaining 
supply of, 214, 215 ; discussed in 
message to Confederate Con- 
gress, 220 ; influence iu behalf 
of Confederacy, 302. 

Council of Appointments, New 
York, 1777, composition of, i., 14. 

Crawford, Martin J., i., 503 ; ii., 
107, 103, 119. See Confederate 
commissioners to Washington. 

Crawford, William H., i., 15. 

Crittenden, John J., i., 112; ii., 
267. 

Crittenden resolution, ii., 319, 
362. 

Crittendeu compromise, ii., 5, 30, 
33. 

Croswell, Edwin, i., 37 ; anti-Whig 
editorial articles, 74 ; superseded 
by Weed as state printer, 81 ; 
succeeds Weed as state printer, 
134. 

Cuba, acquisition of, desired by 
President Polk, i., 466; Spain 
decliues to sell, 466 ; French and 
British Ministers at Washington 
propose mutual agreement with 
the United States not to seek 
the possession of, 466 ; Cass on, 
466, 467 ; Soule" on, 467 ; Hale on, 
467 ; Seward on, 467-469 ; Pierce 
on, 469; "Africanization" of 
Cuba, 470-471 ; Walker on, 472 ; 
Buchanan on, 472, 473 ; Slidell 
on, 473 ; Douglas on, 473 ; Brown 
on, 478. 

Curtis, George Ticknor, on Trent 
affair, ii., 230. 

Curtis, George William, on Sew- 
ard's speech of January 12, 1861, 
ii., 17. 

Dallas, George M., ii., 168 ; in- 
formed by Russell of arrival of 
Confederate commissioners, 168; 
France and Great Britain to 
take the same course as to rec- 
ognition, 168. 

Dana, Charles A., on Seward's jo- 
cose discussion at a dinner, ii., 



511 ; recollections of an inter- 
rupted talk with Seward, 513 n. 

Dana, Richard Henry, Jr., on Sew- 
ard's argument in Trent affair, 
ii., 243; on Seward's conversa- 
tion, 511. 

Davis, Jefferson, i., 211, 220 ; fears 
for the government, 225 ; on 
compromise of 1850, 232 ; series 
of resolutions repudiating Free- 
port doctrine, etc., 506 ; on doc- 
trine of coercion, ii., 14 ; con- 
versation with Seward, 85 ; 
compared with Seward, 90 ; proc- 
lamation offering letters of 
marque, 163 ; attitude toward 
declaratiou of Paris, 198 ; anger 
atRussell's protest against build- 
ing ships, 393 ; treatment of 
Blair's Mexican scheme, 410, 411; 
after Hampton Roads confer- 
ence, 415. 

Davis, Jefferson C, ii., 517, 518. 

Dawson, of Georgia, ii., 85. 

Dayton, William L., ii., 153; first 
important despatch to, 162, 163 ; 
defines attitude of United States 
in reference to signing conven- 
tion, 194; on Trent affair, 230, 
231 ; effect of preliminary proc- 
lamation of emancipation, 340; 
on French aims, 426. 

Declaration of Paris, etc., ii., 187 
ff. ; amendment of, suggested 
by Marcy, 188. 

De Leon, Edwin E., sent to Europe, 
ii., 291, 342. 

Democratic national convention 
of 1844, i., 144; of 1848, 159; of 
1852, 304 ; of 1856, 422 ; of 1860, 
520, 521 ; of 1864, ii., 407. 

Democrats, partisan, 1864, ii., 407. 

Denmark, attitude iu regard to 
selling West Indian possessions, 
ii., 480 ff. 

Dennison, William, ii., 458. 

Dicey, Edward, description of 
Seward, ii., 501 ; on Seward as 
good company, etc., 513. 

Dickinson, Daniel S., i., 74. 



555 



INDEX 



Diplomatic corps in Washington, 
ii., 155. ■ 

Disunion, talk of, i., 234, 235, 237, 
248, 282, 284, 289, 295, 299, 392, 
434, 456. 

Dix, John A., i., 74; ii., 256, 278; 
Free-Soil candidate for gover- 
nor, 161. 

Doolittle, James R., ii., 482, 483. 

Douglas, Stephen A., i., 208 ; Ne- 
hraska to he admitted with 
slavery optional, 335 ; proposes 
the new territory of Kansas, 337, 
338 ; speech on Kansas and Ne- 
braska bill, 340-342; speech on 
repeal of Missouri compromise, 
353-355 ; introduces bill to post- 
pone the admission of Kansas, 
403 ; eager for presidential nom- 
ination, 422 ; active in campaign 
of 1860, 545 ; helps to defeat 
English's Kansas bill, 454 ; com- 
• pared with Seward, ii., 90 ; fa- 
vors abaudouing forts, 122. 

Dred Scott case, i., 437-439, 446- 
449. 

Drouyn de Lhuys, Edmond, suc- 
ceeds Thouvenel, ii., 307 ; sur- 
prised at Dayton's revelations, 
395 ; on French aims, 426 ; "War 
or peace ?" 429 ; asks recogni- 
tion for Maximilian, 437, 438 ; 
meeting with Seward, 523. 



Early, Jubal E., tries to take 
Washington, ii., 407. 

Edmonds, J. W., i., 37. 

Election of 1860, summary of, i., 
552, 553 ; 1862, significance of, 
ii., 311; 1864, significance of, 
415 ; 1868, 468. 

Ely, H., writes to Seward about 
Baltimore outrage, ii., 255 n. 

Emancipation, proposed proclama- 
tion of, ii., 332, 333 ; prelimi- 
nary proclamation of, 336; proc- 
lamation of, 340, 341 ; English 
opiuiou awakened by, 341 ; Cob- 
den on, 341 ; French opinion 
on, 341, 342. 



Einerence, log of, ii., 73-75. 

Erie canal, i., 86-91. 

Europe, public opinion in, in re- 
gard to the Confederacy, ii., 166. 

Evarts, William M., letter to Sew- 
ard, ii., 360; sent abroad, 387. 

Evening Journal, Albany, first is- 
sue of, i., 30 ; publishes Sew- 
ard's letters of European travel, 
49; opinions of, in March, 1861, 
ii., 121, 122. 

Everett,Ed\vard,i., 356,522; ii.,221. 

Ewing, Thomas, advice on Trent 
affair, ii., 229. 

Expansion, territorial, ii., 470 ff. 



Faulknkr, Charles J., political 
prisoner, ii., 164, 165, 268. 

Fenian movement, ii., 494. 

Fessenden, W. P., ii., 86. 

Field, Cyrus W., ii., 66. 

Fillmore, Millard, i., 38; Whig 
vice-presidential nomineo, 159; 
relations with Seward, 213-215, 
278, 279 ; succeeds to the pres- 
idency, 278. 

Fish, Hamilton, i., 297, 486 ; criti- 
cism of Seward's Trent argu- 
ment, ii., 251, 252. 

Fitnan, Thomas, letter to Sew- 
ard, Appendix G. 

Flagg, Azariah C, i., 74 ; succeeds 
Solomon Van Rensselaer as post- 
master, 81 ; reinstated comp- 
troller, 92. 

Florida, the, ii., 383. 

Foote, Henry S., i., 274 ; called to 
order, 284 ; moves for congres- 
sional reception to Kossuth, 
314 ; resolution in behalf of ex- 
iled Irish patriots, 3^3 ; Sew- 
ard's political assailant, ii., 81. 

Foreign policy, Seward's, charac- 
ter of, ii., 134. 

Forey, Elie Frederic, ii., 423. 

Forsyth, John, ii., 107. See Con- 
federate commissioners to Wash- 
ington. 

Fort Donelson, effect in Europe 
of victory at, ii., 285. 
556 



INDEX 



Fort Henry, effect iu Europe of 
victory at, ii., 285. 

Fort Pickens, ii., 92, 104, 119, 123, 
125, 126, 127, 129, 144. 

Fort Sumter, ii., 92, 119, 123, 138; 
expedition for, leaves New York 
harbor, 142 ; tired on, 143 ; forced 
to capitulate, 143 ; causes of 
failure of relief expedition, 143, 
144. 

Fox, Gustavus V., ii., 97, 106, 107, 
480 n. 

Franco, considers intervention in 
Mexico, ii., 134 ; relations with, 
155; disruption of Union preju- 
dicial to, 167 ; public opinion 
in, 297 ; coqnettiug with Groat 
Britain, 306 ; Confederate propo- 
sition of December, 1862, 310 ; 
opinion on preliminary procla- 
mation, 340. 

Fredericksburg, battle of, ii., 311. 

Freedmen's Bureau, ii., 453. 

Freeman, William, Soward's de- 
fence of, i., 174-180. 

Freeport doctrine, i., 505. 

Free-Soil party, i., 160. 

Frelinghuysen, Frederick, i., 145. 

Fr6mont, John C., i., 418 ; procla- , 
mation of, ii., 319 ; favorito 
with tbe radicals, 359. 

Frijs, Count, ii., 483. 

Fugitive slaves, surrender of, i., 
101-107 ; vigilance committees, 
287. 



Garrison, William Lloyd, i., 68 ; 
letter from, Appendix A. 

Georgia, the, ii., 385. 

Gcorgiana, the, ii., 385. 

Giddings, Joshua R., i., 160, 299; 
chosen Speaker of the House,401. 

Gilmer, John A., ii., 39 ; sugges- 
tions about averting war, 120, 
122 ; letters to Seward, Appendix 
L. 

Gilmore, J. E., mission to Rich- 
mond, ii., 409. 

Gladstone, William Ewart, ii., 75; 
on recognition, 303. 

557 



Gortschakoff, Alexander Michail- 
ovitch, ii., 135 n. 

Granger, Francis, i., 35 ; sources of 
his popularity, 38 ; Seward's po- 
litical rival, 63 ; predicts future 
power of the abolitionists, 69 ; 
member of Congress, 75. 

Grant, Ulysses S., made lieuten- 
ant-general, ii., 405 ; losses in 
Virginia in 1864, 405, 407 ; ex- 
pects to drive the French out 
of Mexico, 433, 434 ; Republican 
presidential caudidate,1863, 466. 

Great Britain, considers interven- 
tion in Mexico, ii., 134 ; rela- 
tions of United States with, 
154 ; commercial policy of the 
Confederacy dependent upon 
peace for execution, 162 ; resents 
high tariff, 167 ; proclamation 
of neutrality by, 176 ; reason 
for receiving Confederate com- 
missioners, 17S,179 ; public opin- 
ion in England on American af- 
fairs in summer of 1862, 301-303 ; 
reason for not interfering, 306, 
307, 314, 315; declines Napo- 
leon's proposition, 307 ; Confed- 
erate proposition of December, 
1862, 310 ; English opinion on 
the relation between slavery 
and the war, 321, 322 ; opinion 
on preliminary proclamation, 
339, 340 ; relation between com- 
mercial interest and foreign 
policy, 389, 390 ; change of opin- 
ion in January, 1864, 392 ; her 
offence as to ships, 394. 

Greeley, Horace, i., 64 ; takes 
charge of the Log Cabin, 75 ; 
advocates registration law, 116; 
supplanted by Raymond in the 
contidence of Weed and Seward, 
368 ; reqnests a talk with Sew- 
ard, 371, 372 ; dissolves, by let- 
ter, the political partnership of 
Seward, Weed, and Greeley, 372, 
373; in subsequent letter con- 
fesses his folly, 373 ; champions 
Fremont in opposition to Sew- 



INDEX 



ard, 418 ; tribute to Weed, 523 ; 
opposes Seward's nomination, 
523, 524, 533; charged with 
Seward's defeat, 541 ; election 
as United States Senator pre- 
vented by Seward and Weed, 
ii., 41 ; one of the radical Repub- 
lican leaders, 358 ; attacks Sew- 
ard, 370 ; negotiations for peace, 
409; presidential nominee, 1872, 
525. 

Green, Archibald, i., 22. 

Grimes, James W., ii., 372. 

Grinnell, Moses H., writes to Sew- 
ard about Hicks's correspond- 
ence, ii., 255 n. ; letter to Sew- 
ard, Appendix B. 

Guthrie, James, ii., 267. 

Gwin, William M., relations with 
Seward, ii., 25, 26 ; Seward 
dined by, 83 ; acts as interme- 
diary between Confederate com- 
missioners and Seward, 108-111 ; 
arrest, trial, and liberation of, 
264-266. 

Habeas Corpus, Lincoln's attitude 
toward the writ of, ii., 256. 

Hale, John P., i., 212 ; speech on 
the compromise of 1850, 266- 
268 ; on southern aggressions, 
ii., 3 ; criticism of Seward, 86 ; 
on Trent affair, 236. 

Hampton Roads conference, ii., 
411-415. 

" Hards" and " Softs " (Democrats) 
described by D. S. Dickenson, i., 
368; nominees, 368. 

Harlan, James, ii., 458. 

Harper's Ferry, Johu Brown's raid 
at, i., 495-498; call for investi- 
gation of, 498-500. 

Harvey, James E., telegraphs Con- 
federacy concerning Sumter ex- 
pedition, ii., 145 ; Minister to 
Portugal, 145 ; Northern news- 
papers and Senate committee 
demand his recall, 145 ; shielded 
by Seward, 145; despatch to, 
about Camoens, 504 n. 



Hawaii, Seward's wish to annex, 
ii., 489. 

Hawley, Seth C, ii., 278. 

"Helderberg War," the, i., 108- 
110. 

Helper's The Impending Crisis, 
resolution declaring indorsers 
of, ineligible to be Speaker of 
the House, i., 500 ; merits and 
defects of, 501 ; extracts from, 
501 n., 502 n. ; -welcomed by Re- 
publicans, 502; gratuitous dis- 
tribution of, 503. 

Henderson, John B., on Seward's 
entertaining conversation, ii., 
511, 512. 

Herald, N. Y., assails radicals and 
defends Seward, ii., 364. 

Hicks, Thomas H., requests troops 
and suggests mediation, ii., 
254. 

"Higher-law " speech, i., 243-263 ; 
Tribune, N. Y., on, 252 ; Washing- 
ton Republic on, 253 ; Calhoun 
on, 253 ; Cass on, 253 ; Badger 
on, 254 ; Coifc on, 254 n. ; Pratt 
on, 255 n. , 256 n. ; Foote on, 258. 

Hoffman, Ogden, i., 10. 

Holland Laud Company, i., 57-59. 

Holt, Joseph, ii., 93. 

Houston, Sam, i., 210. 

Hughes, John [Archbishop of New 
York], i., 96-101 ; ii., 221; Sew- 
ard's Friday dinner to, 510. 

Hungarian revolution, i., 313 ff. 

"Hunkers," i., 135. 

Hunter, David, issues order against 
slavery, ii., 327. 

Hunter, Robert M. T., L, 212 ; om- 
nipresence of slavery question, 
225; ii., 62, 108; acts as inter- 
mediary between Confederate 
commissioners and Seward, 111, 
112 ; relations with Seward and 
commissioners, 113-117; at 
Hampton Roads conference, 411, 
415 ; treated kindly by Seward, 
448. 

Hurlbut, S. A., sent to Charleston, 
ii., 107. 



558 



INDEX 



Internal Improvements, ii., 57- 
61. 

Intervention, foreign, Seward's 
warning against, i., 1G4 ; Palm- 
erston on, ii., 209 ; Seward's 
attitude toward, 210; possi- 
bility of, borne in mind, 210 ; 
Confederacy hopeful of, 212 ; 
European, question of, 1862-63, 
231-316 ; Seward to Adauis on, 
294-296 and n. ; influences for 
and against, 314-316. 

"Irrepressible conflict" speech, i., 
458-463. 

"Irrepressible conflict," changes 
wrought by, in North and South, 
i., 507, 508. 

Iverson, Albert, defies the North, 
ii., 4. 

Jackson, Andrew, i., 16, 60. 

Jackson, Margaret, i., 1. 

Jackson, " Stonewall," ii., 296. 

Jaquess, James F., mission to 
Richmond, ii., 409. 

Jay, John, suggests anti - slave - 
trade treaty, ii., 343, 344. 

Jay, William, i., 69. 

Jejfersonian, i., 64. 

Jennings, Isaac, i., 1. 

Jennings, Mary, i., 2; death, 204. 

" Jerry rescue," i., 296. 

Johnson, Andrew, i., 442, 443 ; atti- 
tude toward the South, ii., 445 ; 
early policy closely follows that 
of Lincoln, 446-448; Blaine on 
Seward's influence over, in re- 
gard to plan of reconstruction, 
447 n. ; exhibits prejudice against 
wealthy class, 447 ; vetoes Freed- 
men's Bureau bill, 453; denounces 
Sumner and Stevens, 453; vetoes 
Civil-rights and Tenure-of-office 
bills, 455; " swingiug-around- 
thc-circle" trip, 460, 463; per- 
sistence as to reconstruction, 
463 ; attempted impeachment of, 
486; annual message of 1868 on 
territorial expansion and mili- 
tary government, 487, 488. 



Johnson, Reverdy, becomes Minis- 
ter to Great Britain, ii., 497 ; 
negotiates Alabama Claims con- 
vention, 493 ; indignation on 
account of his speeches in Eug- 
land, 499. 

Jones, George W., political pris- 
oner, ii., 268, 269. 

Juarez, Benito Pablo, ii., 420. 

Kansas, i., 337 ; Badger on slavery 
in, 351 ; slavery in, a barrier to 
free laborers, 357; the Ther- 
mopylae of the contest between 
slavery aud freedom, 383 ; affairs 
in, attract national attention, 
439 If. ; declines to become a 
slave state, 454. 

Kansas-Nebraska bill, i., 335 ff. 

Kendall, Amos, i., 68. 

Kennedy, John A., ii., 221. 

Keyes, Erasmus D., ii., 129. 

King, Preston, informs Seward of 
efforts to remove him, ii., 366. 

King, Thomas Butler, ii., 61. 

King, William R.,i.,211. 

"Know -Nothing" party, motto, 
composition, and aims, i., 369 ; 
hostile to Seward, 370 ; unsus- 
pected strength, 371 ; split in, 
385, 386. 

Lafayette, i., 23 ; invites Seward 
to visit him, 49. 

Lamartine, ii., 76. 

Lamou, Ward H., ii., 129, 130. 

Lander, F. W., ii., 97 ; letters to 
Seward, Appendix J. 

Lee, Robert E., ii., 296, 305; sur- 
render of, 415. 

Liberal party, i., 106, 139, 145, 150. 

Lieber, Francis, ii., 258. 

Lincoln, Abraham, i., 456 ; availa- 
bility as a Republican candi- 
date, 526, 527 ; nomination made 
unanimous, 538 ; memorandum 
for committee of thirteen, ii., 10; 
submits draft of inaugural to 
Seward, 23 ; begins selection of 
Cabinet, 33; Lincoln compli- 



559 



INDEX 



merits Seward, 39 ; calls south- 
ern Unionists " white crows," 
40 ; chooses his own Cabinet, 
43 m., 44; urges Seward to coun- 
termand his withdrawal, 44 ; 
inaugural address, 93 ; attitude 
toward the forts, 93, 94 ; how 
regarded in March, 18G1, 95 ; 
requests opinions of Cabinet 
respecting Fort Sumter, 97 ; 
sarcastic remark, 121 ; Cahinet 
meeting concerning Fort Pick- 
ens, 123 ; requests Scott to use 
all possible vigilance for the 
maintenance of all places, 125 ; 
period of inaction, 134; re- 
plies to Seward's "Thoughts," 
137, 133 ; conflict of orders as 
to the Voxchatan, 139, 144 ; de- 
cides in favor of Welles, 139; 
effect of rejecting programme 
proposed by Seward, 157 ; proc- 
lamation of April 15th, 163 ; 
proclaims blockade of southern 
ports, 1G3; modifies Seward's 
instructions to Adams of May 
21st, 173 and n., 174; proc- 
lamations that were declara- 
tions of intention, 205 ; disa- 
grees with Seward on Trent 
affair, 234 ; warned and criti- 
cised, 255, n. ; attitude toward 
writ of habeas corpus, 256 ; mes- 
sage to Congress, 257 ; anti- 
slavery policy operates against 
intervention, 315; changes ef- 
fect of Fremont's proclamation, 
319; proposition for reimburs- 
ing owners and providiug for 
emancipated slaves, 326; gov- 
ernmental pay for voluntarily 
emancipated slaves, 327 ; re- 
vokes Hunter's order against 
slavery, 327 ; plan of compen- 
sated emancipation, 332, 333 ; 
gives notice of intended emanci- 
pation proclamation, 332, 333 ; 
letter to Greeley, 339; favors 
colonizing free negroes, 345- 
347 ; vetoes part of Seward's 



programme, 356 ; jest about 
Weed and Greeley, 357 ; relations 
with Seward, 357, 358 ; difficul- 
ties with factions, 358, 359 ; re- 
mark to some assailants of Sew- 
ard, 363 ; treatment of attempt 
to remove Seward, 366-369; 
speech at Gettysburg, 403; re- 
elected, 408 ; attitude toward 
peace negotiations, 409 - 412 ; 
at Hampton Roads conference, 
412-414; favors compensated 
emancipation, 414 ; last call on 
Seward, 417 ; assassination of, 
418. 

Lincoln-Douglas debate, i., 454 ; 
wide-spread interest in, 456; cen- 
tral idea of, 457. 

" Loco-focos," i., 59. 

Log Cabin, i., 75. 

Lovejoy, Owen, i., 506. 

Lowell, James Russell, i., 551, ii., 
460, 462 ; on Seward's despatches, 
504 and n. 

Lyons, Lord, communications with 
Confederacy, ii., 197 ; compli- 
mented by Seward, 201 ; re- 
ports to Russell leading features 
of blockade, 206 ; writes to 
Seward concerning Charleston 
blockade, 207; in the Trent af- 
fair, 226; communicates instruc- 
tions in Trent affair, 233, 334; 
characteristics of, 293 

McCarthy, Justin, on Seward as 
a despatch writer, ii., 502. 

McClellan, George B., in Peninsu- 
lar campaign, ii., 286, 296; at 
Antietam, 304, 305 ; removed 
from command, 311 ; retains 
confidence of conservatives, 359 ; 
Democratic candidate, 1864, 407. 

Mcllvaine, Bishop, ii., 221. 

McLeod incident, ii., 111-116. 

Macaulay, Thomas Babington, ii., 
75. 

Maffit, J. N., ii., 383. 

Maun, A. Dudley, ii., 165, 166; on 
Trent affair, 227; reports sup. 



560 



INDEX 



posed intentions of French Em- 
peror, 283 ; on English opinion 
of slavery, 330. 

Marchand, J. B., ordered to over- 
haul the Nashville, ii., 213 ; er- 
roneous assumption as to in- 
structions of, 224. 

Marcy, William L., i., 44, 46, 54, 
55 ; reply to political test ques- 
tions, 71 ; compared with Sew- 
ard, ii., 90; declaration of Paris 
could not be accepted by the 
United States, 187, 188. 

Martineau, Harriet, ii., 75. 

Mason, James M., ii., 212; suc- 
cessfully runs the blockade, 213 ; 
in Trent affair, 223 ; imprisoned, 
223 ; why hated by the North, 
227, 228 ; released, 245 ; recep- 
tion in England, 293 ; presents 
formal request for recognition of 
Confederacy by Great Britain, 
293 ; unfavorable reply, 293 ; on 
Great Britain's expected oppo- 
sition to the slave-trade, 331, 
332 ; mission to end, 342 ; on 
English antislavery opinions, 
342. 

Maximilian (Ferdinand Maximil- 
ian Joseph) becomes Emperor, 
ii., 424; difficulties, 431, 432; 
execution of, 440. 

Maynard, William H., i., 37; op- 
poses resolutions of 1831, 42. 

Medill, Joseph, on Seward and his 
political rivals, i., 530 M.-531 v. ; 
letter to Colfax about Seward, 
ii., 363, 364. 

Meigs, Montgomery C, ii., 129. 

Mercer, Samuel, ii., 138, 139. 

Mercier, Henri, announces to Sew- 
ard his opinion of the South, ii., 

297 ; his tendencies and limita- 
tions, 298; Seward's opinion of, 

298 n. ; trip to Richmond, 299, 
371, 372 ; attitude of France, 
299-301. 

Merryman, John, case of, ii., 256, 

257. 
Mexican War, i., 155, 156. 



Mexico, disorder in, ii., 419; for- 
eign claims against, 420 ; Brit- 
ish, French, and Spanish expe- 
ditious against, 420, 421 ; McDou- 
gal's resolutions against French 
intervention in, 428 ; House of 
Representatives resolutions 
against French intervention in, 
428, 429. 

Miller, Elijah, i., 11. 

Miller, Frances, i., 11, 12. See Mrs. 
W. H. Seward. 

Mining privileges, ii., 53; Seward 
on, 53, 54; Dawson on, 53; Fre'- 
mont on, 53 ; Foote on, 53, 54 ; 
Dodge on, 54. 

Miramon, Miguel, ii., 420. 

Missouri compromise, repeal of, i., 
333-362 ; Atchison on, 335 ; Dix- 
on on, 337, 351 ; Douglas on, 
338, 340-342, 353-357 ; appeal of 
the Independent Democrats on, 
339 ; Chase on, 342 ; Seward on, 
346-350, 357-359; House vote 
on, 356 n. ; Senate vote on, 361 ; 
how received, 361. 

Monroe doctriue, violated, ii., 428 ; 
not referred to by Seward, 441. 

Morehead, Charles S., political 
prisoner, ii., 266-268. 

Morgan, Christopher, i., 182. 

Morgan, William, story of his ab- 
duction, etc., i., 25-27. 

Morris, Gouverneur, i., 86. 

Moss, W. D., letter to Seward, 
Appendix C. 

Motley, John Lothrop, ii., 153, 
154, 440. 

Mure, Robert, connection with 
Bunch case, ii., 199. 

Murray, Robert, ii., 278. 

Napoleon, Louis, proclamation of 
neutrality by, ii., 176; reason 
for receiving Confederate com- 
missioners, 178 and «., 179 n. ; 
national policy, by what con- 
trolled, 281 ; tries to gain co- 
operation of Great Britain, 285 ; 
would soon act independently, 



561 



INDEX 



285 ; grants interview to Slidell, 
291, 292 ; Ms plans and aims, 
297, 298 ; bis duplicity, 298 ; per- 
plexity of, 305; prefers au ar- 
mistice of six months, 306 ; in- 
vites co - operation of Great 
Britain and Russia, 307 ; his 
dilemma, 310, 311 ; thoughts in 
January, 1863, 312; complex 
motives as to intermeddling, 
315 ; attitude regarding war- 
ships, 394, 398 ; purposes of his 
Mexican expedition, 422, 423 ; 
relations with Maximilian, 431, 
432 ; decision as to war with the 
United States, 438 ; wishes to 
postpone withdrawal of French 
troops from Mexico, 439. 

Native-American party, i., 136. See 
"Know-Nothing" party. 

Nebraska, extent aud position of, 
i., 334, 335. 

Nelson, Justice, ii., 113. 

Neutrality, proclamation of, by 
Great Britain, France, Spain, 
the Netherlands, Prussia, and 
other nations, ii., 176, 179. 

Neutrals, property of, safe from 
capture when not contraband 
of war, ii., 181. 

Newcastle, Duke of, Seward's re- 
mark to, ii., 225, 226. 

Nott, Eliphalet, i., 4. 

Office-seekers, ii., 94. 

" Osteud Manifesto," i., 471, 472. 

Pacific, commerce in, ii., 66-68. 

Pacific Railroad, ii., 58-60. 

Palmerstou, Lord, ii., 75, 209 ; in 
regard to Trent affair, 226 ; on 
Federals at Bull Run, 303 ; after 
second battle of Bull Run, 304 ; 
reason for cbange of mind, 307 ; 
on slavery and. Morrill tariff, 
330. 

Paris, declaration of, ii., 187. 

Parker, Theodore, i., 433. 

Partou, James, ii., 480 n. 

Peerless, incident of the, ii., 225. 



Pendergrast,G. J., proclaims block- 
ade of Virginia and North Caro- 
lina coasts, ii., 206, 207. 

Pendleton, John, letter to Seward, 
Appendix D. 

People's party, i., 16. 

Peterhoff, the, ii., 378. 

Petigru, J. L., ii., 107. 

Pickens, Governor, ii., 36. 

Pierce, Franklin, i., 304, 305 ; an- 
nual message of, 1855, 401, 402, 
484; issues proclamation against 
lawlessness in Kansas, 402 ; last 
annual message of, 432 ; Sew- 
ard's mistreatment of, ii., 271- 
276. 

Pierrepont, Edwards, ii., 278. 

Pinkertou, Allan, ii., 278. 

Pius IX., ii., 76. 

Polk, James K., i., 144. 

Pope, John, ii., 296. 

Porter, David D., ordered to com- 
mand relief of Fort Pickens, ii., 
129, 130, 139, 480 n. 

Powhatan, the, ii., 130, 139, 143, 
144. 

Prentice, George D., efforts in be- 
half of political prisoners, ii., 
265 ff. 

Price, Sterling, ii., 296. 

Prisoners, political, ii., 254, 258 ; 
Seward's system, 259-263 ; sam- 
ple cases, 263 n. ; correspond- 
ence in the Pierce case, 271-276; 
none brought to trial, 276; gen- 
eral policy toward, 277 ; treat- 
ment of, 277, 278 ; system criti- 
cised, 278, 279 ; Stanton takes 
cbarge, 279; the result, 280; 
"little bell" story, 280. 

Privateers, to be treated as pi- 
rates, i., 171 ; employment of, 
lawful only in time of war, 175 ; 
French commerce threatened by, 
175, 391. 

Public lands, extent of, ii., 51 ; 
how controlled and disposed of, 
51 ; Seward on, 52-57; Footo on, 
52 ; Douglas on, 52 ; Dawson on, 
51 «., 52. 



562 



INDEX 



Rams, English ironclad, ii., 389; 
French, 394. 

Rappahannock, the, ii., 385. 

Rassloff, ii., 481, 482. 

Raymond, Henry J., i., 367, 368, 
371, 417, 532; blamed Greeley for 
Seward's failure to be nominated 
in 1860, 540, 541; on Seward's 
reply to Drouyn de Lhuys, ii., 
313,*314 ; defends Seward, 370. 

Raynor, Kenneth, ii., 39. 

Rechberg. ii., 77. 

Recognition by Great Britain 
would be intervention and war, 
ii., 162 ; rumors that the Con- 
federacy offered emaucipatiou 
for recognition, 331. 

Reconstruction, ii., 443 ff. ; real 
difficulties of, 443 ; progress of, 
451 ; dissatisfaction with re- 
sults of the presidential plan 
of, 452 ; act of March 2, 1867, 
463, 464 ; reconstruction, con- 
gressional, ii., 463, 464 ; Repub- 
lican platform, 1868, on success 
of, 466, 467 ; Democratic plat- 
form on, 466, 467. 

Reeder, Andrew H., i., 333, 334. 

Registration law, i., 116, 117. 

Removals from office, i., 14. 

Republican party, birth of, i., 364 ; 
first large convention of, 364 ; 
Free - Soilers, anti - Nebraska 
Democrats, and Whigs cannot 
agree on any other name, 364, 
365 ; Whig party absorbed by, 
336, 337 ; important additions 
to, in the Congress of 1855-6, 
400 ; conventions of 1856, 417- 
421 ; objects of, announced, 417, 
413; modifies its policy to gain 
votes, 419 ; grateful to Douglas 
for defeating Buchanan and the 
South on the Kansas question, 
455 ; convention of 1860, 523 
ff. ; adopts platform, 533, 534 ; 
dilemma in winter of 1860-61, 
ii., 6 ; alone could not save the 
Union, 35 ; Seward and Chase 
factions, 41; responsibilities 



after March 4, 1361, 91; con- 
vention of 1864, 406. 

Republican radicals, ii., 353 ; try 
to organize a party at Cleve- 
land, 405, 406. 

Reunion convention at Philadel- 
phia, August, 1866, 459, 460. 

River and harbor improvements, 
ii., 60, 61. 

Rives, William C, ii., 30. 

Roman, A. B., ii., 107, 120. See 
Confederate commissioners to 
Washington. 

Root, of Ohio, efforts to exclude 
slavery from California and New 
Mexico, i., 203. 

Rost, Pierre A., ii., 165, 166, 184. 

Russell, Lord John (afterward 
Earl), ii., 75 ; assures our Min- 
ister no advantage will be 
taken of domestic troubles in 
United States, 163; announces 
intention to be neutral, 163 ; ac- 
quiesces in expediency of disre- 
garding mere rumors, 176 ; un- 
der no obligation to postpone 
decision, 177 ; letter to Everett, 
exposition of opinions of British 
government, 177 n., 178 «.; does 
not expect to see the Confeder- 
ate commissioners again, 179; 
says that ports in the possession 
of the enemy cannot be closed 
by the other belligerent, except 
by blockade, 185; attitude to- 
ward conditions proposed by 
United States for signing dec- 
laration of Paris, 189 ff. ; argu- 
ment in Bunch case, 202; sends 
to Lyons ultimatum in Trent 
aftair, 226; modifies ultimatum, 
226 ; subsequent private instruc- 
tions, 226; reply to Seward's 
argument in Trent affair, 250 
n. ; contrasts objects of North 
and South, 303 ; after second 
battle of Bull Run, 304; reason 
for change of mind, 307 ; less 
friendly toward the South, 322; 
reply to Seward about blockade 



563 



INDEX 



running, 381, 332 ; prevents de- 
parture of rams, 389 ; explains 
silence as to Seward's threats, 
390, 391 ; protest to Confederacy 
against building ships in Eng- 
land, 393 ; rejects Alabama 
claims, 492, 493. 

Russell, W. H., on Seward's man- 
ner as a talker, ii., 511. 

Russia, attitude toward the Con- 
federacy, ii., 134, 135 n. ; reply 
to Napoleon, 303 ; why Alaska 
was sold, 476 ; seutimout of 
United States toward, 478, 479. 

Russian-American Co., ii., 470. 

St. John, negotiations in regard 
to purchase of, ii., 480-486. 

St. Thomas, negotiations in regard 
to purchase of, ii., 480-86. 

Saligny, M. de, ii., 423. 

Santa Cruz, ii., 431. 

Santo Domingo, Republic of, re- 
ported overthrow of, ii., 134 ; 
declares for supremacy of Spain, 
157 ; Seward writes to Tassara 
in relation to, 157 ; Schurz di- 
rected to protest, 158 ; subject 
of Spanish intervention left to 
Congress, 159 ; Spanish rule 
thrown off and republic re- 
vived, 159 ; Seward's attempts 
to annex, 486-489. 

Saturday Review on preliminary 
proclamation of emancipation, 
ii., 340. 

Schofield, J. M., plan to expel the 
French from Mexico, ii., 434 ; 
hoodwinked by Seward, 435. 

School question in New York, i., 
96-101. 

Schurz, Carl, remark to Chase, i., 
526 ; becomes Minister to Spain, 
ii., 153; asks for instructions, 
158; advises that antislavery 
principles be made conspicuous, 
323, 324. 

Scott, Robert E., ii., 30, 39, 40. 

Scott, Winfield, i., 153; candidate 
for Whig nomination, 301 ; nom- 



inated for presidency, 302, 303 ; 
telegraphs acceptance of presi- 
dential nomination, 306 ; de- 
feated by Pierce, 309 ; concern 
about Lincoln's safe arrival, ii., 
40 ; relations with the forts, 93, 
94 ; letter of March 3, 1861, to 
Seward, 96 ; relations with Sew- 
ard, 123-127; writes to Lincoln 
an opinion concerning Forts 
Sumter and Pickens, 125 ; con- 
flict of orders as to reinforcement 
of Fort Pickens, 139, 140 ; de- 
sires a semi-diplomatic position, 
221. 

Secession, i., 218, 223, 225, 234, 235, 
283, 287, 288, 289 ; Seward on, 
549, 550 ; Shermau on, 551 ; 
Lowell on, 551 ; Greeley on, 551. 

Seddon, James A., ii., 22. 

Sedgwick, Charles B., i., 160. 

Segar, Joseph, letter to Seward, 
Appendix I. 

Semmes, Raphael, ii., 382. 

Seward, Augustus H., i., 203. 

Seward, Clarence A., L, 203. 

Seward, Fanny, i., 203 ; death of, 
ii., 507. 

Seward, Frances Miller (Mrs. Will- 
iam H.), aversion to slavery, 
i., 57 ; congratulates Sumner 
on repeal of fugitive-slave-law 
speech, 308 ; satisfied with Sew- 
ard's speech against the Toucey 
bill, 383 ; writes to Sumner, ii., 
34 ; variety of her guests at a 
dinner party, 70 ; receives daily 
letter from Soward, 71 ; death of, 
506. 

Soward, Frederick W., i., 56, 203; 
ii., 28; letter on Russia's atti- 
tude at outbreak of the Rebel- 
lion, 134 n. 

Seward, John, i., 1. 

Seward, Olive Risley, accompanies 
Seward around the world, ii., 
521 ; aids Seward in literary pur- 
suits, 524. 

Soward, Samuel S., i., 2; scant 
allowance imperils sou's career, 



564 



INDEX 



5; unfortunate disposition of, 
8 ; death, 204. 

Seward, William Henry. 

Vol. I. 

Early years. — Ancestors, 1, 2; ear- 
liest recollections, 2 ; school life, 
2, 3; first impressions of Albany, 
4 ; enters Union College, 4 ; per- 
sonal appearance and ambition, 
5 ; college experiences, 5, 6, 9, 10; 
leaves college and goes to Geor- 
gia, 7, 8 ; reads law, 9, 10 ; part- 
nership with Ogden Hoffman, 
10; admitted to practise, 11; 
partnership with Elijah Miller, 
11 ; marriage, 12 ; campaign of 
1824, 16 ; denounces Albany Re- 
gpncy and the caucus system, 
18, 19; campaign of 1826, 20; 
first experience as applicant for 
public office, 20, 21 ; president of 
young men's convention, 21,22; 
ludicrously nominated to Con- 
gress, 22, 23 ; member of com- 
mittee to receive Lafayette, 23 ; 
early public speeches, 23, 24 ; 
joins Anti-masonic party, 29; 
delegate to the state and to the 
national conventions,30; alliance 
with Weed, 31 ; resolution con- 
demning freemasonry, 32 n.) at 
national Anti-masonic conven- 
tion, 33; nominated as an Anti- 
masonic candidate to state sen- 
ate, 34 ; elected, 35. 

State Senator. — Describes Weed, 
38, 39 ; first resolution in senate 
and first speech, 40; militia ser- 
vice, 40; advocates popular elec- 
tions, 41 ; favors re-charter of 
the Bank of the United States, 
42-45; champions Jackson's at- 
titude toward nullifiers, 46; po- 
litical visit to Massachusetts, 47 ; 
campaign of 1831, 49 ; European 
travels, 49; describes "life legis- 
lative," 50 n.; offered bribe, 51; 
self-judgments, 51, 52. 



Waiting for the rise of the Whig 
party. — Nominated for governor 
of New York, 54, 55; first poli- 
tical farewell, 56 ; three-mouths' 
driving trip, 56, 57 ; connection 
with Holland Land Company, 
58, 59 ; speech on panic of 
1836-1837, 62; political rival of 
Granger, 63-66; again nominated 
for governor, 66 ; test questions 
of abolitionists, 69-72; elected 
governor, 72, 73. 

Governor of New York. — Acknowl- 
edgment to Weed, 78 ; applica- 
tions for office, 80, 81 ; protects 
Weed as public printer, 82 ; atti- 
tude toward the spoils system, 
83-85; opinions on internal im- 
provements, 87-96 ; school ques- 
tion, 96-101 ; letter to Bishop 
Hughes, 99; fugitive slaves, 
101-107 ; offered nomination to 
Congress, 107 ; " Helderberg 
War," 108-110; McLeod incident, 
111-116; Registration law, 116, 
117; prison reform, 117-119; use 
of pardoning power, 120-126 ; 
letter to R. M. Blatchford con- 
cerningWebb pardon, 124, 125 ?».; 
reasons for not seeking a third 
term, 127, 123 ; further acknowl- 
edgments to Weed, 129, 130. 

Retirement and politics, 1843-49. — 
Financial ombarrassmeuts, 131- 
134 ; applies toWeed,132; native- 
born and naturalized citizens, 
136, 137 ; sympathy with Irish 
agitators, 137, 133 ; letter to col- 
ored citizens, 139, 140; declines 
to become candidate for nomi- 
nation by the abolitionists, 140; 
loyalty to Clay and Whig prin- 
ciples, 141; addresses Whig mass- 
meeting, 142; campaign of 1844, 
146-151 ; trip to Lake Superior, 
152; visits Washington, 152, 153; 
visits Richmond, 153 ; visits the 
West and South, 153-155 ; reply 
to Chase, 161 ; defence of Whig 
party, 162, 163 ; speech at Cleve- 



565 



INDEX 



laud, 164 ; campaign praise of 
Taylor and the Whigs, 165-168; 
Whig opposition to, 169, 170 ; 
pledges his loyalty to the Whigs, 
169; elocted to United States 
Senate, 170. 

As a lawyer. — Dislike of the 
law as a profession, 171; finan- 
cial and legal successes, 172—183; 
Wyatt case, 174, 175 ; Freeman 
case, 174-180 ; Van Zaudt caso, 
180, 181 ; Fitch case, 181 ; suc- 
cess with patent cases, 181, 182; 
personal appearance, 184. 

Early personal traits and charac- 
teristics. — Literary tastes, 185, 
186; horticultural experiences, 
186, 187 ; fondness for domestic 
pets, 188, 189 ; as a writer, 189 ; 
as an orator, 190-193 ; eulogy of 
John QuincyAdams, 193 ; humor, 
194 ; optimism, 194-196, 198 ; 
use of patronage, 196, 197 ; hab- 
itual politeness, 199 ; personal 
influence of John Quincy Adams 
and Thurlow Weed, 200, 201; 
domestic relations, 201-204 ; his 
children, 203 n. 

United States Senator: Whig leader. 
— Relations with Taylor, 207; 
outwits Fillmore, 213-216; Fa- 
ther Mathew incident, 219-221 ; 
preservation of the Union and 
final abolition of slavery, 226 ; 
says conscience of the age has 
outgrown Webster, 241 ; " high- 
er-law" speech, 243-251; con- 
temporary estimates of the 
" higher-law " speech, 252-258 ; 
expressions similar to the "high- 
er-law" declaration, 258-262; 
justifies his "higher -law" 
speech, 263, 264 ; comments 
on fellow-Senators, 272, 273; 
speech on Texas question, 274 ; 
protests against a mixed bill, 
274, 275 ; Taylor's chief coun- 
sellor, 275 ; speech on " Freedom 
in the new territories " 275- 
278 ; threatened with expulsion 

566 



from the Senate, 279 n. ; " the 
President's plan," 281 ; compen- 
sated abolition of slavery in the 
District, 282-284; reason for 
autislavery sentiments, 290; 
ideas for amending the fugitive- 
slave law, 292 ; proposed amend- 
ment to fugitive-slave laws, 
292, 293 ; allegiance sought by 
opposing political parties, 293, 
294 ; states his position on the 
compromise and fugitive-slave 
laws, 295 ; the Union co-exist- 
ent with the Constitution, 295, 
296; goes bail for the leaders in 
the "Jerry rescue," 296 ; indif- 
ferent to campaign of 1851, 297 ; 
greeting to Sumner, 298 ; helps 
to strengthen Scott's candida- 
cy for Whig nomination, 300 ; 
promises Mrs. So ward to stand 
by his principles, 302 ; desirous 
of resigning from the Senate, 
303 ; withdraws from active par- 
ticipation in campaign, 306 ; ac- 
tion and inaction on question of 
fugitive-slave-lawrepeal,307,308; 
lack of courage helps to bring 
defeat, 309, 310 ; political advice 
to Sumner, 312 ; moves for na- 
tional welcome to Kossuth, 314 ; 
member of Kossuth reception 
committee, 315 ; pledges his 
support to the cause of Hun- 
gary, 315; resolutions condemn- 
ing Russia's treatment of Hun- 
gary, 316, 317 ; speech in sup- 
port of resolutions, 318-321; on 
the end of the Kossuth inci- 
dent, 322 ; resolution and speech 
expressing sympathy with ex- 
iled Irish "patriots," 323-327; 
speech on the fishery question, 
329-331 ; political position in 
December, 1853, 343; imagines 
himself the solitary champion 
of liberty, 344 ; suggests a way 
to defeat Douglas's bill to re- 
peal the Missouri compromise, 
344 ; disclaims responsibility for 



INDEX 



" The Appeal of the Indepen- 
dent Democrats," 345; excuses 
himself from taking part in anti- 
slavery meetings, 345 ; speech 
on repeal of Missouri compro- 
mise, 346-350 ; final argument 
against repeal, 357-359. 
United States Senator: Republican 
leader. — Holds aloof from any 
now party, 365, 360 ; writes to 
Weed about Greeley, 373, 374; 
too lightly regards Greeley's 
chagrin, 374 ; retards formation 
of national antislavery party, 
375 ; re - chosen Senator, 376, 
377 ; puhlic rejoicings and pri- 
vate congratulations, 377, 378; 
prompt acknowledgments to 
Weed, 378 ; speech against " sup- 
plemental fugitive-slave law," 
381, 382 ; wishes to become fore- 
most antislavery leader, 387 ; 
Albany speech, the u Advent of 
the Republican Party," 388-391; 
Buffalo speech, the "Contest 
and the Crisis," 391-393; receives 
hearty congratulations, 394; be- 
lieves the Know-Nothing par- 
ty ephemeral, 395 ; relations 
with the radical abolitionists, 
395, 396 ; Plymouth speech, 395- 
397; speech to admit Kansas 
with tho Topeka constitution, 
404-407 ; gives away thousands 
of copies of his speech, 408 n. ; 
course pursued in regard to 
assault on Sumner, 411-415 ; de- 
clines to meet the promoters of 
an anti-administration conven- 
tion, 416 ; letter to Weed on 
demoralization of Republican 
party, 419 ; disappointment at 
not being chosen Republican 
candidate, 420 ; letters to Mrs. 
Seward on tho same, 420 n., 
421 ; speeches on admission of 
Kansas, 425, 427 ; speech at De- 
troit on the "Dominant Class," 
429, 430; answer to invitation 
to attend a disunion conven- 



tion, 435, 436; plan to divide 
the Democrats on question of 
admitting Kansas, 444 ; speech 
on u Freedom in Kansas," 446- 
450; speech on English's Kan- 
sas bill, 453 ; " irrepressible-con- 
flict" speech at Rochester, 458- 
461 ; "irrepressible conflict" not 
a new idea, 461-463 ; speech at 
Rome, N. Y., 463 ; announced 
as Republican standard-bearer 
for 1860, 465 ; as an expansion- 
ist, 467 ; in the opposition on tho 
Cuban question, 473, 474 ; letter 
to Daua on the Cuban question, 
475, 476 ; clash between the 
Cuban and the homestead ques- 
tions, 476-478 ; speech on pro- 
posed Tehuantepec route, 480, 
481 ; speech in defence of Tay- 
lor's construction of the Clay- 
ton-Bulwer treaty, 482-484 ; 
speeches attacking Great Brit- 
ain and in support of the Presi- 
dent's annual message, 484-488 ; 
writes to Weed concerning an- 
nual message, 488; non-com- 
mittal on proposed arbitration, 
490 ; opposes granting tho Pres- 
ident tho right to declare war 
against Mexico, etc., 491, 492 ; 
prospects of being presidential 
nominee, 493 ; starts for Europe 
and receives unique ovation, 
494; welcomed home, 508-510; 
eulogy on Broderick, 510, 511 ; 
resolution for admission of Kan- 
sas under Wyandotte constitu- 
tion, 511 ; speech, 511-517 ; as- 
sists Tribune correspondent in 
writing an account, 517 ; print- 
ed copies of speech distributed 
broadcast, 518 and n. ; beneficial 
effects of speech on presidential 
nomination prospects, 518, 519 ; 
prospects for presidential nomi- 
nation, 522-526 ; his popularity 
at Chicago convention, 531, 532 ; 
opponents of his nomination, 
534-536; his supporters confi- 



5G7 



INDEX 



dent of success, 536, 537 ; the 
ballots for, 533 ; disappointment 
of liis friends, 539 and ?;. ; cour- 
ageously faces Lis defeat, 542- 
545 ; midsummer recreation trip, 
546; speech-making tour, 546- 
550 ; active in New York can- 
vass, 550, 551 ; complimented by 
James Russell Lowell, 551. 

Vol. II. 

The winter of 1860-1861.— Remarks 
after election of 1860, 1, 2 ; out- 
look at Washington, 2, 7 ; ridi- 
cules Buchanan's message, 3 ; 
leadership, 1860-1861, 7 ; speech 
at dinner of New England So- 
ciety, 7-9 ; propositions for rec- 
onciliation, 9, 14, 15 ; on excite- 
ment, etc., iu Washington, 11 ; 
speech of January 12, 1861, 12-17; 
speech of January 31st, 17, 18 ; 
good effects of his declarations, 
19; activity, 20-22; comments 
on draft of Lincoln's inaugural, 
23,24; has Gwin write to Davis, 
25 ; relations with Weed as to 
compromise, 26-29; equivocal, 
30; says Crittenden compromise 
is necessary to satisfy border 
states, 30 ; favors constitutional 
convention, 32, 33 ; non-com- 
mittal attitude, 33; promises to 
Mrs. Seward, 34 ; two chief aims, 
35, 36 ; subsequent explanation 
of purpose in February, 1861, 36 
«.; effects of policy, 37 ; self-con- 
scious bearing, 37, 38; invited 
to become Secretary of State, 
38, 39 n. ; letter to Lincoln on 
jiolitical affairs, 39 ; desires to 
have southern Unionists in Cab- 
inet, 39 ; fears outbreak in 
Washington before inaugura- 
tion, 40 ; early attentions to 
Lincoln, 40; rumors of being 
sent to the court of St. James, 
42 n. ; asks permission to with- 
draw his acceptance of the in- 



vitation to become Secretary of 
State, 44 ; self-appreciation, 44 ; 
again accepts the secretaryship, 
44 ; reasons therefor, 45. 
Miscellaneous opinions. — A federal- 
ist and protectionist, 46 ; on 
protection, 48; on free -trade, 

48, 49 ; votes for reciprocity 
treaty with Canada, 49 ; ad- 
vocates protection principles 
in revision of tariff of 1857, 

49, 50; amendment on ware- 
house system approved, 50; 
unsuccessful effort to reduce 
tariff on books, etc., 50, 51 ; 
opinions on public lands, 52- 
57 ; on naturalization laws, 53 
and n. ; homestead and mining 
privileges, 53, 54 ; favors Loui- 
siana improvement of naviga- 
tion bill, 54-56 ; scheme to 
utilize public lands for compen- 
sated emancipation, 56, 57 ; 
opinions regarding internal im- 
provements, 57-61 ; urges build- 
ing of Pacific railroad, 58-60; 
approves of river and harbor 
bills, 61 ; speech on ship subsi- 
dies, 63 ; defends Collins con- 
tract, 64-66; efforts on behalf 
of Atlantic cable, 66; speech 
on commerce in the Pacific, etc., 
67-69. 

The Man and the Senator, 1849-61. 
— His dinners and receptions, 
70, 71 ; his personal habits, 71, 
72 and n. ; his trip to Labrador, 
73-75 ; royal and social atten- 
tions received in England, 75, 
76; visits France, 76; Italy, 76; 
Egypt, 76, 77 ; voyage on fruit- 
boat, 77 ; visits Austria and Bel- 
gium, 77; his oratory, genius 
for expression, and imagination, 
77-79 ; four formal addresses, 
79; distribution of political 
speeches, 80 ; political self-con- 
trol, 80, 81 ; senatorial bearing, 
81, 82; relation with South- 
erners, 82-84 ; alleged insiu- 



568 



INDEX 



ccrity, 84, 89 ; stanch partisan, 
85, 89 ; pledges to Whig party, 
85 ; two distinct roles, 86, 87 ; 
letters to Gerrit Smith and 
Theodore Parker, 87 n. ; oppor- 
tunist, 88 ; his political rank, 
89, 90. 
Secretary of State, 1861.— Difficul- 
ties and opportunities as Secre- 
tary of State, 91 ; self-import- 
ance and plans, 95, 96 ; relations 
with Scott, 95, 96, 123-127 ; ac- 
tivity, 97 ; favors evacuation of 
Fort Sumter, 97-100; how he 
expected to avert civil war and 
disunion, 101 ff. ; relations with 
Gwin, 108-111 ; opinion of, held 
by Confederate commissioners 
to Washington, 108-110, 118- 
120; indirect relations with com- 
missioners, 110; interview with 
Hunter, 112; inadequacy of his 
policy, 118-122; struggle for 
supremacy, 123-149; assures 
commissioners thero will be no 
change in status, 125, 126 ; 
response of March 29th con- 
cerning Forts Sumter and 
Pickens, 127, 128; recommends 
Meigs as commandant of Flo- 
rida fortresses on the Gulf, 
128; requests preparation of 
project for the relief of Fort 
Pickens, 129 ; assumes the man- 
agement of Fort Pickens expe- 
dition and furnishes money from 
secret-service fund, 130; inter- 
view with Campbell, 130, 131 ; 
in dire straits, 131, 132 ; " Some 
Thoughts for the President's 
Consideration," 132, 133; for- 
eign policy explained, 135-136, 
157-160 ; unifying effect of a 
foreign war, 137 ; confusion and 
conflict of orders as to the 
Powhatan, 138, 139, 144 ; com- 
munications with Confederate 
commissioners terminated and 
judged, 140-142, 146-148 and 
notes, 149; two serious charges, 

569 



144; Harvey incident, 145, 146; 
two supreme illusions,149; quali- 
fications and disqualifications for 
duties of Secretary of State, 150, 
151 ; guest at Governor Morgan's 
dinner to Prince of Wales, 154 ; 
first instructions to United 
States Ministers abroad, 156, 
157 ; course pursued in regard 
to Spanish seizure of Santo Do- 
mingo, 157-159 ; declares Russia 
an early and constant friend, 
160 ; erroneous conception of the 
war in its early stages, 160, 161 ; 
authority of the Union will not 
bo abrogated nor coercion used 
to preserve it, 161 ; defends Mor- 
rill tariff law, 162 ; instructions 
of May 4th to Dayton, 164, 165; 
despatch and instructions given 
to the press, 165 ; makes his lan- 
guage moro emphatic each week, 
165; excited by agreement be- 
tween France and Great Britain, 
168; egotistic letter of May 17th, 
169 ; instructions of May 21, 
1861, to Adams, 169-174; says 
crisis is reached, 169 ; policy 
to be pursued, 169, 170 ; joint 
action noticed in friendly terms, 
170 ; the blockade to be re- 
spected, 170; recognition not to 
go unquestioned, 170, 171 ; priva- 
teersmen to be treated as pirates, 
171 ; war with foreign powers 
might bo the outcome of the 
struggle at home, 171 ; Great 
Britain warned not to alienate 
her only natural ally, 172; orig- 
inal instructions modified by 
Lincoln, 172, 173 and «.; letter 
to Weed on foreign relations, 
174 ; statement in 1862 concern- 
ing position held by Federal 
government the year previous, 
175; complains against Great 
Britain, 176, 177 ; courteous 
phrases to be read to Russell 
and Thouvcucl, 179 ; foreign 
neutrality a death-blow to pri- 



INDEX 



vateering, 180 ; thwarts attempt 
of British and French ministers 
to act jointly, 180, 181 ; official 
explanation to Adams and Day- 
ton, 182; special instructions to 
Adams concerning mediation, 
183; to Dayton concerning for- 
eign interference, 183; attitude 
of the government toward for- 
eign nations recognizing bellig- 
erency of the insurgents, 183, 
184; question of effective or 
paper blockade, 185, 186 ; desire 
to avert a foreign war the rea- 
son for opposing recognition of 
insurgents, 186; plan concerning 
recognition of belligerency, 187 ; 
reasons why the United States 
should accede to declaration of 
Paris, 188 ff. ; accession of United 
States to, equally binding on 
Confederacy, 189 ; replies to 
British and French objections 
to signing the convention, 192, 
193 ; policy toward neutrals, 195 ; 
learns of Bunch's negotiations, 
199 ; instructs Adams to request 
that Bunch be removed, 200; 
upholds the rights and dignity 
of the United States, 200, 201 
and n.; requests recall of Rus- 
sian consul at Charleston, 203 ; 
believed by Europe to be count- 
ing on foreign war, 203 ; state- 
ments to Lyons concerning 
blockade, 206; reply concerning 
Charleston blockade, 207, 208; 
fears of intervention, 210, 211 ; 
not cast down by Bull Run, 211; 
circular letter to governors, 212, 
213; reviews Thouveuel's plan 
for obtaining cottou, 214, 215; 
replies to Thouvenel, 215-219 ; 
plan to influence European pub- 
lic opinion, 220, 221 ; regarded 
as unfriendly to Great Britain, 
224-226. 
The Trent affair.— In Trent affair, 
223-253; wins President and 
Cabinet to his views on Trent 

5 



affair, 235, 236; argument in 
Trent affair, 237-242 ; its influ- 
ence, 243, 244 ; writes to Weed 
of his course in the Trent affair, 
244, 245 ; letter to Mrs. Seward 
on public opinion, 244, 245 ; 
grants permission to laud Brit- 
ish troops and munitions of war 
in United States, 245 ; argument 
in Trent affair judged, 246-252; 
"rejoinder" to Russell's reply, 
251 ; result accomplished, 253. 

Seward and political prisoners. — 
Reply to suggestion of Hicks, 
254, 255 ; warned and criticised, 
255 n. ; plan to prevent secession 
of Maryland, 256 ; in supreme 
control of political prisoners, 
258, 280 ; system, 259-263, 276- 
279 ; cases of Gwiu, Morehead, 
Faulkner, and Jones, 264-269 ; 
cases of Stanley and Ward, 269- 
270; treatment of ex-President 
Pierce, 271-275 ; comments and 
conclusions, 276-280. 

Seicard and the question of Euro- 
pean intervention, 1862-1863. — 
Stone - fleet a temporary ex- 
pedient, 283 ; fears interven- 
tion early in 1862, 284; ac- 
tivity and misrepresentation 
after McClellan's campaign, 287 ; 
warnings against intervention, 
288, 289 ; August 2, 1862, in- 
structions to Adams on inter- 
vention, 294-296; opinion of 
Mercier, 298 and n. ; attitude of 
France toward North and South, 
299-301; value of warnings 
against recognition, 305 ; con- 
tinues to insist upon absolute 
sovereignty, 308, 309 ; treatment 
of France's proposal to Great 
Britain and Russia, 309 ; reply 
to Napoleon's proposition of 
January, 1863, 312, 313 ; various 
expressions against European 
intervention, 315. 

Seward's treatment of slavery and 
foreign relations. — Slavery a do- 

70 



INDEX 



mestic affair and not involved 
in the war, 317, 318 ; Lis incon- 
sistency, 318 ; theory as to para- 
mount issue, approved, 319 ; re- 
plies to Sclmrz, 324-327 ; de- 
nounced as Lincoln's evil genius, 
327 ; views on slavery and for- 
eign relations, 328-330 ; sur- 
prised by Lincoln's change of 
policy, 333 ; comment on Lin- 
coln's plan of compensated 
emancipation, 333 ; fears result 
of emancipation, 333-335 ; sug- 
gestion of delay accepted, 335; 
questions Motley, 330 ; sugges- 
tions as to provisions of prelimi- 
nary proclamation, 330, 337 ; 
on the preliminary proclama- 
tion, 337, 338 ; receives Jay's 
suggestions as to treaty for the 
suppressiou of the slave-trade, 
343, 344 ; exclamation on ratifi- 
cation of treaty against the 
slave-trade, 344, 345 ; unfavora- 
ble to colonizing free negroes, 
345, 340 and n. ; circular de- 
spatch to United States Minis- 
ters on colonization, 340, 347 ; 
attitude toward slavery ex- 
plained, 347, 348. 
Some miscellaneous activities and 
trials. — His egotism and activity, 
349, 350 ; activity in connection 
with War Department, 350-353 ; 
device by which 300,000 recruits 
were procured, 352-353; rela- 
tions with Welles and Navy De- 
partment, 353-355; relations 
with Departments of Justice 
and the Treasury, 355, 350 ; 
plan of filling offices, 350; re- 
lations with the Post-office De- 
partment, 357 ; relations with 
Lincoln, 357, 358 ; leader of con- 
servative Unionists, 3 j8 ; blamed 
for failures of 1801, 359 ; receives 
credit for management of Trent 
affair, 300 ; some opinions ex- 
plained, 300 ; attacked by radi- 
cals, 303-305 ; despatch of July 



5th, 1802, about extreme advo- 
cates, 305; effort of Republican 
Senators to cause Seward's re- 
moval, 300, 307 ; Mercier's trip 
to Richmond, 370-372; some 
traits, 373. 

Blockade-running and building Con- 
federate tear- ships. — Trade at 
Matamoras, 378, 379 ; on right 
to prevent the export of contra- 
band articles, 379, 380 ; thinks 
British government should check 
blockade-running, 380-382 ; in- 
structions as to Alabama claims, 
385, 3SG ; on capture of Jacob 
Bell, 380 ; warning as to rams, 
388 ; end of peaceful resources, 
390 ; favored privateers, 391 ; 
subtle inconsistencies, 392 ; in- 
structions to Dayton about 
Confederate ships, 395-397; one- 
war -at -a- time policy, 397, 
398; well- chosen methods of 
negotiation, 399 ; speech, July, 
1803, 400, 401 ; egotism, 400, 40i ; 
writes proclamation calling for 
day of thanksgiving, 401 ; speech 
at Gettysburg, 402 ; gives up 
presidential aspirations, 403- 
405 ; jocose letter about candi- 
dacy for presidential nomina- 
tion in 1804, 404 ; on convention 
of 1804, 400 ; sounds keynote of 
campaign of 1804, 408 ; goes to 
Hampton Roads conference, 411- 
413 ; favors compensated eman- 
cipation, 414 ; on course of events 
early in 1805, 415 ; 410 ; carriage 
accident, 410 ; attempted assas- 
sination of, 417; on plots and 
conspiracies for assassination, 
418. 

Attitude toward French intervention 
in Mexico. — His most perfect 
achievement in diplomacy, 419 ; 
decliues to become party to 
Loudon convention, 421, 422 ; 
recognizes right of powers to 
make war on Mexico, 422; in- 
structions to Dayton, March 31, 

1 



INDEX 



1862, 425 ; advantage of one- 
war-at-a-time policy, 426, 427 ; 
declines to recognize Maximil- 
ian, 427 ; opinion of House reso- 
lutions and President's policy, 
429, 430 ; purpose as to France 
during 1S63 and 1864, 430 ; on 
importance of avoiding war with 
France, 430, 431 ; on a peaceable 
solution of the Mexican ques- 
tion, 432, 433 ; keeps Franco 
balanced between her hopes 
and fears, 432 ; disorganizes 
military plans to expel the 
French from Mexico, 435 ; un- 
published private letters to 
Eigelow about Mexican affairs, 
435 ii. 3 ; becomes more peremp- 
tory with France, 436, 437; ulti- 
matum to France, 437 ; cables 
refusal to allow French troops 
to delay departure, 439 ; pre- 
vents departure of Austrian 
troops for Mexico, 440, 441 ; up- 
holds Monroe doctrine, but does 
not mention it, 441, 442. 
Seicard's part in reconstruction. — 
His magnanimity during recon- 
struction period, 444, 448 ; eager 
to resume work, 445, 446 ; has 
important tasks to perform, 448 ; 
speaks in Auburn during cam- 
paign of 1865, 449 ; declarations 
in regard to reconstruction, 
449, 450 ; good opinion of John- 
son, 451, 452 ; proclamation an- 
nouncing ratification of the 
XIII. Amendment, 452; speech 
in New York city February 22, 
1866, in defence of presidential 
plan, 453-455 ; opinions ex- 
pressed to Norton and Godkin 
about reconstruction, 455-457 
n. ; speech in Auburn, May 22, 
1866, 456, 457 ; explanation of 
attitude of, in regard to recon- 
struction, 453; entertains Ten- 
nessee delegation, 459; relation 
to tbo Philadelphia convention 
of August, 1866,459; swinging- 



around-the-circle trip, 460-463 ; 
estimate of Douglas, 461, 462 ; 
how regarded by contempo- 
raries, 462, 463 ; supposed to 
have helped prepare veto of 
tenure-of-office bill, 465 ; opinion 
of the attempt to impeach John- 
son, 466; in campaign of 1868, 
467, 468; relations witli Lincoln 
and Johnson regarding recon- 
struction, 468, 469. 

As territorial expansionist. — Aspi- 
rations for territorial expansion, 
470 ff. ; expects City of Mexico 
to become capital of the United 
States, 471 ; counter-prophecies 
concerning Canada, 472 ; desires 
expansion by peaceful means 
only, 473 ; the purchase of Alas- 
ka, 474-479; negotiations for 
purchase of St. Thomas, etc., 481- 
486 ; trip to West Indies, 481, 482 ; 
unwilling to consult inhabitants 
of St. Thomas, etc., as to annex- 
ation, 483 ; Washburn's opinions 
of, in regard to territorial acqui- 
sitions, 485 «.; opposed by Grant 
regarding St. Thomas, 486; at- 
tempt to annex Santo Domingo, 
486-489 ; wishes to annex Ha- 
waii, 489; acts of, judged, 490, 
491. 

Alabama Claims and some traits as 
Secretary of State. — Alabama 
claims must be insisted on, 385, 
386, 492, 493 ; formally presents 
Alabama claims and complains 
of recognition of Confederate 
belligerency, 494, 495; rejoinder 
to Stanley, 496; urges settlement 
of naturalization, boundary, and 
Alabama claims questions, 496 ; 
instructions to Reverdy John- 
son, 498 ; disappointment on 
account of defeat of Johnson- 
Clarendon convention, 500; per- 
sonal appearance, 500, 501 ; 
Dicey's description of, 501, 513 ; 
habits of work, etc., 501 ; dic- 
tates his despatches after 1865, 



INDEX 



502; some peculiarities of his 
despatches, 502 ff. ; their popular 
and showy character, 502-504 ; 
some advantages of these quali- 
ties, 504, 505 ; his optimism, 506; 
his prophecy that all would he 
over in sixty or ninety days, 506 ; 
some inconsistencies, especially 
about Confederate belligerency, 
etc., 507-509 ; his hospitalities, 
etc., 509, 510; as a talker, 511, 
512; value of his social quali- 
ties, 512. 

Last years. — Some conclusions. — His 
fame abroad, 514, 515; trip to 
Alaska, 516-518; speech about 
Alaska's resources, 518; in Mex- 
ico, 519-521; welcomed home, 
521 ; trip around the world, 521- 
523; return to Auburn, 523; 
physical condition and final oc- 
cupations, 524, 525; non-partisan, 
525 ; favors re-election of Grant, 
525; death, 526. Some conclu- 
sions from his career, 526-529. 

Seward, William Heury, Jr., i., 
203. 

Seymour, Horatio, Democratic 
presidential candidate, 1868, ii., 
467. 

Shenandoah, the, ii., 385. 

Sherman, John, election as Speak- 
er hotly opposed, i., 504 ; with- 
draws in favor of Pennington, 
505; sarcasm about Buchauau, 
ii., 5. 

Sherman, William Tecumseh, 
marches through Georgia, ii., 
405, 407, 410. 

" Shin-plasters," i., 60. 

Ship subsidies, King on, ii., 61 ; 
Collins's agreement, 62; Hunter 
on, 62 ; Seward on, 62-66. 

" Silver Grays," i., 292. 

Slave code in Kansas, i., 384, 385. 

Slavery, i., Clay on, 227-231 ; Davis 
on, 232, 233 ; Calhoun on, 234- 
236 ; Webster on, 237-239 ; Sum- 
ner on, 506, 507 ; Lovejov on, 
506. 



Slavery and foreign relations, ii., 
317-348. 

Slavery iu the territories, i., 207- 
211 ; question reviewed, 222- 
226 ; considered settled, 286. 

Slave-trade, suggested treaty for 
the suppression of, ii., 343, 344 ; 
treaty against, 344, 345. 

Slidell, John, i., 334; ii., 212; 
successfully runs the blockade, 
213; in Trent affair, 223; im- 
prisoned, 223 ; why hated by 
the North, 227, 228; released, 
245 ; authorized to negotiate 
treaty with France, 290 ; unoffi- 
cial meetings with Thouveuel 
and interview with Napoleon, 
291, 292 ; presents formal re- 
quest for recognition of Confed- 
eracy by France, 293 ; no formal 
reply, 293, 294 ; second inter- 
view with Napoleon, 305 ; on 
French opinion of slavery, 330, 
331. 

Smith, Caleb B., ii., 41 ; opinion, 
regarding Fort Sumter, 105. 

Smith, Gerrit, i., 69. 

Smith, Goldwin, ii., 511 ; on Sew- 
ard's freedom of expression and 
fondness for a paradox iu private 
conversation, 511 n. 

Smith, Kirby, ii., 296. 

Soule, Pierre, i., 212 ; denounces 
peon slavery, 273; appointed 
Minister to Spain, 470 ; receives 
instructions concerning Cuba, 
471 ; associates with Madrid 
revolutionists, 471 ; instructed 
to meet Mason and Buchanan 
iu reference to Cuba, 471 ; dis- 
appointing instructions to, 472 ; 
resignation of, 472. 

South Carolina, ordinance of se- 
cession, ii., 6. 

Spain, considers intervention in 
Mexico, ii., 134. 

Spectator, London, on preliminary 
proclamation, ii., 339, 340. 

Speed, James, ii., 458. 

Spencer, John C, i., 38 ; president 



573 



INDEX 



of first national convention to 
nominate presidential candi- 
date, 48 ; reports on the New 
York schools, 99. 

Spencer, Joshua A., i., 113. 

Spoils system, i., 78-85. 

Stanley, Lord, replies to Seward, 
ii., 495, 496. 

Stanley, Marcus C, political pris- 
oner, ii., 269, 270. 

Stanton, Edwin M., order of Feb- 
ruary 14, 1862, ii., 257 n. ; efforts 
to counteract failure of McClel- 
lan's Peninsular campaigu, 352; 
difficulties with Johnson, 466. 

Stanton, F. P., i., 440, 441, 443. 

State, Department of, ii., 151, 152 ; 
foreign diplomatic service, 152- 
154. 

State disunion convention, call for, 
i., 434. 

Stephens, Alexander H., regrets 
the President's policy, i., 223 ; 
at Hampton Roads conference, 
ii., 411-414. 

Stevens, Thaddeus, ii., 358. 

Stewart, Alvau, i., 139. 

Stilwell, charged with plagiarism, 
i., 55. 

Stoeckl, Edward de, ii., 117 ; efforts 
to act the part of peacemaker, 
135 ii.', notified by Seward that 
Barnwell's exequatur would be 
revoked, 203; part in the sale of 
Alaska, 474-477. 

Summers, George W., ii., 103, 120. 

Sumner, Charles, i., 298; moves 
repeal of fugitive-slave law, 307 ; 
Missouri compromise to be re- 
spected in Nebraska's constitu- 
tion, 337; speech against slavery, 
410; attacked by Preston S. 
Brooks, 411; proceedings in the 
Senate thereon, 411-415; com- 
ments on Seward's speech of Jan- 
nary 31, 1856, 489; "The Barbar- 
ism of Slavery," 505, 506; on 
principles vs. forts, ii., 12; ad- 
vice on Trent affair, 229, 236 n. ; 
attends Cabinet conference on 



Trent affair, 235 ; Seward's sever- 
est critic in diplomacy and on 
slavery question, 365; opposes 
issuiug letters of marque, 391 ; 
champions purchase of Alaska, 
478; his caveat as to territorial 
expansion, 478 n. 
Sumter, the, its record, ii., 382. 

Tallmadge, Nathaniel P., i., 37 ; 
replies to Seward's speech on 
Bank of the United States, 42; 
writes to Seward deprecating 
delay, ii., 255 n. 

Taney, Roger B., issues writ of 
habeas coitus for Merryman, ii., 
256; opinion in Merryman case, 
257. 

Tariff on iron imported for rails, 
Mason on, ii., 47; Douglas on, 
47; Halo on, 47, 48 ; Seward on, 
48. 

Taylor, Zachary, i., 155-159; Whig 
presidential nominee, 159; pre- 
vents expedition against Cuba, 
218; presidential policy, 270- 
272 ; death, 278. 

Tehuantepec, proposed route 
through, i., 478-482. 

Tenure-of-orfico act, ii., 464, 465. 

Texas question, i., 143-149, 155. 

Thomas, Lorenzo, ii., 466. 

Thouveuel, Edouard A., ii., 164 ; 
declares right of de facto govern- 
ments to recognition, 168 ; condi- 
tions upon which France would 
sign the convention with the 
United States, 191 ; on Trent 
affair, 231 ; instructions to Mer- 
cier on Trent affair, 235, 282; on 
cotton famine, 285 ; " Union 
could not be restored," 305 ; 
succeeded by Drouyn de Lhuys, 
307. 

Throop, Judge, i., 27 ; defeats 
Granger, 35; approves abolition 
of imprisonment for debt, 46. 
j Times, London, on Trent affair, 
I ii., 224. 

Times, New York, ii., 121, 122 ; on 
74 



INDEX 



the Trent affair, 227; ou block- 
ade by stone -fleet, 232; calls 
for a new Cabinet, 364 ; on Sew- 
ard's relations with Lincoln, 367 
n., 363 n. 

Tompkins, Daniel D., i., 6. 

Toombs, Robert, i., 333, 334; com- 
ments ou Seward, ii., 119 ; su- 
premacy of Confederate laws, 
120; instructions to commis- 
sioners to Europe, 165 ; real mo- 
tive actuating Lincoln and his 
adherents, 320. 

Toucey, Isaac, " supplemental fu- 
gitive-slave law," i., 379. 

Tracy, Albert H., i., 33. 

Tracy, John, i., 54. 

Trent affair, the, ii., 223-253 ; in- 
dignation in England over, 224 ; 
opinions on — Loudon Titties, 224; 
Palmerston, 226 ; Russell, 226 ; 
Confederates, 227 ; New York 
Times, 227 ; Sumner, 229 ; Ewing, 
229; Cass, 229; Walker, 229, 
230; Curtis, 230; Adams, 230; 
Dayton, 230, 231; Thouvenel, 
231 ; Bigelow, 231 ; Weed, 231 
and n. ; Blair, 232; Hale, 236. 

Trescot, William Henry, ii., 197- 
199; on Seward's friendliness 
toward ex-Confederates, 448. 

Tribune, New York, i., 76 ; on right 
of revolution, ii., 4, 123; ou Sew- 
ard's course iu Trent affair, 243, 
244 ; attacks Seward on account 
of Mercier incident, 372. 

Trumbull, Lyman, ii., 122. 

Tyler, John, i., 113, 114 ; ii., 22. 

" Uncle Tom's Cabin," i., 363. 
Union " worth a contest with 

the -world iu arms," ii., 164. 
Union College, i., 4. 
Unionists, southern, condition of 

their loyalty, ii., 120, 421. 

Van Buren, Martin, i., 6; plans 
for the presidency, 15 ; urges 
sub-treasury plan, 61 ; approves 
course of New York in McLeod 



incident, 112 ; opposed to annex- 
ation of Texas, 144 ; Free-Soil 
presidential nominee, 160. 

Van Dorn, Earl, ii., 296, 305. 

Victor Emanuel, ii., 76. 

Victoria, Queen, ii., 75 ; Russell's 
ultimatum iu Trent aifair modi- 
fied by, 226. 

Virginia convention, ii., 22. 

Virginia, vote of [assembly, ii., 32. 

Vogdes, Israel B., ii., 125, 126. 

Wade, Benjamin P., i., 297, 307, 
351, 413, 477. 

" Wakarusa war," i., 393-400. 

Wales, Prince of, tour of United 
States, ii., 154 ; reception and 
dinner to, 154. 

Walker, Robert J., territorial gov- 
ernor of Kansas, i., 440, 441 ; 
resignation of, 443 ; suggestions 
to Buchanan about foreign poli- 
cy, 472; ou Trent affair, ii.,229, 
230. 

Ward, John E., ii., 270, 271 and n. 

Ward, Samuel, ii., 26, 108 ; letter 
to Seward, Appendix K. 

Warehouse system, under tariffs 
of 1846 and 1857, ii., 50 ; Came- 
ron on, 50; King on, 50; Sum- 
ner on, 50; Seward's amend- 
ment to, 50. 

Washburn, of Wisconsin, resolu- 
tion against further purchases of 
territory, ii., 485. 

Washington, alarm iu, ii., 296, 297. 

Washington territory, petition as 
to Alaska, ii., 475. 

Webb, James Watson, i., 123-126, 
169, 465. 

Webster, Daniel, opiuion in Mc- 
Leod incident, i., 112 ; speech of 
March 7, 1850, 236-242 ; " finali- 
ty" resolution, 302 n., 303; in- 
dependent presidential candi- 
date, 306 ; compliments Seward 
ou fishery question speech, 331 
«.; death, 311. 

Weed, Thurlow, i., 30, 31 ; sketch 
of, 33, 39 ; regarded by the 



575 



INDEX 



Whigs as an impartial referee, 
63 ; by intrigue prevents repeal 
of " small-bill " law, 65 ; objects 
to resolution denouncing abo- 
litionists, 69 ; political motto, 
76; as journalist and politician, 
77 ; state printer, 81 ; the school 
question, 98, 99 ; conference 
with Seward on registration 
law, 117 ; regrets Seward's re- 
fusal to become candidate for 
nomination by the Whigs for 
vice-presidency, 141 ; selects 
Zachary Taylor for presidential 
candidate, 156-158 ; manages 
Seward's election to the Senate, 
170 ; helps to outwit Fillmore, 
214, 215 ; goes to Europe, 297 ; 
achieves Seward's re-election to 
the Senate, 376, 377 ; becomes 
manager of New York Republi- 
cans, 396; delegate to conven- 
tion, 458 ; described by Bowles, 
523 ; disappointment on account 
of Seward's defeat, 540 and n. * ; 
opinions as to compromise, ii., 
2, 3 ; relations with Seward as 
to compromise, 26-29 ; letters 
to Seward, 29 n., 30 n. ; goes to 
Springfield, 39 ; reports on de- 
termination to keep Seward out 
of the Cabinet, 42; goes abroad 
"as a volunteer," 221; on Trent 
affair, 231 and n. ; European ob- 
jection to stone-fleet a pretext, 
282, 233 ; on French sympathy, 
283 ; on iucreased army and 
navy, 284 ; warns Seward of 
cotton famine, 285, 286 ; on Sew- 



ard's reply, 314 ; estimate of 
Seward's despatch to Dayton, 
425. 

Welles, Gideon, ii., 41 ; opinion re- 
garding Fort Sumter, 105 ; says 
Seward recommends the Sumter 
question be referred to Scott, 
124, 125 ; Scott eager for a ves- 
sel to carry a despatch, 125 ; ac- 
cuses Seward, 144 ; some traits 
of, and his relations with Sew- 
ard, 354, 355 ; opposes issuing 
letters of marque, 391. 

Welling, James C, ii., 103. 

West Indies, sympathies of, dur- 
ing Civil War, ii., 479, 480. 

Whig party, i., 53 ; disaster of 
1841, 126-128; defeat of 1842, 
129 ; sorrow on account of 
Clay's defeat, 150 ; Seward's 
pledge to, ii., 85. 

" Wide- A wakes," i., 545. 

Wigwam, the, i., 531. 

Wilkes, Charles, overhauls the 
Trent, ii., 223 ; captures Mason 
and Slidell, 223 ; regarded as a 
hero, 228. 

" Wilmot proviso," i., 156. 

Winthrop, Robert C, ii., 221 ; con- 
gratulates Seward on course in 
Trent affair, 243. 

Working Men's party, i., 32. 

Wright, Silas, succeeds Marcy 
as United States Senator, i., 
74. 

Yancey, William L., ii., 165 ; 
traits of, 165, 166, 184 ; on En- 
glish opinion of slavery, 330. 



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